Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[William F. Owen]

The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.

Huh? What spectrum? He didn't mention drug gangs, or organised crime, but his observation are all still highly relevant. Pablo Escobar was defeated exactly in line with CvC observations.

And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.

So let me get this right. You are suggesting that Deterrence is demonstrated by something other than action? Deterrence means "failure to ACT, through fear of harm." No action means deterrence is working. Deterrence by virtue of it's meaning relates to specific conditions within a specific time. Change any of the factors effecting the level of deterrence and it's effectiveness alters.

[Bob's World]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

What one sees in the initial responses and comments above is a great example of the challenges to getting from where we are, and what we are doing currently, as we are all mired in what we have been taught and currently believe. We must step back, take a deep breath, and look at the entire problem set from a fresh perspective. Many changes may be subtle, some may be substantial.

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

CT leads to an Intel driven, reactive chasing of whoever they label as "threat" and conducting a very similar family of engagement against those threats regardless of their actual nature or purpose. Many argue that such an approach has eroded our national credibility globally, and though we have not been attacked, may in fact havecontributed to an even broader range of those who would do us harm today than we had in 2001.

Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.

[William F. Owen]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

[William F. Owen]

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

[Bob's World]

With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.

No argument that most tactics produce very similar results at the tactical level; though just as the rifled musket forced modification of tactics to take into account a formation receiving 6-10 aimed volleys as it closed with the enemy vice the 1-2 they had received over the few hundred years preceding; so to do many advances like UAVs, guided munitions, etc; shape tactics today. But that is not what I am talking about at all.

What i am talking about is the strategic effect expected based on historical experience from COIN tactics simply is far less likely to be achieved due to the enhanced communications tools available to populaces (and therefore insurgents) everywhere.

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

The fact that it still only takes one bullet to kill one man is immaterial and moot to this discussion.

[Bob's World]

Here are some concepts that I believe demand fresh attention and new perspectives if we are to have a holistic family of deterrence across the range of all actors that facilitates the peace we seek:

Balance
Balancing the relative deterrent and provocative effects of actions across a complex span of actors.

Sanctuary
(God save us from the cliche' "sanctuary of ungoverned spaces")
We must understand and address organizations that have "sanctuary" currently from the traditional elements of national power.

Glib cliche's parroted without thought just don't cut it. True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them. Both of these can be addressed if recognized as important, and then understood for their true nature.

Empowered Populaces
Deterrence of people is fundamentally different than deterrence of states.

Legitimacy
When an insurgent populace perceives that an outside power has an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government they are dissatisfied with, they will target that inappropriate source of legitimacy in the pursuit of their aims. This is the central component to AQ's strategy to conduct UW to get these many diverse, nationalist efforts to support their cause. They make the case that the US is the obstacle to achieving good governance, and due to that widely held perception, it works. Address the legitimacy and you both disempower Bin Laden's message; and you also get these nationalist insurgencies to focus on the home front as the obstacle has been removed. (This is why the vast majority of foreign fighters and "terrorists" come from the populaces of our friends, rather than the populaces of our foes - No Iranian believes that the US is responsible for the poor governance they suffer under. Many Saudis do.

Holistic Approaches
We have a mono-focus on deterrence. Cost/benefit analysis aimed at states; differentiated primarily by only if they have, or don't have, nukes. Anyone else we criminalize by labeling them "terrorist". We look through two tubes and neither tube is particularly focused for the realities of today's environment.

What I suggest is that we look at the entire span of actors holistically, and then with that broader perspective look at the deterrence problem with fresh eyes and fresh thinking to address the whole more effectively, by more effectively addressing the individuals.

[William F. Owen]

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.

[Entropy]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

I don't have any real disagreements with that, but I don't see how you get from there to a policy holding governments accountable for peoples they have no control over - ie. HA and various tribes along the AF-PAK border.

I also "get" that new communication tools do have powerful effects though maybe not to the extent that you think they do. Technology certainly has made demagoguery easier than it's probably ever been and governments have pretty much lost the ability to significantly control negative information. That is a powerful combination.

BTW, I also like your slide.

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

Someone upthread said that "terrorists" cannot be deterred because they are not afraid to die for their cause. In some cases that is true, but fear of failure is universal. For example, all the additional security measures protecting airplanes are deterring those who'd like to blow them up or fly them into buildings because their chances of success are greatly diminished.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

[Entropy]

Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

We can use HA as an example. To what can/should we attribute their lack of attacks against Israel since 2006? From your earlier comments in this thread it appears you believe that the cause of their inaction is the deterrent effect from the 2006 campaign. There may be something to that, but there are other causes that are probably just as important if not more so. After all, Nasrallah publicly said the event that precipitated that conflict was a mistake and that HA did not expect the Israeli response. IOW, it was miscalculation that caused that conflict and not any failure of deterrence. Deterrence has limited power over miscalculation.

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

[William F. Owen]

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

So what is proof that deterrence has worked?

Deterrence is obviously dynamic, and not an absolute state. It is predicated on deterring certain actions. Yes, you will never know if the effect you sought was actually achieved. - so what?
Wars start because the credible deterrence breaks down. - again - so what?
We know all this.
What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

[Entropy]

What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

[slapout9]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

Couple of points.

1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

[Bob's World]

Slap,

Agree completely that the far right end of the spectrum, the individual who is committed to some deadly course, cannot be deterred. I list him only because he is part of the fabric, and when he acts, it will be criminal in nature must be accounted for by those who will respond to that act. Part of effective, holistic deterrence is understanding what one can and cannot influence; and responding appropriately when sh#* happens.

I do think it is more complex though. More actors, more distinct statuses, all having to be considered collectively in a balanced program of deterrence is complex.

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953; it would creates far different set of ramifications across this new spectrum of actors today than a much more limited spectrum then.

Images would be immediately blasted around the world; those Iranian citizens at the epicenter of events would text the word through out both the populace at home, and Shia everywhere. Most likely the Shah would have not lasted a week and the re-established Iranian government would have reached out to the Soviets to prevent this from happening again. Or an insurgency would have been born at home, but with a regional or global base of support; with attacks not just launched at the Shah but at the US and England to attempt to break our support for him. Hezbollah would weigh in on behalf of their Iranian ally and target the US and England and their allies as well; most likely attacking Israel. Bin Laden, who has no love for Shia, would recognize the Strat Com potential to engage all Muslims; and would turn this into a PR event to boost his own support by highlighting how by our actions the West validates his claims against us; using this to encourage and incite nationalist insurgent movements in Muslim states who have governments shaped by or overly influenced by the West....and so it spirals out.

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

In 1953 the Iranians complained, it was news for a while, and then the world got on with life, accepting the new construct. Then when some 25 years later the Iranians were finally able to break out from under this construct imposed upon them, we acted like we were the victims. The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

So, to deter the Iranians from such an action today would require a much more sophisticated approach, as it is not just the state actors one must consider, but a much more empowered and connected set of populace-based organizations as well.

[William F. Owen]

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

It's not complex. It's fiction with mixture of unlikely and totally unrealistic strategic contexts, that make as much sense as trying to predict the out come of the French Revolution set in 1999. None of that is evidence!

The only evidence you can have that modern conflict and conditions are more complex is to say you do not understand them. That's the evidence.
I think history shows us that all warfare and conflict has always been infinitely complex.
Men today are not more capable of understanding the conditions that created WW1, than they were at the time.

Let's face it. Everyone is wittering on about the "Tribes" - which are just about the oldest political system on earth, and apparently, the men of today, do not understand them. Not a good indicator that life today is "more complex."

[Entropy]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

[Entropy]

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953

That was not deterring Iran. Forcing an actor (in this case, Iran) to conform to your will through force is not deterrence.

[Bob's World]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

At the end of the day, the US is still the most powerful nation in the world, with all of the associated benefits, duties, and responsibilities associated with that status.

We just need to recognize that the favorable status quo that emerged from the Cold War was a snapshot in time, and that the world is ever changing; and that we too must embrace change in order to remain relevant.

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

[Entropy]

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.