Entropy: "IMO, Afghanistan and Pakistan are like conjoined Frankenstein twins - a menagerie of peoples that have yet to solidify into something resembling our Western concept of nationhood and likely never will."

I don't disagree, but it's not terribly relevant to USG (inter)national security imperativies. Our goal is an AFG that can police it's territory. That requires a "State," not a "Nation" (though I will certainly concede that some form of national identity or social contract is essential for a State to be seen as credible...)

Regarding ANP: This deserves a dissertation, but all your points below are accurate. It is training; and it is the pervasive corruption as well. I had a police trainer (UK) tell me, in speaking about the ANP training, that "Training these guys and then returning them to the same broken corrupt system is like purifying a glass of water then pouring it back into a cesspool."

I feel quite strongly that we should ~not~ continue with the shape-clear-hold-build paradigm until we have some HN agency that can manage the "hold" without being seen by the local population as worse than the Taliban. And that is currently the case in Helmand province, where USMC clearing activities are being followed by ANP who are corrupt and predatory, and do enoromous damage to our efforts...

But back to my thesis question: I now believe the following to be reasonably accurate (and yes, that's two colons in a single sentence):

1. FID is, ideally, an element of a broader Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy by/for a HN government, typically in a fragile or failing state. FID in a ~failed~ state would be like rendering first aid to a corpse.

2. COIN practiced by the US military is usually done in support of a FID mission, per the above.

3. US military doctrine, understandably, focusses on military assistance to COIN/FID, paying lip-service to the importance of other (non-military) aspects of the FID/IDAD mission.

4. Reatively little is written with authority about non-military aspects of FID/IDAD, not to mention those aspects of State-building/improvement/sustainment that must accompany IDAD if it's to be successful.

5. The primary failures in AFG are, as a matter of observation, in those specific areas of non-military FID/IDAD State-building/improvement/sustainment.

6. If a US Commander views his task as a COIN mission, s/he will approach the allocation of resources, METLs, RFFs, and training differently than if s/he has been told that the mission is FID, with potentially significant elements of COIN and direct combat support to the HN.

Comments? Thoughts?