FID or COIN? does it matter

[Klugzilla]

For what it is worth...

FID refers to the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The
focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of internal defense anddevelopment (IDAD). FID can only occur when there is a HN that has asked for assistance. The US will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the above efforts to become effective. For example, a FID program may help a HN to improve the capability or capacity of one of its programs such as counterdrug activities or quell the nascent stages of an insurgency.

FID may or may not include countering an insurgency. When FID includes countering an insurgency, COIN is part of FID. COIN only refers to actions aimed at countering an insurgency whereas FID can aim at dealing with any one or a combination of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. In most
cases, the joint force conducts COIN as part of a larger FID program supporting the HN government. COIN that is not part of FID is an uncommon situation, and it should be a transitory situation where the US and any multinational partners should work to establish or reestablish HN sovereignty. The military instrument of FID includes direct, indirect, and combat. This can cause confusion as a lot of folks use U.S. FID and the military instrument of FID interchangeably, which is not correct.

[Klugzilla]

UW is distinctly different from FID and COIN, as Old Eagle mentioned, although it can occur within other operations. My spin is below.

UW is a special operations mission. UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration and conducted by, with, and through indigenous or surrogate forces. These surrogate forces are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW activities include, but are not limited to, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence, PSYOP, and unconventional assisted recovery. UW most frequently refers to the military and paramilitary aspects of an insurgency designed to resist, overthrow, or gain political autonomy from an established government or used to resist or expel a foreign occupying power. However, UW can also refer to military and paramilitary support to an armed group seeking increased power and influence relative to its political rivals without overthrowing the central government and
in the absence of a foreign occupying power.

[Entropy]

One of the basic theological questions that we never really discussed, but rather took as a foregone conclusion was whether we should be using the lens, vocabulary, taxonomies, and metrics of a COIN operation or a FID mission.

Honest question: How much does it really matter which you use, particularly since operations in Afghanistan span a wide range of conflict?

[LS]

Entropy,

this is the crux of my arguement. If you personally were to do an initial CONOP for COM ISAF and were told to prepare for a FID mission, how would your concept (and subsequent RFFs, JMDs, etc) be different from the exact same situation, only told to prepare for COIN?

I guess I'm intuitively thinking it ~does~ make a significant difference. Even if (only) at the subliminal level.

[Entropy]

I ~know~ first hand that my DOTMLPF will be dramatically different if you tell me "Your mission is to go and fight/counter this insurgency," than if you tell me "Your mission is to go and do what is required to enable GIRoA to fight/counter this insurgency."

Exactly, and in Afghanistan we are doing both. I'm not sure how useful it is to pick one over the other at the level of "Afghanistan" or, if you're like me and take a bigger picture, at the "AF-Pak" level.

[LS]

Exactly, and in Afghanistan we are doing both. I'm not sure how useful it is to pick one over the other at the level of "Afghanistan" or, if you're like me and take a bigger picture, at the "AF-Pak" level.

*huh* Good point. I hadn't thought of it, but I suppose one could argue that our approach in PAK is tilted towards FID, while our approach in AFG is decidedly more COIN.

I've been looking at references this afternoon, and am really disappointed that most of the official literature still limits FID to security assistance, and still (apparently) overlooks the non-kinetic requirements for a viable State (that can, in turn win their COIN fight).

Entropy, where I don't think I agree with you (yet!) is I don't think we're doing FID in AFG (we're not "doing both." We're fighting a COIN fight...). Our efforts to build ANSF are really in support of our own COIN (and other) objectives; not, as would be the case in a true FID-driven mission, IOT give GIROA the capacity to win this fight. Data points? The POI for ANSF are ours, not theirs. Less decisive, but still important (to my mind), the standards for training are ours; artificially high, especially in areas of human rights and other western constructs.

[Entropy]

*huh* Good point. I hadn't thought of it, but I suppose one could argue that our approach in PAK is tilted towards FID, while our approach in AFG is decidedly more COIN.

Even if there was agreement on where the border is located, there are a substantial number of people on both sides that don't recognize it.

Then there are other substantial numbers of people who have long existed under, at best, very limited authority from any central government. There are some groups that don't recognize any authority outside their own extended tribal structure. This is true on both sides of the border. What does the "i" in FID mean in these cases? What about the "i" in COIN? We see these people as "internal" because of lines on a map, we call some of them "insurgents" because they actively oppose central government, yet many of them see things quite differently. Do we have terminology and doctrine to change these kinds of loyalty structures, far removed and long hostile to any central government?

The point being is that I don't think our doctrinal constructs can hope to fit a place like Afghanistan or Pakistan, even assuming guidance from policymakers is clear, which, as Ken notes, it isn't.

IMO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are like conjoined Frankenstein twins - a menagerie of peoples that have yet to solidify into something resembling our Western concept of nationhood and likely never will. What is it called when we assist a central government in what amounts to conquering its own territory and its own peoples? Whatever it is, I don't think it's FID or COIN, but maybe it contains elements of both. We also need to consider that even Pakistan has been unable (and, it turns out, unwilling) to subjugate its people to its authority either through coercion or accommodation or FID or COIN.

Secondly, I think there is FID going on in Afghanistan, it's just that not much of it gets noticed and so much of it has been utter failure. The problems and issues are nicely detailed in a Richard Sale article in the ME Times (link to the full-text at another site) and those problems are nothing new:

Much of the ANP’s incompetence is due to a lack of adequate training but their mission of administering the rule of law is sidetracked and distorted by the sinister influence of power brokers or war lords. Afghan expert Gretchen Peters in a recent book “Seeds of Terror,” wrote of one power broker, Haji Juma Khan, as a criminal skilled in building networks and schemes to corrupt officials wherever he has chosen to operate. Provincial governors’ security agents, officials in the Highway Police or regional military commanders were all his targets. U.S. officials report that many Taliban commanders have forged affective and close ties with Afghan police officials which have proved troublesome. A recent UN report detailed a complex system of kickbacks involving 36 districts where governorships, customs and police postings are up for auction with the job winners paying huge fees to senior officials to keep their place. Top police officials in key districts pay $10,000 a month for job security, Peters said.

Cordesman noted in his report that power brokers see any improvement in police efficiency as a threat to their own operations and are desperate to forestall it by any means. But Cordesman and others make clear that their activity can only be countered by making vast improvements in the ANP leadership.

There are more details in Cordesman's report here. The short version is that it's hard to conduct FID when the population thinks the police are just a bunch of criminals.

[LS]

thanks to all for your thoughts.

Some clarifications: I'm not interested here in UW. I'm familiar with the concept and execution of UW and can easily imagine that there is somewhere UW planning being done wrt to GIROA. I don't wanna know about it...

And I'm less interested in putting our current engagement in AFG into a "FID" or "COIN" basket than I am untangling - deconstructing as it were - the logic of our actions <-- concepts of operation <-- intellectual constructs about the nature of the problem, vocabularies, etc <-- Kantian "Categories" (as evidenced here by "COIN" or "FID").

In other words, given the exact same Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP, COP, SA, whatever), how would proposed COAs be different if one "team" (at a JUW10, for example *grin*) used a doctrinal FID model, vice another "team" that was instructed to use a doctrinal COIN model. How would it effect JMD's? Would the LOOs be different? Would we look for different PME among our officers? Would the desired profile be different at all levels? NCO, Company- or field-grade? Flag level? Would the mixure of resources (civil and military) be different in a FID vice a COIN situation?

I've done FID; both as a member of the military and as various sorts of civilian. I ~know~ first hand that my DOTMLPF will be dramatically different if you tell me "Your mission is to go and fight/counter this insurgency," than if you tell me "Your mission is to go and do what is required to enable GIRoA to fight/counter this insurgency."

Maybe this is all semantics (as was pretty strongly suggested during a discussion along these lines in theatre). But somehow I don't think that it is.

Anyway, thanks again (and in advance) for the contributions and the thought...