Iraqi SA = Secruity Agreement.... or Separation Agreement

[Team Infidel]

I have floated this theory around the office here in Iraq a bit and I think I have come up with a pretty solid argument. Right now the Security Agreement has mandated that we are out of cities, which we are, and that we are on the road to leaving Iraq. However, the understanding of the Security Agreement on our side is a bit hazy.

The security agreement is kind of like a separation agreement. Iraq and the U.S. have been married for going on 7 years now, and the relationship has hit a crossroads. Iraq wants a divorce. And like many divorces, a separation agreement is first enacted. During this separation you are supposed to be moving out of the house that you occupied for all of those years. You divide the property, figure out who gets the kids and what type of support you have to pay the other. We (US) should be doing that, however, we aren’t. We are being told to aggressively partner with our Iraqi counterparts. Senior leaders are trying to keep their foot in the door as to not want this relationship to end.

Tell me…. If you are in the middle of a divorce, do you try and “aggressively partner” with your ex? Only if you are drunk or stupid. If you are in the middle of a divorce, you are trying to move on with your life. You want to be independent, regardless of how the ex feels. Sound familiar?

The GoI does not want us around anymore. They have made that publically known, yet we continue to push. The divorce date has been set…31Dec11, but we haven’t even moved out of the house yet.

Like a divorce, this can go one of two ways. Either we agree to move on and maintain a friendship, or we try and “aggressively partner” and screw up any enduring friendship we would hope to have. Either way, they will get half our stuff and we still have to move out.

The Iraqi’s are sovereign, regardless of our definition of how WE think things should go. It’s their show and it is time for us to move out.

I recently read the article by Jenkins entitled “The Unchangeable War”, Nov ’70. I replaced the word Vietnam with Iraq, and saw some eerie similarities.

Time to come home. We did our duty. Senior leaders need to let go and allow the Iraqis to run the show. If they need our help, they will let us know. So far…. they haven’t called.

[Courtney Massengale]

This only works if you make the assumption that the GoI is interchangeable with the will of the people of Iraq.

The GoI, and in particular certain individuals within the GoI who are up for reelection in January, want us gone in order to bolster their own power base. The majority of Iraqis want us to have a larger role than what the GoI is limiting us to. As one of our translators said "The only people who are happy about the pullout are the criminals".

An “enduring friendship” is not going to be build on the backs of local politicians who play to their base. I feel we want and need to “aggressively partner” with the people in the GoI who can see the bigger picture (ie beyond January’s elections). Iraq will emerge as a regional power, they will need foreign support (economic, diplomatic, military and industrial) and forsaking the United States in the short term will only prolong the transition.

[jmm99]

From the NY Times, Time to Go Home:

U.S. Adviser’s Blunt Memo on Iraq: Time ‘to Go Home’
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: July 30, 2009

WASHINGTON — A senior American military adviser in Baghdad has concluded in an unusually blunt memo that the Iraqi forces suffer from deeply entrenched deficiencies but are now capable of protecting the Iraqi government, and that it is time “for the U.S. to declare victory and go home.”

Prepared by Col. Timothy R. Reese, an adviser to the Iraqi military’s Baghdad command, the memorandum asserts that the Iraqi forces have an array of problems, including corruption, poor management and the inability to resist political pressure from Shiite political parties.

For all of these problems, however, Colonel Reese argues that Iraqi forces are competent enough to hold off Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias and other internal threats to the Iraqi government. Extending the American military presence in Iraq beyond 2010, he argues, will do little to improve the Iraqis’ military performance while fueling a growing resentment. ....

Full Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo.

[Rex Brynen]

Note the forthcoming USIP discussion on Withdrawing from Iraq, which I've posted in another thread here.

[jmm99]

in NYT Blog, by: Kori Schake, U.S. Military Academy professor; John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Douglas Macgregor, retired colonel and author; Jonathan Morgenstein, captain, Marine Corps Reserves; Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations; Thomas E. Ricks, author.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Iraq is a bit new to me as I have only been on the ground here a few weeks and the last time I was here was 2004 so I am really NOT writing from my vast experience ... however as that has never stopped me before...

1. It would appear to me the we (both the Americans and the Iraqis) have placed the GoI in an awkward position. After the SA, culturally speaking, the GoI and its related politicians MUST be in charge. Any weakness or perceived weakness is an opening for an opponent. The appearance of power is almost more important than actually having power. Regardless of whether they want help or not, they will be very slow in asking for it (at least in any public fashion). Certainly not where it comes to security. It might have been better if the agreement took effect AFTER the fall/winter elections.

2. We only stand to lose political ground by engaging in direct actions. Everything we do now has to be very closely vetted for political impact. This is where IO really needs to be the focus of the targeting meetings. Even though we are technically only a supporting element. The "awe ####s" are going to stand out much more than the "atta boys".

3. We (the military) can still have an impact in shaping the IA, but more in the CS and CSS arenas. This is probably where we will get the biggest bang for the buck over the next year (and hopefully into the next few years).

4. We are going to have to accept, like the letter says, that what results from our efforts will not be a "mini me". Iraq is not America. The society and culture are markedly different. The GoI and the IA will have their own local flavor. We will have to "get over it" and work towards building a long term relationship with a potential strategic partner.

5. Dovetailing into the last comment, we will need to restrain ourselves in telling our hosts how they need to do things or what they need to do except when we are asked. We especially have to restrain the overzealous commander looking to fix all the IA's problems for them.

I had some other thoughts but I forgot them.