Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[Entropy]

Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

We can use HA as an example. To what can/should we attribute their lack of attacks against Israel since 2006? From your earlier comments in this thread it appears you believe that the cause of their inaction is the deterrent effect from the 2006 campaign. There may be something to that, but there are other causes that are probably just as important if not more so. After all, Nasrallah publicly said the event that precipitated that conflict was a mistake and that HA did not expect the Israeli response. IOW, it was miscalculation that caused that conflict and not any failure of deterrence. Deterrence has limited power over miscalculation.

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

[William F. Owen]

The point is that lack of action is not proof an opponent is deterred since there can be (and often are) many reasons an actor may not pursue a particular COA. The danger is that one may think deterrence is "working" when in fact it isn't working at all.

So what is proof that deterrence has worked?

Deterrence is obviously dynamic, and not an absolute state. It is predicated on deterring certain actions. Yes, you will never know if the effect you sought was actually achieved. - so what?
Wars start because the credible deterrence breaks down. - again - so what?
We know all this.
What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

[Bob's World]

Slap,

Agree completely that the far right end of the spectrum, the individual who is committed to some deadly course, cannot be deterred. I list him only because he is part of the fabric, and when he acts, it will be criminal in nature must be accounted for by those who will respond to that act. Part of effective, holistic deterrence is understanding what one can and cannot influence; and responding appropriately when sh#* happens.

I do think it is more complex though. More actors, more distinct statuses, all having to be considered collectively in a balanced program of deterrence is complex.

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953; it would creates far different set of ramifications across this new spectrum of actors today than a much more limited spectrum then.

Images would be immediately blasted around the world; those Iranian citizens at the epicenter of events would text the word through out both the populace at home, and Shia everywhere. Most likely the Shah would have not lasted a week and the re-established Iranian government would have reached out to the Soviets to prevent this from happening again. Or an insurgency would have been born at home, but with a regional or global base of support; with attacks not just launched at the Shah but at the US and England to attempt to break our support for him. Hezbollah would weigh in on behalf of their Iranian ally and target the US and England and their allies as well; most likely attacking Israel. Bin Laden, who has no love for Shia, would recognize the Strat Com potential to engage all Muslims; and would turn this into a PR event to boost his own support by highlighting how by our actions the West validates his claims against us; using this to encourage and incite nationalist insurgent movements in Muslim states who have governments shaped by or overly influenced by the West....and so it spirals out.

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

In 1953 the Iranians complained, it was news for a while, and then the world got on with life, accepting the new construct. Then when some 25 years later the Iranians were finally able to break out from under this construct imposed upon them, we acted like we were the victims. The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

So, to deter the Iranians from such an action today would require a much more sophisticated approach, as it is not just the state actors one must consider, but a much more empowered and connected set of populace-based organizations as well.

[Entropy]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

[Entropy]

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953

That was not deterring Iran. Forcing an actor (in this case, Iran) to conform to your will through force is not deterrence.

[Bob's World]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

At the end of the day, the US is still the most powerful nation in the world, with all of the associated benefits, duties, and responsibilities associated with that status.

We just need to recognize that the favorable status quo that emerged from the Cold War was a snapshot in time, and that the world is ever changing; and that we too must embrace change in order to remain relevant.

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

[William F. Owen]

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

It's not complex. It's fiction with mixture of unlikely and totally unrealistic strategic contexts, that make as much sense as trying to predict the out come of the French Revolution set in 1999. None of that is evidence!

The only evidence you can have that modern conflict and conditions are more complex is to say you do not understand them. That's the evidence.
I think history shows us that all warfare and conflict has always been infinitely complex.
Men today are not more capable of understanding the conditions that created WW1, than they were at the time.

Let's face it. Everyone is wittering on about the "Tribes" - which are just about the oldest political system on earth, and apparently, the men of today, do not understand them. Not a good indicator that life today is "more complex."

[Entropy]

Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.

Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.

[Entropy]

What worries me is there seems to be such an imperfect understanding of how deterrence is applied. Regardless of the effectiveness, or duration, or reason, if you wish to deter, you are required to credibly pose a very great threat. Logically, that means doing things that are threatening to those you seek to threaten. What am I missing?

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

[Bob's World]

Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.

Nations have much to lose, so fear works. Those with little to lose, perhaps not so much. Again, balance our approach, not abandon it.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure how else to explain it. The fact that HA has not attacked or provoked Israel since the 2006 conflict is not self-evident proof that Israel is deterring HA.

Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

[Ken White]

Bob's World:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

On Item 1. I strongly doubt that it is possible to deter all irregular threats. I believe that an effort to disrupt potential irregular threats is vastly preferable to the rather to passive effort of deterring. Particularly when such deterring is going to be in a mostly now unidentifiable form.

Re: item 2, disruption is also preferable -- and cheaper -- the disadvantage is that it requires knowledge and action early on; areas in which the US does not excel...

Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.

I very much agree; I'd agree even more if it read 'Deterrence and disruption..."

This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.

True -- thus disruption has to be an alternative.

Entropy:

In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

I'm not sure that's always correct. I can understand your motives and still fail to deter you because I attempted to counter a feint -- or because you were deflected enroute to your target and selected another. It's also quite possible that my selected mode of deterrence was poorly chosen or just flat wrong...

Slapout, as always, applies some common sense and realiistic thinking and makes two statements with which I strongly agree

1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

The first is I believe the crux of the matter -- we make this harder than it is and we do have a global reach and thus we have simply increased the problem quantitatively, not qualitatively.

Given the American penchant for over-control and centralization, we need distributed thinking; the NSC and State should have regional super-Ambassadors and Desks with real clout. DoD should defer to the CoComs and SOCOM to their regional commands. You cannot run the World from Pennsylvania Avenue; the Armed Forces from E-Ring; all of the SO stuff from MacDill. As long as we continue to do that, we'll keep having the same old problems and the sheer number will overwhelm attempts at sensible decision making.

Slap's absolutely right that some types cannot be deterred -- and I'll add or disrupted for long -- IOW, we're going to have to live with a degree of risk. We always have, we just communicate more quickly and widely now so folks are more aware more rapidly and this allows minor panics to (wrongly) influence government into taking foolish actions.

Strategies and policies need to take those things into account.

Lastly,Bob's World again, he sums up the root of the whole problem:

The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

True. That factor is prevalent in much of our history. Even given the 1953 coup and some -- not many -- Iranians being quite angry over that, what happened later was totally preventable. We ignored it -- and then came up with the WRONG reaction when there was an eruption. Those failures and the cults of centralization and "I am in charge, here, now..." control are part and parcel of our current situation.

We cannot undo our history, we are where we are and that has to be accepted, not apologized for going forward. We need to look to the future. So we aim to deter and disrupt.

That requires adequate and effective early warning or knowledge -- and there still is no guarantee we will take the correct action...

Wilf said it well and we'd be far better off as a nation if we paid heed:

In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.

Ran across this gem in the NYT today:

TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.

For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.

“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.” (LINK).(emphasis added /kw)

That about sums it up...

[Entropy]

Agreed, but what would constitute evidence that it is? That in no way negates having and exercising levels of capability and intent, that may be producing a deterrent effect for the time being.

Unless your adversary is willing to tell you directly, then there isn't any way of knowing for sure. Obviously, the better one studies and understands an opponent, the better one is able to estimate their motivations and use all the policy tools available to affect those motivations, not just deterrence. That's why good intelligence is critical to policymaking.

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove. Other examples include "x" policy has worked or GWB is a great President because there hasn't been another attack since 9/11. Or, more recently, my own government leaders have claimed that if it hadn't been for the stimulus package, the economy/unemployment would be much worse. It's impossible to disprove or quantify such assertions when they are framed that way.

Maybe it's misperception on my part, but ISTM many elites and policymakers have too much faith in "deterrence" over other forms of influence and have drawn false conclusions based on the "success" of deterrence during the Cold War. For example, the idea that deterrence will prevent a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran (should it acquire nuclear weapons) is dangerously naive. People miscalculate. Nations miscalculate. We got lucky at several times during the Cold War and our intelligence was able to tell us when our attempts at projecting a deterrent posture had the opposite effect. That happens more that people realize.

In short, putting too much faith in deterrence as a strategy provides a false sense of security.

[Bob's World]

Ken,

No arguements about the "disrupt" component. Hanging onto the "disrupt" task; and dumping the "defeat" task (which is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable, by the way if you really think about it) and replacing it with "deter."

This gives us the foundation for a new framework for the GWOT plan that we can build upon and that won't by its very terms alienate our allies and our own interagency community.

So what I am really looking at is two different things here. One is an overall review and revision of how we approach deterrence as a whole to more accurately and completely address the many actors on today's scene. Second is to then Re-write the GWOT plan in the context of detering (and yes, exactly right Ken,)Disrupting Irregular Threats.

[Taiko]

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfa...do_joc_v20.doc

DO JOC v2 might be a good start to look at how the US approaches deterrence now. There has been a considerable shift from the Cold War approach. Keith Payne and Colin Gray would be two good academics/policymakers to read. They have had considerable influence in how we should understand deterrence post-9/11. I'm in the middle of finishing a paper so I can't extrapolate much more. However, if you need any more sources I would be glad to forward you a reading list Bob's World, I have been studying this for two years so I have most of what has been written on it. Send me a PM if you need any resources about a specific subject area on deterrence.

I'll just put forth a couple of points:

1. In the p-9/11 security environment the US needs to deter more actors from taking different sets of actions. During the Cold War the US faced a single risk adverse actor, in the current security environment there a number of risk taking actors. Game theory works well when there are only two actors, once you have a n+ situation the theory becomes more problematic.

2. Prospect theory has had the most influence on how policymakers view deterrence p-Cold War. Specifically, it argues that the an actor may view the cost of inaction to be higher than any benefit of inaction, making deterrence both unstable and harder. There is a lot more to it than that, suffice to say the theory itself resulted in DO JOC V2.

3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.

4. In terms of 'irregular threats' how do you deter a individual or group with no fixed address?

5. How do you deter a individual or group if they perceive that the cost of inaction is higher than the benefit of inaction, or if death is seen as a reward/benefit in itself?

4 and 5 are the most common questions on deterrence p-9/11, so if you can answer then you will have a number of people interested.

From what I can work out the Airforce has been working on deterrence p-CW so make sure to read DO JOC V2., if you haven't already, otherwise they might pick your propositions to pieces.

[Bill Moore]

While deterrence of irregular threats is exponentially better than GWOT for visualizing the scope of the threat and how we should respond (strategy), but as stated above, even by Bob's W, it is not feasible to deter the irregular threats we are dealing with today. I’m still forming by thoughts on this, but it seems that deterrence in many respects requires some degree of symmetry between two or more potential foes. For instance in a state versus state scenarios conventional warfare deterred due to anticipated costs, based on perceived parity (not necessarily equal in strength, but regardless the superior strength is marginalized somehow) of conventional forces. Of course we had mutual assured destruction (nuclear symmetry) policy that worked because in the end the USSR and the U.S. shared the same value of protecting their homeland/nation. Irregular threats are entirely different, we’re talking about deterring criminals, super empowered individuals, terrorists, insurgents, etc. In all fairness each should be viewed individually within their own context, but in general there are few feasible options to deter them. We haven’t been effective in deterring illegal migration, illegal drug use, the spread of nuclear weapons/technology, or organized crimes as just a few examples of failed deterrence strategies. If 9/11 and our response should have taught us anything, it is the limits of American (and the West) power.

I recommend we further investigate using a combination of approaches to build a more comprehensive strategy against the wide range of irregular threats we are faced with. One approach is “countering” irregular threats, which includes active measures against existing threats and inoculating vulnerable populations to the extent possible against the influence of these bad actors. Recognizing the sad truth that we won't be 100% successful, it is critically important to also focus a parallel approach for developing the “resilience” to ensure we can weather successful irregular attacks ranging from 9/11 style attacks to attacks on economic infrastructure. Maybe “deterrence” can be the third leg of strategy, but I need to be convinced on the feasibility of just how we would implement this. I’m not sure we can wield a bigger stick than we wield now and we are deterring the threat. I hope your definition of deterrence doesn’t mean reaching out to the enemy and compromising. In the end our alternative views (the threat and us) are not compatible. Thus I offer two legs for a strategy “countering irregular threats” and “developing resilience” to weather successful attacks.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Good thoughts, as always. I just don't like countering though, primarily because it leads us to approaches too tied to the intel guys sending us around to violate the sovereignty of a variety of nations to attack organizations and individuals within those states. It just tends to get out of control in ways that I believe have more of a "provoke" effect across the spectrum of actors, even if it may very well have a "disrupt" effect on the particular target of the engagement.

The main thought in getting more focused on "deter" as a baseline (besides the fact that our President and SECDEF are very much focused on deter and IMO not getting a lot of fresh ideas from their advisers to date as to how to think about this today), is that it changes the perspective from which one plans his operations.

The problem facing the US today is not that there are insurgent organizations in many of the Muslim states of the world. The problem facing the US is that those nationalist insurgencies believe that they must first break the support of the US to their governments at home before there can be reform of government that addresses their grievances and gives them a government whose legitimacy they recognize. Any effort to defeat these insurgencies will only serve to reinforce their belief that they must break the will of the US to meddle in the region.

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

This isn't how intel people think. They focus on the "threat" and rail on and on about how evil these people are, etc, etc. Not helpful. What we need to focus on is sadly outdated foreign policies that we have with this region; a top down review focus not on "fixing" others, but instead on "fixing" our self.

I've always felt it was a cop-out when someone blames their shortcomings on others. I think our current approach for GWOT is just such a cop-out. I say Fix ourselves, and then with clear conscience swing the big stick at any who dare to oppose us. If we have our act straight first, such actions won't have the negative, provocative effect they have today.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

I like this line of thought, because it is a unique way of reframing the problem. Framing the problem correctly seems to be the origin of most of our failure. I second your thoughts on the intell community and their narrow view of the problem set. Whe we say we use intelligence to drive operations that simply reinforces your point, because now instead of executing a strategy we're simply trying to catch mice.

I'm goint to try to rain on your parade a little. While I agree with many of your points, I'l focus on the one I quoted above. For the global islamist movement to maintain wind in its sails it "must' paint the U.S. as the bad actor. It uses that narrative to mobilize the people against the great satan. I think you clearly identified the center of gravity. Unfortunately, the islamist narrative doesn't have to be acccurate, just perceived to be true, and unfortunately we have history that will hard to shake. The point is I think this is another infeasible objective, but if we could make it work it would be very powerful. There is another parallel in the Saudi issue, that is the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Who has given more aid to the Palestinians than any other nation? I read that the U.S. has, but obviously our information/influence activities are not in synch with this cash handout effort, since we still get slaughtered in the media as simply siding with Israel. The U.S. has "always" put a lot of pressure on Israel to back off on their hard right wing policies, but again it shows the limits of U.S. power, because we can only influence either of them to a small extent. This location is the grave yard of good intentions for many U.S. administrations.

[Ron Humphrey]

trying to keep up with and take in the major issues and process them in such a way as to really develop an understanding for them.

a couple of points of interest-

Bob's World the focus on deterrence in the form you've described seems viable if and only if we can both do as you suggested in your last post and find some common requirements among both ourselves and those whom we seek to deter.

By this I mean areas, capabilities, life stuff that both they and we would rather not be without because those are probably the only areas we could count on being a constant during and after a given state of conflict.

I guess the best example I could give would be something like the Internet
(Big I) although most actors would be likely to attack networks or connectivity for an opponent it's hard to imagine that many either state or non-state would attempt to take down The Internet because they depend on it as much if not more than we. Leaving Slaps individuals out of that equation what other things, capabilities, requirements are there which might fall in the same category's

Maybe by actually clarifying those which are least likely to be the way someone decides to act up may help to point out more clearly those areas where deterrence would not only be doable but perhaps beneficial not only militarily but politically as well(mainly in the Foreign policy arena).

The one other thing I wondered about would be whose job it is to develop understanding of the various ideologically based strategies out there which are most likely to precipitate what we would consider potentially in need of "deterrence" This seems pertinent due to the fact that even though we might not like talking or thinking about it much of the risk of conflict in many areas is pretty clearly tied to policies in governance based off them or lack of populaces to entertain them.

Not sure that made sense

[Bob's World]

Posted by Bob's World

I like this line of thought, because it is a unique way of reframing the problem. Framing the problem correctly seems to be the origin of most of our failure. I second your thoughts on the intell community and their narrow view of the problem set. Whe we say we use intelligence to drive operations that simply reinforces your point, because now instead of executing a strategy we're simply trying to catch mice.

I'm goint to try to rain on your parade a little. While I agree with many of your points, I'l focus on the one I quoted above. For the global islamist movement to maintain wind in its sails it "must' paint the U.S. as the bad actor. It uses that narrative to mobilize the people against the great satan. I think you clearly identified the center of gravity. Unfortunately, the islamist narrative doesn't have to be acccurate, just perceived to be true, and unfortunately we have history that will hard to shake. The point is I think this is another infeasible objective, but if we could make it work it would be very powerful. There is another parallel in the Saudi issue, that is the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Who has given more aid to the Palestinians than any other nation? I read that the U.S. has, but obviously our information/influence activities are not in synch with this cash handout effort, since we still get slaughtered in the media as simply siding with Israel. The U.S. has "always" put a lot of pressure on Israel to back off on their hard right wing policies, but again it shows the limits of U.S. power, because we can only influence either of them to a small extent. This location is the grave yard of good intentions for many U.S. administrations.

While you are right that we cannot escape our history, that is, IMO, more of a benefit than a hindrance to turning this around.

First being that we have a very short history; second being that most of that history we were the little guy our self working to get out from under the big guy's control. We build a national ideology around our belief that we had a right to be free from that control, and we succeeded in achieving that vision. I believe that oppressed populaces around the world still look to that example, still look to the "idea" of America as the first colony of western Europe to stand up and be free.

It is only a relatively short history (though longer than my life) that we have stepped from the role as an example of achieving freedom and slid (through the controlling efforts necessary to contain the Soviets) through our Cold War engagement into a place where we are now more of an obstacle than we would like to admit. Like when I look in the mirror and see that I look more like I think of my dad, and my sons look more like I picture myself. We have grown up and become our parent. It happens; but unlike for us as humans, for us as a nation it is a reversible condition.

But you have to stop doing what you're doing and start a new approach. Doing the same old thing in the same old ways rarely leads to much change.

De Oppresso Liber, brother, De Oppresson Liber