Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[William F. Owen]

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

So what is proof that deterrence has worked?

Deterrence is obviously dynamic, and not an absolute state. It is predicated on deterring certain actions. Yes, you will never know if the effect you sought was actually achieved. - so what?
Wars start because the credible deterrence breaks down. - again - so what?
We know all this.
What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

[Entropy]

What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

[Ken White]

Bob's World:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

On Item 1. I strongly doubt that it is possible to deter all irregular threats. I believe that an effort to disrupt potential irregular threats is vastly preferable to the rather to passive effort of deterring. Particularly when such deterring is going to be in a mostly now unidentifiable form.

Re: item 2, disruption is also preferable -- and cheaper -- the disadvantage is that it requires knowledge and action early on; areas in which the US does not excel...

Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.

I very much agree; I'd agree even more if it read 'Deterrence and disruption..."

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

True -- thus disruption has to be an alternative.

Entropy:

In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

I'm not sure that's always correct. I can understand your motives and still fail to deter you because I attempted to counter a feint -- or because you were deflected enroute to your target and selected another. It's also quite possible that my selected mode of deterrence was poorly chosen or just flat wrong...

Slapout, as always, applies some common sense and realiistic thinking and makes two statements with which I strongly agree

1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

The first is I believe the crux of the matter -- we make this harder than it is and we do have a global reach and thus we have simply increased the problem quantitatively, not qualitatively.

Given the American penchant for over-control and centralization, we need distributed thinking; the NSC and State should have regional super-Ambassadors and Desks with real clout. DoD should defer to the CoComs and SOCOM to their regional commands. You cannot run the World from Pennsylvania Avenue; the Armed Forces from E-Ring; all of the SO stuff from MacDill. As long as we continue to do that, we'll keep having the same old problems and the sheer number will overwhelm attempts at sensible decision making.

Slap's absolutely right that some types cannot be deterred -- and I'll add or disrupted for long -- IOW, we're going to have to live with a degree of risk. We always have, we just communicate more quickly and widely now so folks are more aware more rapidly and this allows minor panics to (wrongly) influence government into taking foolish actions.

Strategies and policies need to take those things into account.

Lastly,Bob's World again, he sums up the root of the whole problem:

The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

True. That factor is prevalent in much of our history. Even given the 1953 coup and some -- not many -- Iranians being quite angry over that, what happened later was totally preventable. We ignored it -- and then came up with the WRONG reaction when there was an eruption. Those failures and the cults of centralization and "I am in charge, here, now..." control are part and parcel of our current situation.

We cannot undo our history, we are where we are and that has to be accepted, not apologized for going forward. We need to look to the future. So we aim to deter and disrupt.

That requires adequate and effective early warning or knowledge -- and there still is no guarantee we will take the correct action...

Wilf said it well and we'd be far better off as a nation if we paid heed:

In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Ran across this gem in the NYT today:

TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.

For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.

“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.” (LINK).(emphasis added /kw)

That about sums it up...

[Entropy]

Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

Unless your adversary is willing to tell you directly, then there isn't any way of knowing for sure. Obviously, the better one studies and understands an opponent, the better one is able to estimate their motivations and use all the policy tools available to affect those motivations, not just deterrence. That's why good intelligence is critical to policymaking.

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove. Other examples include "x" policy has worked or GWB is a great President because there hasn't been another attack since 9/11. Or, more recently, my own government leaders have claimed that if it hadn't been for the stimulus package, the economy/unemployment would be much worse. It's impossible to disprove or quantify such assertions when they are framed that way.

Maybe it's misperception on my part, but ISTM many elites and policymakers have too much faith in "deterrence" over other forms of influence and have drawn false conclusions based on the "success" of deterrence during the Cold War. For example, the idea that deterrence will prevent a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran (should it acquire nuclear weapons) is dangerously naive. People miscalculate. Nations miscalculate. We got lucky at several times during the Cold War and our intelligence was able to tell us when our attempts at projecting a deterrent posture had the opposite effect. That happens more that people realize.

In short, putting too much faith in deterrence as a strategy provides a false sense of security.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

No arguements about the "disrupt" component. Hanging onto the "disrupt" task; and dumping the "defeat" task (which is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable, by the way if you really think about it) and replacing it with "deter."

This gives us the foundation for a new framework for the GWOT plan that we can build upon and that won't by its very terms alienate our allies and our own interagency community.

So what I am really looking at is two different things here. One is an overall review and revision of how we approach deterrence as a whole to more accurately and completely address the many actors on today's scene. Second is to then Re-write the GWOT plan in the context of detering (and yes, exactly right Ken,)Disrupting Irregular Threats.

[Taiko]

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfa...do_joc_v20.doc

DO JOC v2 might be a good start to look at how the US approaches deterrence now. There has been a considerable shift from the Cold War approach. Keith Payne and Colin Gray would be two good academics/policymakers to read. They have had considerable influence in how we should understand deterrence post-9/11. I'm in the middle of finishing a paper so I can't extrapolate much more. However, if you need any more sources I would be glad to forward you a reading list Bob's World, I have been studying this for two years so I have most of what has been written on it. Send me a PM if you need any resources about a specific subject area on deterrence.

I'll just put forth a couple of points:

1. In the p-9/11 security environment the US needs to deter more actors from taking different sets of actions. During the Cold War the US faced a single risk adverse actor, in the current security environment there a number of risk taking actors. Game theory works well when there are only two actors, once you have a n+ situation the theory becomes more problematic.

2. Prospect theory has had the most influence on how policymakers view deterrence p-Cold War. Specifically, it argues that the an actor may view the cost of inaction to be higher than any benefit of inaction, making deterrence both unstable and harder. There is a lot more to it than that, suffice to say the theory itself resulted in DO JOC V2.

3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.

4. In terms of 'irregular threats' how do you deter a individual or group with no fixed address?

5. How do you deter a individual or group if they perceive that the cost of inaction is higher than the benefit of inaction, or if death is seen as a reward/benefit in itself?

4 and 5 are the most common questions on deterrence p-9/11, so if you can answer then you will have a number of people interested.

From what I can work out the Airforce has been working on deterrence p-CW so make sure to read DO JOC V2., if you haven't already, otherwise they might pick your propositions to pieces.

[William F. Owen]

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove.

Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

[Taiko]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute....cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.

[Bob's World]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute....cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:



How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.

Beyond the fact that IO is a mess of half a dozen vaguely related disciplines all strapped together under one all inclusive definition; and then the entire bundle left sitting out on the doorstep by the "real" ops guys who are too busy planning action to worry too much about what the IO guys do to support them....

It is more accurately the Strategic Communication aspect of IO, and even then, not the "here is what I say" take on Strat Comm, but the perspective that I share wholeheartedly with my boss that "Strat Comm is 80% what one does, and 20% what one says."

We must change what we say to be more in line with our professed principles as a nation, we must extend to other states and populaces the same sovereignty and dignity we demand for ourselves; and then we must design and implement our engagement to state by our actions the very message that is coming from our mouths.

Sad fact is that in the Middle East in particular, long before GWOT, we had let our principles, words, and actions diverge. I think we just need to bring them all back on azimuth and move out as one.

[Entropy]

Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

Agree, except I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.

[Bob's World]

men carried clubs, cities built walls; not because they had identified necessarily some specific threat they wished to deter, but simply because they wanted whatever threat that might come along to be deterred; and also to be better able to deal with those who were not.

Some deterrence is general in nature, some specific; most provocative as well as deterrent. But not being attacked by any particular threat is never a full measure of how well one's scheme of deterrence worked.

[Entropy]

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph I read a couple of years ago for a class:

U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. This report attempts to help these decisionmakers see the potential use of influence campaigns in the war on terrorism. To do this, the authors gauge the lessons learned from past U.S. operations, analyzing the “de-Nazification” efforts of postwar Germany, the psychological operations conducted during the Vietnam War, and the support of anticommunist movements and resources in Poland throughout the Cold War. Although stipulating that influence campaigns are highly sensitive to their respective operational environments, the authors arrive at the following general guidelines for the use of persuasion in the struggle against terrorism: match objectives, message, and delivery to the audience; incorporate feedback mechanisms in the planning stage; and set realistic expectations. They then apply these guidelines to three different types of audiences in the Muslim world-Yemen, Indonesia, and diaspora communities in Germany. The authors note that the use of strategic influence is not and probably never will be a “silver bullet” to removing the threat of terrorism; however, the research herein should help bring U.S. decisionmakers closer in refining how and in what circumstances such campaigns can best be applied.

Thoughts on this?

BW,

Premise: The US treats those states who possess nuclear weapons with a greater degree of respect for their national sovereignty than those states that do not possess such weapons. Thus providing a powerful provocative motivation to gain such weapons in the very states that we are working the hardest to prevent from doing that very thing.

I'm not sure I agree with your premise. To begin with, all the nuclear powers but three are allies of the United States. For the exceptions - North Korea, China and Russia - there are many factors besides nuclear weapons for us to show greater respect for their sovereignty. Additionally, I don't think those three would argue the US shows their sovereignty much respect (Missile Defense, NATO expansion, Taiwan, human rights, proliferation security initiative, etc.)

Then, if you look at Iran, the perception that it seeks to develop weapons has increased calls to violate is sovereignty through military or covert action including regime change. One might therefore argue that pursuit of such weapons is more likely to result in violations of sovereignty.

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Those states have told us directly where we are hypocritical: We actively oppose non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) acquiring legal dual-use technology while failing to take sufficient measures to abide by article VI of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). We are attempting to get states to implement the additional protocol to the NPT, yet we are receiving significant pushback from the NNWS because of this perception of hypocrisy. Then there is our bilateral nuclear deal with India, which greatly damaged our credibility on nonproliferation and is arguably a violation of the spirit of the NPT.

So rather than make a declaration on the equality of sovereignty, it might be better for the US to make more efforts toward disarmament and at least rhetorically end the policy that the NNWS should not be blocked from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology.

[William F. Owen]

I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.

Your a fan of using Intelligence on which to base your policy?? ME TOO!!