FID or COIN? does it matter

[MM_Smith]

Dayuhan:

The US sent armed forces to the Philippines (in 1898), removed an existing government, installed a new government, and used armed force to crush all resistance to the new government. How exactly is that different from what we are doing (or trying to do) in Iraq and Afghanistan?

I think the intent was different. Regarding the Spanish-American War, compare Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. We chased the Spanish out of Cuba, stuck around for a while, then left the Cubans pretty much to their own devices. We chased the Spanish out of Puerto Rico and claimed it as US territory. In the PI the US replaced a Spanish colonial government with an interim administration based on US laws and procedures but adapted to the environment and with the intent of pulling out and leaving a functioning Philippine government behind. Aguinaldo, et al, wanted independence immediately and philosophically equated the Spanish occupation with the US occupation; most of his countrymen disagreed.

I haven’t seen anyone designated as US governor of either Iraq or Afghanistan. I haven’t seen US laws and legal systems imposed. I haven’t seen any long range plans for US occupation of either country. On the other hand, I have seen US lawyers being trained in Iraqi and Afghan law and I have seen efforts to untangle the legal and administrative cesspools left behind by the Baathists, Taliban and co-conspirators. I’ve seen programs and policies designed to implement local through national governments and I’ve seen evidence of home grown representative governments. I’ve also seen constant clamoring to get US forces out of both countries.

I’m not sure of the intent of your riposte but I’m fairly certain it wasn’t to address the differences between FID and COIN.

Bob's World:

COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.

I think you are agreeing with me. I'd like to think, however, that governments don't always teeter on the edge of open, violent, insurgency.

There can be another factor, however, and that is a simple destabilization desire without any attempt to replace an ineffective government. That may be what we're seeing in Mexico and Colombia.

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan:
I’m not sure of the intent of your riposte but I’m fairly certain it wasn’t to address the differences between FID and COIN.

Actually it was. Let me be more clear. The points:

1. These distinctions are largely a question of semantics and perception.

2. Our classification of a conflict may be driven by the desire to frame the conflict in terms favorable to us and acceptable to our populace, not by a desire to accurately describe the conflict.

3. Our perception of the conflict may be quite different from that of the populace of the conflicted nation, and where these differences occur, their perception matters more than ours.

The "Philippine Insurrection" was of course not an insurrection at all, but resistance to foreign invasion and occupation. It had to be publicly classified as "insurrection" because calling it what it was would have been politically unacceptable on the home front.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the distinction between FID and COIN revolves around the perception of whether the governments in question are "ours" or "theirs". If the governments are "theirs", then yes, we're "doing FID" in support of an autonomous but allied foreign government. If the government is perceived as "ours" - our creation, our tool, accountable primarily to us - then we're "doing COIN", or simply propping up a puppet.

Certainly we would like to see ourselves in the former position, but whether that is the position we are actually in is open to question. My own sense is that in Iraq the government has achieved a degree of "theirs-ness" and to that extent we might say that what we are doing is FID. In Afghanistan I suspect that claiming an FID role is a self-serving illusion, and a pretty threadbare one at that.

The potential for variance in perception is considerable. It may serve our politics to say that the Karzai government is an autonomous and legitimate ally that we are protecting from vile insurgents, but if a plurality of Afghans believe that Karzai is a puppet and they are fighting a foreign occupation, we will only be deceiving ourselves, and the deception isn't likely to hold up for long. It's their opinion, not ours, that will shape the future of the conflict.

At the end of the day, are we basing our classifications and policies on what we want to see or on what's really there? It's a question worth asking on a regular basis.

I think the intent was different. Regarding the Spanish-American War, compare Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. We chased the Spanish out of Cuba, stuck around for a while, then left the Cubans pretty much to their own devices. We chased the Spanish out of Puerto Rico and claimed it as US territory. In the PI the US replaced a Spanish colonial government with an interim administration based on US laws and procedures but adapted to the environment and with the intent of pulling out and leaving a functioning Philippine government behind. Aguinaldo, et al, wanted independence immediately and philosophically equated the Spanish occupation with the US occupation; most of his countrymen disagreed.

This is a subject on which I'm inclined to run on a bit, and I suspect strongly that this is not the place for that particular historical digression. I would, however, suggest revisiting that particular bit of history in detail before arriving at conclusions of this nature. There's a good deal more to it than that, to put it mildly.