Is an insurgent an insurgent?

[William F. Owen]

The answer to the question is definitely yes. An insurgent doesn't have to have national aspirations to be an insurgent - if the group is seeking to (violently) compete or replace local government with his own version of it, he is an insurgent.

Why so? That makes every irregular military force an insurgent. That's just not true. Competing with or seeking to inoculate yourself against Government policies, or even the activities of another armed group, does not make that party an insurgent or their activity an insurgency. Insurgencies are "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."

Not all irregular armed groups are insurgents.

[Bob's World]

Why so? That makes every irregular military force an insurgent. That's just not true. Competing with or seeking to inoculate yourself against Government policies, or even the activities of another armed group, does not make that party an insurgent or their activity an insurgency. Insurgencies are "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."

Not all irregular armed groups are insurgents.

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.

Yet both are categories of insurgencies in my book. It sounds like what he is dealing with is a subset of a separatist movement. Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.

[Dayuhan]

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.

Yet both are categories of insurgencies in my book. It sounds like what he is dealing with is a subset of a separatist movement. Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.

I think there's another type of insurgency, one that gets less attention here than it might. My own familiarity with this comes from an environment far removed from Afghanistan, but it would not surprise me to see the same phenomenon appearing there.

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

We tend to see these things in national terms: a national insurgency fighting a national government. It is said, though, that all politics are local, and this tends to be very true in tribal areas of decentralized states, where national governments (and for that matter nations) may seem very remote. In these environments, if people are fighting there are often immediate, local reasons that may be resolvable, addressable, and even legitimate. Many of my neighbors were insurgents once (they won, one of the rare places where that's happened), and given the way their government treated them, I can't blame them at all: in their shoes I'd have done the same thing.

National insurgencies tend to be aware of these local issues, and often move to exploit them by offering alliances. When these offers are accepted, that may give the impression that the local insurgency is a subset of the national one. That impression may be false: alliances may be a matter of convenience, and if local issues are addressed they may dissolve.

Of course these local issues may not be immediately visible to an outsider, and local government may not be at all eager to see them become visible, especially if the government or its agents have done specific things that provoked a violent response.

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

[marct]

I think there's another type of insurgency, one that gets less attention here than it might. My own familiarity with this comes from an environment far removed from Afghanistan, but it would not surprise me to see the same phenomenon appearing there.

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

That's a very good point, and I can think of several examples off the top of my head (the Red River Rebellion comes to mind). My gut guess is that this type of issue-driven insurgency rapidly shifts into either a separatist one (e.g. the US Colonies), a governmental replacement (e.g. Cuba) or gets resolved politically (e.g. Bolivia). Of course, it probably depends on what the "issue" is .

[jmm99]

A good starting point from Wilf:

In A'Stan the Taliban were the constituted government. Again, this shows the lack of rigour the terminology is held to.

During the Taliban "uprising" (ca. 1995 to date), Afghanistan was regarded by all as a nation-state. That does not end the line of inquiry.

Who or what was its government when the Taliban, de facto, held a majority of the country under their control ?

According to Pakistan, for example, the duly recognized government of Astan was the Taliban (the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" as it was unilaterally renamed in October 1997 by the Taliban). According to Russia and Iran, for example, the duly recognized government of Astan was the Rabbani government (allied with the Northern Alliance).

The US position was more complicated, as follows:

1. Rabbani government - recognition ended 15 Aug 1997.

2. No government - 15 Aug 1997 up through 21 Dec 2001.

3. Interim Authority (and successors) - from 22 Dec 2001.

References for all of the above are in this thread.

All of this is more than legal mumbo-jumbo because governmental recognition drives how a group and its members are regarded both diplomatically and militarily. Let's just look at it from a military standpoint.

A Pakistani officer looking across the border would see all forces authorized by the Taliban government (the recognized government by his country), including the AQ 055 Brigade, as being "regular combatants"[*]. He would see the forces of the Northern Alliance as "irregular combatants" (regardless of whether they were authorized or not by the Rabbani government). Also, because Pakistan did not ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

An Iranian officer would see it differently. He would see the forces authorized by the Rabbani government (the recognized government by his country) as being "regular combatants". He would see the Taliban (including its AQ allies) as "irregular combatants". Also because Iran did not ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

A Russian officer would see it the same way as the Iranian officer, except that because Russia did ratify the 1977 Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could claim the benefits of the APs. API does bring in the concept of "national liberation" and "self-determination":

PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art 1. General principles and scope of application

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all circumstances.

2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.

3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.

4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

A US officer (from 15 Aug 1997 up through 21 Dec 2001), because the US recognized no Astan government, would see all Taliban and Northern Alliance forces as "irregular combatants". Also because the US did not ratify the Additional Protocals, those irregular combatants could not claim the benefits of the APs.

Please note that this is not a question of what international law "should be"; or what government in your mind "should be" recognized. The question is what position has your country taken in recognizing or not recognizing a government. The forces of a recognized government are "regular combatants"; all other conflicting forces are "irregular combatants", except for a "Power" to that conflict which has accepted and applies the GCs (Common Article 2 exception **); and of course the forces of nation-states (HCPs to the GCs) who are involved in the conflict.

The term "insurgency" (as also the terms "rebellion, insurrection, guerrilla, partisan forces") may well have a defined meaning in domestic law; but those terms are surplusage in the LOAC (except for the extent that they enter into the API definition, for example).

----------------------
[*] "Regular" and "irregular", in a LOAC sense, have little to do with how those combatants fight, but a lot to do with authorization by a recognized government and the chain of command. E.g., the Continental Line would have been "irregulars" to the British, but "regulars" to the French.

[**] I can't think of a group that has met the Common Article 2 exception. An example from long before the GCs was the Confederate States of America, where both sides accepted and applied the laws of war as then generally accepted. Actually, the South was the first to do so. Initially, the North attempted to treat the Southern combatants as traitors (its naval forces as pirates). That led to something of a revolt in the Federal courts. The situation was normalized on the North's side by the Lieber Code.

[George L. Singleton]

MarkT and Dayuhan:

In particular I like Mark's overall summary, and I like this comment by our Philippines based friend Dayuhan, but everyone's inputs are very insightful and helpful individually and in total:

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

In Northern Pakistan the media, all their media, in genral use the terms "miscreants" and sometimes "extremists"

Based on several years now of reading, studying and writing in the Pak media myself, where I use the terms terrorists, Taliban, and al Qaida, I will create some confusion I suppose by nothing that the terrorists (my choice of words) have to rob, steal, and extort money nowadays to keep their fighting up and going. We are harming their main source of income whenever we taken on the poppy growers who will do business with anyone who can pay them hard currency, anyone, that includes us.

Shifting to remarks to me circa 2002/2003 from the Greatgrandson of a two times prior, based on the last King's tenure, of Afghanistan, who is retired from the Pakistani Foreign Service and was a protege of the late (executed) PM Bhutto (father of Mrs. Bhutto who was murdered by the Taliban agents it now seems clear to some of the world media in that the UN is formally invetigating now her murder/assassination)...the Afghans tribally are just that, tribes, loose confederations with a weak overall central governance system "until" the Taliban came long.

Thus I think the PsyOps folks using VOA and related channels of communications should pound away at the past and future intentions of the Taliban, and AQ, to "take away" local tribes initiatives and freedom of local governance, to create the in fact true picture that if you think you have got it rough now (remember, these tribe folks have never, ever known nor do they understand democracy or western style governance) just wait until the Taliban and AQ should get back in power and first thing that happens is "off with your heads" as you immediately are a threat to "their" soverignty that would take away the budding system of local governance we are fighting to give back to you.

How is that for another point of view without hanging up on technical military dictionary operating terms?

Simple is always better to me, at least.

[William F. Owen]

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

Exactly - BUT that is NOT a type of insurgency. What they want does not even have to be legitimate. Look at Sierra Leone and Colombia.

Based on the idea that what you describe is an Insurgency, the US brands all "Irregular Warfare" as "Insurgency," this COIN! - and out comes the COIN play book and all the associated baggage.

[Bob's World]

I think there's another type of insurgency, one that gets less attention here than it might. My own familiarity with this comes from an environment far removed from Afghanistan, but it would not surprise me to see the same phenomenon appearing there.

I would call this type of insurgency "issue-driven", with the driving issues primarily local. People in this position may not be trying to overthrow a government or secede from a nation, they are simply trying to force a government to stop doing specific things that they find offensive or opposed to their interests.

We tend to see these things in national terms: a national insurgency fighting a national government. It is said, though, that all politics are local, and this tends to be very true in tribal areas of decentralized states, where national governments (and for that matter nations) may seem very remote. In these environments, if people are fighting there are often immediate, local reasons that may be resolvable, addressable, and even legitimate. Many of my neighbors were insurgents once (they won, one of the rare places where that's happened), and given the way their government treated them, I can't blame them at all: in their shoes I'd have done the same thing.

National insurgencies tend to be aware of these local issues, and often move to exploit them by offering alliances. When these offers are accepted, that may give the impression that the local insurgency is a subset of the national one. That impression may be false: alliances may be a matter of convenience, and if local issues are addressed they may dissolve.

Of course these local issues may not be immediately visible to an outsider, and local government may not be at all eager to see them become visible, especially if the government or its agents have done specific things that provoked a violent response.

Again, I'm not at all sure that lessons learned among the hill tribes of the northern Philippines have any relevance at all to the hill tribes of northern Afghanistan, but I think it's worth considering that in any given area, some insurgents may be fighting because of local, immediate issues, and that it might be possible to divide these groups from the national insurgency by addressing and resolving the issues that motivate them.

Perhaps Shay's rebellion and the Whiskey rebellion in our own fromative history are such examples of issue-driven insurrection; both of which served to help the government understand what "good governnace" looked like in the eyes of the populace and to shape a fledgling national government to more effectively serve its populace in a manner they found acceptable.

[MikeF]

This thread provides a very good discussion highlighting the complexities involved in small wars. Personally, I find it easier to use the old languages of rebellion, insurrection, guerilla, partisan forces, etc...when confronting these types of conflicts. In the current environment, we use terms like Anti-Iraqi Forces, Anti-Coalition Forces, and Anti-Afghan Forces. These buzz words are too Orwellian for me, and they often minimize the issues, grievances, or ideology of each particular group.

Perhaps Shay's rebellion and the Whiskey rebellion in our own fromative history are such examples of issue-driven insurrection; both of which served to help the government understand what "good governnace" looked like in the eyes of the populace and to shape a fledgling national government to more effectively serve its populace in a manner they found acceptable.

COL Jones,

Sir, how would you categorize a nationalist group that does not necessarily support the current government, but mainly fights American/Coalition forces because they are perceived as occupiers? Many Sunni/Shia groups in Iraq fall into that category. I find it difficult to include them in issue-driven insurrection b/c their biggest beef is that a foreign nation is conducting operations in their homeland. I'm not sure what exactly to call them.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

This thread provides a very good discussion highlighting the complexities involved in small wars. Personally, I find it easier to use the old languages of rebellion, insurrection, guerilla, partisan forces, etc...when confronting these types of conflicts. In the current environment, we use terms like Anti-Iraqi Forces, Anti-Coalition Forces, and Anti-Afghan Forces. These buzz words are too Orwellian for me, and they often minimize the issues, grievances, or ideology of each particular group.



COL Jones,

Sir, how would you categorize a nationalist group that does not necessarily support the current government, but mainly fights American/Coalition forces because they are perceived as occupiers? Many Sunni/Shia groups in Iraq fall into that category. I find it difficult to include them in issue-driven insurrection b/c their biggest beef is that a foreign nation is conducting operations in their homeland. I'm not sure what exactly to call them.

v/r

Mike

in regards to the invader; that may be little more than a minority populace or political party in terms of the nation itself.

Think of if Canada invaded the US to liberate us from Clinton or Bush or Obama. In all cases there would have been nationalist organizations strongly opposed to our sitting government who would have fought to the death to defeat the outside invader. Sure those same Republicans and Democrats go back to slandering each other once the common threat is defeated.

Or like a police officer responding to a domestic dispute. Keep an eye on that oft battered wife, because she may be the one trying club the officer when he cuffs her loser husband.


This is why we need to be slow to simply brand such movements as "Terrorists" as they may well be part of the fabric that will contribute to a strong nation one day. I believe addressing such organizations was a big part of what made the "surge" work in Iraq.

[MikeF]

in regards to the invader; that may be little more than a minority populace or political party in terms of the nation itself....

This is why we need to be slow to simply brand such movements as "Terrorists" as they may well be part of the fabric that will contribute to a strong nation one day. I believe addressing such organizations was a big part of what made the "surge" work in Iraq.

I used to use the movie "Red Dawn" to describe the resistance mentality, but not too many of the younger O's and NCO's have seen it anymore. I'd prefer to call it a resistance movement rather than an insurgency, but I think that it is important to understand that a big majority of armed forces attacking the US will fall in this category, AND they will have the sympathy of the local populace.


Just ran across this article...

Iraqi Group Renounces Violence

Rod Norland
NY Times

BAGHDAD — An extremist Shiite group that has boasted of killing five American soldiers and of kidnapping five British contractors has agreed to renounce violence against fellow Iraqis, after meeting with Iraq’s prime minister.

The prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, met with members of the group, Asa’ib al-Haq, or the League of the Righteous, over the weekend, said Ali al-Dabbagh, a spokesman for the prime minister, confirming reports. “They decided they are no longer using violence, and we welcome them,” he said in a telephone interview.

Mr. Dabbagh first revealed the negotiations in remarks on Monday to Al Iraqiya, the state television network. “We have reached an agreement to resolve all problems, especially regarding detainees who do not have Iraqi blood on their hands,” he said. He did not say anything about British victims of the group.

Asked about that later, he added, “Whether it’s British blood or American blood, it is a violation of the law, and we will treat them no differently.”

Salam al-Maliki, the insurgent group’s liaison to the government, said in a telephone interview that the group had not renounced fighting the Americans. “Of course we want to get into the political process, because circumstances have improved, and the United States is out right now,” said Mr. Maliki, who is not related to the prime minister. “We told the government anyone who has Iraqi blood on their hands, you should keep him in jail. We are only fighting the United States.”

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.

Insurgencies aim to overthrow the government ruling over them. Yes separatists are insurgents, but you have to distinguish between the political end states. The IRA wanted a "United Ireland" - they sought to over throw the British and install the existing Irish Govt. Same in Vietnam. Very different from the insurgency in Kenya, Malaya or Aden.

Point being, not all irregular warfare is insurgency, and not all insurgencies are the same, bar the replacing of the Government relevant to the population conducting the insurgency.

Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.

Again context. What about "Restorationists." In A'Stan the Taliban were the constituted government. Again, this shows the lack of rigour the terminology is held to. Insurgent has specific meaning. I stopped describing Operations or conflicts as insurgencies long ago - well since I came the SWJ!

Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.

Concur, but the irregular forces are the bit you use military force against.