Biddle on Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

Dr. Biddle is a smart guy, but he does not understand the problem that he is prescribing a solution for. What he offers is the CNAS party line, but its a very flawed position all the same.

[George L. Singleton]

We keep coming back to Lt. General Nathan Bedford Forrest's axiom from the US Civil War of: "Get thar firstest with the mostest!"

[rborum]

Dr. Biddle is a smart guy, but he does not understand the problem that he is prescribing a solution for. What he offers is the CNAS party line, but its a very flawed position all the same.

Bob - I think I understand what you mean by the "CNAS party line", but to my knowledge Biddle is not - and has not been - affiliated with CNAS. He was at the AWC/SSI and is now connected to the CFR. If you have different/better information about that, let me know, but in fairness, I wanted to be clear that neither Biddle's presence on McChrystal's advisory group nor his subsequent reflections and analysis appear to have any institutional connection to CNAS (even if they do reach some similar conclusions).

[jcustis]

Gen. McChrystal organized that assessment as a series of teams or committees of members of his staff to work subtopics. But to work the overall question of how things are going--can we succeed, [and] if so how are we to do it?--he brought in a team of outside nongovernmental analysts to advise him.
We spent about the first week to ten days of the project in familiarization travel. We were then briefed very extensively by the key elements of the headquarter staff on the situation as they saw it, on the existing plans, on their current plans, and expectations for looking forward. And we then spent a substantial amount of time deliberating among ourselves and coming up with a draft written document that will eventually, assuming that Gen. McChrystal ultimately agrees, come out as the overall assessment [made] to the secretary of defense and to the secretary general of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. That transmission is expected to occur on or about August 15.

Does anyone know how much time was spent with Afghani government officials, to see how they saw things? And would it have mattered? I presume it would have, and for the better.

[William F. Owen]

Bob - I think I understand what you mean by the "CNAS party line", but to my knowledge Biddle is not - and has not been - affiliated with CNAS. He was at the AWC/SSI and is now connected to the CFR.

That was my perception. The first six chapters of his book "Military Power" are extremely solid work. I've always judged him to be far more in the Neo-Classicist camp. Not quite a solid "Joel 2:30", but getting close.

[Bob's World]

Bob - I think I understand what you mean by the "CNAS party line", but to my knowledge Biddle is not - and has not been - affiliated with CNAS. He was at the AWC/SSI and is now connected to the CFR. If you have different/better information about that, let me know, but in fairness, I wanted to be clear that neither Biddle's presence on McChrystal's advisory group nor his subsequent reflections and analysis appear to have any institutional connection to CNAS (even if they do reach some similar conclusions).

It is just that CNAS has become the unofficial source of what officials think "the right answer is." on these issues. So if you want to take the "correct" position on irregular activities, take one that falls in that lane. Staff at the AWC are great guys, but the institutional controls (largely informal I believe) are that you do not color outside the lines, so to speak. I've met Dr. Biddle and have heard him speak, read some of his stuff. Solid guy and well respected in his community.

Many of the current policy and strategy team at the Pentagon either came from CNAS, or rode the coattails of a CNAS mentor into the building. My sense is they are largely a good, competent, well-intended, hard working group. But it does create an air of 'not wanting to bite the hand that feeds you.'

I just think that the first source for what right looks like should be USSOCOM and/or SOLIC; but blood is thicker than water, and the bloodlines run to CNAS.

[George L. Singleton]

What would work best for and inside Afghanistan would need to build from and upon the tribal system that permeated and continues today througout all of Afghan society.

This is a heavy, complex subject which does not take a stamp or mold as from Iraq or Pakistan, it has to be unique to Afghanistan for Afghans at the simpliest level of society to buy it.

Providing security at the local level has always been the key that we cannot provide...this has to be done by trained up Afghan military and police.

Trying to convert to cash crops other than poppies is and has always been very difficult. Greed is the same the world over. Give me a subsidy not to grow poppies, I take your subsidy and then I still grow poppies and make even more money. Simplisticly said that is how it has been, is, and in my opinion will always be in Afghanistan.

[Entropy]

What would work best for and inside Afghanistan would need to build from and upon the tribal system that permeated and continues today througout all of Afghan society.

This is a heavy, complex subject which does not take a stamp or mold as from Iraq or Pakistan, it has to be unique to Afghanistan for Afghans at the simpliest level of society to buy it.

I agree with George here. Afghanistan is much too diverse for a top-down approach, which is what has been tried. Grassroots is the way to go, local control is the way to go IMO.