BW,
There is that perception in some cases, but there's also the realization that pursuit of nuclear weapons (as opposed to actually possessing them) is going to increase one's chances of getting bombed by the US. The US has demonstrated and clearly stated its willingness to use force to prevent that.
I also think the history of nuclear proliferation shows that governments are willing to risk those consequences if they perceive an existential threat. That was the case with Brazil/Argentina, Iran/Iraq, Israel/Arab World, and India/Pakistan. The case of Brazil and Argentina is particularly instructive since it demonstrates how reduced tensions and bilateral transparency can lead to states deciding that nuclear weapons are no longer in their interest.
On Iran, my analysis indicates that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons during the 1980's and 1990's because of Iraq, not the US or Israel. Now that Iraq is no longer a threat to Iran, Iran's strategic rationale for nuclear weapons is gone. The policy problem I see is that most policymakers and analysts believe Iran's program is independent of its strategic position and that Iran is "bent" on acquiring weapons regardless. To me that is a dangerous and ahistorical view that will lead to self-fulfilling policymaking.
For most of the rest of the world, however, I think the bigger issue is the perception (and often the reality) that the US works to deny nations the benefits of nuclear technology while failing to live up to its disarmament obligations under the NPT. A big reason the NNWS originally agreed to the limits imposed on them by the NPT was access to nuclear technology.
Personally, I think unless things change, the NPT's days are numbered. The NNWS are not going to collectively adhere to the NPT when they believe the US and other NWS are breaking the spirit and letter of the agreement.
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