Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[Dayuhan]

True sanctuary does not come from a "space"; but from a favorable terrain/veg that also is protected by some legal status (often a sovereign border) and the support of a poorly governed populace. Focus on the legal status's that bind us and the elements of poor governance that shape a populaces motivations. Many of these new actors are taking advantage of new forms of sanctuary, and those sanctuaries are primarily a function of laws that we follow but they can ignore; and poorly governed populaces that we have ignored in favor of the governments that in many cases, we have imposed or sustained over them.

That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

[Bob's World]

That definition of "true sanctuary" may need to be opened up a bit, to include disaffected sectors of a generally well-governed populace. I'm thinking particularly here of the foothold radical Islam has gained in Western Europe... many of us may have criticisms of European governments, but as a rule it would be hard to classify the European populace as poorly governed. Radical movements have still managed to gain a significant presence there, often using the very rights and privileges that we associate with good governance as protection. It's a different form of sanctuary, one that poses a different set of challenges.

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

The question of whether the security environment presented by "irregular" threats is more or less complex than that presented by "regular" threats seems irrelevant to me. It may or may not be more complex, but it's certainly different. Is the threat presented by a nuclear warhead delivered by a ballistic missile more or less complex than the threat presented by a nuclear warhead smuggled into the country in a cargo container? I don't know or care: the point is not to decide which is more complex, the point is to prepare for both possibilities, and for possibilities we have yet to consider. Bob's effort seems a useful step toward that goal, and I'll be interested to see what comes of it.

It never has to be the entire populace to do anything, and certainly not to provide sanctuary. There is very little that could be described as "ungoverned space" in Western Europe, but you are very correct that there appears to be growing sanctuary within pockets of populaces who feel excluded from the full benefits of that governance. This is exactly what I mean by "sanctuary within a poorly governed populace."

As to the complexity issue, it is the combination of "regular" and the newer "irregular" aspects that I have laid out on the slide I provided that make the new complexity. We need new ways to deal with the new actors, reformed ways to deal with the old; and then an overall review and synch of the entire system in a holistic manner that recognizes that nothing happens in isolation. Pull this here and something moves there. Deter this guy, provoke that guy. We can absolutely do this.

[Ken White]

Taiko:

3. Cold War deterrence after Kennedy was not based on massive retaliation, but flexible response. It was a more nuanced approach then you are making it out to be.

Quite true. I have difficulty convincing people the Cold War wasn't nearly as clear cut as popular culture and out incompetent media allege it to be. It was nuanced and constantly adjusted, sometimes well, sometimes not so well. It wasn't nearly as monolithic as many like to think..

Also agree that Gray approaches a 'must read' on the topic.

The problem today, of course, is that the artificiality of the Cold War and effectively having to deal with only one threat has been replaced by many threats, some a significant and dangerous as the one once was...

Welcome to 1935 redux.

Bill Moore:

In all fairness each should be viewed individually within their own context, but in general there are few feasible options to deter them. We haven’t been effective in deterring illegal migration, illegal drug use, the spread of nuclear weapons/technology, or organized crimes as just a few examples of failed deterrence strategies. If 9/11 and our response should have taught us anything, it is the limits of American (and the West) power.

Absolutely...

Your recommendations:

Thus I offer two legs for a strategy “countering irregular threats” and “developing resilience” to weather successful attacks.

are on target though I'm not at all sure we've got the willingness in our political system to be that focused...

I agree with much of Bob's World thought but I keep trying to tell him the US political system not only won't allow long term thinking and strategies, it actively eats them. We have the problem that many in Congress are truly afraid of (1) A strong and highly capable set of Armed forces; (2) A truly effective Intelligence community; (3) A forward looking and capable Diplomatic machine; and (4) Exercising the political will necessary.

I suspect, given that, we will continue to try to deter, be only partly successful and then have to disrupt, sometimes with Intel, Diplomacy, USAid and SF, occasionally adding the GPF in the mix. Heck of a job, USG...

[jcustis]

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

There are a majority of folks (granted, this is just my observation), unfortunately, within the ranks of our military who believe we will never be able to change these perceptions if they have taken root in the Muslim mind.

Kinda difficult to root out the excesses of our own folks if we don't have their mind in line with our larger aims.

Awesome thread, BW. You've sent me on a theoretical binge today that left my head hurting a bit.

[slapout9]

I agree with much of Bob's World thought but I keep trying to tell him the US political system not only won't allow long term thinking and strategies, it actively eats them. We have the problem that many in Congress are truly afraid of (1) A strong and highly capable set of Armed forces; (2) A truly effective Intelligence community; (3) A forward looking and capable Diplomatic machine; and (4) Exercising the political will necessary.

I suspect, given that, we will continue to try to deter, be only partly successful and then have to disrupt, sometimes with Intel, Diplomacy, USAid and SF, occasionally adding the GPF in the mix. Heck of a job, USG...

That about sums it up. We can not deter all but we could deter many and disrupt a few others and then finally be well prepared to mitigate and recovery from the ones will get through......but we are close to having no leadership at all in this country. And that is our greatest vulnerability!

[William F. Owen]

What I object to are simplistic pronouncements of cause and effect - that "x" has not happened because of "y" which, in this case, is deterrence. It's nice rhetorically because that argument is usually impossible to disprove.

Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

[Taiko]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute....cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:

So the key is not to target the organization so much as it is to target the perception that we are the obstacle to achieving good governance, and to instead achieve at least a neutral, or better, an enabler role in the long overdue reforms needed in these states.

How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.

[Bob's World]

For those interested:

Colin Gray 'The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On' in Comparative Strategy 22(5) 2003

Colin Gray 'Maintaining Effective Deterrence' in Strategic Studies Institute 2003

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute....cfm?pubID=211

The SSI paper looks at deterrence from a army/landpower perspective.

Bob's World:



How is what you are proposing different from IO? Effective communication is only one part of deterrence. There is also credibility and commitment.

In terms of understanding the current security environment, have you looked at any of the work that has been done on the Second Nuclear Age?

Also, how is what you are proposing different to the Clinton administration's Full Spectrum Dominance, which was the base from which the 1996 NPR was developed?

I can understand where you are coming from in terms of changing the perception of deterrence to include the concept of better governance, but this has already been attempted by the Bush admin. with foreign aid to third world countries, and military aid to other countries. Trying to enable 'reforms of states' is not going to work well anywhere in Asia because we have this concept called sovereignty, which most countries down my way believe is the corner stone of international order.

The point you are trying to make about the problem of the aggregation of threats under the rubric of terrorism is a good one. Terrorism is a tactic. What makes the various groups different are the political goals they are trying to achieve using terror as a tactic. However, the problem is in legitimizing the groups by identifying them with their political motives. It does help with identifying the threat and working out how to deal with it, but may be counterproductive for deterrence. If any group with a grievance sees that they can elevate their status via the use of terror, due to the reaction of the US to other groups using terror, then you can see how it can create more rather than less violence. Especially if the US reaction involves foreign intervention. Well thats how I see it anyway.

Beyond the fact that IO is a mess of half a dozen vaguely related disciplines all strapped together under one all inclusive definition; and then the entire bundle left sitting out on the doorstep by the "real" ops guys who are too busy planning action to worry too much about what the IO guys do to support them....

It is more accurately the Strategic Communication aspect of IO, and even then, not the "here is what I say" take on Strat Comm, but the perspective that I share wholeheartedly with my boss that "Strat Comm is 80% what one does, and 20% what one says."

We must change what we say to be more in line with our professed principles as a nation, we must extend to other states and populaces the same sovereignty and dignity we demand for ourselves; and then we must design and implement our engagement to state by our actions the very message that is coming from our mouths.

Sad fact is that in the Middle East in particular, long before GWOT, we had let our principles, words, and actions diverge. I think we just need to bring them all back on azimuth and move out as one.

[Bob's World]

A thought for the day, as we look at not just the deterrence of Irregular Threats, but as importantly how this fits into the larger collective of a comprehensive scheme of deterrence: Nuke states; Non-Nuke States; and the sticky issue of proliferation.


Premise: The US treats those states who possess nuclear weapons with a greater degree of respect for their national sovereignty than those states that do not possess such weapons. Thus providing a powerful provocative motivation to gain such weapons in the very states that we are working the hardest to prevent from doing that very thing.

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Similarly, would a shift in focus with those states that are routinely held up as potential "threats" (by those who are desperate to find some way to make our current threat-based strategy hanging over from the Cold War valid once again) from the points where our National Interests diverge, to points of convergence instead. We will always have competitors, and we need to compete. But do we really need to make others into "threats"?

[Entropy]

Concur. That's why I think EBO is drech. However if the enemy's specific lack of action is the condition that gives you benefit, what do you care?

The fallacy is in attempting to apply a deterrence against something you have not identified. You cannot physically threaten something you cannot fix in time and space. No physical threat. No deterrence.

Agree, except I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.

[Bob's World]

men carried clubs, cities built walls; not because they had identified necessarily some specific threat they wished to deter, but simply because they wanted whatever threat that might come along to be deterred; and also to be better able to deal with those who were not.

Some deterrence is general in nature, some specific; most provocative as well as deterrent. But not being attacked by any particular threat is never a full measure of how well one's scheme of deterrence worked.

[Entropy]

I suspect that the use of the term "deterrence" is becoming a bit of an obstacle to the discussion. There seem to be two different definitions floating around: some use "deterrence" in the broad sense of "any action or policy intended to prevent or discourage an attack", others see it in the more limited sense of "using the threat of retaliation to discourage an attack" (off-the-cuff definitions). I personally think the first is more appropriate, especially since massive retaliation against the type of amorphous organization that typically presents an irregular threat may not be possible. We need the entire toolbox, and terminology that tends - by design or by reflex - to emphasize one tool can distort the discussion from the start. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "confronting irregular threats", "neutralizing irregular threats", or something similar?

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph I read a couple of years ago for a class:

U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. This report attempts to help these decisionmakers see the potential use of influence campaigns in the war on terrorism. To do this, the authors gauge the lessons learned from past U.S. operations, analyzing the “de-Nazification” efforts of postwar Germany, the psychological operations conducted during the Vietnam War, and the support of anticommunist movements and resources in Poland throughout the Cold War. Although stipulating that influence campaigns are highly sensitive to their respective operational environments, the authors arrive at the following general guidelines for the use of persuasion in the struggle against terrorism: match objectives, message, and delivery to the audience; incorporate feedback mechanisms in the planning stage; and set realistic expectations. They then apply these guidelines to three different types of audiences in the Muslim world-Yemen, Indonesia, and diaspora communities in Germany. The authors note that the use of strategic influence is not and probably never will be a “silver bullet” to removing the threat of terrorism; however, the research herein should help bring U.S. decisionmakers closer in refining how and in what circumstances such campaigns can best be applied.

Thoughts on this?

BW,

Premise: The US treats those states who possess nuclear weapons with a greater degree of respect for their national sovereignty than those states that do not possess such weapons. Thus providing a powerful provocative motivation to gain such weapons in the very states that we are working the hardest to prevent from doing that very thing.

I'm not sure I agree with your premise. To begin with, all the nuclear powers but three are allies of the United States. For the exceptions - North Korea, China and Russia - there are many factors besides nuclear weapons for us to show greater respect for their sovereignty. Additionally, I don't think those three would argue the US shows their sovereignty much respect (Missile Defense, NATO expansion, Taiwan, human rights, proliferation security initiative, etc.)

Then, if you look at Iran, the perception that it seeks to develop weapons has increased calls to violate is sovereignty through military or covert action including regime change. One might therefore argue that pursuit of such weapons is more likely to result in violations of sovereignty.

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Those states have told us directly where we are hypocritical: We actively oppose non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) acquiring legal dual-use technology while failing to take sufficient measures to abide by article VI of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). We are attempting to get states to implement the additional protocol to the NPT, yet we are receiving significant pushback from the NNWS because of this perception of hypocrisy. Then there is our bilateral nuclear deal with India, which greatly damaged our credibility on nonproliferation and is arguably a violation of the spirit of the NPT.

So rather than make a declaration on the equality of sovereignty, it might be better for the US to make more efforts toward disarmament and at least rhetorically end the policy that the NNWS should not be blocked from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology.

[William F. Owen]

I do care because not understanding why an adversary is not making an action leads to vulnerability to deception and strategic surprise. There are many historical examples that illustrate this point.

Your a fan of using Intelligence on which to base your policy?? ME TOO!!

[Entropy]

Your a fan of using Intelligence on which to base your policy?? ME TOO!!

Yeah, it's a pretty radical concept!

[Bob's World]

Maybe I'm too much of a stickler for definitions, but I think the second, limited definition, is what most people think of when considering "deterrence." The first is either "influence" or "disincentive" or "dissuasion." I agree with a lot of what BW is saying, I just think using "deterrence" to include things like "improving governance" is only going to confuse people.

There seems to be a lot of overlap with "strategic influence." I'm reminded of this RAND monograph I read a couple of years ago for a class:



Thoughts on this?

BW,



I'm not sure I agree with your premise. To begin with, all the nuclear powers but three are allies of the United States. For the exceptions - North Korea, China and Russia - there are many factors besides nuclear weapons for us to show greater respect for their sovereignty. Additionally, I don't think those three would argue the US shows their sovereignty much respect (Missile Defense, NATO expansion, Taiwan, human rights, proliferation security initiative, etc.)

Then, if you look at Iran, the perception that it seeks to develop weapons has increased calls to violate is sovereignty through military or covert action including regime change. One might therefore argue that pursuit of such weapons is more likely to result in violations of sovereignty.



Those states have told us directly where we are hypocritical: We actively oppose non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) acquiring legal dual-use technology while failing to take sufficient measures to abide by article VI of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). We are attempting to get states to implement the additional protocol to the NPT, yet we are receiving significant pushback from the NNWS because of this perception of hypocrisy. Then there is our bilateral nuclear deal with India, which greatly damaged our credibility on nonproliferation and is arguably a violation of the spirit of the NPT.

So rather than make a declaration on the equality of sovereignty, it might be better for the US to make more efforts toward disarmament and at least rhetorically end the policy that the NNWS should not be blocked from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology.

One of all of the nuclear states we have bombed or invaded in the past 20 years; and one of all of the non-nuclear states we have bombed or invaded.

Then explain to me once again how we treat everyone with the same respect to their sovereignty.

[Bill Moore]

Thought for consideration: Would our counter-proliferation efforts be more successful and perceived as less hypocritical if the U.S. were to state and then implement a policy of recognizing the same writ of sovereignty to all states, regardless of whether or not they possess such weapons?

Perhaps, but to date efforts to extend an olive branch to Iran and North Korea haven't been productive, and one can make strong arguments they have been counterproductive. North Korea and Iran are not seeking nuclear weapons only to counter U.S. power, they also have regional interests, other actors they want to influence (or deter if you will) by acquiring these weapons. I do refer to them as threats based on their activities and their stated intentions. Other countries are developing nuclear weapons that are competitors versus threats, but when we have a threat we must recognize it and not play see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.

I think the underlying theme in the deterence argument is a failure to address the limits of U.S. government power (power defined as the ability to influence). As the world becomes ever more connected we're becoming just another player on the field, versus "the" player, and individual actors are gaining more power with ever increasng connectiveness which allows them to form their own coalitions ranging from Islamist violent extremist groups, environmentalists, tea-party groups, anti-globalists, transnational criminal organizations, etc. BW's discussed the civil rights movement in another thread. Martin Luther King had the power to influence the most powerful nation in the world. That type of movement can no longer be constrained by modern states with democratic values, and we see more of those states emerging around the world. Unfortunately not all movements will be as altruistic as the civil rights movement, some movements will be focused on restricted rights and imposing shari'a law.

While we are unquestionably the greatest military power, we have witnessed the limits of military power aganst people power. People power is not vulnerable to our type of military power (powerful, high tech western militaries constrained by our western values). What other forms of power do we have? Diplomacy? How do we employ diplomacy to influence non-state actors? Our diplomacy is in as great of need for reformation/transformation as our miltary. Our current use of diplomacy is to build coalitions of like minded partners to do more of the same, economic sanctions (although we can't control the black economy, and it is growing larger day by day), build a conventional military coalition to respond ineffectively to an irregular threat? Or extend olive branches to bad actors when all else fails? Our information power has been subverted by grass roots activists who build schools and establish websites to indoctrinate (and in the case of Islamists radicalize) people receptive to their message. Our message doesn't promise paradise, nor does provide answers to the questions people ask in developing nations, nor does it provide a sense of belonging, and rarely does it touch the populace it needs to. We have a narrative based on capitalistic values that is all too often turned against us by so-called spiritual leaders. Spiritual leaders touch emotion, while we try to reason with people based on "our" values. Emotion has always had more impact than reason. The same is true of our economic power, it is misdirected at large projects, while our foes effectively use their money to organize at the grass roots level (building schools/madrass's as mentioned above), again to mobilize the people to support them.

I know many will disagree, but the more I think about our SECDEF's efforts to focus our military on irregular warfare, the more I realize just how far we are from optimizing our government to address to these threats.

[marct]

Interesting discussion, Bob. Back to your slides for a minute - why are you excluding non-state actors from well governed states? I'm not referring to the issue of Islamist radicals in Europe (or Canada, the US, Australia, etc.) - I'm talking about multinational corporations, transnational organizations and supra-national bodies regardless of whether or not they are capable of overt military action.

[Entropy]

One of all of the nuclear states we have bombed or invaded in the past 20 years; and one of all of the non-nuclear states we have bombed or invaded.

Then explain to me once again how we treat everyone with the same respect to their sovereignty.

I never said we treated everyone equally. What I said was that factors other than nuclear status account for the different treatment. Being an ally of most nuclear weapons states is a pretty big reason we haven't bombed or invaded them. If Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons disappeared tomorrow it is still pretty unlikely we would bomb or invade them.

[Bob's World]

Interesting discussion, Bob. Back to your slides for a minute - why are you excluding non-state actors from well governed states? I'm not referring to the issue of Islamist radicals in Europe (or Canada, the US, Australia, etc.) - I'm talking about multinational corporations, transnational organizations and supra-national bodies regardless of whether or not they are capable of overt military action.

I very specifically used the term "actor" for the non-state category as they do not represent nor have a direct official link to any state. Could a corporation be a "non-state actor", absolutely. Now, most corporations have to operate primarily within the law, so we have strings on them that work quite well. My main concern then are those non-state actors with no such compulsion to be constrained by law. I am also more focused on those with political agenda, vice profit agendas.

If, however, a corporation chose to act outside the law to pursue a political agenda they would fall in this group; but again, we can always yank them back by fact that they must operate primarily within the law.

The poster child for the category of non-state actors I describe here is AQ. Not the many nationalist insurgency movements who have put on AQ T-shirts for cool points and "corporate" sponsoring; but the core AQ ran by Mr. bin Laden. As to those nationalist insurgencies I would refuse to recoginze their claim to being AQ and call them by their original name, and certainly prescribe engagement based upon their primary nationalist purpose.

[Bob's World]

I never said we treated everyone equally. What I said was that factors other than nuclear status account for the different treatment. Being an ally of most nuclear weapons states is a pretty big reason we haven't bombed or invaded them. If Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons disappeared tomorrow it is still pretty unlikely we would bomb or invade them.

If you were a state leader, and your state had an agenda and interests that ran counter to the US; and you had no desire to subjugate yourself to the US, nor to back off from what you saw as your duty to pursue in support of your populace, what are your options?

1. Form an alliance and subjugate yourself to some nuclear state willing to rebuff the US. or

2. Gain your own nuclear weapon so that the US would back off a bit.

I think this is the perception our policy projects; and I believe that addressing that perception would help us tremendously in our very reasonable interest in promoting non-proliferation.