Renamed Thread: Operational Design Discussion

[William F. Owen]

When working on counterinsurgency definition with the Pentagon, we were looking at various thought leaders in preparing 3.24.2 (December 2006 revision).

How and why did the definition change?

The idea with Human COG is to redefine the term to understanding the motivators and drivers of humans in the OE, and then understanding that those motivators (and human actors obviously) are what drive battlefield changes, whether of kinetic or non-kinetic effect.

The COG is something you strike. The JP3 definition is wrong, and less it explicitly makes that point or unless it wants to invent a new term.
What I think you are saying is the HumanCOG is the motivation that cause people to act. Correct?

The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors.

Does this mean, trying to understand what everyone wants?

Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) -

So an insurgency is exactly the same as any other type of warfare.

[Bob's World]

The COG is something you strike.

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

Dr. Strange's work helped my think about this, but I could never fully get on board with his analysis either. It just didn't make sense to me to call something the COG's "Critical Capability" and then say it was something that the COG requirred. To me it was something the COG produced.

So to may way of thinking (makes sense to a mind educated in the Myrtle Creek public school system)
- A COG is like a factory that is the producer of the things the enemy must have to prevail
- Critical Capabilities are the things that factory produces. Targeting this output has little effect on the COG, but does reduce effectiveness. The importance of these things are what validates your assessment of what the COG is.
- Critical Requirements are those raw inputs to the COG that it must have to produce the Critical Capabilities. These are what must be disrupted to render the COG ineffective.
- Critical Vulnerabilities. THESE MUST BE A SUBSET OF YOUR CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. CVs are those CCs that are also vulnerable to attack. You can get at them with reasonable risk, and their disruption will produce your desired effect.

Anyway, I always think of attacking the COG like attacking an Enemy Strongpoint. Yes its important, but you don't want to attack it if you can defeat it in other ways. Find the CVs, and attack those.

[William F. Owen]

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

Strike merely means the action that does harm.

[MikeF]

Dr. Jack,

Sir, is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?

Mark O'neill / Wilf,

Some of this thread is confusing me, and I've spent two years studying this stuff. I'll try to explain it as best that I can. In the most simplest form, all these folks are trying to do is determine better ways of problem solving. That's it. In most circles, the main strategy to devise better answers is more defined and thorough problem definition.

Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.

My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.

Out of all the literature, I best enjoyed Dr. James Adams' Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas. As Dean of Stanford Engineering back in the early 1970's, he became frustrated b/c his students were book smart but could not think creatively. So he wrote a book on how to think creatively. It's short, and provides cool tricks to entertain with at a pub.



v/r

Mike

[marct]

Mike, thanks for mentioning the huddle aka collaboration. As an academic, I've seen two ideal types (in the Weberian sense) of this. The first involves collecting people who are "like minded" and will reinforce the "correctness" of what you write, while the second is closer to Red Teaming (I suspect that in academia it derives from the old Advocatus Diaboli position).

Of the two, the first reinforces any perceptual pathologies that are present. In effect, this type of collaboration is worse than useless, it is destructive of creative thinking. The second type, when done properly, identifies holes in one's thinking and may or may not produce creative solutions. Some of the research on organization culture seems to indicate that there is a strong correlation between HR practices (especially rewards and punishments) and styles of collaboration. As a rough rule of thumb, the more clearly laid out HR policies are in terms of ordering (e.g. promotion and pay structures in a linear form), the greater likelihood that "collaboration" will tend towards the first type.

Part of this seems to centre around the organizational culture's formalization of "problems"; i.e. how they are defined, who "owns" them, how the must be approached, what may or may not be considered as a legitimate problem, etc.

Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?

Will this planning process - design - encourage such problem identification and increase the likelihood that such "problems" will be acted on?

[MikeF]

Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?

Will this planning process - design - encourage such problem identification and increase the likelihood that such "problems" will be acted on?

Marc,

Here's how I understand it.

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

This type of design and decision making process is extremely helpful on the policy making level. One of the best examples that I've seen is the distribution of water rights in California. There are many stakeholders, every has a legitimate request, but there is simply a limited supply of water. Finding fair or appropriate solutions in this type of scenario requires something a bit broader than the Military Decision Making Process.

I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.

As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations. Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.



v/r

Mike

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Thanks for the response. Just a couple of comments / questions.

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

On its face, the makes perfect sense - I can't think of any better way to mess up a ground op than to have academics "helping" to devise it ! At the same time, sometimes, I would suggest, the long term tactical solution is not the immediately optimal one. For example, setting up a long term "siege", complete with biometric ID stations and interface with local tribal elders, may prove better than moving into an area. Other times, leaving an area under OPFOR control may prove to be in your long term interests especially if the OPFOR has a nasty habit of beheading people.

Now, I would hope that most current commanders would recognize these options, but I'm not sure.

I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.

Agreed ! Personally, I would suggest that two things would help that in junior officer training. First, encourage all junior officers to develop a friendship network outside of the military that they can call on. Second, reward in the HR system innovations that work.

As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations.

That's why I used that example - it is a truly wicked problem ! As to it being outside of your COAs, hmmm, not in all cases. Even if you cannot get them removed, and you don't have the direct authority to remove them, it is still grist for the IO mill that can be bumped up to the appropriate level.

Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.

Oh, I agree it should be a consideration of future FID / SFA operations. The problem with both Iraq and Afghjanistan is that you (the US) created those governments by overthrowing the previous ones. This is an especially tricky situation as far as legitimacy is concerned and, I would argue, that the legitimacy of that new government is a co-creation of both it and the US. A special case maybe, but still there.

Anyway, I have to run off and sing a concert .

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).

Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.

In some ways this strikes to heart of my issues with the idea of Operational Design. As far as I can tell, (from the badly written FM) OD essentially attempts to predict outcome in a deterministic and even casual way.
"We do this, so the situation created is this...." - It then basically seeks a set of opinions to predict the second and even third order effects of actions. - cannot be done.

So question. Would the US have invaded IRAQ if opinions suggested that it would lead to a six year insurgency and X-thousand dead? - If no one ventured that opinion, then the process is useless. Now the OD guys say "if we had used OD, it wouldn't have been like that." - but OD does not avoid the entirely human desire to pick the information that fits the desired version of events.

Exactly like EBO and MW, the "enduring wisdom" of OD takes credit for success, and denies involvement in failure.

[Ron Humphrey]

Don't take the beating from the "old" guys to hard. They just get kinda tired of things which they have known forever and have assumed should have been common sense having to be approached in doctrine to fix what should have been happening from (training birth). So yes their right there is nothing new under the sun ;except for us(people). Each of us has developed our understanding of the world through the lens of our own experiences and training. For some reason throughout the years it seems that the realization that the primary analyst at any echelon is the CO (or at least should be IMHO) has gone awry. Thus those simple common sense up front requirements in order to facilitate a good analysis of the mission before even trying to apply MDMP has gone by the wayside.

In so far as the COG at least from where I have come to see it is that treating the populous as a Center of Gravity for operations leads one to ask the questions about that particular group which should point out the less apparent what not to do's. Having done that it becomes much easier to define both what the mission is and to gain at least acceptable expectations for how it should be approached by those assigned to it.

An example is that if you have looked at a group through the "targeting" lense of COG then not only have you given yourself more clarity about those with whom you will interact but you have also in the same stroke managed to "red team" the heck out of the enemies probable approaches in that arena that they must survive in.

As Mike noted it really is about how to plan but honestly it is even more about getting the whole orchestra on the same sheet of music and then keeping time. And the pub thing is pretty cool too

[William F. Owen]

Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.

OK, I understand the idea of wicked problems, but how does that translate into the conduct of Operations?

My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.

So essentially, this is seeking the advice of others?
On the strategic level I can think of many, many times this fails. People seeking advice are often merely seeking approval for their plan, so I'm not sure this is a step forward, or that this is part of the Planning or Estimate process.

[Dr Jack]

Dr. Jack,

... is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?

Mike - design will complement formal / detailed planning processes, such as MDMP and JOPP - it certainly won't replace these systems. It also won't just look at "re-thinking" or reframing problems, but be the conceptual component that a commander does for detailed planning - that can take place before initiating MDMP/JOPP, during MDMP/JOPP, or doing execution of a mission.

[MikeF]

Mike - design will complement formal / detailed planning processes, such as MDMP and JOPP - it certainly won't replace these systems. It also won't just look at "re-thinking" or reframing problems, but be the conceptual component that a commander does for detailed planning - that can take place before initiating MDMP/JOPP, during MDMP/JOPP, or doing execution of a mission.

Dr. Jack,

Sir, I'm all for innovation and y'alls way ahead, but as I tried to express in my earlier comment, we must keep it KISS (Keep it simple stupid). I always deferred to my PSG test...If after briefing something, my PSG's found what I was saying incomprehensible, then I tried to reexplain it...

In context, and I'm not trying to marginalize what you're doing, if the boys cannot comprehend it b/c your using post-modern buzzwords from acadamie, then your efforts will be as fruitless as Effects Based Operations (EBO).

I hope this is helpful in your planning...I suppose the bottom line is that someone should not need a post-graduate degree to understand the planning.
I only stated this b/c I believe what you and TRADOC are trying to accomplish is important.


v/r

Mike

[slapout9]

I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

That is exactly why EBO was invented....you want to affect(cause) a target to change to something (effect). And how you do that may be kinetic or non-kinetic,lethal or non-lethal.

[jmm99]

from MikeF
My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively.

Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.

[Bob's World]

Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.

The caption of this photo probably would more accurately read:

"Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"

(But your right, with time on our hands we can complicate the heck out of what is often very intuitive to the good commander, and then in turn penalize intuitive commanders for "Not using the process to standard" and promote far less capable men over them who dogmatically churn through the process like the unimaginative clerks that they are.)

In Patton's book he talked how he would go forward to his commander's location for a huddle over the Jeep hood; one page document, basic task/purpose/intent on one side, sketch on the other. I highly doubt he relied on 40 guys grinding through a 4-5 hour process to produce it either.

[William F. Owen]

In Patton's book he talked how he would go forward to his commander's location for a huddle over the Jeep hood; one page document, basic task/purpose/intent on one side, sketch on the other. I highly doubt he relied on 40 guys grinding through a 4-5 hour process to produce it either.

Spot on! - but today, we have a collection of officers who blindly assert that Patton would have failed in today's conflicts, because today, it would all be too complicated for Patton to understand.

In the UK, the size of HQs now occupy a far greater percentage of manpower versus the formation they serve than ever before, for no better ability to support the commander.

[jmm99]

has to be right on:

"Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"

as evidenced by the smiling faces of the first four captains, and the pokerface of Morrie Stoffer (on the far right of the photo - the best combat soldier in the lot), whose gaze is directed at the "pile" in question.

The language suggested would not have been appropriate to Bob Frankland, who was a Tennessee gentleman (like Walt Johnson, the regimental commander, he was a NG officer). Bill Lyman, in his Bn history ("Curlew History", long out of print and not on line that I could find), noted that Frankland was "much more than a superior tactician and battle director ... He was innately considerate and gentlemanly in his dealings with all those under his command. ... Under his guidance, the battalion was noticeably free of the petty jealousies and bickerings that plagued so many units."

Bob Frankland also was a decent pistol shot under stress. 7 Aug 1944, St.-Barthelemy, France (from Lyman) "As he entered [the front door of his HQ FOP], he saw two of his HQ men, hands up, walking out the rear door in front of two Germans. The Bn CO pulled out his pistol, ran to the door and promptly shot the two Jerries dead." LTC was awarded the DSC for his role in resolving the very fluid situation at St.-Barthelemy (the .45 bit was only a small part), where 1/117 and the 117th's Cannon Coy stacked up Liebstandarte (1SSPz) in front of the regimental HQ. And, had their bacon saved by Wilf's RAF Typhoons, I should add (with a sincere hat tip to your dad's tactical counterparts).

More to the point involved (planning and the "Huddle"), two folks aren't shown in the photo, but who entered into the planning process for 1/117. One was the Bn XO, Hank Koczowka (MAJ), and Able Coy CO, when the Bn landed at Omaha a week after the invasion. The other was the S-3, Dave Easlick (CPT), and Dog Coy CO when the Bn landed - a Michigan boy from Ann Arbor. As to his rapport with LTC Frankland (from Lyman): "The two officers complemented each other perfectly. The LTC was thorough, sound, dependable; the CPT quick, clever, brilliant. ... The First Battalion was a good team."

By mid-Nov 1944, that planning team consisted of 7 then or former combat company commanders - and Bob Frankland, who like the others hadn't seen combat before Normandy. As Ken has said elsewhere, the good ones learn quick in heavy combat.

PS: Bob Frankland's very brief "bio", by his grand-daughter Laila, is here - complete with the "pile" photo (from Bill Lyman's book). She wasn't quite on about the decorations: 4 BS; 2 SS and the DSC (from Lyman).

At bottom of page, AAR for Mortain (St Bart) engagement & 3 maps. A snip with my added text is attached so that Wilf will know whereof I speak re: RAF.

[William F. Owen]

Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.

Excellent example. If you have a sound planning process, which aims at issuing orders and not just creating plans (something all too often forgotten), then this is an implicit part of the orders process. Orders require plans. Plans do not require orders.

If anyone can explain how separating the problem from the plan can lead to simpler plans resulting in faster and more useful sets of orders, then I'm all ears.