Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

[rborum]

Gumz does thank his Department in the acknowledgement, but does not mention COL/Dr. Gentile by name.

[Van]

Did Gumz address the impact of widespread, instantaneous, personal communications and the absolute (and often asinine) democratization of media?

Did he talk about virtual sanctuaries in addition to the classic geographical sanctuaries?

Did he address globalization of insurgent movements enabled by contemporary transportation networks?

Did he address the impact of the rise of social sciences and their subsequent corruption by political activists?

Did he address the differences between classic cell structured organizations and contemporary viral or distributed organizations?

If he failed to address these points, he missed the impact of the second half of the XXth Century on Small Wars (insurgency, irregular warfare, LIC, etc. - pick your buzz word). I'm all about historical-mindedness, but historical models have limits. I would argue that Gumz is being excessively reactionary and conservative in response to the "revisionist" young firebrands. The young guns can be seen as 'cherry-picking' history, but given the dynamics that are present in the world, we have to. No classic model or example comprehensively integrates the factors that shape the current environment.

[Ken White]

If he failed to address these points, he missed the impact of the second half of the XXth Century on Small Wars (insurgency, irregular warfare, LIC, etc. - pick your buzz word). I'm all about historical-mindedness, but historical models have limits. I would argue that Gumz is being excessively reactionary and conservative in response to the "revisionist" young firebrands...

However I thought he was using history to show that many of today's adaptations of 'history' are flawed -- thus he would seem to agree with you to this point:

The young guns can be seen as 'cherry-picking' history...

As do I agree. However, on this:

:...but given the dynamics that are present in the world, we have to. No classic model or example comprehensively integrates the factors that shape the current environment.

I disagree and Professor Gumz seems to as well.

I agree that no prior example can provide a road map to integrate factors and shape the current environment. However, those young guns you cite are picking some elements of previous insurgencies and attempting to produce such a map. They're highly likely to err due to the factors you cited and a few others applied to an out of date datum for their map. I would in fact submit they have already done so. Err, that is...

You may recall that three years ago I was trying to slow down Gian -- I owe him an apology, he was closer to it than I was and picked up on it before I did. The COINistas are dangerous not least because they are selectively misapplying history. They mean well. But...

One of the things I discovered in seven years in TRADOC and a few more in FORSCOM was that there are almost no new thoughts in our doctrine -- the operational rule in the vast majority of training and doctrinal publication writing was to cut and paste the maximum amount. I would like to believe that is changing but my copies of FMs 3-0, 3-0.1, 3.07, 3-07.1, 3-21-75, 3-24 and a few others lead me to believe not much has changed.

I knew one LTC whose favorite technique was to cut paragraphs out of an existing document, rewrite them in longhand on a legal pad and paste the result in the appropriate location for a 'draft' approval before they went of to the typing pool. It worked. Too well...

Everyone wants a checklist, makes life simple, don't have to think too hard and if you follow the checklist, no matter how badly you foul up, you get over because you did follow it. Regrettably, warfare can have no realistic checklist...

History has much to teach and we should pay more attention to it than we do but warfighting, while subject to historical precepts and some constants is not politics or a social science project -- if you get it wrong, people get killed, therefor you have an obligation to approach it with an open mind and a willingness, even an eagerness, to adapt and succeed. Trying things that worked elsewhere under very different conditions -- and with bureaucratically added restrictions that also significantly impact conditions in comparison to past wars -- is what we've been at for the last eight years. How has that worked out for us?

Every war is different.

[William F. Owen]

Did Gumz address the impact of widespread, instantaneous, personal communications and the absolute (and often asinine) democratization of media?

Did he talk about virtual sanctuaries in addition to the classic geographical sanctuaries?

Did he address globalization of insurgent movements enabled by contemporary transportation networks?

Did he address the impact of the rise of social sciences and their subsequent corruption by political activists?

Did he address the differences between classic cell structured organizations and contemporary viral or distributed organizations?

OK, but do any of things pass the "so what test" of operational relevance. Some of those things are not new. All those things may be true, but do they actually have the impact that the "Nouveau-COIN" say they do? Kilcullen goes on about Globalisation. Colin Gray convincingly argues it's irrelevant - and I agree with him. I'd say the same about the Internet. Have any of these things changed the nature of Political goals each side seeks to achieve? If no, then they have little or no military impact.

The "Nouveau-COIN," is like the MW crowd, they don't just cherry pick, but they are also generally poor military historians, in that they assume there is something distinct called "Counter-insurgency," -which you can study in isolation, and that from that you can develop "COIN Theories."

The worst thing they try to tell you is that military force isn't the primary method by which insurgencies are defeated, and as evidence cite cases where military force was stupidly or badly applied, or ignore and denigrate it's absolute necessity in creating the conditions where the political solution could be achieved - so none of them read Clausewitz either.
From this we see, in the last 7 years, is body of literature emerging , that says nothing new or insightful, about so called "counter-insurgency."

As Ken says "Every War is Different," and in unanimous agreement with that, I say "War is War."

[Tom Odom]

The "Nouveau-COIN," is like the MW crowd, they don't just cherry pick, but they are also generally poor military historians, in that they assume there is something distinct called "Counter-insurgency," -which you can study in isolation, and that from that you can develop "COIN Theories."

The worst thing they try to tell you is that military force isn't the primary method by which insurgencies are defeated, and as evidence cite cases where military force was stupidly or badly applied, or ignore and denigrate it's absolute necessity in creating the conditions where the political solution could be achieved - so none of them read Clausewitz either.
From this we see, in the last 7 years, is body of literature emerging , that says nothing new or insightful, about so called "counter-insurgency."

Once again Wilf you jump on the same soap box and start the "they" and "Nouveau COIN" labeling in the interest of bludgeoning anyone who might have a different idea than you or your near idolic worship of CvC.

Careful reading of Kilcullen, Nagl etc does not state that COIN is won without force; they do state that COIN campaigns are lost by an overapplication of force. That I definitely agree with and have watched it happend from the ground.

As for assuming that you can study COIN as a distinct element in warfare, perhaps. It is part of a spectrum of operations and as such boundaries are unclear. That I would say is better than ignoring it or worse banning it as a subject to consider.

Is all the scholarship of the past 7 years wasted? Hardly and as for the good professor, his own assumptions are equally glaring.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Once again Wilf you jump on the same soap box and start the "they" and "Nouveau COIN" labeling in the interest of bludgeoning anyone who might have a different idea than you or your near idolic worship of CvC.

...and once again we are back into this!
I fail to see how attempting to clearly state my case counts as "bludgeoning," or being consistent counts as a soap box. I would have thought it entirely normal that I should seek to argue against ideas I see as unhelpful or poorly presented.
"Nouveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, and not necessarily people. I don't worship CvC. I merely suggest folks would benefit from the insights he gives, and revisit some of their ideas in that light. I am no more wedded to CvC than most Physicist are to Newton - and merely because of the subject matter, War.

Careful reading of Kilcullen, Nagl etc does not state that COIN is won without force; they do state that COIN campaigns are lost by an overapplication of force. That I definitely agree with and have watched it happend from the ground.

I would agree with 100%. They are correct, and that observation is at least 60 years old. My concern are the statements such as

• "80% Political. 20% military" -
• "Can't kill or capture your way to success" -
• "COIN is armed social work" -
• "You out govern. You don't out fight."

Those are the simplistic, context free, and misleading ideas I seek to challenge.

As for assuming that you can study COIN as a distinct element in warfare, perhaps. It is part of a spectrum of operations and as such boundaries are unclear. That I would say is better than ignoring it or worse banning it as a subject to consider.

I grew up in an Army doing COIN and with a strong COIN tradition. My grandfather did COIN Operations. At no time have I ever suggested it should be ignored. Quite the opposite. I consider "COIN" as what armies mostly do, which is why the "woolly thinking" is so dangerous. Insurgencies should be studied, but that is very different from creating a distinct field of military study, which holds "COIN" to be a distinct and unique military problem.

Is all the scholarship of the past 7 years wasted? Hardly and as for the good professor, his own assumptions are equally glaring.

I don't have a problem with the scholarship. It's the agendas and the ideas that the instances of poor scholar ship has spawned.
To whit, what great insights have we gained, that did not exist already?

[William F. Owen]

How they communicate that objective to a wider audience has changed. How they utilize technology and exploit our so called 'globalized' world has changed. However, wars natural laws of cause (politics) and effect (violence) and the regulating principles that go to make up its objective and subjective character have not changed.

I concur, but while forms of communication have changed, all the "big ideas" such as Protestantism, Communism, and various forms of political Islam all spread via word of mouth. National Socialism, used radio as a mass communication medium, but by the time it did, it already had power.
The original forms of Zionism were spread entirely by word of mouth, world wide. The modern state of Israel was established, via word of mouth.
OK, the Rwandan Genocide used the radio. Possible via word of mouth? Many genocide's were.

The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict.

[Taiko]

Gumz argues that "the appearance of insurgency was linked to the breakdown of bracketed conflict and with it the jus publicum Europaeum at the advent of the early twentieth century....Only with the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe did insurgency assume an increasingly prominent position in war. ... Insurgency’s appearance has less to do with technological changes or advancing stages of war than with normative changes in war’s boundaries."

One could argue the same for conventional war when comparing the cabinet wars of the Monarchists to the revolutionary wars of Napoleon in the 18/19th century. I think its a dangerous game to place any 'normative boundaries' on war. Simply because war is a duel between two or more opponents who will adapt or adjust in order to achieve military victory and meet their political objective. Napoleon exploited the norms of the previous cabinet wars by a using a broadsword instead of a dress rapier, with startling results.

[slapout9]

I actually started a thread similar to this back in December 2006"Title was Is Everybody Wrong" based on an old article from Military Review about how some COIN Cannot be won link to thread and article is below.



http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=wrong

[Tom Odom]

...and once again we are back into this!
I fail to see how attempting to clearly state my case counts as "bludgeoning," or being consistent counts as a soap box. I would have thought it entirely normal that I should seek to argue against ideas I see as unhelpful or poorly presented.

Consistently on the soap box is a good description. And once again I will respond to the same labels until you go beyond mere labeling. This is a discussion board and discussion is based on full thoughts.

"Nouveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, and not necessarily people. I don't worship CvC. I merely suggest folks would benefit from the insights he gives, and revisit some of their ideas in that light. I am no more wedded to CvC than most Physicist are to Newton - and merely because of the subject matter, War....

If "Noveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, who then presents that set that you so often rail against? If no one, then against whom are you arguing?

As for the simple ideas that bother you,

"80% Political. 20% military" -

Actually fairly accurate depending on the war and the situation if applied with thinking.

"Can't kill or capture your way to success" -

True unless you are prepared to kill them all.

"COIN is armed social work" -

As a metaphor, not bad. Oversimplified and therefore used as a substitute for thought--rather like "war is war" in that regard.

"You out govern. You don't out fight."

Again fairly accurate depending on the conflict. Without addressing underlying causes and absent scorched earth tactics, the failure to adress reasons for a conflict extends it.

If these ideas are offered as a cautionary note in the interest of more study, I applaud their use. If they are simply bumper stickers, then I would agree with your concerns. But I do not agree there is a COIN cabal, mafia, or whatever that is determined to kill all other ideas regarding war in a broader sense. There was, however, a very real conventional school of thought that tried and succeeded in the main force to stamp out any consideration of COIN.

I consider "COIN" as what armies mostly do, which is why the "woolly thinking" is so dangerous. Insurgencies should be studied, but that is very different from creating a distinct field of military study, which holds "COIN" to be a distinct and unique military problem.

Again if you do not study COIN as a somewhat separate field, then those who would ignore it will do so by banning its study.

I grew up in an Army doing COIN and with a strong COIN tradition.

I also grew up in an Army doing COIN with a strong COIN tradition. But that Army's senior leaders did its best to ignore the tradition until forced to face its demands. Even as the Army was involved in COIN in central America in the 1980s, the institution maintained intellectual blinders to that fact and wore them fairly religiously until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Even then many kept them on.

My grandfather did COIN Operations.

Good than he understood that it isn't simple. This is my third as a participant in one fashion or another. We do care what the populace thinks; we get our best information from them. That does not mean we bake cookies and send flowers to win their favor.

so none of them read Clausewitz either

The smartest guy in this realm I ever met is Paul Kagame. He has fought on both sides of the fence. He never mentioned CvC to me. Maybe he read CvC; he cared very much what the populace thought and he still does. He used all elements of persuasion to affect their thinking including lethal and non-lethal.

Tom

[Taiko]

The young guns can be seen as 'cherry-picking' history, but given the dynamics that are present in the world, we have to. No classic model or example comprehensively integrates the factors that shape the current environment.

As a 'young gun' who has very deep respect and appreciation of the classics: if CvC, Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli or Mao Tse-Tung did not say it then its not worth saying.

I would bet, CvC for example, would argue that technology is little more than an enabler that extends the strategist's understanding of the role of the laws of probability in military combat. It has to be taken into account, but it is not the dominating principle from which we can then argue that everything else, especially friction and fog, can be assumed away as an invalid element in the nature of war and its conduct. It is still humans that fight the wars, and it is still humans who articulate the political objectives which set the war into motion. How they communicate and exploit that objective to a wider audience has changed. How they utilize technology and exploit our so called 'globalized' world has changed. However, wars natural laws of cause (politics) and effect (violence) and the regulating principles that go to make up its objective and subjective character have not changed.

I am not saying that the various technological innovations and globalization are irrelevant. Far from it, they need to considered within a framework. I would be very confident to argue that all of the 'technological' innovations you have listed can be considered within the framework of what CvC called chance and probability. Technological shifts in warfare and the tools of war are constantly changing how we fight, not why we fight. There is little utility in trying to reinvent the wheel every time a 'buzz concept' comes into being.