Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[TheCurmudgeon]

The old adage is that Democracies do not go to war with each other. This is because democracies are slow and stupid – I mean it is because they value what they have and are reluctant to risk their hard fought gains. I don’t believe that is true, I believe that Democracies will go to war with each other, but WHAT they will fight over will be different from what monarchies went to war over. In any case, the democratic or quasi-democratic governments do not easily engage in direct action. Similarly, small states with inadequate militaries will not engage in direct action since they will be easily defeated.

But tensions still exist, and as another person here pointed out, if you squeeze a balloon it just bulges elsewhere. Since states won’t act or won’t act directly, others will. The result is that conflict moves from the realm of direct state-on-state engagement to state surrogates and non-state actors. Where a state surrogate exists it may still be possible to threaten direct action against the state, but probably not because of the collateral effect on the state’s population may make any direct threat counterproductive. The tools of deterrence therefore start to move away from direct military action (although never far away) to attacking the root causes of the tensions. You must preempt you’re enemy by directly addressing their issues, taking away their power over the people.

That is a F*&#ing tall order, particularly if your enemy is an ideological zealot. I don’t claim to have the answer to it. I think the Theater Security Cooperation Programs the COCOMs have is a start, but it needs to be more focused and tied into not only USAID but other international players. The farther you separate the population from the ideology of the zealot the more likely you are to remove the power base the zealot gains his resources from. In effect, you are cutting his supply lines, either by traditional deterrance targeted at the state sponsor or by removing the support of the local population. The latter requires an understanding of the indigenous population in a fashion probably only traditional SF forces are capable of. Therefore, you would have to have a two pronged approach, a carrot and a stick. (Guess which one is the stick)

All this seems a lot more like statecraft than military actions. Maybe it is. Maybe it is just recognition that we are part of Clausewitz’s trilogy just as our potential adversary is.

Anyway, thought I would throw in my 2-cents. All this may seem very basic, but sometimes I think the basics get lost in the minutia.

In case you were wondering, I am not a peacenik. I cringe every time I get a Christmas card that reads “Peace on Earth” as that would put me out of a job.

[Dayuhan]

(Dr.?)Steve,

As you know CNPC is not the first to be involved with 'outside of the box' business models...

From Frontline: At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item

Dr??? Lord, no, far from it.

Certainly neither CNPC nor Siemens is the first or the last to be involvbed with bribery. The difference, of course, is that Siemens got caught, and slapped with a $1.6 billion fine. I don't think you'll see CNPC paying any fines.

Never invest in a market where there are no scandals. Somebody will always push the envelope: if there are no scandals, that just means nobody's getting caught, and if nobody's getting caught that there is no incentive to stay in the envelope, which means there is no envelope. Yes, corporations and there executives get up to all kinds of monkey business, which is why we routinely see them getting hauled into the courts. How many government officials do we see getting hauled into court? Is that number low because they are all fearfully well behaved and nobody is doing anything wrong?

I'm not sure how analogous the various East India Companies, the State of Venice, and the Templars are to modern corporations. Not that trade and business are not potential sources of friction: they are, and always will be. I don't expect to see a Corporation going to war any time soon.

What type of attack capability does Boeing Aircraft Corporation have if they really got pissed off?

Who do you figure they'd bomb, Airbus Industrie? What do you think that would do to their share price?

If we want to see what Boeing would do when pissed off, all we have to do is look at recent events. Not long ago Boeing lost out on a $35 billion USAF contract for tanker aircraft, a contract they were widely expected to win. Not only that, they lost out to a European-dominated consortium. That had to piss them off, but nobody got bombed. Instead, they howled to their Congresspeople, and encouraged their subcontractors - strategically distributed over key legislative districts - to do the same, and the contract award was rescinded and sent back for review. That's a good deal more than bombing anyone (not a tactic likely to sell airplanes, to the Government or to airlines) would have accomplished.

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.

[William F. Owen]

All this seems a lot more like statecraft than military actions. Maybe it is. Maybe it is just recognition that we are part of Clausewitz’s trilogy just as our potential adversary is.

Concur. It seems to me that US posters in particular write about, discuss and attempt to inform "the policy" - which to me is entirely political. The military should not muck about with the policy. The policy is what they enforce, not create, and even then, the politicians place constraints in your path, meaning it may actually be impossible.

[Ken White]

...Never invest in a market where there are no scandals. Somebody will always push the envelope: if there are no scandals, that just means nobody's getting caught, and if nobody's getting caught that there is no incentive to stay in the envelope, which means there is no envelope...

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.

Verily on the first item. On the second; the Big Guys like peace and tranquility, better for their market share. They may do bad stuff, no question, unless checked by governments or competitors but mass violence is not in their interest.

[marct]

Hi Ken,

On the second; the Big Guys like peace and tranquility, better for their market share. They may do bad stuff, no question, unless checked by governments or competitors but mass violence is not in their interest.

Well, I'd agree with that if you limited it to their market area . Mass violence has proven to be quite lucrative for a number of corporations as long as it took place outside their major bases.

From Dayuhan

I'm not sure how analogous the various East India Companies, the State of Venice, and the Templars are to modern corporations. Not that trade and business are not potential sources of friction: they are, and always will be. I don't expect to see a Corporation going to war any time soon.

The various Charter companies are somewhat analogous to the larger resource and manufacturing companies, albeit without much sovereignty... although, now that I think of it, didn't one of the German companies have a limited form of sovereignty in Katanga province?

Venice was a classic Port of Trade type society (cf Karl Polanyi in various places such as Trade and Market in early Empires). Few of them project much actual kinetic "power" - Venice, Carthage, Tyre and Sidon are early city state examples. Today, about the only major one left is Singapore (Hong Kong used to be one, but...). It think they are relevant as a model because it would be quite possible for a group of corporations to get together, "buy" a country and turn it into a Port of Trade.

As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.

On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes.

[Bob's World]

"Some people you just can't deter" or stated another way "Some people you just have to kill"

I won't argue with either statement, but I would attempt to offer perhaps a little to consider in the application of my model of actors to add some perspectives:

1. Agreed that certain individuals can not be deterred, as such they fall into that far right box of actor on my model. And certainly AQ and Greenpeace (non-state actors) and 1945 Japan (State Actor) are or were full of such individuals. Interesting, true, and largely immaterial to our larger mission of deterrence.

2. While even the majority of individuals within an organization may be undeterable individually, rare is the organization that cannot be deterred if addressed appropriately.

Japanese were willing to die to the last man, woman and child to preserve the Nation, but once the death of the nation was threatened through the use of nuclear weapons they surrendered to preserve Japan.

The zealot member of Greenpeace will likely remain zealots no matter what, but the nature of the organization can be shaped through a well designed scheme of encouraging and preventive measures designed to deter them from acting in a way that is unacceptable.

Same with AQ. Many members will never change; but AQ can be disempowered by both engaging them appropriately and by targeting the motivation of the many nationalist insurgencies that they franchise under their banner that currently perceive the US to be the obstacle to achieving good governance in their respective states. Certainly good messaging and the surgical removal of key rabble rousers is appropriate (low provocative) ways helps.

Bottom line is that everything is related; and certainly in the deterrence of irregular threats one must recognize that how we engage any of these actors affects popular perceptions; how we engage AQ will have positive, neutral, or negative effects on support to various insurgent movements and vice versa. Balance across the spectrum, think before we speak or act, and recognize provocative and deterrent effects differ by audience.

The military has a key role in all of this. All of this is also policy. You cannot separate. Military does not and should not craft policy; but we certainly must inform it, as we will be a major component of its implementation.

Perhaps this is uniquely American. We speak up where other may remain silent. Brash, you know. Probably, like most Americans, when I read the "Charge of the Light Brigade" I don't get inspired. I respect the hell out of those poor bastards, but I don't wish I was there with them. The American soldier is more likely to say "Why not call in some arty first sir, and then hit that open flank?"

[William F. Owen]

As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.

On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes.

The Templars were De-facto actors for the Pope. They were an executive military arm, of Roman Catholic political power, - when they became a competing political entity, they had to be destroyed? (maybe)
Regardless of the conspiracy theories, Machiavelli warns about the use of Mercenaries for exactly this reason.

Not so different from Executive Outcomes who were contractors to create "stability" so as resources exploitation could take place, and thus enforce the policy of the government. The world is getting more Medieval everyday!

- thus more Clausewitian!!

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

The Templars were De-facto actors for the Pope. They were an executive military arm, of Roman Catholic political power, - when they became a competing political entity, they had to be destroyed? (maybe)
Regardless of the conspiracy theories, Machiavelli warns about the use of Mercenaries for exactly this reason.

That's why they went underground !

Yeah, Machiavelli warned against the use of mercenaries and, IMO, for good reason. Of course, that was in the Prince which was him sucking up so that he could get out of exile - note that the prince involved was descended from mercenaries too .

Not so different from Executive Outcomes who were contractors to create "stability" so as resources exploitation could take place, and thus enforce the policy of the government. The world is getting more Medieval everyday!

- thus more Clausewitian!!

Hawkwood was always one of my favorites . And, yes, I think we are getting more medieval....

[slapout9]

If we want to see what Boeing would do when pissed off, all we have to do is look at recent events. Not long ago Boeing lost out on a $35 billion USAF contract for tanker aircraft, a contract they were widely expected to win. Not only that, they lost out to a European-dominated consortium. That had to piss them off, but nobody got bombed. Instead, they howled to their Congresspeople, and encouraged their subcontractors - strategically distributed over key legislative districts - to do the same, and the contract award was rescinded and sent back for review. That's a good deal more than bombing anyone (not a tactic likely to sell airplanes, to the Government or to airlines) would have accomplished.

MNCs are not angels, but I just can't see them as a significant element in the security threat matrix.

I never said anything about bombing anybody! I said attack which is exactly what they did. Your account of their behavior proves my point. Living in Alabama and having legally WON the contract for the tanker TWICE just shows how MNC do not respect any rules or laws, if they don't get their way they will engage in Irregular Warfare until they get it.

Better defention of war than the one commonly used.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war

[slapout9]

2. While even the majority of individuals within an organization may be undeterable individually, rare is the organization that cannot be deterred if addressed appropriately.

That is the key....The Enemy is a system! and if you understand the system properly it can generally be deterred.

[slapout9]

Bob, here is some good Air Force stuff on what to do.
So what kind of organization do we need to deter irregular threats?Colonel Warden's suggestion from a long time ago. Stop thinking like the dead Prussian Guy.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a.../vorfal99.html


Start thinking like Americans and we will be alright.... for your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement ELO-Calling America
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uE6RqGgmPZA&feature=fvst

[Ken White]

and just reread it.

Interesting thing is I had many of the same thoughts he expresses some 30 or more years before he wrote that. He was a Retired Colonel, so he wrote his thoughts down and got 'em published. About the time a lot of that stuff gelled for me, I was a Platoon Sergeant and, had I written it, no one would've paid an ounce of attention.

Warden and I have one other thing in common -- neither of our thoughts on that line are going to happen because to do those things would upset the system. The 'system' hates risk and innovation...

[Dayuhan]

You must preempt you’re enemy by directly addressing their issues, taking away their power over the people.

That is a F*&#ing tall order, particularly if your enemy is an ideological zealot.

This is true... you will not convert ideological zealots by addressing their issues. You can, however, isolate that ideological zealot from his sources of recruits, money, and sanctuary, and simultaneously pursue him with military or LE tools, as appropriate to the environment.

[Dayuhan]

Slap...

I never said anything about bombing anybody! I said attack which is exactly what they did. Your account of their behavior proves my point. Living in Alabama and having legally WON the contract for the tanker TWICE just shows how MNC do not respect any rules or laws, if they don't get their way they will engage in Irregular Warfare until they get it.

Yes, politicians will go to bat for major employers in their districts, and these issues are often settled by political influence. Welcome to America.

Does that happen because politicians are corrupt, or because they are representing the interests of their districts... or a little of both? Is this "irregular warfare", or simply a less savory side of democracy?

Seems to me there's abundant room for discussion of how to manage the influence of special interests on government (corporate, labor, religious, ideological, etc), but that seems more of a political reform discussion than a small wars discussion. I doubt that we're likely to see anything from the corporate side that would constitute an "irregular threat" that needs to be deterred.

Well, I'd agree with that if you limited it to their market area . Mass violence has proven to be quite lucrative for a number of corporations as long as it took place outside their major bases...

The various Charter companies are somewhat analogous to the larger resource and manufacturing companies, albeit without much sovereignty... although, now that I think of it, didn't one of the German companies have a limited form of sovereignty in Katanga province?

Venice was a classic Port of Trade type society (cf Karl Polanyi in various places such as Trade and Market in early Empires). Few of them project much actual kinetic "power" - Venice, Carthage, Tyre and Sidon are early city state examples. Today, about the only major one left is Singapore (Hong Kong used to be one, but...). It think they are relevant as a model because it would be quite possible for a group of corporations to get together, "buy" a country and turn it into a Port of Trade.

Dubai might be classed as a Port of Trade, and arguably the Netherlands. Hong Kong is still pretty close, they just changed nominal sovereigns. The Chinese have messed a bit with HK politics, but they don't want to mess too much with the revenue stream.

Much of the discourse on this subject ignores the adaptive changes we've seen in corporate investment practices over the last 30 years.

Once upon a time a fruit packer would own plantations and hire employees in developing nations. That's very rare now: they are more likely to deal with contract growers in as many supply areas as possible, letting the local contractor own, employ, and finance production. They risk less and gain more by simply buying product, branding and promoting it, and reselling it at a higher price.

We see a similar trend with oil companies. Once upon a time they sought to own and develop resources; if nationalization was threatened they howled for the marines. Nowadays they are perfectly willing to make deals with national oil companies. In areas with high political and conflict risks, companies don't want to own: they would rather have a national company borrow a few billion to develop, then make money on service contracts, limiting their risk if things go sour. They know the marines won't come. If the Dutch East India Company was threatened by a local rebellion their own armed forces couldn't handle, they knew they could call on government forces. If Shell gets thrown out of Nigeria, what armed forces do they have? Will the Dutch government send gunboats and marines? Figure the odds...

Same deal if a computer company wants to assemble motherboards in Thailand. They don't build their own factory, they subcontract to a locally owned supplier, who borrows money, builds his own factory, and sells the product on.

None of this is about altruism, or about restoring sovereignty to developing nations. It's risk mitigation, pure and simple. This is why a group of multinationals are not going to get together and buy a Port of Trade: it's too risky. People don't always stay bought. You could easily "buy" your place, invest a few tens of billions, and the locals decide to take it back. If that happens, who you gonna call?

If we're going to assess the irregular threat posed my MNCs, we have to look at the way they operate today, not the way they operated 30 or 150 or 500 years ago: things change. I would still maintain that the threat is pretty far down the list.

As for the Templars, well, one might argue that they are analogous to other religious MNCs such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.

If we expand the definition of MNC to that point, the term really doesn't mean much.

On corporations going to war, check out Executive Outcomes.

I'm of course familiar with EO. I can't say I'm entirely comfortable with the business model, but you could argue that if we must have mercenaries, better to have the process organized and to some extent controlled than to have it going on under the table. One could imagine a scenario where a company like EO would start a conflict to create a market for its services, but while this would make a good plot for a movie or novel, in the real world the consequences and probability of exposure would probably outweigh the benefits.

[Surferbeetle]

Max Boot's The Savage Wars of Peace had some interesting things to say about dollar diplomacy. Boot classified America as a commercial power during 1801-1899, a great power during 1900-1941, and a superpower thereafter. It's an interesting book and helped to bring back some echo's from my 'enriched' history classes back when.

My copy of the May 2009 edition of The Atlantic had an article that is still reverberating as well. It gives some insights into how things are changing. The Quiet Coup by Simon Johnson.

One thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.

The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed.

Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.

In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.

But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.

[William F. Owen]

.
So what kind of organization do we need to deter irregular threats?Colonel Warden's suggestion from a long time ago. Stop thinking like the dead Prussian Guy.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a.../vorfal99.html

Stop thinking? Very very few US Officers have ever heeded CvCs advice, read or understood his work, or understand the nature of his observations. The US, and USAF in particular have never had a Clausewitian understanding of war.

In short, the Newtonian, Clausewitzian concept of the battlefield itself has become an anachronism.

Interesting statement. Where's the evidence?

The Anti-CvC always make the same errors.
They ascribe meanings and statements to CvC, which he never made or they don't understand.
They say, the "solution is X" and invariably, if it actually makes sense, repeat something Clausewitz said.

[Dayuhan]

I read the Atlantic article... some things I can agree with, but there are some real distortions. Popular distortions in the mode du jour, and thus largely immune to criticism, but still distortions. From your citations...

Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets.

I can't agree with this. Developing countries where a government/elite nexus has managed the country "like a profit-making company" have often taken risks and gotten into trouble, but in general the money they have used has been invested in sustainable enterprise (examples might be South Korea or Singapore), and in the long run they have gotten out of trouble and done fairly well. The perennial basket cases are the ones where the government/elite nexus has NOT managed the country like a "profit making company", but treated it as a pure milking cow, borrowing as much as possible and, instead of investing the money in profitable enterprise, spending it or stealing it. The Philippines is a good example, or take your pick among many in Africa and Latin America. Management in these countries has no resemblance at all to that of a profit making company... any company run along these lines would be unprofitable and would soon be out of business.

But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse.

It has become very fashionable to attribute the recent financial crisis to "wall street" or "the financiers", but this ignores a long chain of perverse incentives and appallingly bad policy decisions that spans the Clinton and Bush II administrations. This is why both Republicans and Democrats would rather point to Wall Street: they can't confront the causative role played by Government without pointing out the ostrich egg on their own faces.

I could say a whole lot more, but I fear we veer way off the thread topic... perhaps another thread is in order.

[slapout9]

Slap...



Yes, politicians will go to bat for major employers in their districts, and these issues are often settled by political influence. Welcome to America.

Does that happen because politicians are corrupt, or because they are representing the interests of their districts... or a little of both? Is this "irregular warfare", or simply a less savory side of democracy?

Seems to me there's abundant room for discussion of how to manage the influence of special interests on government (corporate, labor, religious, ideological, etc), but that seems more of a political reform discussion than a small wars discussion. I doubt that we're likely to see anything from the corporate side that would constitute an "irregular threat" that needs to be deterred.

It is out and out Fraud. And it is a threat to the National Security of the US. Many of the great COIN theorist talked about and warned about governments failing to recognize insurgencies until it was to late, largely because they failed to deal with subversion and fraud...they did little until it became an armed rebellion. And because you doubt it could happen so much is exactly the reason that I believe it will, our enemies understand the value of surprise.

[slapout9]

Stop thinking? Very very few US Officers have ever heeded CvCs advice, read or understood his work, or understand the nature of his observations. The US, and USAF in particular have never had a Clausewitian understanding of war.


Interesting statement. Where's the evidence?

The Anti-CvC always make the same errors.
They ascribe meanings and statements to CvC, which he never made or they don't understand.
They say, the "solution is X" and invariably, if it actually makes sense, repeat something Clausewitz said.

Hi Wilf, don't know...just know what he wrote. My personal opinion of where I think CvC is wrong and this goes with the post I just did for Doyuan was his fundamental definition of War. It is not just the use of violence.... it is Violence and/or Fraud (mental violence)used to impose your will on your opponent. That is why we think COIN/Irregular War is so deferent from Regular war because of the massive use Fraud against your opponent.

[Dayuhan]

It is out and out Fraud. And it is a threat to the National Security of the US. Many of the great COIN theorist talked about and warned about governments failing to recognize insurgencies until it was to late, largely because they failed to deal with subversion and fraud...they did little until it became an armed rebellion. And because you doubt it could happen so much is exactly the reason that I believe it will, our enemies understand the value of surprise.

Fraud, or business as usual? Not that the two are mutually exclusive...

This sort of thing has been going on a long, long time, and if people were going to insurge over it they'd have done it already. I wouldn't call it great policy or good governance, but it's a long way from the level of bad government that inspires insurrection. I'm not sure which enemies you see as are looking to surprise us, or how...

[rant]

As long as we put the production and distribution of goods and services in private hands (state-owned enterprise hasn't worked so well) we are going to have to deal with large private enterprises: mom and pop shops don't do commercial aircraft, computers, you name it. When you run government up against large private enterprise you get an uneasy interface, always. Regulate too much and you stifle the productive part of your economy; regulate too little and it eats you. It's a search for equilibrium and it's never 100% right.

No system is perfect. You draw the rules as well as you can and enforce therm as well as you can, and people evade them, so you redraw them, and people evade them again... people break the rules, you prosecute, people get around the rules, you modify the rules, and they still get around them...

It never ends and it's never gonna be perfect, or even close. It's the continuing process of trying to make a nation work... and while it pisses me off too at times (less so than most, as it's all very far away), I don't see it anywhere near the point of generating insurrection.

[/rant]