Iraqi SA = Secruity Agreement.... or Separation Agreement

[Courtney Massengale]

This only works if you make the assumption that the GoI is interchangeable with the will of the people of Iraq.

The GoI, and in particular certain individuals within the GoI who are up for reelection in January, want us gone in order to bolster their own power base. The majority of Iraqis want us to have a larger role than what the GoI is limiting us to. As one of our translators said "The only people who are happy about the pullout are the criminals".

An “enduring friendship” is not going to be build on the backs of local politicians who play to their base. I feel we want and need to “aggressively partner” with the people in the GoI who can see the bigger picture (ie beyond January’s elections). Iraq will emerge as a regional power, they will need foreign support (economic, diplomatic, military and industrial) and forsaking the United States in the short term will only prolong the transition.

[jmm99]

From the NY Times, Time to Go Home:

U.S. Adviser’s Blunt Memo on Iraq: Time ‘to Go Home’
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: July 30, 2009

WASHINGTON — A senior American military adviser in Baghdad has concluded in an unusually blunt memo that the Iraqi forces suffer from deeply entrenched deficiencies but are now capable of protecting the Iraqi government, and that it is time “for the U.S. to declare victory and go home.”

Prepared by Col. Timothy R. Reese, an adviser to the Iraqi military’s Baghdad command, the memorandum asserts that the Iraqi forces have an array of problems, including corruption, poor management and the inability to resist political pressure from Shiite political parties.

For all of these problems, however, Colonel Reese argues that Iraqi forces are competent enough to hold off Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias and other internal threats to the Iraqi government. Extending the American military presence in Iraq beyond 2010, he argues, will do little to improve the Iraqis’ military performance while fueling a growing resentment. ....

Full Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo.

[Rex Brynen]

Note the forthcoming USIP discussion on Withdrawing from Iraq, which I've posted in another thread here.

[jmm99]

in NYT Blog, by: Kori Schake, U.S. Military Academy professor; John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Douglas Macgregor, retired colonel and author; Jonathan Morgenstein, captain, Marine Corps Reserves; Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations; Thomas E. Ricks, author.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Iraq is a bit new to me as I have only been on the ground here a few weeks and the last time I was here was 2004 so I am really NOT writing from my vast experience ... however as that has never stopped me before...

1. It would appear to me the we (both the Americans and the Iraqis) have placed the GoI in an awkward position. After the SA, culturally speaking, the GoI and its related politicians MUST be in charge. Any weakness or perceived weakness is an opening for an opponent. The appearance of power is almost more important than actually having power. Regardless of whether they want help or not, they will be very slow in asking for it (at least in any public fashion). Certainly not where it comes to security. It might have been better if the agreement took effect AFTER the fall/winter elections.

2. We only stand to lose political ground by engaging in direct actions. Everything we do now has to be very closely vetted for political impact. This is where IO really needs to be the focus of the targeting meetings. Even though we are technically only a supporting element. The "awe ####s" are going to stand out much more than the "atta boys".

3. We (the military) can still have an impact in shaping the IA, but more in the CS and CSS arenas. This is probably where we will get the biggest bang for the buck over the next year (and hopefully into the next few years).

4. We are going to have to accept, like the letter says, that what results from our efforts will not be a "mini me". Iraq is not America. The society and culture are markedly different. The GoI and the IA will have their own local flavor. We will have to "get over it" and work towards building a long term relationship with a potential strategic partner.

5. Dovetailing into the last comment, we will need to restrain ourselves in telling our hosts how they need to do things or what they need to do except when we are asked. We especially have to restrain the overzealous commander looking to fix all the IA's problems for them.

I had some other thoughts but I forgot them.

[Courtney Massengale]

1. It would appear to me the we (both the Americans and the Iraqis) have placed the GoI in an awkward position. After the SA, culturally speaking, the GoI and its related politicians MUST be in charge. Any weakness or perceived weakness is an opening for an opponent. The appearance of power is almost more important than actually having power. Regardless of whether they want help or not, they will be very slow in asking for it (at least in any public fashion). Certainly not where it comes to security. It might have been better if the agreement took effect AFTER the fall/winter elections.

Not trying to snipe or beat a dead horse, but this line of thinking fails to separate a government from its politicians.

If we try to shape our operations and agreements to accommodate select individuals within the GoI rather than do what is necessary to support a bilateral agreement between two sovereign nations, we're pandering.

Setting the withdrawal date after the elections and drawing down our forces WITHOUT allowing for the current GoI to be tested would be a gigantic disservice to the people of Iraq. They need to see and experience what their politicians are and are not doing for them. If the people of Iraq feel that the current policies are not providing the stability they need, they have the option to voice that opinion at the polls.

To put a different spin on it, the GoI isn't a uniform entity. At some point, a plurality of ISF will be ready to do their mission without us. Do we wait until that plurality becomes a majority? Do we hold back the progress that some are making until all are at the same level? We’re doing a greater disservice in some very critical areas by staying around.

[Team Infidel]

I believe that the GoI is as good now as it will be. The marginalization of U.S. Forces is pretty strong. We don't know what the Iraqis want at the CORPS and FORCE level of planning because they don't attend our meeting. Meanwhile, we continue to plan bilateral efforts without any Iraqi buyin. How can we do this and be successful in our partnership? How hard would it be for an Iraqi planner to sit in with our planning teams and tell us how we can support them? So we continue for hours and hours in our OPTs and JPTs planning blind. Does that make ANY sense? Really... does it?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Not trying to snipe or beat a dead horse, but this line of thinking fails to separate a government from its politicians.

No, my comment was not intended for any particular politician. It was intended for any government in power at the time. I don't believe that any politician currently in office and looking towards an upcoming election can be seen as weak. Because of that they will not seek nor accept US military assistance. To me it is more of a question of overall culture rather than particular personality.

"I against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I against the world" goes the old Arabic saying. Not really a lot of room in that philosophy for partnership or asking for help.

I am new here so I may be misreading what I am seeing. What I see is a Government and an Army made up of a very proud and headstrong people who no longer want our help. Probably never really did except where it does not make them appear incapable of handling things themselves. They want to stand or fall on their own.

What I hope is still possible is a strategic partnership that allow us to keep forces in the region.

[Entropy]

Iraq is a bit new to me as I have only been on the ground here a few weeks and the last time I was here was 2004 so I am really NOT writing from my vast experience ... however as that has never stopped me before...

I like all your points here. Well said and concise!