Disarmament of Population

[Strickland]

If security is truly the answer, and thus we cannot do anything else in Iraq until the security situation improves, why do police officials and city planners not feel the same way in the US?

In Compton, East St. Louis, SE D.C., South Philly, Harlem, etc., city planners and police officials routinely seek economic development and increased governance programs ahead of more cops, more cars, more guns, etc. Why? If the answer to solving the 18,000 homicides, and more than 100,000 attempted murders and homicides each year was simply more security through an increased presence, why havent we done it yet?

I believe that it is never too late to do the right thing, thus, disarmament needs to be part of the overall effort. I am not suggesting that we walk into Sadr City and say give up the only means you have for protection; however, I am suggesting that in cities such as Fallujah, where there are thousands of Iraqi Police and Military, it is possible.

[Jones_RE]

The widespread presence of small arms among the population is definitely causing some problems, but the fact is that no disarmament program undertaken in the current environment will successfully disarm:

1) Criminal gangs.
2) Sectarian militias.
3) Insurgent groups.

All three groups already hide their weapons (and appear to do so effectively because they are still operating), have intimidated or infiltrated Iraqi security forces to one degree or another, have connections with various foreign powers willing to supply them and are capable of engaging and defeating Iraqi, non-US/UK coalition and contractor security forces. That's four routes to obtain high quality small arms and ammunition.

Moreover, the insurgents base a lot of their effectiveness on fear and intimidation. For every gun they show on the street, they have twenty in the minds of the locals (and fifty in the minds of the media). Disarmament will not have an appreciable impact on the level of violence unless it can be carried out by honest, and fully professional Iraqi police and military forces. Currently, Iraqi police tend to be: incompetent, corrupt, cowardly, sectarian or insurgents. From the reports, sometimes they manage all five at once.

A small scale, targetted disarmament program might succeed at the local level. It would require a high concentration of US/UK forces and trustworthy Iraqi forces (both in short supply), as well as onerous movement and identity controls in the affected area. It would also require disarming Iraqi police and untrustworthy army units in the area, otherwise local bandits, militias and insurgents would be armed again in a matter of days.

[Strickland]

So, does a criminal enterprise truly need to possess guns, or just have a population intimidated to the point of thinking they do? I agree that the current situation is very difficult; however, i trust that no commander will simply accept the premise that the country is adrift in a sea of weapons, thus that there is nothing to do but try to steer a course through the storm. I would rather have a population living with irrational fears of highly armed gangs, than actually have the presence of highly armed gangs. I think it is worth further review.

[Jedburgh]

Much of this discussion so far has focused on Iraq, where disarmament efforts have been fleeting, dispersed and unfocused.

For a look at a (supposedly) cohesive country-wide targeted disarmament effort aimed at illegal groups, I'd be interested in hearing from anyone who has experience on the ground with the attempt to implement the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program in Afghanistan. DIAG falls under the purview of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, which is a joint effort between UNAMA and the UNDP, but I believe it is technically under the control of the Afghan government with aid from donor countries like Japan.

The official websites are full of press releases and stories that reflect positive progress. However, in an article posted at ISN on 16 May, Afghan Disarmament a Never-Ending Process, the author states that nearly a year after the effort began, there has been little real success.

...DIAG has three phases, the first of which was for commanders to disarm voluntarily, something that many of them did in the run-up to the parliamentary election last September. Retaining links with illegal armed groups was grounds for disqualification for potential candidates, so last summer saw a rush of former warlords trying to obtain the necessary certification that their arms had been handed in.

The second phase of DIAG involves asking local commanders to hand in their weapons. This program depends heavily on cooperation from the law enforcement agencies, since it is up to them to help DIAG officials locate arms caches and their owners.

“In order to collect arms, we really need the help of local police and national army,” said Nawzadi. If commanders fail to surrender their arms in response to official requests, DIAG will then disarm them by force...

DIAG is an extension of the DDR program, which is a wonderful concept, but, again, turned out not be very effective in its implementation. If there is anyone on the board, or reading the board, that has experience with DIAG, I would certainly be interested in hearing feedback.

As far as Iraq goes, there have been a number of efforts to control, license, restrict, and/or collect weapons since '03 - although there have been very limited localized effects, in all they have had no significant impact upon ops.

Strickland's statement about tying in any type of disarmament effort with economic development and improved governance is key. That is really where the DIAG program seems to be failing - on the economic development side. For a number of reasons economic development is also failing in Iraq - not the least of which is continued insurgent attacks upon economic infrastructure (which the media rarely mentions).

And what Shek said regarding incentives and alienation is spot-on. In Iraq, focusing forced disarmament only on certain Sunni towns, while putting them under the control of Iraq army units manned primarily by Shi'a and Kurds, will not help anything. There is already a great deal of Sunni resentment regarding the perceived lack of US control (or even perception of active US encouragement) of the Shi'a/Kurdish militias that feeds right into the insurgency. No need to stoke the fire for no real strategic benefit.

All this takes us around in a big circle. All the focused military and law enforcement efforts come to naught without concurrent improvements in the economic and political situation. The reverse is also true. Until we're able to truly fine-tune interagency ops in this odd fusion of a COIN/FID environment we're working in, we won't suceed. (...and even if we do everything perfectly, we still have to deal with the vagaries of the indig...)

[slapout9]

I was going to ask some more questions about IED's but alot has been posted since then. As a police officer here are a couple of things I noticed right off. You are not in control of your beat, nobody respects you, until this happens you have big problems. You are Army and Marine officers, when there is no law you are the law. You are "The Man" and you must act like it. The population is looking to you for that. If there is no law then make one, right then, right there. From this point forward Capt. whoever says this is what I expect. Then enforce it without fear or favor. The criminal/insurgent groups are testing you. Are you The Man or aren't you. If you don't pass the test the law of the street says you will be attacked. What you are experiencing is flat out basic criminal behavior. The population is alienated because you cain't protect them not because of your enforcement actions. Major Strickland is right!! security must come before all else. Until you have that forget about hearts and minds, no one will trust you or believe in you. In short disarm them first and be there friends second. Then civil programs can begin.

[Jedburgh]

As a police officer here are a couple of things I noticed right off. You are not in control of your beat, nobody respects you, until this happens you have big problems.

If you hadn't noticed, we haven't had the manpower in Iraq to "control the beat" from day one. And, given our current domestic political situation, we are never going to have that ability. So, in the meantime, the insurgency has risen, and we are trying to get the Iraqi military and security forces stood up under fire in order to gain that degree of control. It's a tough row to hoe.

But you can't put aside economic development until after total security has been established. Disruption of basic services, high unemployment and underemployment, wide gaps between salaries and the price of goods...all of these contribute directly to the security problem. It has nothing to do with "being friends" - it has everything to do with addressing root causes. When young men have meaningful educational and job opportunities, and the wherewithal to pursue them, they tend not to slip into criminal behavior.

It's the same thing here in the US, when you look at the demographics of criminals - sure, you'll have people from all walks of life committing a wide variety of crimes; but violent criminals tend to come from the wrong side of the tracks. If its only a security/LE issue, then why are we in the US exerting such a broad coordinated LE and social effort towards addressing the rise of violent youth gangs? And, from my perspective in having worked with a Joint Gang TF in central CA, the LE side of that equation is failing, and only the social efforts are having any real effect.

As I stated before, all the focused military and LE efforts come to naught without concurrent improvements in the economic and political situation. The reverse of that is that economic and political improvement cannot take place or be sustained in an unsecure and unstable environment. That all these elements must be addressed concurrently is the challenge of COIN, and, ultimately, the only effective path to success.

[SWJED]

21 May New York Times - Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Police by Michael Moss and David Rohde.

As chaos swept Iraq after the American invasion in 2003, the Pentagon began its effort to rebuild the Iraqi police with a mere dozen advisers. Overmatched from the start, one was sent to train a 4,000-officer unit to guard power plants and other utilities. A second to advise 500 commanders in Baghdad. Another to organize a border patrol for the entire country.

Three years later, the police are a battered and dysfunctional force that has helped bring Iraq to the brink of civil war. Police units stand accused of operating death squads for powerful political groups or simple profit. Citizens, deeply distrustful of the force, are setting up their own neighborhood security squads. Killings of police officers are rampant, with at least 547 slain this year, roughly as many as Iraqi and American soldiers combined, records show.

The police, initially envisioned by the Bush administration as a cornerstone in a new democracy, have instead become part of Iraq's grim constellation of shadowy commandos, ruthless political militias and other armed groups...