FID or COIN? does it matter

[jcustis]

Let's assume that we are striving to apply the SHAPE - CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD paradigm to getting Afghanistan back on its feet.

Through the CLEAR phase, what measures of effectiveness are applied to it? Is the task to clear an area(s) of Taliban, corrupt elements (official or tribal or both), Al Qaeda, or is it to clear the area of those elements that do not support the freely elected government? Is it to prevent random violence at the hands of [insert local boogeyman title here], the imposition of Sharia-based law, or illegal drug trafficking? Where is the line, or is that line so terribly blurred from the interagency struggles we face that we will never run a tactical and operational effort that is nested in the strategy?

Maybe I'm just dense or exceptionally confused, but I seem to remember this hoopla about preventing Afghanistan from becoming this lawless, borderless, sieve that facilitates safe harbors for Islamic fundamentalists (specifically AQ). I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

I don't believe the Pottery Barn rule applies in AFG. Is it a mess? Absolutely, but will those expenditures in blood, money, and time ever truly result in a net gain in our security or the security of the region? Is security the end goal? From a distant perch, we are all over the place, and the only folks with any sort of productivity in this area are the think tanks and their studies mills.

[jmm99]

in your wonderment ...

I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

I also wonder if any change in policy would result if we were today or tomorrow to kill UBL and Zawahiri ?

[davidbfpo]

(from Jon Custis)what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

Jon and JMM,

Look back at Imperial British history, with three Afghan Wars and regular cross-border issues (even during WW2, NWFP was fully manned). The British Empire learnt, very painfully, notably in 1845, that it was best not to stay, just visit; visiting with a very large "stick" and some "carrots". Ironically I suspect many said this about the Soviet intervention and upon their exit.

What would we say to all Afghans if we were to leave? "Don't allow 'X' or we will be back", "We tried to change you and failed. Please forgive us and we will pay you" and more. I do not assume there is such a common nationality shared by all Afghans.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

What would we say to all Afghans if we were to leave? "Don't allow 'X' or we will be back", "We tried to change you and failed. Please forgive us and we will pay you" and more. I do not assume there is such a common nationality shared by all Afghans.

I haven't been to Afghanistan in years and since reality is always different from what you read in the press, no comment on our current strategy in OEF-A. However, this discussion in general is interesting to me. My thinking has evolved to the point that are no end points, and what is called the Powell Doctrine is deeply flawed. Conditions change, policies change, objectives change (based on new policy or conditions) on a continuous basis. If we see ourselves getting involved more and more in these messy poorly defined conflicts like Afghanistan, etc., doesn't it seem unrealistic to base our strategy on government, economic and essentially cultural reform? We just don't have enough resources to do this world wide the way we're approaching it now.

What prompted this thought is the question above, "what do we tell the people"?

When we make public such idealistic views and goals I think we make our moralist quagmire and the muck we're stuck in is our own idealism. Agree or disagree? If you agree, what is alternative strategy?

I'm ducking for cover, but will be back up in a few days.

[SWJED]

When we make public such idealistic views and goals I think we make our moralist quagmire and the muck we're stuck in is our own idealism.

Well said Bill.

[jcustis]

Well said Bill.

Aye, and why I beat the drum on this board long ago that it wasn't about "victory for the American people", despite what Bush proclaimed.

I've done half and afternoon's thinking about this Afghanistan thing, and the whole enormity of the task makes me ponder even more...we probably need a guy with a businessman's background, experience and drive, in order to do better at these sort of conflicts. The problem is just that expansive and complicated, and as I read the 2 April '09 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, I am more convinced that a military, government, or aid guy (or gal for that matter) isn't the best choice to run herd over all the players involved in the issue.

[Schmedlap]

Maybe I'm just dense or exceptionally confused, but I seem to remember this hoopla about preventing Afghanistan from becoming this lawless, borderless, sieve that facilitates safe harbors for Islamic fundamentalists (specifically AQ). I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.

That is the best question on the issue and not one that I have read or heard anyone address. I can't help but think that if the Taliban were in control of Afghanistan that they would be having the same legitimacy issues that the GIRoA is having now. Afghanistan seems to favor the insurgent. Perhaps we would be better positioned if the Taliban were the government and we were aiding the insurgents who seek to oust it. I suspect that we could do that for substantially less money and with a far smaller footprint. And as to whether or not the insurgents ever succeed - so what?