What we really need is a better crystal ball

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to the Australian Lowry Institute think-tank for this. A mix of experts commenting on the issue, on-line summary or a podcast:http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/09/...of-prediction/

[slapout9]

Hat tip to the Australian Lowry Institute think-tank for this. A mix of experts commenting on the issue, on-line summary or a podcast:http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/09/...of-prediction/

Here is my question. Isn't the act of saying you cain't predict the future....an act of prediction?

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

I have one of those T-shirts that says:

Not everyone wandering around is lost.

[davidbfpo]

Difficult to find a place for this commentary on intelligence analysis, so dropped in here.

Titled 'How Critics of Obama's Libya Response Profoundly Misunderstand Intelligence' and sub-titled 'Agencies still don't have all the facts about what went down in Benghazi, and interpreting them correctly will take time, a former CIA analyst explains':http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/...igence/263139/

When intelligence from a conflict zone is assessed, the results are not clear, linear, or static. Rather, 21st-century intelligence analysis -- particularly when it is occurring in real-time and on something high-profile -- can be messy, obtuse and, above all, evolving.

1. A lot of first-contact intelligence is wrong.
2. Intelligence analysts almost always hedge their language.
3. The intelligence community's production timelines are ill-suited to our 24/7 news cycle.
4. Arguing over what to call the assailants misses the point.

The author co-wrote this book, not heard of:http://www.amazon.com/Find-Fix-Finis.../dp/1610391284

[Ken White]

I agree with his or her contention that political gamesmanship and a rush to blame any sitting President -- Obama is far from the first to suffer that -- is ill advised and just wrong. I disagree rather strongly on the contentions as to why that is so:

1. A lot of first-contact intelligence is wrong.

That is true, however, my observation has been that most of it is reasonably accurate and much of that is rejected by the 'analysts' as it it does not fit their preconceived notions of what should be. The unnamned author even gives an example of that often fatal failing:

Here's an example: Ten years ago this month, D.C.-area residents were held hostage by the rampages of the Beltway sniper. Over the course of three weeks, the killer slaughtered 10 people and injured others, mostly at random. Based on reasonable FBI and local law-enforcement analysis, the killer was said to be a lone, white, employed, male gunman in a white van. It took additional information and some dumb luck to determine that, other than his gender, every one of these assumptions was totally wrong.

Analysts too often reject facts due to 'assessments' that such facts should not be true. The 9/11 assaults are another example as was the Battle of the Bulge and more than one other military debacle...

His other points also err IMO:

2. Intelligence analysts almost always hedge their language.

He or she is ferociously understating that problem. History is rife with examples of such hedging due to a fear of being wrong. ' Reputations' must be protected, if others die due to that, tough...

3. The intelligence community's production timelines are ill-suited to our 24/7 news cycle.

Not really. The intelligence communities bureaucratic protective instincts are ill suited to that cycle. Not the same thing at all.

4. Arguing over what to call the assailants misses the point.

Well, the author got one out of four correct...

However, in so doing, he or she neatly obscures an issue -- motive. What the assailant is called is indeed immaterial; who the assailant was and what their motivation happened to be are often crucial. The latter will frequently lead to the former.

[davidbfpo]

In April 2012 a London-based left of centre think tank, Demos, published a report; which I read and forgot to post here The three authors include Sir David Omand, one of Whitehall's respected intelligence guru's; which made it more interesting to read.

Link:http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/intelligence

The growth of social media poses a dilemma for security and law enforcement agencies. On the one hand, social media could provide a new form of intelligence – SOCMINT – that could contribute decisively to keeping the public safe. On the other, national security is dependent on public understanding and support for the measures being taken to keep us safe.
Social media challenges current conceptions about privacy, consent and personal data, and new forms of technology allow for more invisible and widespread intrusive surveillance than ever before. Furthermore, analysis of social media for intelligence purposes does not fit easily into the policy and legal frameworks that guarantee that such activity is proportionate, necessary and accountable.

This paper is the first effort to examine the ethical, legal and operational challenges involved in using social media for intelligence and insight purposes.

A "lurker" who works in this field commented:

a thoughtful analysis...they avoid that can of worms as they are keen to discuss the ethical / legal framework that would be needed to support this

The Frontline Club, London held a discussion evening after the launch, rightly the title was 'Cyber-snooping a threat to freedom or a necessary safeguard' and is available on a podcast:http://www.frontlineclub.com/events/...safeguard.html

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" commended I look at this previously unknown blogsite for a review of the Demos paper and a related UN paper:http://osintblog.org/?p=1462

Good points made here, which to date are rarely heard in public discussions with officialdom on social media intelligence:

A democratic state will not want (and be able) to afford general and permanent mistrust in its ways of safeguarding democracy, and so the authors adjust some Just War criteria in order to form the very necessary ‘rules of engagement’ for SOCMINT: sufficient, sustainable cause; integrity of motive; proportionate and necessary methods; and right authority, validated by external oversight.