Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

[Taiko]

Gumz argues that "the appearance of insurgency was linked to the breakdown of bracketed conflict and with it the jus publicum Europaeum at the advent of the early twentieth century....Only with the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe did insurgency assume an increasingly prominent position in war. ... Insurgency’s appearance has less to do with technological changes or advancing stages of war than with normative changes in war’s boundaries."

One could argue the same for conventional war when comparing the cabinet wars of the Monarchists to the revolutionary wars of Napoleon in the 18/19th century. I think its a dangerous game to place any 'normative boundaries' on war. Simply because war is a duel between two or more opponents who will adapt or adjust in order to achieve military victory and meet their political objective. Napoleon exploited the norms of the previous cabinet wars by a using a broadsword instead of a dress rapier, with startling results.

[slapout9]

I actually started a thread similar to this back in December 2006"Title was Is Everybody Wrong" based on an old article from Military Review about how some COIN Cannot be won link to thread and article is below.



http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=wrong

[Tom Odom]

...and once again we are back into this!
I fail to see how attempting to clearly state my case counts as "bludgeoning," or being consistent counts as a soap box. I would have thought it entirely normal that I should seek to argue against ideas I see as unhelpful or poorly presented.

Consistently on the soap box is a good description. And once again I will respond to the same labels until you go beyond mere labeling. This is a discussion board and discussion is based on full thoughts.

"Nouveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, and not necessarily people. I don't worship CvC. I merely suggest folks would benefit from the insights he gives, and revisit some of their ideas in that light. I am no more wedded to CvC than most Physicist are to Newton - and merely because of the subject matter, War....

If "Noveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, who then presents that set that you so often rail against? If no one, then against whom are you arguing?

As for the simple ideas that bother you,

"80% Political. 20% military" -

Actually fairly accurate depending on the war and the situation if applied with thinking.

"Can't kill or capture your way to success" -

True unless you are prepared to kill them all.

"COIN is armed social work" -

As a metaphor, not bad. Oversimplified and therefore used as a substitute for thought--rather like "war is war" in that regard.

"You out govern. You don't out fight."

Again fairly accurate depending on the conflict. Without addressing underlying causes and absent scorched earth tactics, the failure to adress reasons for a conflict extends it.

If these ideas are offered as a cautionary note in the interest of more study, I applaud their use. If they are simply bumper stickers, then I would agree with your concerns. But I do not agree there is a COIN cabal, mafia, or whatever that is determined to kill all other ideas regarding war in a broader sense. There was, however, a very real conventional school of thought that tried and succeeded in the main force to stamp out any consideration of COIN.

I consider "COIN" as what armies mostly do, which is why the "woolly thinking" is so dangerous. Insurgencies should be studied, but that is very different from creating a distinct field of military study, which holds "COIN" to be a distinct and unique military problem.

Again if you do not study COIN as a somewhat separate field, then those who would ignore it will do so by banning its study.

I grew up in an Army doing COIN and with a strong COIN tradition.

I also grew up in an Army doing COIN with a strong COIN tradition. But that Army's senior leaders did its best to ignore the tradition until forced to face its demands. Even as the Army was involved in COIN in central America in the 1980s, the institution maintained intellectual blinders to that fact and wore them fairly religiously until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Even then many kept them on.

My grandfather did COIN Operations.

Good than he understood that it isn't simple. This is my third as a participant in one fashion or another. We do care what the populace thinks; we get our best information from them. That does not mean we bake cookies and send flowers to win their favor.

so none of them read Clausewitz either

The smartest guy in this realm I ever met is Paul Kagame. He has fought on both sides of the fence. He never mentioned CvC to me. Maybe he read CvC; he cared very much what the populace thought and he still does. He used all elements of persuasion to affect their thinking including lethal and non-lethal.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Consistently on the soap box is a good description. And once again I will respond to the same labels until you go beyond mere labeling. This is a discussion board and discussion is based on full thoughts.

Well I guess I cannot and should not attempt to alter your perception. If for no other reason than I can learn from it. Anyhoo.... with the my best soap box forward.....

If "Noveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, who then presents that set that you so often rail against? If no one, then against whom are you arguing?

Well this may be me deferring to style rather than function. I don't have many problems with people. I have problems with ideas. I know a lot of smart and well intentioned guys, doing military thought and theory, but I don't agree with a great many of their ideas. Not just COIN either. I even go to at it, with Doug MacGregor once in a while.

As for the simple ideas that bother you,

"80% Political. 20% military" -
"Can't kill or capture your way to success" -
"COIN is armed social work" -
"You out govern. You don't out fight."

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

They may ameliorate the feelings that poorly reasoned military action made a very big mess and now someone has to clear it up, but none of those statements is the basis for an historically valid approach to defeating an insurgency, or a sound basis for the conduct of irregular warfare.

The smartest guy in this realm I ever met is Paul Kagame. He has fought on both sides of the fence. He never mentioned CvC to me. Maybe he read CvC; he cared very much what the populace thought and he still does. He used all elements of persuasion to affect their thinking including lethal and non-lethal.

I have met very, very few practitioners who have ever read Clausewitz. If they are effective practitioners, they probably should not bother. Moreover I do not thing it necessary that most Officers should actually read CvC.

However, if you want to use military history as a guide to the present and the future, and teach lessons derived from military history, then he is pretty much essential.

[Tom Odom]

Wilf

Good post.

One thing:

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

I will disagree--big surprise I know--for 2 reasons:

A. Primarily because I have seen those things apply in a non-NATO and non-US environment. By applying I mean applied by the government facing the insurgency.

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

Tom

[goesh]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

[Valin]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

The very fact that I'm sitting here in "beautiful scenic" South Minneapolis is proof that the Net has changed things.
People don't really change, but how they use technology, affects them and society in general....see the printing press

For the Jihadis this is definitely true. The Jihadi/Salafist forums have been a boon to providing a means of passing information...etc. and giving them a sense of community.

For more see
"The Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the Twenty-First Century"
Marc Sageman

"Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice"
Jarret M. Brachman

Available from all the usual sources

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

They may ameliorate the feelings that poorly reasoned military action made a very big mess and now someone has to clear it up, but none of those statements is the basis for an historically valid approach to defeating an insurgency, or a sound basis for the conduct of irregular warfare.

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

I agree with both of Tom's points here but, especially, his last one. I'm going to be getting up on my semantics soap box for a bit here .

Okay, some basic definitions: an insurgency is a political-military action against the "legitimate" government of a state or para-state (depends on how states are defined, but that's another discussion). We (NATO, etc.) are not conducting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (or Iraq) at present because we are not the legitimate government of either state.

The entire issue is muddied because in both cases the "legitimate" governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan were overthrown by foreign (NATO, MNF) conquest. This conquest and the following occupation then gave way to the creation of local governments more in line with those desired by the West, which have been "legitimated" by both international recognition and elections. This has created a situation were the legitimacy of these regimes may be questioned, in large part because a) they were imposed by foreigners and b) they have no longstanding "tradition" of legitimacy inside their respective states (NB: this second point marks a sharp disctinction against, say, the restoration of a previous regime).

A further complicating factor in these situations is that the foreign "invaders" really have no desire to stay there. Again, this marks a distinct difference with, say, the Colonial wars of the 19th century where the colonial powers often retained some components of local sovereignty. The closest historical analogs that I can think of off the top of my head are the post-WWII occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are some noatble differences.

All of this is a roundabout way of saying that I think the statement can give us some excellent insights into countering the current insurgencies. I do agree, however, that if taken as a truism, it is problematic.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

I cannot tell you, you are wrong. My father opined that television changed the way people spoke to each other and behaved in general, because people tend to mimic what they believe to be effective behaviours.
If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!

Wilf

Good post.

Thank you, and thanks for keeping me on my toes. Without some useful and constructive disagreement, this could turn into a bit of a "sausage-fest" ...as my wife so delicately puts it.

I will disagree--big surprise I know--for 2 reasons:

A. Primarily because I have seen those things apply in a non-NATO and non-US environment. By applying I mean applied by the government facing the insurgency.

So let's call the US NATO environment a critical context. Would the discussion be the same if the US was intervening at the request of a foreign government?

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

As the basis of a discussion, that may have some merit. Any thesis subjected to rigour, or argued against, is almost certainly useful. I am less convinced, when they are held to be the solution.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!

Okay....

On the printing press, consider the effect of cheap, mass produced copies of the Bible printed in the local languages. This invention led to massive increases spread of the breakup of the Roman Catholic hegemony in Western Europe during the late 15th through the end of the 17th centuries. It also directly led to an increase in the number of people involved in discussions surrounding science (with profound political implications), and the development of newspapers, broadsheets and yellow journalism that changed the nature of political debate, mobilization and control of political discourse. See, for example, Prophecy and Protest in Renaissance Italy.

On the political effects of radio, the telegraph and the telephone, see The Gutenburg Galaxy (Marshal McLuhan), The Soft Edge (Paul Levinson), and Technology in World Civilization (Arnold Pacey), Empire and Communications (Harold Inness), and Technology and Empire (George Grant) to name a few.

In (exceedingly) short form:

The telegraph extended basic written communications and, hence, the geographic span of control. This change specifically shifted how people reacted to central authorities, specifically decreasing the amount of local autonomy available. this allowed for the spread of a modern, centralized bureaucratic state organization, as well as producing a rapid spread of "news" over vast geographic areas 9thereby changing the content of local political discourse).

The radio, as a one-way communicative medium, greatly increased the centralizing power of state organizations through control of popular culture and political discourse. Consider, by way of example, the fact that almost all states moved rapidly to "license" radio broadcasting.

The telephone reconstructed two-way (or more) discussions at the local level but, also, increased the possibility of central control and monitoring, mainly in industries (Levinson's chapter on the telephone is quite interesting).

Cheers,

Marc