Page 2 of 3 FirstFirst 123 LastLast
Results 21 to 40 of 44

Thread: Renamed Thread: Operational Design Discussion

  1. #21
    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2007
    Location
    Canberra, Australia
    Posts
    307

    Default What are you trying to say, in simple prose, and why?

    Quote Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel View Post
    In this context, operational design is decribed by McMaster to be a "creative approach" to solving challenges in planning for operations. Rather than following a checklist of items to match with the conditions on the ground and targeting tactics to support those criteria, McMaster talks about focusing on a problem statement, one that is centered around a human/population problem, and planning your solution around resolving the human/population problem. It's a very simplistic explanation, but McMaster, if he attends, will probably discuss this in detail, and I'm sure he has written in Parameters or other journals on that topic....

    Human COG refers to center of gravity, meaning that the environment and subsequent effects are dependant on the psychology or actions/behaviors of targeted humans (the capacity to execute is dependant on this core). See Nash, Nagl, Gurney, Vego, or Gavrilis for further authorship on this subject.

    Cheers,
    Rach

    (HOOAH)
    George Orwell once wrote that one of the things a writer must ask is "Have I written anything unnecessarily ugly?"

    I am not sure if you have, because I understand neither your prose or context.

    Could you humour me( and maybe some of the other members) and explain what your point is, and why you are making it.


    Thanks

    Mark

    PS I would prefer in without any postmodern expression.

    PPS 'Hooah' means what as an emphasis for whatever point you were trying to make?

  2. #22
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    44

    Default

    Mark,

    Dr. Jack and W. Owen did a great job of explaining OD/OPP and human COG, as well as provide some historical context, so have a look above.

    With regards to Hooah, I usually use it in an affectionate manner, when showing approval or excitement or gearing up to go do something fun. Hooah can also mean "yes" and a number of other different things. I just love my Army...

    Be advised that Hooah in the US Army takes a different meaning than OORAAHH in the Marine Corps - they use it more specifically when given a task/mission and it is more of a response that the task is understood and let's go get 'em!

    Cheers,
    Rach
    "Be convinced that to be happy means to be free and that to be free means to be brave. Therefore do not take lightly the perils of war." Thucydides

    "Philosophising about war is useless under fire." Linda Berdoll

    http://phoenix.mod.bg

  3. #23
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel View Post
    Dr. Jack and W. Owen did a great job of explaining OD/OPP and human COG, as well as provide some historical context, so have a look above.
    Well that's very kind, but I'm not sure I did. (Cannot speak for Dr. Jack)

    My extrapolation of what you said was that the "Human COG" was the primary cause or motivation, and that some effort is made to try and understand this. If so, then that is not a COG, as in "Centre of Gravity" unless TRADOC is arbitrarily inventing some new meaning that is different from that which Clausewitz intended.

    As concerns "Operational Design," I remain a sceptic. It seems to have no clear and concise definition and like EBO seems to alter and morph when confronted by criticism. Manoeuvre Warfare may have been founded on ignorance, but it stayed consistent.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #24
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default Why attack the enemy's strength?

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post

    The COG is something you strike.
    I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.

    Dr. Strange's work helped my think about this, but I could never fully get on board with his analysis either. It just didn't make sense to me to call something the COG's "Critical Capability" and then say it was something that the COG requirred. To me it was something the COG produced.

    So to may way of thinking (makes sense to a mind educated in the Myrtle Creek public school system)
    - A COG is like a factory that is the producer of the things the enemy must have to prevail
    - Critical Capabilities are the things that factory produces. Targeting this output has little effect on the COG, but does reduce effectiveness. The importance of these things are what validates your assessment of what the COG is.
    - Critical Requirements are those raw inputs to the COG that it must have to produce the Critical Capabilities. These are what must be disrupted to render the COG ineffective.
    - Critical Vulnerabilities. THESE MUST BE A SUBSET OF YOUR CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. CVs are those CCs that are also vulnerable to attack. You can get at them with reasonable risk, and their disruption will produce your desired effect.

    Anyway, I always think of attacking the COG like attacking an Enemy Strongpoint. Yes its important, but you don't want to attack it if you can defeat it in other ways. Find the CVs, and attack those.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  5. #25
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.
    Strike merely means the action that does harm.
    Last edited by SWJED; 08-06-2009 at 04:00 PM. Reason: Fixed quote tag.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #26
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    Chapel Hill, NC
    Posts
    1,177

    Default Better ways of problem solving

    Dr. Jack,

    Sir, is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?

    Mark O'neill / Wilf,

    Some of this thread is confusing me, and I've spent two years studying this stuff. I'll try to explain it as best that I can. In the most simplest form, all these folks are trying to do is determine better ways of problem solving. That's it. In most circles, the main strategy to devise better answers is more defined and thorough problem definition.

    Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.

    My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.

    Out of all the literature, I best enjoyed Dr. James Adams' Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas. As Dean of Stanford Engineering back in the early 1970's, he became frustrated b/c his students were book smart but could not think creatively. So he wrote a book on how to think creatively. It's short, and provides cool tricks to entertain with at a pub.



    v/r

    Mike
    Last edited by MikeF; 08-06-2009 at 04:35 PM.

  7. #27
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    See Nash, Nagl, Gurney, Vego, or Gavrilis for further authorship on this subject.....

    I just got off a conference call....have you looked into SAMS's COE project on OD?

    See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...

    Check out what SAMS and TRADOC is doing to help push creative design. BGEN McMaster is a good POC on this - I'm sure he has some publications out. Check with NDU Press - I'm pretty sure he published an article recently on this subject....
    Rachel,

    Instead of just throwing out names and suggestions, please try to post actual links to the sources you are mentioning, or at least try to discuss them in a more substantive manner. People should not have to PM you for details about everything......

  8. #28
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default A semi-tangent on collaboration

    Mike, thanks for mentioning the huddle aka collaboration. As an academic, I've seen two ideal types (in the Weberian sense) of this. The first involves collecting people who are "like minded" and will reinforce the "correctness" of what you write, while the second is closer to Red Teaming (I suspect that in academia it derives from the old Advocatus Diaboli position).

    Of the two, the first reinforces any perceptual pathologies that are present. In effect, this type of collaboration is worse than useless, it is destructive of creative thinking. The second type, when done properly, identifies holes in one's thinking and may or may not produce creative solutions. Some of the research on organization culture seems to indicate that there is a strong correlation between HR practices (especially rewards and punishments) and styles of collaboration. As a rough rule of thumb, the more clearly laid out HR policies are in terms of ordering (e.g. promotion and pay structures in a linear form), the greater likelihood that "collaboration" will tend towards the first type.

    Part of this seems to centre around the organizational culture's formalization of "problems"; i.e. how they are defined, who "owns" them, how the must be approached, what may or may not be considered as a legitimate problem, etc.

    Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?

    Will this planning process - design - encourage such problem identification and increase the likelihood that such "problems" will be acted on?
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  9. #29
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Kansas
    Posts
    1,099

    Post Welcome to the fray Rach

    Don't take the beating from the "old" guys to hard. They just get kinda tired of things which they have known forever and have assumed should have been common sense having to be approached in doctrine to fix what should have been happening from (training birth). So yes their right there is nothing new under the sun ;except for us(people). Each of us has developed our understanding of the world through the lens of our own experiences and training. For some reason throughout the years it seems that the realization that the primary analyst at any echelon is the CO (or at least should be IMHO) has gone awry. Thus those simple common sense up front requirements in order to facilitate a good analysis of the mission before even trying to apply MDMP has gone by the wayside.

    In so far as the COG at least from where I have come to see it is that treating the populous as a Center of Gravity for operations leads one to ask the questions about that particular group which should point out the less apparent what not to do's. Having done that it becomes much easier to define both what the mission is and to gain at least acceptable expectations for how it should be approached by those assigned to it.

    An example is that if you have looked at a group through the "targeting" lense of COG then not only have you given yourself more clarity about those with whom you will interact but you have also in the same stroke managed to "red team" the heck out of the enemies probable approaches in that arena that they must survive in.

    As Mike noted it really is about how to plan but honestly it is even more about getting the whole orchestra on the same sheet of music and then keeping time. And the pub thing is pretty cool too
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  10. #30
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.
    OK, I understand the idea of wicked problems, but how does that translate into the conduct of Operations?
    My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.
    So essentially, this is seeking the advice of others?
    On the strategic level I can think of many, many times this fails. People seeking advice are often merely seeking approval for their plan, so I'm not sure this is a step forward, or that this is part of the Planning or Estimate process.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  11. #31
    Council Member Dr Jack's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2006
    Posts
    86

    Default Design complementing MDMP

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Dr. Jack,

    ... is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?
    Mike - design will complement formal / detailed planning processes, such as MDMP and JOPP - it certainly won't replace these systems. It also won't just look at "re-thinking" or reframing problems, but be the conceptual component that a commander does for detailed planning - that can take place before initiating MDMP/JOPP, during MDMP/JOPP, or doing execution of a mission.

  12. #32
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.
    That is exactly why EBO was invented....you want to affect(cause) a target to change to something (effect). And how you do that may be kinetic or non-kinetic,lethal or non-lethal.

  13. #33
    Council Member
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Posts
    4,021

    Default 1944 Huddle

    from MikeF
    My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively.
    Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

    Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

    PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-06-2009 at 08:54 PM.

  14. #34
    Registered User GMLRS's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2009
    Location
    Fort Sill, OK
    Posts
    6

    Default Why renamed?

    Hello All,

    Curious as to why the thread was renamed. I say that because I am the Fires Center of Excellence STRATCOM Knowledge Management Advisor, and earlier this week we received correspondence from Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Strategic Communications to announce the upcoming TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference (TSLC). I have posted the announcement to our Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence website (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/130700)

    See TRADOC message below:

    All,

    From 18 - 20 August, TRADOC invites every member of your organization to
    follow the semiannual TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference (TSLC) via computer by reading and posting comments on the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) discussion board.

    New for this TSLC, reporters and bloggers at the conference will provide
    significant public transparency and feedback using a near real time
    interactive discussion board as TRADOC's senior leaders discuss the
    requirements, capabilities, and topics that support the execution of
    TRADOCís mission.

    Also, please ensure your leadership is aware of this media presence and that
    your offices are synchronizing engagements to outcomes and cross promoting
    the event in all traditional and social networking mediums.

    Please post this invitation on your websites and link to the TRADOC and
    small wars journal websites as well.

    Thank you,

    v/r,
    Major Bill Jakola
    Deputy Strategic Communication Director

  15. #35
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2009
    Posts
    44

    Default

    Noted Jedburgh, will do... Sometimes only insiders would be able to access information, so I point people to the location. But only that's only the case sometimes. My apologies.
    "Be convinced that to be happy means to be free and that to be free means to be brave. Therefore do not take lightly the perils of war." Thucydides

    "Philosophising about war is useless under fire." Linda Berdoll

    http://phoenix.mod.bg

  16. #36
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default It was renamed because the lead post in this thread

    Quote Originally Posted by GMLRS View Post
    Curious as to why the thread was renamed.
    diverted into a discussion of Design and a moderator pulled it an started a new thread to prevent disruption of the TSLC Thread.

    That thread still exists, it's here: LINK

  17. #37
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2007
    Location
    Chapel Hill, NC
    Posts
    1,177

    Default PSG test....

    Quote Originally Posted by Dr Jack View Post
    Mike - design will complement formal / detailed planning processes, such as MDMP and JOPP - it certainly won't replace these systems. It also won't just look at "re-thinking" or reframing problems, but be the conceptual component that a commander does for detailed planning - that can take place before initiating MDMP/JOPP, during MDMP/JOPP, or doing execution of a mission.

    Dr. Jack,

    Sir, I'm all for innovation and y'alls way ahead, but as I tried to express in my earlier comment, we must keep it KISS (Keep it simple stupid). I always deferred to my PSG test...If after briefing something, my PSG's found what I was saying incomprehensible, then I tried to reexplain it...

    In context, and I'm not trying to marginalize what you're doing, if the boys cannot comprehend it b/c your using post-modern buzzwords from acadamie, then your efforts will be as fruitless as Effects Based Operations (EBO).

    I hope this is helpful in your planning...I suppose the bottom line is that someone should not need a post-graduate degree to understand the planning.
    I only stated this b/c I believe what you and TRADOC are trying to accomplish is important.


    v/r

    Mike

  18. #38
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default Based on my military experience

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

    Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

    PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.
    The caption of this photo probably would more accurately read:

    "Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"

    (But your right, with time on our hands we can complicate the heck out of what is often very intuitive to the good commander, and then in turn penalize intuitive commanders for "Not using the process to standard" and promote far less capable men over them who dogmatically churn through the process like the unimaginative clerks that they are.)

    In Patton's book he talked how he would go forward to his commander's location for a huddle over the Jeep hood; one page document, basic task/purpose/intent on one side, sketch on the other. I highly doubt he relied on 40 guys grinding through a 4-5 hour process to produce it either.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-07-2009 at 12:06 PM. Reason: I highly doubt - he (added) - relied
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  19. #39
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.

    Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.

    PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now.
    Excellent example. If you have a sound planning process, which aims at issuing orders and not just creating plans (something all too often forgotten), then this is an implicit part of the orders process. Orders require plans. Plans do not require orders.

    If anyone can explain how separating the problem from the plan can lead to simpler plans resulting in faster and more useful sets of orders, then I'm all ears.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  20. #40
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    In Patton's book he talked how he would go forward to his commander's location for a huddle over the Jeep hood; one page document, basic task/purpose/intent on one side, sketch on the other. I highly doubt he relied on 40 guys grinding through a 4-5 hour process to produce it either.
    Spot on! - but today, we have a collection of officers who blindly assert that Patton would have failed in today's conflicts, because today, it would all be too complicated for Patton to understand.

    In the UK, the size of HQs now occupy a far greater percentage of manpower versus the formation they serve than ever before, for no better ability to support the commander.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

Similar Threads

  1. Military Interactions with Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan
    By TG Discourse in forum PMCs and Entrepreneurs
    Replies: 28
    Last Post: 09-09-2009, 01:36 AM
  2. SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)
    By Rob Thornton in forum FID & Working With Indigenous Forces
    Replies: 120
    Last Post: 06-02-2009, 03:47 AM
  3. Operational Design Process and Security Force Assistance
    By SWJED in forum FID & Working With Indigenous Forces
    Replies: 6
    Last Post: 06-10-2008, 09:03 PM
  4. Systemic Operational Design
    By Strickland in forum Doctrine & TTPs
    Replies: 21
    Last Post: 03-23-2007, 04:08 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •