Hi Mike,

Thanks for the response. Just a couple of comments / questions.

Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.
On its face, the makes perfect sense - I can't think of any better way to mess up a ground op than to have academics "helping" to devise it ! At the same time, sometimes, I would suggest, the long term tactical solution is not the immediately optimal one. For example, setting up a long term "siege", complete with biometric ID stations and interface with local tribal elders, may prove better than moving into an area. Other times, leaving an area under OPFOR control may prove to be in your long term interests especially if the OPFOR has a nasty habit of beheading people.

Now, I would hope that most current commanders would recognize these options, but I'm not sure.

Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.
Agreed ! Personally, I would suggest that two things would help that in junior officer training. First, encourage all junior officers to develop a friendship network outside of the military that they can call on. Second, reward in the HR system innovations that work.

Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations.
That's why I used that example - it is a truly wicked problem ! As to it being outside of your COAs, hmmm, not in all cases. Even if you cannot get them removed, and you don't have the direct authority to remove them, it is still grist for the IO mill that can be bumped up to the appropriate level.

Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.
Oh, I agree it should be a consideration of future FID / SFA operations. The problem with both Iraq and Afghjanistan is that you (the US) created those governments by overthrowing the previous ones. This is an especially tricky situation as far as legitimacy is concerned and, I would argue, that the legitimacy of that new government is a co-creation of both it and the US. A special case maybe, but still there.

Anyway, I have to run off and sing a concert .

Cheers,

Marc