FID or COIN? does it matter

[Entropy]

*huh* Good point. I hadn't thought of it, but I suppose one could argue that our approach in PAK is tilted towards FID, while our approach in AFG is decidedly more COIN.

Even if there was agreement on where the border is located, there are a substantial number of people on both sides that don't recognize it.

Then there are other substantial numbers of people who have long existed under, at best, very limited authority from any central government. There are some groups that don't recognize any authority outside their own extended tribal structure. This is true on both sides of the border. What does the "i" in FID mean in these cases? What about the "i" in COIN? We see these people as "internal" because of lines on a map, we call some of them "insurgents" because they actively oppose central government, yet many of them see things quite differently. Do we have terminology and doctrine to change these kinds of loyalty structures, far removed and long hostile to any central government?

The point being is that I don't think our doctrinal constructs can hope to fit a place like Afghanistan or Pakistan, even assuming guidance from policymakers is clear, which, as Ken notes, it isn't.

IMO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are like conjoined Frankenstein twins - a menagerie of peoples that have yet to solidify into something resembling our Western concept of nationhood and likely never will. What is it called when we assist a central government in what amounts to conquering its own territory and its own peoples? Whatever it is, I don't think it's FID or COIN, but maybe it contains elements of both. We also need to consider that even Pakistan has been unable (and, it turns out, unwilling) to subjugate its people to its authority either through coercion or accommodation or FID or COIN.

Secondly, I think there is FID going on in Afghanistan, it's just that not much of it gets noticed and so much of it has been utter failure. The problems and issues are nicely detailed in a Richard Sale article in the ME Times (link to the full-text at another site) and those problems are nothing new:

Much of the ANP’s incompetence is due to a lack of adequate training but their mission of administering the rule of law is sidetracked and distorted by the sinister influence of power brokers or war lords. Afghan expert Gretchen Peters in a recent book “Seeds of Terror,” wrote of one power broker, Haji Juma Khan, as a criminal skilled in building networks and schemes to corrupt officials wherever he has chosen to operate. Provincial governors’ security agents, officials in the Highway Police or regional military commanders were all his targets. U.S. officials report that many Taliban commanders have forged affective and close ties with Afghan police officials which have proved troublesome. A recent UN report detailed a complex system of kickbacks involving 36 districts where governorships, customs and police postings are up for auction with the job winners paying huge fees to senior officials to keep their place. Top police officials in key districts pay $10,000 a month for job security, Peters said.

Cordesman noted in his report that power brokers see any improvement in police efficiency as a threat to their own operations and are desperate to forestall it by any means. But Cordesman and others make clear that their activity can only be countered by making vast improvements in the ANP leadership.

There are more details in Cordesman's report here. The short version is that it's hard to conduct FID when the population thinks the police are just a bunch of criminals.

[Tom Odom]

From Ken: LS and others posted definitions, all of which I agree with. So IMO, we are now performing FID. Period. We are not performing COIN because the US has no insurgents to fight (That is not just a semantic quibble; whose insurgents are they?).

We are using COIN TTP to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) with their COIN operation. We are also assisting them in the control of smuggling and other criminal operations. Well, that's mostly what we say, anyway...

In short we are supporting the host nation in their COIN effort or whatever as part of FID
Tom

[William F. Owen]

In short we are supporting the host nation in their COIN effort or whatever as part of FID

...so we could say "conducting warfare against irregular forces, in support of asserting the authority of the national government."

Does that express the same means and ends?

[Tom Odom]

...so we could say "conducting warfare against irregular forces, in support of asserting the authority of the national government."

Does that express the same means and ends?

yes, the difference being that mine (and Ken's) is using US doctrinal terms

[LS]

Entropy: "IMO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are like conjoined Frankenstein twins - a menagerie of peoples that have yet to solidify into something resembling our Western concept of nationhood and likely never will."

I don't disagree, but it's not terribly relevant to USG (inter)national security imperativies. Our goal is an AFG that can police it's territory. That requires a "State," not a "Nation" (though I will certainly concede that some form of national identity or social contract is essential for a State to be seen as credible...)

Regarding ANP: This deserves a dissertation, but all your points below are accurate. It is training; and it is the pervasive corruption as well. I had a police trainer (UK) tell me, in speaking about the ANP training, that "Training these guys and then returning them to the same broken corrupt system is like purifying a glass of water then pouring it back into a cesspool."

I feel quite strongly that we should ~not~ continue with the shape-clear-hold-build paradigm until we have some HN agency that can manage the "hold" without being seen by the local population as worse than the Taliban. And that is currently the case in Helmand province, where USMC clearing activities are being followed by ANP who are corrupt and predatory, and do enoromous damage to our efforts...

But back to my thesis question: I now believe the following to be reasonably accurate (and yes, that's two colons in a single sentence):

1. FID is, ideally, an element of a broader Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy by/for a HN government, typically in a fragile or failing state. FID in a ~failed~ state would be like rendering first aid to a corpse.

2. COIN practiced by the US military is usually done in support of a FID mission, per the above.

3. US military doctrine, understandably, focusses on military assistance to COIN/FID, paying lip-service to the importance of other (non-military) aspects of the FID/IDAD mission.

4. Reatively little is written with authority about non-military aspects of FID/IDAD, not to mention those aspects of State-building/improvement/sustainment that must accompany IDAD if it's to be successful.

5. The primary failures in AFG are, as a matter of observation, in those specific areas of non-military FID/IDAD State-building/improvement/sustainment.

6. If a US Commander views his task as a COIN mission, s/he will approach the allocation of resources, METLs, RFFs, and training differently than if s/he has been told that the mission is FID, with potentially significant elements of COIN and direct combat support to the HN.

Comments? Thoughts?

[Old Eagle]

You might also look at the CORDS program in Vietnam, where there was a different, possibly more formal model of a tactical interagency program.

I would submit that there is still a significant combined and interagency effort in Afgh along the non-military LOOs.

[LS]

You might also look at the CORDS program in Vietnam, where there was a different, possibly more formal model of a tactical interagency program.

I would submit that there is still a significant combined and interagency effort in Afgh along the non-military LOOs.

OE: I don't disagree that there is significant presence by lots of USG agencies, bureaux, and offices. But that's like watching a crowd standing around a traffic accident and assuming someone has taken charge and is doing triage, providing assistance, calling 911, etc.

I think, on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 is virtually no interagency or combined civ-mil collaboration and 10 is fully-integrated, we're about a 3. And happy, because we used to be at a 2; so we've improved our performance by 30%. But, IOT succeed, we really need to be at about a 7; and that would require a "revolution in civ-mil affairs." Radical things!

[JM2008]

Before I start giving my two cents on this matter let me first caviat it by saying that my knowledge on Afghanistan is the result of 1x 9month deployment to RC-East doing MI at the tactical level. I did my best to pay attention to the bigger picture but that may have been hampered by the need to fully grasp the unique social/cultural/tribal dynamics of the two provinces that were in our AO. What I did learn is that there were no cookie-cutter solution between neighboring districts within the same province province... and I would venture to say that is the case throughout RC-East. The knowledge I have of RC-South has come from studying that command since returning home and what I know is it is a completely different world than the East.

Well onto the my reply...
The question of are/should we be conducting FID or COIN in AFG:
We should be doing both, but we are doing neither. To say that the operations in Afghanistan are COIN IMO would be wrong. The reason being that we are missing fundamental elements. We are attempting a "CLEAR"-"go back to the FOB"-"try to build--indirectly fund the insurgency through corrupt contractors--demonstrate our inability to secure our own construction project sites little-on the populace". We are completely missing the HOLD phase and many people overlook the SHAPE phase as well. Our failed BUILD phase means that we are merely CLEARING valleys/villages until the end of the CONOP period. We kill some guys, kick in some doors, and maybe take some "Bad" guys away, but as soon as we are out of the area the INS come right back and HOLD the terrain. Until we conduct all 4 phases it is not COIN it is merely just a dog-and-pony show.

As for the FID side... this is not something that we can do from the side lines. Yeah we have diplomats and civil service members in country but really what are they doing? To say they are DOING the job of their Afghan counterparts I think would be just as inaccurate as saying they are supporting them. They simply try to "mentor" the Afghan officials to do things in our Western-friendly "Afghan" way but that is not the Afghan way. There are "western ideals" that Afghans must adapt such as checks and balances in every level of government. This is essential to exposing corruption to the population with the intent of the population policing their government.

So how do we determine which is best for Afghanistan, FID/COIN? I think that you can implement FID in areas where GIROA has at least Marginal legitimacy but not in the areas where they don't. How do you help a government that has only authority but never gained legitimacy. Many people may view the two as one but it is important to note that authority is something a government has by means of existence but legitimacy is something that only a population can give to a government. There are areas in Afghanistan that GIROA has authority while the TB has legitimacy (RC-S). There are areas where neither has legitimacy and that is given to the tribal leadership (RC-E).

So how do we get the populace to legitimize GIROA? IMO we conduct COIN with GIROA in the backseat. We SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD but we build in a way to show GIROA is the one building. "They" build the means for the populace to HOLD the terrain w/ GIROA support. Then they build the social structures/programs needed to begin building other "stone and mortar" projects. The US military then becomes the FID players we should be and not the COIN force.

For what its worth,
James

[Ken White]

NYT:TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.

For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.

“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.”

(LINK).

Therein lies the 'problem' that we have created. If it's FID, we can't be in charge; if it's COIN we have to be in charge. Thus we are ...

What we're SUPPOSED to be doing is FID and helping the Host Nation with THEIR COIN effort since we cannot do COIN because they aren't our insurgents and isn't in our country. The capabilities and qualities of their government are irrelevant -- it is still not ours. By over controlling, we're confusing everyone -- except the bad guys who are taking advantage of it...

That will be dismissed by some as simplistic. It is not. Having lived and fought under that dichotomy in three other Nations under perhaps more violent circumstances and with the exact same 'problem' a while ago, let me assure you that I learned the hard way over a few years that is not a good plan.

[William F. Owen]

2. COIN practiced by the US military is usually done in support of a FID mission, per the above.

Comments? Thoughts?

That actually makes sense, in that it holds COIN to be a primarily military activity, therefore reliant on military power.

[Jayhawker]

This is a good question that began the thread. If a Commander is doing FID then his tasks, equipment and skills sets of his folks have to be one thing while counterinsurgency requires other JMETLS, etc. So nailing down exactly what we're doing is the place to begin. Its a little unsettling that you got shouted down, as it were.

On a bigger plane, and taking the wholistic approach to all of ISAF's activities in Afghanistan, we're doing far more than short term FID and far more than counterinsurgency. I've had friends at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan mentoring their faculty, so what is that? FID? Probably fits more with that than counterinsurgency. The problem with the term counterinsurgency is not only that the US and NATO can't do counterinsurgency in a country that is not ours, as pointed out above, but that the prefix "counter" only speaks to identifying what we're fighting against, rather than what we're fighting for. If COMISAF is doing counterinsurgency, he should get all the SOF, Psyops, intel, recon, assets to go kill insurgents. But all that does is create dead insurgents. Alone it does not defeat the movement commonly known as the Taliban because the issue(s) that inspired its creation in the first place remains.

So what to do? What are we fighting for and who gets to decide that? The Afghans do and somehow the Afghans have to create a movement that builds the sense of themselves that along the way eclipses the Taliban's movement. The Afghan cadets and many of the 20 somethings in the Kabul area seem to be wishing to do that, they just need some time to figure out what shape that will take. Hopefully ISAF buys them the time and space to do that.

[LS]

Keeping in mind that I'm "LS," and have no idea who this "Sampler" guy is (though he sounds like a true legend in his own mind)...

After reading all these responses and discussions (on this thread), I went back and looked at JP 3-07 to try and resolve the questions in my mind: Specifically, what're the relationships between COIN, FID, and (added later) IDAD. If heirarchical relationships exist, presumably so too would heirarchical weightings for resource allocation and priorities of political "fire."

I'm becoming persuaded that there is (in fact if not in practice) a taxonomy that's doctrinally supported, and it looks like the picture attached here. If this is the case, one might sensibly ask why our priorities and resources don't follow this same schema.

Finally, being of small and simple mind, I have to cast these hard questions in my own Gumpian algorithms.

For my mind, COIN is like showing up (as directed) at your girlfriend's church social to discover that the damned place is infested with mosquitoes, and then spending the rest of the evening swatting or fanning them away (from you and your girlfriend, primarily).

FID is - still during the evening social - getting the maintenance guy to help you strategically place a few fans and close a few window screens in the Fellowship Hall; and then placing and lighting those mosquito coils that've been in the tackle box in the bed of your truck since "last season."

IDAD is making a donation to the church IOT allow them to fix the drainage problem on the back of the lot where the damned bugs breed, repair their window screens, put screen doors on the Fellowship Hall before the ~next~ social event.

And, of course, success is convincing the girlfriend that there's too many bugs at this place and absconding with the girl, a half a chicken off the grill, and what's left of Ms. Smith's pecan pie and tooling down to the lake in the truck with your sweetie for your own intimate little picnic... Only to remember you left the damned mosquito coils burning back at the church!

Thanks all, as ever, for the interesting and intellectually stimulating discussion.

L

[IMG]Settings\Owner.YOUR-15B8553252\Desktop\samplers taxonomy[/IMG]

[Ken White]

That is a really good slide; seriously.

However, given that urge...

[Schmedlap]

Forgive the complete absence of doctrinal definitions/references and my general ignorance of strategy, but I came across something that seems relevant. Here is a quote from Abu M (Exum)...

There is a growing realization that we can run the greatest counterinsurgency campaign in the world's history in Afghanistan and that it will all be for naught as long as the government of Afghanistan remains weak, catastrophically corrupt, or both. - link

This suggests to me that it is not (or at least should not be) a COIN mission. But it also seems that we are not defending the government, so much as attempting to stand it up as an alternative to the governance offered by the Taliban.

In the business world, this would be analogous to a decision of how to expand into a foreign market. Agent, franchise, joint venture, acquisition, or greenfield? Thus far, it seems like we started with agent (CIA and SOF), then jumped to the other end of the spectrum, greenfield (US forces attempting to stand up a new gov't and ANA from scratch) , rather than going the happy medium route of joint venture. Joint venture with whom, you ask? Well, who was there? Let's see, we had the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. I suppose neither one is ideal. But how is greenfield working out for us?

My understanding is that Taliban does not always equal al-Qaeda. And our strategy is apparently to make Afghanistan hostile to al-Qaeda. Perhaps a joint venture with the Taliban makes some sense. I suspect that if they were offered some power that their "religious" objection to cooperating with the infidel would significantly subside. This would undoubtedly lead to subjugation of women, rape of pre-teen boys, and a reversal of some good that has come to Afghanistan. I can't help but think that, while awful, this is less objectionable to the countless Afghanis who will be killed, maimed, orphaned, crippled, etc, as we continue on our current course.

I suppose this amounts to bondage for the Afghan people. I have always been of the opinion that it is better to die fighting than to live in bondage. But that's me. That's not a decision I would presume to make for others.

If nothing else, working with an organization allows you to collect intel on them so that you can target them later, if the relationship sours.

Two cents from a guy who has never attended the War College, SAMS, or even the career course.