Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[TheLapsedPacifist]

Sorry Bob, I may have missed your point - hotel room still not available - so still no sleep and so my thoughts are as fragged as they were earlier!

I think that the state - non-state deter thing was my point. Yet, I thought that you were writing a paper on how to deter non-state-actors. Your last comment seems to suggest to me that deter is a reasonable COA against a state - because they make a cost-benefit decision and hopefully we have stacked the odds in our favour.

Whereas a NSA has a different worldview and therefore unresponsive - either because they are deluded or immune (e.g. different value set). And even if they are responsive - we have to demonstrate the lesson frequently because of the myriad of NSAs - which leads to my attritional point.

So what’s the secret?

And if I might modify your elephant metaphor - what we are doing is swinging at the balls, sometimes we hit them, but mostly we don't – when we miss we sometimes kick the elephant – which is big and strong. I mean there's no real evidence that places AQ at the centre of Muslim interest - whereas being male, my balls are most definitely at the centre of my interest – especially if someone is trying to kick them.

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, I may have missed your point - hotel room still not available - so still no sleep and so my thoughts are as fragged as they were earlier!

I think that the state - non-state deter thing was my point. Yet, I thought that you were writing a paper on how to deter non-state-actors. Your last comment seems to suggest to me that deter is a reasonable COA against a state - because they make a cost-benefit decision and hopefully we have stacked the odds in our favour.

Whereas a NSA has a different worldview and therefore unresponsive - either because they are deluded or immune (e.g. different value set). And even if they are responsive - we have to demonstrate the lesson frequently because of the myriad of NSAs - which leads to my attritional point.

So what’s the secret?

And if I might modify your elephant metaphor - what we are doing is swinging at the balls, sometimes we hit them, but mostly we don't – when we miss we sometimes kick the elephant – which is big and strong. I mean there's no real evidence that places AQ at the centre of Muslim interest - whereas being male, my balls are most definitely at the centre of my interest – especially if someone is trying to kick them.

You will have to be willing to step away from what you believe to be true and attempt to see things from my perspective if you hope to understand. Actually, I see that a lot on here, people talking past each other because they are not curious about differing positions, so much as challenged by them. So they seek to defend what they already "know" rather than seek to understand something that does not fit within that comfortable circle.

I could take this elephant things several directions, but I will try to focus a bit myself. The balls by themselves won't cause much trouble, nor frankly, will the elephant without the balls. They are a team. We should not be trying to separate them from each other, nor should we be trying to help the rider (government) control the elephant, particularly if the rider was placed in his position by us.

But as you said, the elephant is getting powerful motivational messages from the balls and is likely to listen if not constrained by a steady hand on the reins by a caring rider, and a set of fair rules enforced by just rewards and punishment.

To deter the balls then, I do not target them directly except in a worse case situation where all else has failed. I focus on periphery. First the rider. Ensure the elephant knows that he is a rider of their choosing and work with the rider to ensure that he cares well for his charge, has just rewards and punishments and fair rules of law. Then the elephant himself. Treat him with respect and give him the space he needs and the opportunity to do those things that bring a sense of accomplishment to an elephant. For the most part, ignore his damn balls. They'll always be there, but he will not act out inappropriately often if these other factors are in place; and as the elephant matures and the rider becomes more comfortable and experienced in his role, the elephant will listen to the balls less and less every day.

So don't worry about trying to deter Bin Laden himself. Waste of time, kill the bastard. Don't try to rationalize with AQ directly either, they will think you are weak and pathetic and draw strength from your efforts. Seek to understand why the organization really exists (and to spread Islamism around the world and create a mighty Caliphate is NOT IT). This is indirect approach business. Focus on the needs of these long suppressed populaces, and on the poor governance that rules over them, and on the inappropriate influence the West has in this region. Create conditions that render AQ irrelevant and they are "deterred."

Or, you can just go kick the elphant in the Jimmy. Your call.

[William F. Owen]

You will have to be willing to step away from what you believe to be true and attempt to see things from my perspective if you hope to understand. Actually, I see that a lot on here, people talking past each other because they are not curious about differing positions, so much as challenged by them. So they seek to defend what they already "know" rather than seek to understand something that does not fit within that comfortable circle.

So basically to understand a certain argument, you will just have to believe that the earth is flat, or that gravity pushes, not pulls?

While I understand the spirit of enquiry and open minded thinking you are trying to impart, I have to say that does not translate well into discussion based on empirical evidence. I am immensely curious about the way you think, because I disagree with a lot of your basic assumptions.

EG: Bob's World teaches that insurgencies are caused by bad governments. I do not believe that to be true, because no government is perfect. What degree of imperfection causes an insurgency? Plus very many very bad Governments are very secure.

Giving up what people actually know to be true, or have evidence to support, is how you get faith based arguments like EBO, MW and 4GW. To understand them, you just have to "free your ass" from the facts.

[Bill Moore]

TheLapsedPacifist

I'm temporally embarressed at the moment, so possibly not at 100% but help me reconcile your comments...

"I don't think anyone is implying that irregular threats are a greater threat than potentially hostile nation-states."

...with...

"I'll argue an attack from a non-state actor is more dangerous, because it can come from...groups that we don't currently have the ability to deter...attack from the non-state actor is more probable and harder to prevent, thus more dangerous"

Fair enough, I must have changed my mind "after" I started writing (must have been a powerful argument ). Change that second paragraph to read an attack from a non-state actor is more likely, harder to detect, harder to deter, etc. I'll leave it to the reader to determine whether it is more dangerous based on their own criteria.

And which non-state actors are more capable than a state? Few. And of those who is a direct threat to, say, the USA? None.

If I wrote this, I'm not sure when and in what thread (I'm sleep deprived also ). In this discussion I wrote:

My guess is it is the group that obtains a weapon of mass destruction, probably a biological weapon and the group is willing to use it.

I don't think any of us know if that group exists now or will exist tomorrow, but we have to remain prepared and vigilant for that potential (and of course that is the rub, are we preparing for imaginary threat versus dealing with real threats? Since imaginary threats are limitless which ones should we prepare for).

What non-state actors are more capable than a State? What State? More capable at what? States have fallen to non-state actors throughout history, so it is important to understand the context.

[Bob's World]

So basically to understand a certain argument, you will just have to believe that the earth is flat, or that gravity pushes, not pulls?

While I understand the spirit of enquiry and open minded thinking you are trying to impart, I have to say that does not translate well into discussion based on empirical evidence. I am immensely curious about the way you think, because I disagree with a lot of your basic assumptions.

EG: Bob's World teaches that insurgencies are caused by bad governments. I do not believe that to be true, because no government is perfect. What degree of imperfection causes an insurgency? Plus very many very bad Governments are very secure.

Giving up what people actually know to be true, or have evidence to support, is how you get faith based arguments like EBO, MW and 4GW. To understand them, you just have to "free your ass" from the facts.

Ok, you have my position close, but not quite, and this is definitely an area where small nuances are incredibly important.

I do believe that "Insurgency happens when Government Fails," but that is a bumper sticker intended to state a general case and gain the attention of the majority of "new to insurgency" individuals and let them know that if they are focused on defeating the insurgent they are looking in the wrong direction.

Now, I do not say though that this is cause by "bad" or "failed" governments; often they are quite well intentioned and effectively functional. Often it is a fairly small segment of the populace that feels that it is experiencing "poor" governance.

So what is "poor" governance? It can be anything really, and it may only be a strongly believed perception and not actually true. Almost always it is considered to be quite irrational to the counterinsurgent. Usually it is something that falls in the "respect" tier of Maslow's hierarchy. (Too many focus on the lower tier issues of hunger, shelter, security, etc. These do influence the masses to join, but the movement itself is typically about ones mind and not their stomach). But "PG" is a two-part equation. The first part is this condition. The second part is the widely held perception that there is no means in legitimate channels to address the condition. So to target PG one must:
1. Believe that it is important to address PG to resolve the Insurgency,
2. Conduct polling to gain a sense of what the PG issues really are from the perspective of those who either participate in or support the movement,
3. Develop a program of engagement to address the PG issue,
4. Develop a companion program of engagement to address the exclusion (real or perceived) of the disenfranchised group from legitimate resolution channels.
5. Provide enhanced security measures for the rest of the populace coupled with increased efforts to bring key wrong-doers to justice.
6. Bundle all of this into a cogent narrative that describes what you are doing, why you are doing it, and that also matches what you are actually doing. (The insurgent's message will fall of its own weight if you do this, so focus on your own, not his).

I see this as a universal construct to every insurgency that I have studied. I don't believe that the nature of warfare has changed recently, nor do I believe the nature of insurgency has changed recently either. I do, however, believe that many populaces, primarily in the Middle East, were held static with governments that were more the choosing of others than themselves, and that the end of the Cold War set these populaces into motion to seek change (much as the end of WWII set populaces in South and Southeast Asian into motion) and that the new information tools not only render many time-proven tactics fairly ineffective, they also make the insurgent movement itself much harder to simply extinguish through force of arms as they are less likely to lose hope for success. These same info tools allow AQ, which is essentially a club, to act like a state to conduct UW to incite and fuel these many discrete insurgencies to support common causes in addition to their primary nationalist base causes.

Another area we differ is that I see these dynamics on a continuum (as does Kitson by the way, pg 2-3 of LIC) from a satisfied populace, to one that has a subversive movement, to one that has an insurgent movement. The key being, that the causation is the same for the subversion as it is for the insurgency; and it is far more helpful to deriving and implementing a solution to focus on the causation of the problem rather than to focus on if the organization has resorted to violence or not. To focus on the use of violence leads to confusing a populace acting out due to poor governance with other types of violence. It puts the focus on ending the violence rather than resolving the cause for the violence.

Most counterinsurgencies struggle because the counterinsurgent is unwilling to recognize and admit his own shortcomings, after all, he is in the right. Far easier to focus on the insurgent, who is by definition a criminal.

So the BW approach is rooted in what I believe to be the underlying principles of human dynamics, group dynamics, and governance that I see at work in these types of conflicts. This is very different than the dynamics that lead to conflicts between states.

The dynamics that drive insurgency are the same ones that drive neighborhood and family disputes. They are deeply personal and not about what "side" you are on; because at the end of the day you are on the same side, you just have an issue that is intolerable to some, and those same few don't feel they have a legitimate venue to resolve it.

This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.

[jmm99]

your viewers in the peanut gallery are not losing interest.

Just to keep the constructs in some sort of order, I'm looking at the positions (in this thread and several other current threads) as basically three:

1. Classic (conventional, establishment) counterinsurgency - e.g., Wilf as its proponent, joined by others.

2. Reformist counterinsurgency (the huge middle ground - which has its "conservative" and "liberal" wings, framing its own middle ground) - possibly most here at SWC ?

3. Revolutionary counterinsurgency - e.g., COL Jones seems to point in that direction (not quite Cord Meyer in his younger days - first three paragraphs in the last link are relevant to what I mean - but close IMO).

You are really not talking past each other; but are presenting very different constructs. Good work, all.

[William F. Owen]

This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.

Well I only see Insurgencies as using "military means." Anything peaceful is politics in it's broadest sense. This is why I view military power as instrumental. It's the difference between a GP (the Government) and a Surgeon ( the Military). If you don't have resort to military power to combat military means, it simply fails to make my radar as a military problem.

This is Small Wars, is it not?

[MikeF]

Well I only see Insurgencies as using "military means." Anything peaceful is politics in it's broadest sense. This is why I view military power as instrumental. It's the difference between a GP (the Government) and a Surgeon ( the Military). If you don't have resort to military power to combat military means, it simply fails to make my radar as a military problem.

This is Small Wars, is it not?

so who's the psychiatrist or priest to mend the emotional wounds?

[William F. Owen]

so who's the psychiatrist or priest to mend the emotional wounds?

I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

[MikeF]

I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

Wilf, I would suggest that is the flaw in your argument. That transcends the notional explanation of the Westphalian nation-state solution. Using the gunshot wound analogy, the surgeon (military) can only operate. They cannot heal the emotional divide (the seperation in most areas between nation and state).

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

I can't tell you, but if they're not cutting, they're not surgeons!

I've long believed that who you go to with your problem will shape remedy you are told to apply.

Go to a Priest, and he will recommend you pray.

Go to a bartender, and he will pour you a drink.

Go to your lawyer, and he will recommend you sue.

Go to a surgeon, and he will recommend surgery.

So, you are the head of a small country and you have been very focused on watching the balance grow in your Swiss accounts, but not so much on the concerns and needs of your populace. Western Governments have been very helpful in your endeavors, and extraction operations are in full swing. One day you look out your window and see that those malcontents in Provence X have taken up arms and are beginning to act out violently. You task your own security chief to do something about it, but not much changes and you suspect strongly that he has made some sort of "non-confrontation" pact with the rebels.

Meanwhile, the corporate heads of the western companies running the extraction operations have been lobbying hard back to their own governments about their concerns of potential disruption of vital resources (ok, their real concern is disruption of profits, but they know to shape their argument for the target audience). Ambassadors call on you and offer their assistance in your COIN efforts, and a Military coalition is formed and flown into your country to deal with the problem.

Now, if you ask a military officer what the solution to your problem is, what do you think he will suggest? After all, this is just a Small War, right?


Point being it is not the size of the war that determines the cause or solution to the problems that gave rise to the conflict. You must, as CvC warned, first understand what type of war you are in, not what size.


It reminds me of a significant emotional experience I had as an undergrad. I was studying forestry at Oregon State University, and was on an engineering track. Until I got to integration calculus, that is. My professor was a genius who would fill 5-6 blackboards with complex equations while he rapidly explained what he was doing. He would not, however explain steps based in Algebra or Geometry, as those were self-evident, and only focus on the calculus aspects of the problems. Now, those who have studied Calculus know that there are dozens of reducing formulas that must be memorized, and that there are a few basic types of problems. To solve an equation requires that one recognize first what type of problem it is, then set up the equation properly, and then simply apply the correct reducing formulae in the right manner to ultimately get to the correct answer. Simple, no?

Meanwhile, I was still trying to figure out the Algebra or Geometry step the prof had skipped. I was overwhelmed with data, and my circular thinking was causing me to think about options I didn't understand, and was preventing me from grasping the basics first and building from there. I earned a D+, but Dr. Stacey gave me an F so that I would have to take the course again.

Next term, I had a far less skilled TA, but my brain had time to finally commit the reducing formulae to memory, get up to speed on algebra and geometry, and then one day, like a curtain lifted, I could suddenly look at the problems and immediately recognize what type they were and apply the correct reducing process. I earned the highest score in the class.


This is why I am adamant (as is Galula) that COIN is civil government business. They own both the cause and the solution, and should never be absolved of that fact. Then, when the military comes in, I suggest highly that you call a specialist in this type of conflict to shape and implement the proper cure. These are big jobs, and there will be plenty of work for the total force, but use the right guys to scope the problem. SOF within the military are much like specialists within the Medical profession. Sure, you can have a general practitioner operate on your daughter's brain tumor, or, you can hire a specialist who focuses on that type of operation. The specialist if far more likely to be able to ID exactly what type of tumor he is dealing with and apply the correct treatment. The general practitioner may focus on surface issues, such as the size of the tumor, and prescribe the wrong approach based on that incomplete analysis of the problem.

Truth be told "Small Wars Journal" is a misnomer; but it has a nicer ring to it than "Populace-based Wars Journal."

So:
1. Be careful who you bring your problems to,
2. Size matters, but it does not determine the nature of the problem,
3. Causation is more important than Motivation, and that is more important than the tactics being employed, as one assesses a populace-based conflict and is shaping a program of engagement.
4. Never, ever, get in front of the Civil Government or the Host Nation when you assist them. You are there help fix them, not help them fix their populace.

[William F. Owen]

I've long believed that who you go to with your problem will shape remedy you are told to apply.

Go to a Priest, and he will recommend you pray.

Go to a bartender, and he will pour you a drink.

Go to your lawyer, and he will recommend you sue.

Go to a surgeon, and he will recommend surgery.

Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions.

[Bob's World]

Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions.

Ahh, but if you are used to one particular solution working for you for a particular problem, you are likely to call that provider even though the situation has changed.

Do you keep taking your car to the corner gas station for a tune up now that it is far more a computer issue than a mechanical one? After all, it is still just a car and just a tune up...

Times change, we must change as well. Some changes are significant, others not so much, key is to understand which ones are. I think we've largely missed the boat on that particular aspect of our current problem set.

[Entropy]

BW,

When are policmakers ever so enlightened? I think your theory is mostly sound but, as is often the case, people (politicians in particular) don't conform well to theories.

Secondly, one shouldn't assume there is only one solution to a problem and governance may not be the best. So I wonder if you are replacing one set of blinders with another since it seems you are arguing that, once deconstructed, these conflicts are always about governance.

Third, the US, as a third party in these conflicts, must operate within the constraints set by the host government or take our ball and go home. That latter option usually isn't feasible, so we end up with the nasty sausage-making business of trying to help and reform the host government at the same time. Take Afghanistan. For better or worse, our strategy is wedded to that government and, by extension, the governance it can potentially provide.

Fourth, as I've said before, there are limits to what "governance" can do. You may have the best government in history and there will still be people and groups who would rather go their own way and don't want any part. What do you do then? In Afghanistan, for example, this isn't uncommon.

Finally, and this is a point I've brought up before (and related to my third point), the nature of governance matters. What is it when one tries to impose an alien form of governance upon a populace? Is that governance or imperialism? That is happening in Afghanistan too. The West operates from a mindset that "Afghanistan" is a single nation with the clearly defined borders shown on a map. It has never been thus and there are many populations within that border who aren't interested in ceding authority to Kabul. How does your theory deal with populaces that are largely self-governing and neither need nor desire any "national" form of governance? These populations are not rebelling against "poor governance" since governance (outside their group) never really existed.

You see, I'm skeptical of this whole "governance" thing when it comes to Afghanistan. Our attempts to extend governance fail miserably because we don't understand the local conditions and we operate with a Western concept of what governance is supposed to be. We are wedded to the idea of a strong central government which can "control" the entire "nation" of Afghanistan and your theory would seem to argue that all we need is more governance in order to bring this to pass. It seems likely that Afghanistan, a Frankenstein colonial creation, may be an inherently unviable state. If that's the case, then it seems to me that less "governance" is required, not more.

Wilf,

Conversely if you have burst pipe, call a plumber. If you have fire, call the fire brigade. Some problems define their solutions.

Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

[William F. Owen]

Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

Wow! Thanks. Never knew that. As my wife frequently tells people, "Sure, he can talk about Clausewitz, but can he cook?"

[Bob's World]

BW,

When are policmakers ever so enlightened? I think your theory is mostly sound but, as is often the case, people (politicians in particular) don't conform well to theories.

Secondly, one shouldn't assume there is only one solution to a problem and governance may not be the best. So I wonder if you are replacing one set of blinders with another since it seems you are arguing that, once deconstructed, these conflicts are always about governance.

Third, the US, as a third party in these conflicts, must operate within the constraints set by the host government or take our ball and go home. That latter option usually isn't feasible, so we end up with the nasty sausage-making business of trying to help and reform the host government at the same time. Take Afghanistan. For better or worse, our strategy is wedded to that government and, by extension, the governance it can potentially provide.

Fourth, as I've said before, there are limits to what "governance" can do. You may have the best government in history and there will still be people and groups who would rather go their own way and don't want any part. What do you do then? In Afghanistan, for example, this isn't uncommon.

Finally, and this is a point I've brought up before (and related to my third point), the nature of governance matters. What is it when one tries to impose an alien form of governance upon a populace? Is that governance or imperialism? That is happening in Afghanistan too. The West operates from a mindset that "Afghanistan" is a single nation with the clearly defined borders shown on a map. It has never been thus and there are many populations within that border who aren't interested in ceding authority to Kabul. How does your theory deal with populaces that are largely self-governing and neither need nor desire any "national" form of governance? These populations are not rebelling against "poor governance" since governance (outside their group) never really existed.

You see, I'm skeptical of this whole "governance" thing when it comes to Afghanistan. Our attempts to extend governance fail miserably because we don't understand the local conditions and we operate with a Western concept of what governance is supposed to be. We are wedded to the idea of a strong central government which can "control" the entire "nation" of Afghanistan and your theory would seem to argue that all we need is more governance in order to bring this to pass. It seems likely that Afghanistan, a Frankenstein colonial creation, may be an inherently unviable state. If that's the case, then it seems to me that less "governance" is required, not more.

Wilf,



Actually, if you have a burst pipe, the first thing you do is turn off the water - otherwise you'll have a lot more than the plumber coming to your house.

I would never suggest to impose ones governance on another. Rarely will it be proper, and never will it be apprciated.

And while I say that it is the failure of governance that leads to insurgency, often it may well be LESS governance that provides the solution. Particularly in a strongly tribal culture such as the Middle East and Africa.

This reminds me of how America almost destroyed our forests. Obviously our unregulated "cut out and get out" approach to the first 1/3 of the country was not sustainable, so we turned to the Germans who were experts on managing forests. They had cut down all of their wild forest years earlier, and had in place a very orderly, logical system of managed stands. This is the technology they brought to America and that we accepted as the "right answer."

So, step one to an orderly, managed, sustainable forest was to cut down all of the wild forests. And this is what we set out to do. Can't have disorder, you know, it is too difficult to manage.

I think westernrs take a similar approach to governance. First you must take out all of the "wild" governance and replace it with an orderly, managed, sustainable system.

I don't think this approach is any more proper for the governance of people than it is for the management of forests. Those who know forests understand the importance of bio-diversity, and the incredible inter-related order that exists within what looks like chaos and wilderness to an outsider.

Less is more.


As to WILF's pipes, instead of calling a plumber every 20 years when they go out, and looking at the 20 good years as success; I suggest that you consider what it is about your actions that may well be contributing to this regular failure? Is it some destructive mix you regularly dump into the system? Is it a failure to conduct proper regular maintenance? Are you perhaps using that handy pipe in the basement as a pull-up bar?

These things are systems, and our input to the system is major component to how that system operates. Perhaps you will still need to call that plumber, but if you understand your role in the problem more completely you will be less likely to blame the pipes or the last plumber for the problem. Human nature is to avoid blame. We must overcome our nature.

[Entropy]

Wow! Thanks. Never knew that. As my wife frequently tells people, "Sure, he can talk about Clausewitz, but can he cook?"

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be sarcastic! The only point I was trying to make is that problems can quickly explode past easily defined solutions.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

I do believe that "Insurgency happens when Government Fails," but that is a bumper sticker intended to state a general case and gain the attention of the majority of "new to insurgency" individuals and let them know that if they are focused on defeating the insurgent they are looking in the wrong direction.

Now, I do not say though that this is cause by "bad" or "failed" governments; often they are quite well intentioned and effectively functional. Often it is a fairly small segment of the populace that feels that it is experiencing "poor" governance.

So what is "poor" governance? It can be anything really, and it may only be a strongly believed perception and not actually true.

Are you drawing on RK Merton's work on criminology? I'm just getting the feeling that, if you aren't, you should take a look at it since it seems to be paralleling your argument.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, I wasn't trying to be sarcastic! The only point I was trying to make is that problems can quickly explode past easily defined solutions.

No sarcasm detected. It was a good point on the limit of my analogy!

[Bob's World]

Hi Bob,



Are you drawing on RK Merton's work on criminology? I'm just getting the feeling that, if you aren't, you should take a look at it since it seems to be paralleling your argument.

I suspect as we scratch into this we will find many parallels in many walks of life, as what we are discussing is not warfare so much as human nature; and human nature affects everything we do when we gather in groups.

As a former prosecutor I got a pretty good dose of dealing with three groups that I did not have much contact with prevously:
1. Criminals
2. Addicts
3. mentally ill

(And that was just the Defense Bar!!)

Clearly this experience contributed to how I look at things. Being an SF officer made me a more effective prosecutor (I love a good jury trial! The combination of mission, populace, opponent, strategy and tactics, etc. Each trial was like a mini-campaign); and having been a prosecutor makes me a more effective SOF strategist. We are all shaped by our experiences, and I recognize that mine are fairly unique.