Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
This drives a number of questions. First, we're shifting the goalposts a bit. We were discussing the factors that drive insurgency, now we're talking about the factors that drive the export of foreign fighters... two very different things.
Yes, Saudis represent roughly 40% of the foreign fighters in Iraq, and that sounds a lot. But 40% of what number? In sum we are talking about a few hundred individuals, and it is difficult to see that as a reaction of a populace to misgovernment. I'm not sure that it's accurate to say "we are not being attacked by the populaces of our "enemies," but rather by the populaces of our "friends"", because we are not being attacked by a populace, we are being attacked by a small cadre of committed radicals. If the populace is truly disaffected, why do we not see anything resembling an insurgency in Saudi Arabia? Surely AQ would promote such an insurgency in Saudi Arabia if it could. If it hasn't, that means it can't.
When you say that "The irony is that those we consider "enemies" are the states that had the hutzpah to break out from our influence during the cold war.", it is worth noting that the second largest contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq is from Libya, which is a prominent member of the group that "had the hutzpah to break out from our influence". The pattern is not entirely consistent.
Re this comment: "We can supplant AQ as the facilitator of governmental change.". I have to ask, is AQ really seen as a facilitator of governmental change by more than a small minority of the Saudi populace? I'm not sure that it is. I see no evidence that any significant portion of the Saudi populace - including those that support AQ efforts abroad - wants to be ruled by AQ or wants to see AQ gain significant influence in the Saudi government. Again, if this was the case we would be seeing something resembling insurrection in Saudi Arabia... and we're not.
I don't see any particular evidence that the changes in Saudi government sought by AQ have any particular appeal to the populace at large. Neither do I think that anything we would consider "reform" would undercut AQ - more likely it would get them even more upset.
Does AQ represent a Saudi insurgency - a populace disaffected by bad government - or a small cadre of committed ideologues pursuing an extremist agenda with limited popular appeal? I'd have to suggest the latter.
A few other points relevant to the discussion:
We need to recall that the precedent for Saudi financial and personal support for jihad against a foreign military presence in Muslim nations was established with the full consent and encouragement of the US and the Saudi government. It's easier to create a precedent like that than it is to un-create it.
The mess that was Saudi Arabia in the 90s was exacerbated by bad government, but it was largely driven by external factors. The oil glut and price crash of that period had a devastating impact on the Saudi economy. The first Iraq war and the uncertain resolution of that war left a prolonged American military presence that was easily exploited by radicals claiming that the Americans were keeping oil prices low, keeping the Saudis marginalized, etc. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left a large cadre of unemployed jihadis and a group of jihad leaders that were ill equipped to return to civilian life. That's a mix that even effective government would be hard pressed to manage.
I see a distinct reluctance among Americans to acknowledge what the Saudi Government has done with its recent oil windfall. The proceeds of the first great oil surge were invested almost entirely abroad; not so the second time around. The Saudis have put hundreds of billions into housing, hospitals, infrastructure, factories, job generation. Civil Service salaries have surged. The money is being spent locally, it is extremely visible, and there has been a real impact on popular sentiment. The hard core religious ideologues will not change their view, but the populace at large is a whole lot less disaffected than it was in the late 90s.
What do we want the Saudi government to do? They can't go back in time and rectify the errors of the past, any more than we can. If we want them to adopt western-style democracy we're bound to be disappointed; they won't do it and there is little popular demand for it. If we want them to invest more in meeting the needs of their people, they are already doing that.
We do not prop up the government of Saudi Arabia, and they are not our puppet. They don't need us to prop them up. Maybe they did at some point in the past, but that point is long gone: at this point we are more likely to be requesting their support (particularly in managing the oil price/supply balance and maintaining their investments in US debt and equity markets) than they are to be requesting ours. They certainly don't need our financial support, more the other way around. If they are threatened with external aggression we will support them whatever their shortcomings, because there is a compelling strategic need to do so: their enemies are also ours, and we cannot afford to see that much oil in the hands of enemies. What exactly are we asking the Saudi government to do?
Where exactly do you propose to elevate the populace, rather than the government, and how do you propose to do that?
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