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Thread: Deterrence of Irregular Threats

  1. #21
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    BW,

    I understand the difference between AQ and HA, but I could just as easily substitute any number of "Pakistani" groups for AQ. The area where AQ has sanctuary is not "ungoverned" as there are local governing structures and peoples which pre-date the creating of the Pakistani state. That "state" of Pakistan has never had control of these areas, nor did the British before them. They are still largely "administered" under the same system used by the British and are quasi-colonies.

    Regardless, in Lebanon, I think "Master and Servant" is a poor analogy. HA is a remnant of a civil war, so one can argue that the civil war is still ongoing even though there isn't a lot of fighting anymore. Holding one side in a civil war accountable for the actions of the other side doesn't make a lot of sense to me as the Lebanese government cannot compel/coerce HA.

    Now, the US could certainly "incentivize" the Lebanese government and HA to resolve their longstanding differences, but that strikes me as something different from what you're suggesting.

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    If a state lack the means to control an informal organization, then it has become ineffective and illigitimate. It is no longer really "the state." If LH is the majority, then recognize them as such and hold them accountable.
    Recognize HA as the legitimate government of Lebanon, or recognize them as a new state, seperate from the rest of Lebanon? What US interest is served by pursuing either one of those COA's? Neither one seems wise, IMO.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.
    Huh? What spectrum? He didn't mention drug gangs, or organised crime, but his observation are all still highly relevant. Pablo Escobar was defeated exactly in line with CvC observations.

    And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

    A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.
    So let me get this right. You are suggesting that Deterrence is demonstrated by something other than action? Deterrence means "failure to ACT, through fear of harm." No action means deterrence is working. Deterrence by virtue of it's meaning relates to specific conditions within a specific time. Change any of the factors effecting the level of deterrence and it's effectiveness alters.
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    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
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    The base premise here is simply that:

    1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

    2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

    3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

    4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

    5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

    What one sees in the initial responses and comments above is a great example of the challenges to getting from where we are, and what we are doing currently, as we are all mired in what we have been taught and currently believe. We must step back, take a deep breath, and look at the entire problem set from a fresh perspective. Many changes may be subtle, some may be substantial.

    But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

    CT leads to an Intel driven, reactive chasing of whoever they label as "threat" and conducting a very similar family of engagement against those threats regardless of their actual nature or purpose. Many argue that such an approach has eroded our national credibility globally, and though we have not been attacked, may in fact havecontributed to an even broader range of those who would do us harm today than we had in 2001.

    Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 08-01-2009 at 12:25 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    No action means deterrence is working.
    Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

    If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

    4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

    5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.
    Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

    Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?
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    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary.
    Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default One cannont ignore the present any more than they can the past

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

    Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?
    Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.

    However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  9. #29
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    Default Exactly.

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

    If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.
    Too often we focus on the wrong indicators and draw the wrong conclusions. Usually because we look at them based upon an understanding built from our experience and colored by what we want to see.

    Certainly in politics perspectives may sometimes be cast in a light most favorable to the politician and shaped to tell his constituency what they want to hear.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.
    With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
    The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
    The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
    The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

    The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.
    If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, that does not necessarily mean that the action didn't occur because of something you did to deter it. I would think that to declare a policy of deterrence "successful" there would be have to be some evidence to suggest that our actions deriving from the policy of deterrence were the cause of the inaction.

    If there was an intention to carry out more attacks on the US, and those attacks were not carried out because our actions left the enemy unable to proceed with their intention, the policy of deterrence was successful. If there was no intention to carry out further attacks, the policy of deterrence was irrelevant. If a riot policeman holds up a shield when the people throwing rocks have already moved on to other targets, it's hard to declare that the shield was what protected the policeman.

    The question is whether no further attacks were made because we prevented them, or because, having achieved the desired goal, the enemy had no further need or desire to attack. Of course we don't know which is the case, but there's enough uncertainty there that I wouldn't want to claim success for a policy of deterrence.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, that does not necessarily mean that the action didn't occur because of something you did to deter it. I would think that to declare a policy of deterrence "successful" there would be have to be some evidence to suggest that our actions deriving from the policy of deterrence were the cause of the inaction.
    Agreed. You'll never know, but that in no way negates threatening people with greater harm, if they harm you. You may deter threats you never knew existed, just because of reputation.
    It's having the reputation which is key, and reputations are built on clear and unambiguous threats (capability and intent) of the use force.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  13. #33
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    Default I focus on the strategic effect, as this shapes the course of nations

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
    The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
    The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
    The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?

    The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.
    No argument that most tactics produce very similar results at the tactical level; though just as the rifled musket forced modification of tactics to take into account a formation receiving 6-10 aimed volleys as it closed with the enemy vice the 1-2 they had received over the few hundred years preceding; so to do many advances like UAVs, guided munitions, etc; shape tactics today. But that is not what I am talking about at all.

    What i am talking about is the strategic effect expected based on historical experience from COIN tactics simply is far less likely to be achieved due to the enhanced communications tools available to populaces (and therefore insurgents) everywhere.

    This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

    The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.

    The fact that it still only takes one bullet to kill one man is immaterial and moot to this discussion.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The base premise here is simply that:

    1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

    2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

    3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

    4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

    5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.
    I don't have any real disagreements with that, but I don't see how you get from there to a policy holding governments accountable for peoples they have no control over - ie. HA and various tribes along the AF-PAK border.

    I also "get" that new communication tools do have powerful effects though maybe not to the extent that you think they do. Technology certainly has made demagoguery easier than it's probably ever been and governments have pretty much lost the ability to significantly control negative information. That is a powerful combination.

    BTW, I also like your slide.

    Wilf,

    On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

    Someone upthread said that "terrorists" cannot be deterred because they are not afraid to die for their cause. In some cases that is true, but fear of failure is universal. For example, all the additional security measures protecting airplanes are deterring those who'd like to blow them up or fly them into buildings because their chances of success are greatly diminished.
    Last edited by Entropy; 08-01-2009 at 02:13 PM. Reason: spelling

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    Here are some concepts that I believe demand fresh attention and new perspectives if we are to have a holistic family of deterrence across the range of all actors that facilitates the peace we seek:

    Balance
    Balancing the relative deterrent and provocative effects of actions across a complex span of actors.

    Sanctuary
    (God save us from the cliche' "sanctuary of ungoverned spaces")
    We must understand and address organizations that have "sanctuary" currently from the traditional elements of national power.

    Glib cliche's parroted without thought just don't cut it. True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them. Both of these can be addressed if recognized as important, and then understood for their true nature.

    Empowered Populaces
    Deterrence of people is fundamentally different than deterrence of states.

    Legitimacy
    When an insurgent populace perceives that an outside power has an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government they are dissatisfied with, they will target that inappropriate source of legitimacy in the pursuit of their aims. This is the central component to AQ's strategy to conduct UW to get these many diverse, nationalist efforts to support their cause. They make the case that the US is the obstacle to achieving good governance, and due to that widely held perception, it works. Address the legitimacy and you both disempower Bin Laden's message; and you also get these nationalist insurgencies to focus on the home front as the obstacle has been removed. (This is why the vast majority of foreign fighters and "terrorists" come from the populaces of our friends, rather than the populaces of our foes - No Iranian believes that the US is responsible for the poor governance they suffer under. Many Saudis do.

    Holistic Approaches
    We have a mono-focus on deterrence. Cost/benefit analysis aimed at states; differentiated primarily by only if they have, or don't have, nukes. Anyone else we criminalize by labeling them "terrorist". We look through two tubes and neither tube is particularly focused for the realities of today's environment.

    What I suggest is that we look at the entire span of actors holistically, and then with that broader perspective look at the deterrence problem with fresh eyes and fresh thinking to address the whole more effectively, by more effectively addressing the individuals.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

    The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.
    So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

    Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

    Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Wilf,

    On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.
    Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
    Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
    Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default In this forum I do not seek approval, only thoughtful discourse.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?

    Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

    Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.
    So all positions are welcome and helpful. Seriously. I'd far rather debate a wise man with whom I disagree, than to talk to a sycophant who nods dutifully at my every syllable.

    However, I will say that while your position is both quite rationale and widely held among those who shape policy; I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.

    But I have no path to take, as there have not been that many who have gone before me to make one on this particular journey. That's ok, I enjoy a little intellectual exploration and am happy to provide the sweat and bear the scars that come with breaking new trail...

    Like most explorers, I may not find what I seek, but in the course of the journey I will learn much of value.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.
    OK, so what is that? What does this tragedy look like?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

    Couple of points.

    1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

    2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

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