Renamed Thread: Operational Design Discussion

[jmm99]

has to be right on:

"Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"

as evidenced by the smiling faces of the first four captains, and the pokerface of Morrie Stoffer (on the far right of the photo - the best combat soldier in the lot), whose gaze is directed at the "pile" in question.

The language suggested would not have been appropriate to Bob Frankland, who was a Tennessee gentleman (like Walt Johnson, the regimental commander, he was a NG officer). Bill Lyman, in his Bn history ("Curlew History", long out of print and not on line that I could find), noted that Frankland was "much more than a superior tactician and battle director ... He was innately considerate and gentlemanly in his dealings with all those under his command. ... Under his guidance, the battalion was noticeably free of the petty jealousies and bickerings that plagued so many units."

Bob Frankland also was a decent pistol shot under stress. 7 Aug 1944, St.-Barthelemy, France (from Lyman) "As he entered [the front door of his HQ FOP], he saw two of his HQ men, hands up, walking out the rear door in front of two Germans. The Bn CO pulled out his pistol, ran to the door and promptly shot the two Jerries dead." LTC was awarded the DSC for his role in resolving the very fluid situation at St.-Barthelemy (the .45 bit was only a small part), where 1/117 and the 117th's Cannon Coy stacked up Liebstandarte (1SSPz) in front of the regimental HQ. And, had their bacon saved by Wilf's RAF Typhoons, I should add (with a sincere hat tip to your dad's tactical counterparts).

More to the point involved (planning and the "Huddle"), two folks aren't shown in the photo, but who entered into the planning process for 1/117. One was the Bn XO, Hank Koczowka (MAJ), and Able Coy CO, when the Bn landed at Omaha a week after the invasion. The other was the S-3, Dave Easlick (CPT), and Dog Coy CO when the Bn landed - a Michigan boy from Ann Arbor. As to his rapport with LTC Frankland (from Lyman): "The two officers complemented each other perfectly. The LTC was thorough, sound, dependable; the CPT quick, clever, brilliant. ... The First Battalion was a good team."

By mid-Nov 1944, that planning team consisted of 7 then or former combat company commanders - and Bob Frankland, who like the others hadn't seen combat before Normandy. As Ken has said elsewhere, the good ones learn quick in heavy combat.

PS: Bob Frankland's very brief "bio", by his grand-daughter Laila, is here - complete with the "pile" photo (from Bill Lyman's book). She wasn't quite on about the decorations: 4 BS; 2 SS and the DSC (from Lyman).

At bottom of page, AAR for Mortain (St Bart) engagement & 3 maps. A snip with my added text is attached so that Wilf will know whereof I speak re: RAF.

[MikeF]

Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?

Will this planning process - design - encourage such problem identification and increase the likelihood that such "problems" will be acted on?

Marc,

Here's how I understand it.

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

This type of design and decision making process is extremely helpful on the policy making level. One of the best examples that I've seen is the distribution of water rights in California. There are many stakeholders, every has a legitimate request, but there is simply a limited supply of water. Finding fair or appropriate solutions in this type of scenario requires something a bit broader than the Military Decision Making Process.

I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.

As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations. Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.



v/r

Mike

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Thanks for the response. Just a couple of comments / questions.

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

On its face, the makes perfect sense - I can't think of any better way to mess up a ground op than to have academics "helping" to devise it ! At the same time, sometimes, I would suggest, the long term tactical solution is not the immediately optimal one. For example, setting up a long term "siege", complete with biometric ID stations and interface with local tribal elders, may prove better than moving into an area. Other times, leaving an area under OPFOR control may prove to be in your long term interests especially if the OPFOR has a nasty habit of beheading people.

Now, I would hope that most current commanders would recognize these options, but I'm not sure.

I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.

Agreed ! Personally, I would suggest that two things would help that in junior officer training. First, encourage all junior officers to develop a friendship network outside of the military that they can call on. Second, reward in the HR system innovations that work.

As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations.

That's why I used that example - it is a truly wicked problem ! As to it being outside of your COAs, hmmm, not in all cases. Even if you cannot get them removed, and you don't have the direct authority to remove them, it is still grist for the IO mill that can be bumped up to the appropriate level.

Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.

Oh, I agree it should be a consideration of future FID / SFA operations. The problem with both Iraq and Afghjanistan is that you (the US) created those governments by overthrowing the previous ones. This is an especially tricky situation as far as legitimacy is concerned and, I would argue, that the legitimacy of that new government is a co-creation of both it and the US. A special case maybe, but still there.

Anyway, I have to run off and sing a concert .

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

In some ways this strikes to heart of my issues with the idea of Operational Design. As far as I can tell, (from the badly written FM) OD essentially attempts to predict outcome in a deterministic and even casual way.
"We do this, so the situation created is this...." - It then basically seeks a set of opinions to predict the second and even third order effects of actions. - cannot be done.

So question. Would the US have invaded IRAQ if opinions suggested that it would lead to a six year insurgency and X-thousand dead? - If no one ventured that opinion, then the process is useless. Now the OD guys say "if we had used OD, it wouldn't have been like that." - but OD does not avoid the entirely human desire to pick the information that fits the desired version of events.

Exactly like EBO and MW, the "enduring wisdom" of OD takes credit for success, and denies involvement in failure.