Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[davidbfpo]

I would suggest that SWC look south for an indicator of what can be done with an apparently strongly entrenched government capable of suppressing internal and external dissent - I refer to the Republic of South Africa (RSA). Several factors undermined the RSA's strength: lack of external investment, internal demand for economic change (or growth), illegitimacy internally (notably within part of the white population) and externally. The list goes on.

What did the real world do? I exclude platitudes and UN "action".

Arms boycott (with holes), legislation reinforcing economic disinvestment (marked impact on internal debate in RSA), encouraging dialogue between businessmen and the ANC - which developed into politicians joining in. Low-profile, official dialogue between some Western governments with the ANC and internal dissidents.

Some of these steps will not apply to Saudi Arabia (KSA), or Eygpt. Nor will they work, e.g. Zimbabwe.

Many such options will now be seen as unthinkable - with KSA - and how would KSA react?

Not my area 'new' diplomacy, just some thoughts.

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

Saudi Arabia is our Ally, but they are not our Friend

Saudi Arabia is a kingdom, and as such, not only do they not share the national interests of the United States, they do not even possess national interests at all. There is only one kind of interest in Saudi Arabia, and that is the interest of the King. It is extremely important for the U.S. to understand this simple point as it strives to establish a stable, Shia dominated, democratic Iraq on The Kingdom’s northern border, because that is the last thing that King Abdullah wants to see happen there.

There are arguably three things that King Abdullah fears more than anything else, and these fears shape the essence of Saudi policy. The first of these fears is a reemergence of Iran as a major regional power with normalized relations with the U.S. and the West; the second fear is a rise in power of Shia Muslims relative to that possessed by Sunnis; and the third great fear of the King of Saudi Arabia is of his own populace. These fears shape the policies of Saudi Arabia, and they shape the nature of the Saudi aspect of the Saudi-U.S. relationship. The U.S. aspect is shaped by oil; the need to keep the flow of Saudi oil moving to U.S. consumers, and also the terms of long-standing contracts that control how the profits of that oil market are distributed.

So long as the U.S. understands that these three great fears shape the policy of Saudi Arabia above all things, there is no reason end the alliance. The essence of the relationship however is not about alliance, it is about reliance, and therein lays the problem. The U.S. appears to confuse its need for Saudi oil with a need for sustaining the Saudi Governance in its current state; a position so out of context with everything that the U.S. stands for, that it can only be explained by an almost drug addict-like reliance on sustaining that flow of oil. The King, on the other hand, is equally reliant on the power of the U.S. to sustain the chokehold that he and his family have on the wealth and power of Saudi Arabia. A relationship this dysfunctional cannot help but produce unfortunate results.

A strong case can be made that the U.S. – Saudi relationship, more than any other thing, is the Decisive Point for achieving stability in the Middle East. In military terms, a Decisive Point is “A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack.” While that is a very tactical perspective, the potential from getting this relationship right could produce a domino effect of stability throughout the entire Middle East, and it is high time to stop allowing one man’s personal, self-serving interests to prevent that from occurring.

The Saudi populace, like so many in the Middle East, is in a state of emergent insurgency. It is essential to understand three elements of governance in order to deal appropriately with an insurgent populace: Effectiveness, Goodness, and Legitimacy. Effectiveness is an objective assessment of how well a government performs. Goodness is a subjective assessment through the eyes of the governed populace as to how they feel about their government and their options for effecting legal change. Legitimacy is the perceived source of power that creates and sustains a government. Of the three, it is a failure of “Goodness” that leads to insurgency; but it is the real or perceived source of “Legitimacy” that determines who the insurgent attacks.

The disgruntled segment of the Saudi populace understands full well that they must first break the support of the U.S. government to their own before they can have any hope of achieving good governance at home. Osama bin Laden, who shares this goal of disrupting U.S. control of the region and taking down the Saudi royals, makes this point very clear as his al Qaeda Network wages a very state-like unconventional warfare campaign to synergize the Sunni insurgencies of the region. This explains why 15 of the 19 attackers of 9/11 were Saudis. This explains why some 40% of the foreign fighters and the vast majority of suicide bombers in Iraq have been Saudis. To cast these men simply as “Terrorists” while accurate is both unfair to them and dangerous to the U.S. These men do not take these extreme measures to destroy America, they take these extreme measures to restore and preserve Saudi Arabia.

To be clear, this is a popular uprising, and not state sanctioned terrorism. It is highly unlikely that the King sanctions these attacks on U.S. interests. Far better to have the insurgent segment of his populace focused on frustrating U.S. interests in the region than on attacking the Saudi Government directly; particularly if this provides an outlet to his populace’s frustrations and prevents or slows the establishment of a Shia dominated Iraqi democracy and keeps the Iranians in check. After all, it is in his interest.

[davidbfpo]

Sometime ago I recall a UK commentator talked about two nightmare events for the UK: a) a coup in Pakistan by Jihadist army officers; and b) the violent removal of the Saudi royal family by Jihadists.

Looking back to 1969 such a small nightmare has happened with Gadafy's coup in Libya, removing a King whose regime was seen as pro-Western; with UK and US bases. Perhaps the King's governance was poor for Libyans I don't know, but what has happened since has many critics; as indicated in coverage of the 40th anniversary. At the time the UK had enough soldiers in Libya to reverse the coup with ease (IIRC a light armoured brigade) and who was Gadafy's first visitor - the UK Army brigadier, to ask what are your intentions?

Would we take such a "hands off" stance on Gadafy figure again?

For the UK I suspect much of our policy towards Pakistan and KSA is governed by the nightmare fear - however remote or likely inside government assessments are.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

I think the discussion on the numbers of foreign fighters from each country is somewhat misleading. First the numbers are small, and that does matter. Second, it isn't that hard for a fighter to move from Saudi to Iraq, so geography plays a major role. Third, the information is patchy, hardly a complete picture, there is a lot we don't know. Fourth, foreign fighters are recruited, so if there is a recruiting infrastructure in place there will be probably be foreign fighters. There have been Europeans, Brits, and Americans recruited, and this has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with the legitimacy of the government. They just happen to believe in the cause. It is too simplistic to draw a line to the government's legitimacy.

Let's take a look internally, the KKK hates blacks, and the Aryan Nation hates everyone, but especially Jewish people. The Aryan Nation is a global network of sorts, so it isn't improbable to assume that they could recruit fighters to support resistance movements against Israel throughout Europe, S. Africa, parts of S. America, and throughout the U.S.. Transforming their governments and appealing to the "people" will not change this one bit, nor will building schools, roads, etc. These groups are motivated by hate. Many of the groups in the Middle East are motiviated by hate, and they will not be swayed with our populace centric COIN doctrine or the proposed deterence proposals.

Not all is lost, it doesn't mean that our COIN doctrine or your proposed deterence model is wrong, but simply that it doesn't apply in all situations. Wilf can counter if I'm taking his words out of context, but I agree strongly with what he wrote earlier (this is an interpretation, not a quote), about understanding the problem and then developing an appropriate strategy to address it, don't blindly apply doctrine.

My thoughts are if you come into the fight with a population-centric COIN doctrine view, then you'll perceive the problem from that lens, and it may blind to you what is really going on. This is my problme with our irregular warfare concept, which simply throws COIN, FID, UW, Stability Ops, and CT into one bin. What do you think the problem is? A terrorist? Use this book. An insurgent? Use this book. It doesn't work. We talk about complexity, yet we default to stupid. We are showing up witha preconceived view of the problem (government legitimacy), and building schools, and losing the fight.

We must look at every problem as unique and respond appropriately. It isn't population or enemy centric (what fight isn't?), it is something else, and we're missing it.

[Rex Brynen]

My thoughts are if you come into the fight with a population-centric COIN doctrine view, then you'll perceive the problem from that lens, and it may blind to you what is really going on. This is my problme with our irregular warfare concept, which simply throws COIN, FID, UW, Stability Ops, and CT into one bin. What do you think the problem is? A terrorist? Use this book. An insurgent? Use this book. It doesn't work. We talk about complexity, yet we default to stupid. We are showing up witha preconceived view of the problem (government legitimacy), and building schools, and losing the fight.

We must look at every problem as unique and respond appropriately. It isn't population or enemy centric (what fight isn't?), it is something else, and we're missing it.

(emphasis added)

I absolutely agree--we're in real danger of developing cookie-cutter approaches to complex and varied problems, each rooted in very different sets of social, political, military, and geopolitical contexts.

Just to take the Middle East: Hamas, Hizbullah, AQI, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Fateh al-Islam, the Saada insurgency in Yemen are all very different things, even if there are some occasional points of intersection. By all means, lets develop a COIN toolbox, rooted in lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But lets also recognize that what tools are used depends on what the issue is--the whole point, indeed, of having a toolbox and not simply fixing everything with a hammer.

[slapout9]

Yeah, it's a clue -- and it's accurate. It's the result of many things, most not attributable to US errors, though some certainly are. Sure is a clue. Big, glaring obvious one.

The issue is what to do about it.

What's the SBW solution?

What's the Bob's World's solution?

Realistic solutions preferred.

There is a SBW solution and I do believe it is realistic, but you will have to wait for the answer. Since Colonel Gurney has requested an article on the Strategic Value of SBW I will certainly try to do that.

[MikeF]

[Osama bin Laden, who shares this goal of disrupting U.S. control of the region and taking down the Saudi royals, makes this point very clear as his al Qaeda Network wages a very state-like unconventional warfare campaign to synergize the Sunni insurgencies of the region. This explains why 15 of the 19 attackers of 9/11 were Saudis. This explains why some 40% of the foreign fighters and the vast majority of suicide bombers in Iraq have been Saudis. To cast these men simply as “Terrorists” while accurate is both unfair to them and dangerous to the U.S. These men do not take these extreme measures to destroy America, they take these extreme measures to restore and preserve Saudi Arabia.

Agree, BUT...

The charaterization of al Qaeda as a very state-like unconvential warfare campaign is a better description than a transnational terrorist organization; however, OBL only represents one moment in a rather long struggle to take down a state and establish a caliphate.

Arguably, this movement started back in the 1920's in Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a non-secular government. The Muslim Brotherhood was formed, and they ventured to Egypt and conducted a UW campaign there. Sayid Qutb rose as the primary religious leader (as described by Albert Bergensen in The Sayyid Qutb Reader). Qutb along with other members were tortured and executed in Egyptian jails during the 1960's. These actions sparked the next movement of which Zawahari rose.


LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein captures the link between Zawahiri and Qutb in
Ayman al-Zawahiri, A Mythic Figure or Fringe Leader within the Islamist Political Movement: Highlighting the 2006 Writings of Egyptian Journalist Gamal Abdal-Rahim.

Psychosis is defined as a mental state involving a loss of contact with reality. However, Zawahiri can arguably be classified as a rational psychotic, whose ideas were formulated over decades and whose rational delusions are still evolving. To deconstruct his psychosis, it is important to examine his evolution from upper middle class medical student, successful doctor to a man who has chosen the life of caves and extremism. The trial and execution of Sayyid Qutb was a pivotal event in the formation of Zawahiri’s intellectual development and framed his political thought. He read Qutb in the ninth grade and was influenced by his two works “In the Shade of the Quran,” and “Milestones Along the Road.” His first analytical attempt at understanding the Quran (the Islamic book of divine revelation) came through Qutb and has shaped his views ever since. This is unfortunate as one can spend a lifetime studying the diverse commentaries on the Quran, and typically learned clerics delve into various and competing interpretations found in Islam’s fourteen century history. Zawahiri was obsessed with Qutb’s view on tawheed (monotheism) which not only defined the struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims, but was an ideological struggle as to who possesses sovereignty, God or man? It is the shariah (Islamic Law) or the man-made laws of secularism, materialism, communism, democracy, there is no middle road. In essence, Zawahiri’s argument is a self-defeating struggle of the creator versus the created and who will reign supreme?

The movement morphed and evolved. Eventually, AQ settled for a safe-haven in Afghanistan-Pakistan with the hopes of conducting UW against KSA. I'm not sure if this helps or hurts your argument. I wanted to include it for background. In the beginning, the movement was not about KSA or the US.

v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

It isn't population or enemy centric (what fight isn't?), it is something else, and we're missing it.

Bill, you are absolutely right we are missing something....and war is a system believe it or not. A couple of times in some of your posts you have come close to hitting it dead center as in pointing out what is missing and then you moved away from it for some reason.

[Bob's World]

The Caliphate is BS. That's like someone saying they want to reestablish the Roman or Greek or Napoleonic empires.

Even adding to ludicrousness is that fact that AQ must have the sanctuary of its non-state status to avoid being hammered by the strong states they have attacked.

Yet our intel guys take everything they say about this as gospel without stopping to apply a "how much of this is PSYOP" test.

So I do not take the Caliphate literally at all, and so do not fear it. If you mean an alliance not unlike the EU or NATO of predominantly Muslim states, well, I think that is quite possible, but not anything we need to be particularly scared of.

[Bill Moore]

Bill, you are absolutely right we are missing something....and war is a system believe it or not. A couple of times in some of your posts you have come close to hitting it dead center as in pointing out what is missing and then you moved away from it for some reason.

Slapout, I'm still trying to zero my rifle, I think it is cheap replica from China, so I'm having some trouble. You know it is never the shooter's fault, must be something wrong with the weapon.

To me systems are like models, and to accept a model (system) is the first step to putting the blinders on, especially as the nature of the conflict morphs over time. I'm listening, still not buying it.

[MikeF]

The Caliphate is BS. That's like someone saying they want to reestablish the Roman or Greek or Napoleonic empires.

Even adding to ludicrousness is that fact that AQ must have the sanctuary of its non-state status to avoid being hammered by the strong states they have attacked.

Excellent observation, and I think that this point hammers home a weakness in the entire AQ argument. They simply don't have a "good" idea to sell. Living under a regime where your hand is cut-off for minor infractions or your first-born is trained to blow himself up doesn't exactly lead to prosperous hopes for the future. Personally, I think AQ will be marginalized by the Muslim community in the next two decades.

Yet our intel guys take everything they say about this as gospel without stopping to apply a "how much of this is PSYOP" test.

I think the problem is worse than that. How many intel dudes (or other mil guys) have even read Qutb or Zawahari? The USMA CTC does a great job of translating the documents, but there is a lack of analysis and interpretation throughout the military. We just disregard it.

v/r

Mike

[Bill Moore]

The Caliphate is BS. That's like someone saying they want to reestablish the Roman or Greek or Napoleonic empires.

This depends, perhaps it is not feasible, but that far from being B.S.. If this is the strategic end envisioned by Islamists, then it is there organizing strategic principle, and from my optic they seem to be pursuing this goal. This is part of understanding our enemy, you can't simply dismiss it as B.S.

Even adding to ludicrousness is that fact that AQ must have the sanctuary of its non-state status to avoid being hammered by the strong states they have attacked.

This may not be a "must have", but it has enabled the insurgency to survive in Afghanistan since the Soviets invaded until present day. Having a safe have definitely makes these groups more effective, and I would argue considerable more effective.

[Bob's World]

Actually what I am saying is that our fear of the Caliphate is doing more to build the caliphate than anything that AQ is doing itself. Our actions to stop what we fear validates their propaganda.

But no original Caliphate was made up of volunteers, these were conquered populaces. Hitler used the Third Reich in the same way AQ uses the Caliphate. It speaks to an oppressed people and offer hope for a better future where they do not have to fear such outside influence over them.

My point is that it is an impossibility in its stated form, and that we can offer these same people something that offers the same effect that is actually achievable. We cannot simply take everything AQ puts out as gospel, and then take a position 180 out. To dis-empower an ideology you must be able to take the reasonable aspects of it and AGREE with it. This leaves AQ with nothing by the unreasonable aspects to peddle.

[MikeF]

My point is that it is an impossibility in its stated form, and that we can offer these same people something that offers the same effect that is actually achievable. We cannot simply take everything AQ puts out as gospel, and then take a position 180 out. To dis-empower an ideology you must be able to take the reasonable aspects of it and AGREE with it. This leaves AQ with nothing by the unreasonable aspects to peddle.

After reading your initial post on US and KSA, I was trying to remember where I had seen that before...I just remembered that it flows throughout OBL's 21 year plan and much of the internal AQ philosophical/strategy debates.

I was going to post that OBL may concur with much of your logic.

So, I'm curious to see where you are headed.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

After reading your initial post on US and KSA, I was trying to remember where I had seen that before...I just remembered that it flows throughout OBL's 21 year plan and much of the internal AQ philosophical/strategy debates.

I was going to post that OBL may concur with much of your logic.

So, I'm curious to see where you are headed.

v/r

Mike

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...magazine-tw-1/

OBL makes some excellent points. So, what do we do about that?? Say that because he is our enemy that everypoint he makes is wrong (oh, except what he say about ideology and the caliphate, that is all 100% true)?

All I ask is that people think for themselves. Don't just parrot what Glenn Beck says. The US cannot move forward in the Middle East until we recognize that our Cold War based policy there is obsolete, create new policy, and move forward in a way that help clean up some of the mess we made. If we have the moral courage to do this we will render OBL largely moot.

We need to stand up to the "experts" who defined this conflict for us 8 years ago and tell them they had their chance, and they made the problem worse. Now it is time to apply sound principle of populace based conflicts to this and move forward.

[Dayuhan]

As to foreign fighters, I use this as an indicator, not some hard metric. We need to use indicators more. An increase of foreign investment capital in Mindanao is a far better indicator of progress than how many MILF were rolled up by the PNP, or when the last bombing was, or how many medical events the US sponsored, right?

I agree that indicators may be more useful than hard metrics. They are also dangerous, because there's a great deal of interpretation involved, and in every case the interpretation is likely to be affected by the background and assumptions of whoever is doing the interpreting. We often end up learning more about whoever is interpreting the indicators than we do about the subject.

We can look at the number of foreign fighters coming from Saudi Arabia and conclude that they are motivated by resentment toward US support of a government they want to get rid of. I'm not convinced that this is the only or the best explanation. Saudi Arabia also contributed much of the foreign manpower and money supporting the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation... was this an expression of resentment toward Soviet support of the Saudi regime? Why should we conclude that the factors motivating Saudis to assist Afghans fighting Soviet occupation were significantly different from those motivating Saudis to assist Iraqis fighting US occupation?

As you say, testosterone is a major factor, and I'd add that the combination of testosterone and adherence to a fundamentalist belief system (whether religious or political) is a particularly volatile combination. Again, though, does this indicate that the Saudi populace wants to overthrow its government, or does it indicate that the combination of a youthful population and a strong fundamentalist tradition makes Saudi Arabia an ideal recruiting ground for jihadis, whether aimed at the US or elsewhere?

We over state the problem. A dozen member of an insurgent group in Algeria that is getting ready to stand down change their name to AQ, and the intel guys go nuts and declare US Jihad on Algeria AQ. Perfect, just what Bin Laden would want us to do: conflate the threat, engage Algeria inappropriately and and force their hand to either attack their own populace more, or to allow us to run ops that violate their sovereignty...

If 95% of the Sioux Indian tribe are on the reservation, but Crazy Horse and a handful of testosterone fueled young bucks wipe out a couple of mining camps in the Black Hills, a supply convoy and a cavalry patrol; we blame the entire tribe and declare war.

Agreed... but with all due respect, is this not exactly what you are proposing with respect to Saudi Arabia? 99.999% of the Saudis are on the reservation; aren't you looking at the .001 percent that are attacking us and concluding that something is wrong with Saudi Arabia and we need to fix it?

So, like I said: Attack the perceptions. Co-opt and dis-empower much of AQ's message by taking on the role of mediator of evolution of self-determined governance and less overt Western influence over Middle Eastern politics.

Isn't there a bit of contradiction here? How do we take on the role of "mediator of evolution of self-determined governance" without exerting "overt Western influence"? Is there any evidence that the Saudis want us to take on such a role? If we're not invited to take on this role - and we're not - wouldn't any attempt to adopt that role be quite legitimately seen as overt interference? It seems to me that any effort to promote "self-determined governance" is going to be perceived as Western interference aimed at promoting Western interests, values and systems, and is likely to provoke rather than alleviate resentment. I'm also not sure what vehicles exist for us to promote political evolution: we can't do it by withholding support, because our support really isn't needed. Actively supporting some political groups would be interference and would probably hurt those groups more than it would help them.

Oh, and as to Saudi Arabia, that county has been in a constant state of Insurgent Causation, but every time a movement dares to emerge from the shadows it is crushed brutally. They have tried Shia based ideology movements, communism-based ideology movements, etc.

Is it not a basic premise of our approach to COIN that brutal suppression of an insurgency with a wide popular base is only going to fuel that insurgency? Why should it be any different in Saudi Arabia? Are their security services really that efficient? I'd suggest that the insurgencies you mention failed not only due to suppression, but because they failed to achieve sufficient traction among the populace. A Shi'a insurgency in Saudi Arabia is by definition going to be limited to a small area and a minority of the population, while a Communist one would have a difficult time gaining widespread support in such an intensely religious and conservative society.

All of the Gulf governments are engaged in a difficult balancing act. Their people are not monolithic; there are competing impulses involved. They need to respect tradition and religion; they are also expected to deliver modern conveniences and opportunities. While the vast bulk of their populations are rigorously Muslim, the radical political Islamists are a small minority: as in any country, most of the population is mostly concerned with their own security and prosperity, and see "good governance" as that which delivers security and prosperity. Policies that advance the interests of the bulk of the population (moderate internationalist foreign policies, openness to incoming and outgoing investment, active trade, modern education, etc) are likely to inflame the Islamist fringe. Surrendering to the Islamists in an effort to avoid violence is likely to provoke further violence aimed at generating further surrender. Violence makes the jihadi fringe visible; it does not mean that the jihadi fringe represents the will of the Saudi populace.

I have business interests in the Gulf, and I've spent a fair bit of time there, though more in the UAE and Qatar than in The Kingdom. I honestly don't sense any great urge to move toward Western-style democracy; there seems a widespread impression that it would result in absolute chaos. I've also noted that in many ways the average citizen has more access to government, through clan and tribal structures, than the average American. I have no doubt that evolution of some sort will occur, and that it needs to occur. I have no idea what form it will take, and I suspect that the best thing the US can do to promote it will be to keep our hands completely off the process. They will evolve in their own way, in their own time. They don't want us in that picture, and given the assumptions that US involvement invokes (we want the oil, we want to convert them to Christianity, etc), any effort by the US to participate in any way is likely to be perceived as self-interested interference and is likely to make matters worse.

[MikeF]

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...magazine-tw-1/

OBL makes some excellent points. So, what do we do about that?? Say that because he is our enemy that everypoint he makes is wrong (oh, except what he say about ideology and the caliphate, that is all 100% true)?

All I ask is that people think for themselves. Don't just parrot what Glenn Beck says. The US cannot move forward in the Middle East until we recognize that our Cold War based policy there is obsolete, create new policy, and move forward in a way that help clean up some of the mess we made. If we have the moral courage to do this we will render OBL largely moot.

We need to stand up to the "experts" who defined this conflict for us 8 years ago and tell them they had their chance, and they made the problem worse. Now it is time to apply sound principle of populace based conflicts to this and move forward.

I ask that question only half-jokingly. I tend not to listen to any "news" show that yells or conjures fear-mongering. So, I'm pretty much limited to Fareed Zakaria and comedic spoofs like John Stewart. If you're interested, I wrote my own comedy in Nature Redux in parody summarizing what Emerson may have to say about today's events....

When I redeployed after the Surge, I started reading everything about AQ's beliefs that I could so I could attempt to understand how they could convince my neighbors to volunteer to blow themselves up. A year ago, I tried to study it, explain it, but hit a brick wall on how to implement. Reading OBL, Qutb, and other Islamist contemporaries, I was frustrated realizing that many of their main grievances were true. I could not assimulate that with my own beliefs in my nation and our policy (NSS 2002 and 2006).

As y'all have seen in some of my past posts on SWJ, I was unnerved for a bit. I finally accepted and adapted.

I am truly curious on how you plan to shape this alternative policy. Moreover, I agree with your thoughts. Thanks for posting your article. I was caught up in college football today so i'll need some time to digest it. I added the historical background today b/c it is important. I'll send you a PM on other matters- SF does not escape parochialism. Many times y'all forget to explain your reasoning to everyone else. BW, sir, you may be on to something here. As Bill Moore stated, "we missed something." In truth, we just looked at the problem from the wrong angle.

In some ways, we are in a race to define the post-cold war paradigm. I think the answer will eventually surface in SWJ. That's why I continue to contribute.

Long ago, back in 2002 in Kuwait after my commander briefed the big plan, I asked a "stupid" question.

"Sir, I understand the plan. I'll lead the battalion and brigade from Kuwait to Baghdad. What are we supposed to do when we get to Baghdad? There is no plan."

"Mike, don't worry about it. You think too much."

In 2007, I was the first American to successfully dispose of AQI through my version of COIN and begin re-instituting HN governance, security forces, and returning displaced persons. As my people continued to bicker over grievances from long ago, I asked another stupid question.

"Sir, what do you want me to do?"

"Mike, I don't know."

This is not a time to not think.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

You realize of course that the Soviet invasion of Afg was during the Cold War, and was just the type of threat that the West was helping defend the Middle East from. Thus the tolerance for our presence. Then the Gulf War. Bin Laden offered to lead a similar effort to deal with Saddam, and was rejected and instead US forces brought into the Kingdom. This was a major decision for the King. He knew it violated everything his populace believed, but also knew that he had no other viable choice to preserve his kingdom. This was post Cold War. The tide had turned. We were no longer keeping the Soviets out, we were now for all effects the mercs of the King guarding his status as King and fighting other Muslims.

Then we decided to stay in the Kingdom. This created an issue for Bin Laden to focus on, and so he did. And for populaces of countries that had lived through generations of western governmental manipulation, it was a message that resonated.

Not all are fighters, only a few. But most essentially agree with the message and respect Bin Laden for daring to stand up. In between there is a wide range of positions and degrees of participation.

Oh, and a mediator has no position, he just facilitates a dialog between parties that have too many issues to be able to negotiate. Its a suitable role for the US to take.

[slapout9]

MileF, Glenn Beck is a FOX TV conspiracy theorist commentator who recently lost about 46 of his sponsors for some of the outrageous stuff he is saying. Google Glenn Beck or Lunatic Fringe either one will get you details.

[Surferbeetle]

There is a continuum which arcs from those who believe in team objectives, benchmarks, and endstates to those who believe in process driven by the smartest individuals who can cut a deal.

This article is much more political than I'd like, nonetheless it attempts to describe a method and associated framework in deterring irregular threats which is interesting to think about. The authors bio is linked from a site called fifthstate. The definition of Fifth Estate can be found here. As we know, people are always trying to cut deals; vetting credibility, ability, and determining applicability and effectiveness for the problem at hand is not as easy as it may seem to some...

From Vanity Fair by David Rose Heads in the Sand

The so-called Sunni Awakening, in which American forces formed tactical alliances with local sheikhs, has been credited with dampening the insurgency in much of Iraq. But new evidence suggests that the Sunnis were offering the same deal as early as 2004