Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

[William F. Owen]

Consistently on the soap box is a good description. And once again I will respond to the same labels until you go beyond mere labeling. This is a discussion board and discussion is based on full thoughts.

Well I guess I cannot and should not attempt to alter your perception. If for no other reason than I can learn from it. Anyhoo.... with the my best soap box forward.....

If "Noveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, who then presents that set that you so often rail against? If no one, then against whom are you arguing?

Well this may be me deferring to style rather than function. I don't have many problems with people. I have problems with ideas. I know a lot of smart and well intentioned guys, doing military thought and theory, but I don't agree with a great many of their ideas. Not just COIN either. I even go to at it, with Doug MacGregor once in a while.

As for the simple ideas that bother you,

"80% Political. 20% military" -
"Can't kill or capture your way to success" -
"COIN is armed social work" -
"You out govern. You don't out fight."

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

They may ameliorate the feelings that poorly reasoned military action made a very big mess and now someone has to clear it up, but none of those statements is the basis for an historically valid approach to defeating an insurgency, or a sound basis for the conduct of irregular warfare.

The smartest guy in this realm I ever met is Paul Kagame. He has fought on both sides of the fence. He never mentioned CvC to me. Maybe he read CvC; he cared very much what the populace thought and he still does. He used all elements of persuasion to affect their thinking including lethal and non-lethal.

I have met very, very few practitioners who have ever read Clausewitz. If they are effective practitioners, they probably should not bother. Moreover I do not thing it necessary that most Officers should actually read CvC.

However, if you want to use military history as a guide to the present and the future, and teach lessons derived from military history, then he is pretty much essential.

[Tom Odom]

Wilf

Good post.

One thing:

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

I will disagree--big surprise I know--for 2 reasons:

A. Primarily because I have seen those things apply in a non-NATO and non-US environment. By applying I mean applied by the government facing the insurgency.

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

Tom

[goesh]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

[Valin]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

The very fact that I'm sitting here in "beautiful scenic" South Minneapolis is proof that the Net has changed things.
People don't really change, but how they use technology, affects them and society in general....see the printing press

For the Jihadis this is definitely true. The Jihadi/Salafist forums have been a boon to providing a means of passing information...etc. and giving them a sense of community.

For more see
"The Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the Twenty-First Century"
Marc Sageman

"Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice"
Jarret M. Brachman

Available from all the usual sources

[William F. Owen]

For the Jihadis this is definitely true. The Jihadi/Salafist forums have been a boon to providing a means of passing information...etc. and giving them a sense of community.

Yes, it's a changed how they act. It has not changed why they act. The Iranian revolution made great use of fax machines and cassette tapes. Neither of those things created the revolution, or made it possible.

The problems that created Political Islam, are nothing to do with the internet. The internet is just a medium, in which discussion takes place and information is exchanged.

Ask this question. Are people more or less likely to adhere to Scientology because of the internet?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

These may come from a perspective where the US/NATO military action is the cause of the insurgency. The insurgencies currently faced, resulted from the US/NATO overthrowing the Governments. What is more, the insurgencies sprang up, prior to the existence of the governments they currently oppose, so unless that is held to the fore, as explaining those statements, I cannot see them as truisms or insights into countering an insurgency.

They may ameliorate the feelings that poorly reasoned military action made a very big mess and now someone has to clear it up, but none of those statements is the basis for an historically valid approach to defeating an insurgency, or a sound basis for the conduct of irregular warfare.

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

I agree with both of Tom's points here but, especially, his last one. I'm going to be getting up on my semantics soap box for a bit here .

Okay, some basic definitions: an insurgency is a political-military action against the "legitimate" government of a state or para-state (depends on how states are defined, but that's another discussion). We (NATO, etc.) are not conducting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan (or Iraq) at present because we are not the legitimate government of either state.

The entire issue is muddied because in both cases the "legitimate" governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan were overthrown by foreign (NATO, MNF) conquest. This conquest and the following occupation then gave way to the creation of local governments more in line with those desired by the West, which have been "legitimated" by both international recognition and elections. This has created a situation were the legitimacy of these regimes may be questioned, in large part because a) they were imposed by foreigners and b) they have no longstanding "tradition" of legitimacy inside their respective states (NB: this second point marks a sharp disctinction against, say, the restoration of a previous regime).

A further complicating factor in these situations is that the foreign "invaders" really have no desire to stay there. Again, this marks a distinct difference with, say, the Colonial wars of the 19th century where the colonial powers often retained some components of local sovereignty. The closest historical analogs that I can think of off the top of my head are the post-WWII occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are some noatble differences.

All of this is a roundabout way of saying that I think the statement can give us some excellent insights into countering the current insurgencies. I do agree, however, that if taken as a truism, it is problematic.

Cheers,

Marc

[Bob's World]

A lot of great discussion taking place in this thread.

A couple points to consider that may help:

First, GWOT is not COIN; and really isn't GWOT either. We know that, yet struggle to devise a smarter approach the new range of security challenges we face today.

When President Bush left office he stated as his one metric of success that "we have not been attacked." Two comments on that:
1. A very poor metric of success, as one's opponents have their own agenda and schedules for how they pursue their ends, and if no attacks are necessary, why launch them and risk messing with success? So I don't credit it much as to our larger effectiveness in the GWOT. It may or may not mean our efforts are working.
2. HOWEVER: It does clearly indicate that the Commander in Chief saw the primary purpose of the GWOT campaign under his watch as one of Deterring such terrorist attacks from happening again.
This got me thinking, as I have been discussing Deterrence with a broader conventional community and attempting to highlight some of the new challenges in deterrence today than back in the good old days when all we had to worry about was MAD.

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

Many diverse organizations will employ terrorism as a tactic, and all require unique approaches. Weak(er) states; failed states (like Somalia); Quasi-state actors (like Hezbollah), non-state actors (like AQ), nationalist insurgencies (LET, MILF, etc etc etc), and the odd dissident individual (such as Mr. McVeigh). To lump them by their tacics leads to a dangerous conflation that contributes to approaches that are as likely to provoke some groups as they are to deter others. But by focusing on deterrence it forces one to break down the problem set and conduct a more sophisticated analysis and to better balance potential cost/benefit analysis by each category and major actors within those categories to various courses of deterrence or engagement that we plan to set out upon.

It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

Now, before the "kill them all" gang gets too fired up, yes, any good deterrence campaign incorporates a balanced and appropriate LOO directed at bringing to justice those needing the same. Most will be in a court of the own HN; others will simply wake up knowing they are dead, yet wondering where all the virgins are. Such things are best done in low key fashion as a capable and certain supporting effort to a much larger and holistic campaign of deterrence.

[marct]

Hi BW,

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats....

It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

You know, I'm beginning to think that my mind is truly warped... I immediately translated this into the rhetorical meme of "armed etiquette instruction" !



Actually, and all silliness aside, I think you have a really good point here. Possibly more important that a potentially new narrative is the possibility for a reconstructed dialogue at the global level.

[Taiko]

If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.

Sounds good in theory:

1. How do you deter an individual or group of individuals with no fixed address?

2. How do you deter an individual or group of individual who a) are not afraid to die b) prefer the consequence/cost, and in some cases the reward of death, over inaction?

I've been having a look at this subject area for some time now and concur with David that this is very worthy of a thread of its own.

Where I suspect we disagree is on the nature of causality. I view "causality" in an inductive format, i.e. by changing the frequency distribution of a particular behaviour, that technology has "caused" that behaviour to change. The social understandings at the time of those changes are the "ideas" which, since they are embedded in the change themselves, are "created" by that change. I know, it sounds post-moderninst, but it actually isn't

I view causality deductively within the framework of power, in this case political power. Your ontological framework of preferencing behaviour is problematic in the sense that it is conditioned by the presence, or lack there of, of power, or the aspiration for power. Power, more specifically political power is the independent variable and behaviour is the dependent variable. All the technological innovations you have cited and the 'change in behaviour' they have created are examples of human's attempting to control the minds and actions of other humans, they are examples of aspirations for power. In short the exercise of power (the why) that has been a ongoing condition of human nature's struggle for power and, it will continue, despite the advances in technology (the how). You are correct in highlighting the variations in how this struggle for power takes place, but it does not change the struggle for power. There is no neo-marxist or liberal condition which will see technology as the route to the perfection of man and the end of history. The theoretical position itself, the belief that it will change behaviour, is an exercise in power! Rather than a linear progression of history there is an enduring cyclical quality based on the struggle for power at the domestic and international level. Hence, war, the use of violence, is the continuation of politics by other means. To draw on a poker analogy: I'll see your Alex Wendt and raise you one Hans Morgenthau

[goesh]

this section is turning me into a hippy again and I'm going to have to start wearing my ju-ju in order to attempt to evey try to keep up...

[marct]

Hi Taiko,

I view causality deductively within the framework of power, in this case political power.

And which framework would that be, since there are several that use that term?

Your ontological framework of preferencing behaviour is problematic in the sense that it is conditioned by the presence, or lack there of, of power, or the aspiration for power. Power, more specifically political power is the independent variable and behaviour is the dependent variable.

Behaviour is empirical - you can see it; "power" isn't, it has to be inferred. Also, at least as far as research methods are concerned, even within a nomonological-deductive framework in the social sciences, you can always exchange the dependant ind independant variables. A strict deductive methodology that doesn't allow that is usually called a theology .

All the technological innovations you have cited and the 'change in behaviour' they have created are examples of human's attempting to control the minds and actions of other humans, they are examples of aspirations for power.

That is certainly one interpretation, but it isn't the only one. I'm begining to suspect either a Marxian or Foucauldian framework, with a touch of Nietzsche.

In short the exercise of power (the why) that has been a ongoing condition of human nature's struggle for power and, it will continue, despite the advances in technology (the how).

Personally, I think you are confusing the potentiality for power (however that may be defined) with the socio-technical conditions that allow for or inhibit the practice of power. You might want to take a look at Stewart Clegg's Frameworks of Power.

You are correct in highlighting the variations in how this struggle for power takes place, but it does not change the struggle for power. There is no neo-marxist or liberal condition which will see technology as the route to the perfection of man and the end of history.

That sounds like one of your axiomatix assumptions. As to the teleological implications, I don't subscribe those implications - I'm more along the lines of a neo-Darwinian that a Teilhard de Chardin.

The theoretical position itself, the belief that it will change behaviour, is an exercise in power!

Sounds like another axiomatic assumption - did you want an "Amen, Brother" after it ?

More seriously, anyone who doesn't think that changes in technology will cause (in the inductive sense I described earlier) changes in behaviour needs to seriously rethink their position. Is that an "exercise in power"? Maybe... what is your definition of power?

Rather than a linear progression of history there is an enduring cyclical quality based on the struggle for power at the domestic and international level. Hence, war, the use of violence, is the continuation of politics by other means.

Neitzsche meets CvC, with Foucault hosting the lovefest!

To draw on a poker analogy: I'll see your Alex Wendt and raise you one Hans Morgenthau

I'll see your Morgenthau and raise you a Dilthey .

Cheers,

Marc

[goesh]

" If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!
(Wf.O)
-I'd argue that we see a large hunk of our teen generation texting in code that gets made up and passed and more made up and passed all impacting behaviors rather quickly, almost a mutual mass understanding solely facilitated by a machine(s). I recall Howard Dean's Candidacy and the so-called Deaniacs who would rally almost instantly in key locations, the sole impetus being a technological prompt, backed by a simplistic idea of one man for President. All subsequent behaviors at the impromptu rallies can be as easily attributed to the machine as the imagination/idea of one man becoming President. Apples v Oranges ....?

[Greyhawk]

Back in April, 2007...

BASH: The phrase "the war is lost" really touched a nerve.

Do you stand by that -- that -- that comment?

REID: General Petraeus has said that only 20 percent of the war can be won militarily. He's the man on the ground there now. He said 80 percent of the war has to be won diplomatically, economically and politically. I agree with General Petraeus.

Now, that is clear and I certainly believe that.

BASH: But, sir, General Petraeus has not said the war is lost.

I just want to ask you again...

REID: General -- General Petraeus has said the war cannot be won militarily. He said that. And President Bush is doing nothing economically. He is doing nothing diplomatically. He is not doing even the minimal requested by the Iraq Study Group.

So I -- I stick with General Petraeus. I have no doubt that the war cannot be won militarily, and that's what I said last Thursday and I stick with that.

BASH: Arlen Specter, a Republican, but somebody who, in many ways, is like you, a critic of the president's Iraq policy. He said this. He said: "For men and women who are over in Iraq to have somebody of Senator Reid's stature say that the war is lost, it is just very, very demoralizing and not necessary."

Is there something to that, an 18- and 19-year-old person in the service in Iraq who is serving, risking their lives, in some cases losing their life, hearing somebody like you back in Washington saying that they're fighting for a lost cause?

REID: General Petraeus has told them that.

BASH: How has he said that?

REID: He said the war can't be won militarily. He said that. I mean he said it. He's the commander on the ground there.

"I do not think that means what you think that means" - to paraphrase Princess Bride.

[William F. Owen]

"The Internet, isn't going to change the "ideas" and it's the ideas that create the conflict. " ( WF.O)

I wish I could be entirely convinced of that. I've been telling myself a long time that it is nothing but man-made metal, plastic, glass and electricity but I wonder at times over cultural perceptions of it, linear V circular thinking and perceptions become fixed rather quickly - a tangent here but a real one.

I cannot tell you, you are wrong. My father opined that television changed the way people spoke to each other and behaved in general, because people tend to mimic what they believe to be effective behaviours.
If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!

Wilf

Good post.

Thank you, and thanks for keeping me on my toes. Without some useful and constructive disagreement, this could turn into a bit of a "sausage-fest" ...as my wife so delicately puts it.

I will disagree--big surprise I know--for 2 reasons:

A. Primarily because I have seen those things apply in a non-NATO and non-US environment. By applying I mean applied by the government facing the insurgency.

So let's call the US NATO environment a critical context. Would the discussion be the same if the US was intervening at the request of a foreign government?

B. Rather than truism or insight I see them more as an opening statement of a theme or longer discussion.

As the basis of a discussion, that may have some merit. Any thesis subjected to rigour, or argued against, is almost certainly useful. I am less convinced, when they are held to be the solution.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

If someone can show me that radio, telegraph, telephones or printing presses changed the essential nature of political and religious/political ideas, then I'll think again. I stand by writing and speaking as being mainly to blame!!

Okay....

On the printing press, consider the effect of cheap, mass produced copies of the Bible printed in the local languages. This invention led to massive increases spread of the breakup of the Roman Catholic hegemony in Western Europe during the late 15th through the end of the 17th centuries. It also directly led to an increase in the number of people involved in discussions surrounding science (with profound political implications), and the development of newspapers, broadsheets and yellow journalism that changed the nature of political debate, mobilization and control of political discourse. See, for example, Prophecy and Protest in Renaissance Italy.

On the political effects of radio, the telegraph and the telephone, see The Gutenburg Galaxy (Marshal McLuhan), The Soft Edge (Paul Levinson), and Technology in World Civilization (Arnold Pacey), Empire and Communications (Harold Inness), and Technology and Empire (George Grant) to name a few.

In (exceedingly) short form:

The telegraph extended basic written communications and, hence, the geographic span of control. This change specifically shifted how people reacted to central authorities, specifically decreasing the amount of local autonomy available. this allowed for the spread of a modern, centralized bureaucratic state organization, as well as producing a rapid spread of "news" over vast geographic areas 9thereby changing the content of local political discourse).

The radio, as a one-way communicative medium, greatly increased the centralizing power of state organizations through control of popular culture and political discourse. Consider, by way of example, the fact that almost all states moved rapidly to "license" radio broadcasting.

The telephone reconstructed two-way (or more) discussions at the local level but, also, increased the possibility of central control and monitoring, mainly in industries (Levinson's chapter on the telephone is quite interesting).

Cheers,

Marc

[Hacksaw]

I must first apologize for the ill-disciplined effort at levity at the beginning of the thread... it didn't contribute, but Gian is a good friend and the opportunity was one I couldn't resist...

BW... I'd respond in a thoughtful way, just still trying to digest... I can say - I think its one of the more helpful approaches I've heard discussed, I hope you/it are gaining traction in FLA...

As for the bumper stickers, and their potential harm... maybe I'm too optimistic, except in rare cases, I do see the community using these as a point of departure for discussion as opposed to absolutes... As someone else noted time will tell, but...

I too grew up in an Army with a rich tradition of small wars... and despite the fact that I attended the Army's "premier" school for developing military planners... I was never once asked to think about something beyond force on force until 2002 - that's 15 years... as Sec Gates says when discussing the 2010 budget -- this isn't a IW budget, it just gets IW a seat at the table -- if the nouveau COIN/COINistas provide for a small wars seat at the table -- its worth the risk

and I know that doesn't mean what he thinks that means

[William F. Owen]

I too grew up in an Army with a rich tradition of small wars... and despite the fact that I attended the Army's "premier" school for developing military planners... I was never once asked to think about something beyond force on force until 2002 - that's 15 years... as Sec Gates says when discussing the 2010 budget -- this isn't a IW budget, it just gets IW a seat at the table -- if the nouveau COIN/COINistas provide for a small wars seat at the table -- its worth the risk

You allude to a very interesting distinction here. I have always believed that the exclusion of "Small Wars" from military thought, training, equipment and doctrine, to be profoundly stupid.
I submit that the best way to prevent that is to nurture an "All Wars" approach.

This is why the Soap box, with the "Read Clausewitz" and "War is War" bumper stickers comes zooming out, ( much to Tom's annoyance! ) every time I sense the vibrations of those who see "COIN" as being something not grounded in War and Warfare. Small Wars and Irregular Warfare are not just about "COIN," and believing any warfare against an Irregular enemy is COIN and can be addressed by the "new thinking" that comes with that belief, may set you on the road to disaster.

So quote my more JEPY friends, "Love Small Wars. Love Irregular Warfare. Not so sure about the COIN, Darling."

[Gian P Gentile]

I must first apologize for the ill-disciplined effort at levity at the beginning of the thread... it didn't contribute, but Gian is a good friend and the opportunity was one I couldn't resist...

Hack, I didn't take it that way at all; but dude, Lincoln Hall, even Schmedlap knows that History is in Thayer! In fact if you go to Schmed's cool post on the Wanat thread you will see me tacking my 95 theses on the door where Patton used to walk through to ride his horse (a bit of creative license here, allow me).

Of course I read it and provided encouragement along with some comments; but as Jonathan highlights in his acknowledgment section he received much help from our old Sams Obe Won, Professor Roger Spiller.

And by the way, if any of the council members want to read a classic of war history and literature, read Roger Spiller's 2005 "An Instinct for War." Nothing less than brilliant it is.

little g

[Hacksaw]

Just thought they had moved History to the high-end neighborhood As I said earlier, just an attempt at levity, I'm incoregible (SIC, I think)...

[William F. Owen]

Shalom Marc,

All fascinating - genuinely - but what correct me if I am wrong, but you are talking about these technologies, enabling behaviours. They are instruments. Radio changed warfare. It cannot change war. Same is true of I.P. technology.
None of them "created ideas." Protestants challenged the hegemony of the Roman Catholics, not the printing press.

Much the same is true of the observation that the motor car and the aeroplane symbolised, and inspired, Fascism but did not create it.