Much of this discussion so far has focused on Iraq, where disarmament efforts have been fleeting, dispersed and unfocused.

For a look at a (supposedly) cohesive country-wide targeted disarmament effort aimed at illegal groups, I'd be interested in hearing from anyone who has experience on the ground with the attempt to implement the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program in Afghanistan. DIAG falls under the purview of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, which is a joint effort between UNAMA and the UNDP, but I believe it is technically under the control of the Afghan government with aid from donor countries like Japan.

The official websites are full of press releases and stories that reflect positive progress. However, in an article posted at ISN on 16 May, Afghan Disarmament a Never-Ending Process, the author states that nearly a year after the effort began, there has been little real success.
...DIAG has three phases, the first of which was for commanders to disarm voluntarily, something that many of them did in the run-up to the parliamentary election last September. Retaining links with illegal armed groups was grounds for disqualification for potential candidates, so last summer saw a rush of former warlords trying to obtain the necessary certification that their arms had been handed in.

The second phase of DIAG involves asking local commanders to hand in their weapons. This program depends heavily on cooperation from the law enforcement agencies, since it is up to them to help DIAG officials locate arms caches and their owners.

“In order to collect arms, we really need the help of local police and national army,” said Nawzadi. If commanders fail to surrender their arms in response to official requests, DIAG will then disarm them by force...
DIAG is an extension of the DDR program, which is a wonderful concept, but, again, turned out not be very effective in its implementation. If there is anyone on the board, or reading the board, that has experience with DIAG, I would certainly be interested in hearing feedback.

As far as Iraq goes, there have been a number of efforts to control, license, restrict, and/or collect weapons since '03 - although there have been very limited localized effects, in all they have had no significant impact upon ops.

Strickland's statement about tying in any type of disarmament effort with economic development and improved governance is key. That is really where the DIAG program seems to be failing - on the economic development side. For a number of reasons economic development is also failing in Iraq - not the least of which is continued insurgent attacks upon economic infrastructure (which the media rarely mentions).

And what Shek said regarding incentives and alienation is spot-on. In Iraq, focusing forced disarmament only on certain Sunni towns, while putting them under the control of Iraq army units manned primarily by Shi'a and Kurds, will not help anything. There is already a great deal of Sunni resentment regarding the perceived lack of US control (or even perception of active US encouragement) of the Shi'a/Kurdish militias that feeds right into the insurgency. No need to stoke the fire for no real strategic benefit.

All this takes us around in a big circle. All the focused military and law enforcement efforts come to naught without concurrent improvements in the economic and political situation. The reverse is also true. Until we're able to truly fine-tune interagency ops in this odd fusion of a COIN/FID environment we're working in, we won't suceed. (...and even if we do everything perfectly, we still have to deal with the vagaries of the indig...)