Since I said we can and should do this better and the 'we' was the US -- most of the commonwealth countries do a better job than we do in my observation and experience -- I'll address it to us because though I think the principles broadly apply, each nation is different and the training regimen has to account for the entry demographics of the day in that nation.

I agree with Wilf's and Eden's comments above. Both explain very well why we do what we do and Eden explains much that is wrong. He also raises very valid points that must be considered so let me first offer some suggestions to accommodate those.

As he says, currently, a small number of trainers with relatively limited resources use the assembly line approach to produce soldiers with a specified skill set. These are then forwarded to units where they have to have additional training before they are fully qualified. There are two flaws with this approach which as he says is mobilization based. The first and quite obvious problem is that we need to be able to do that on a mobilization basis but we do not have to and should not do that now with a professional force.

The second is that the process of selecting which tasks are trained in the schoolhouse and which get trained after arrival in the unit is very badly skewed -- tasks which are difficult or expensive to train or which will have high failure rates (and thus reflect poorly on the training institution...) are selected to be 'unit trained' (the schools and centers get to do the final selection...). Thus the first step is to rectify those two mistakes. Both are equally difficult but not impossible, the former due to costs, the second due to the need for constant changes in 'Tasks, Conditions and Standards' caused not by changes in warfare so much as by the fact that the Bureaucracy involved is largely Civil Service and job security entail doing 'work' -- even if it is not needed.

The hurry up and wait syndrome can be largely eliminated with one measure. Adopt a Cadre system of Squad Trainers. For these trainers, hire recently retired NCOs on the same basis as used for Junior ROTC Cadet instruction; they draw their retired pay and the School pays the difference to bring their total compensation up to the level of not being retired. This contractual basis allows the selection and retention of good trainers (every NCO is far from that...), insistence refresher and update training, maintain a decent standard of fitness and appearance and so forth. They wear the uniform with all accoutrements and such plus a Drill Sergeant Hat in a different color. This will insure that most do not fall prey to the valid concerns expressed by Eden. You'll still not be error free but the number of personnel failures will be far smaller and you'll have continuity. These people need to be contracted to the Army as consultants and not as persons supplied by a Commercial organization.

Talented soldiers must be moved to Squads moving at a faster pace. This will be exceedingly difficult as cries of discrimination and the like will surely result. Documentation should preclude any real trauma from this but it will still be a distractor that Commanders will seek to avoid.

The system is slow to change because it has become highly bureaucratic and the Civilian employees involved have entirely too much say in what occurs. Their efforts to keep relatively soft and in many case not terribly productive jobs rules. This can be changed (but will be resisted. NOTE: I say this based on 18 years service as a DAC, starting as a GS 11 Instructor, Training developer and Branch Chief for seven years in TRADOC and ending up rather more senior and the supervisor of 50 plus military and a like number of civilian employees. I don't know everything but I do know sinecures, bureaucratic foolishness, make work and refusal to take responsibility when I see them. I also know how to fix them -- by eliminating positions... )

Eden ended with this:
"Bottom line is we will not improve basic training until we invest a great deal more resources in it and are willing to accept risk and the inevitable failures. I don't think it is a question of some new approach to training per se."
He is totally correct. Those things are the cost of doing it right -- the option is to continue doing it wrong and getting a marginally trained Soldier that succeeds in spite of mediocre training because he's a good fit for the job.

Among other things, a Squad Trainer approach as Eden and I suggest will allow the marginal recruit to be identified earlier and eliminated before the expense of training him and retaining him mounts. Better selectivity in recruiting helps but that still doesn't catch all the slackers -- no system will catch them all but a bunch of old NCOs working with ten or so Soldiers will enable most to be spotted very quickly; they can then be moved to a second or even to a third squad and if all the Cadre agree, he or she is history

If you want a quality professional force, the old, mass production idea of any warm body has to go.

So: What follows is an unconstrained answer to your question Note there is little new, only the trainer and the time really differ.

Step 1. Adjust the training process to account for today's professional force and save the mobilization based process for when it is needed.

Step 2. Convene a number of branch specific working groups of Company level officers and NCO -- no Field Grades, no Civilians, No 1SG/Co SGM/ Color Sgt and about four O, four NCO -- and determine a Basic Soldier Task list (generic) AND an Intermediate Soldier Task list (branch specific). Scrub the generic list with a second board of Co level O/NCO and produce a single desired list. Submit it to TRADOC for their Scrub and then appoint one -- only one -- non TRADOC GO as an arbitrator to produce a Basic list. The object of all that is to produce an accurate and not, as is currently true, a bureaucratically skewed and incomplete list of tasks for institutional training.

Step 3. Restructure training along roughly these lines. To break the five day week attachment and emphasize the 'you're no longer a civilian' aspect, establish 10 day modules of nine work days and one day off.

Module 1 - Barracks. Reception, processing, weapons issue, clothing and equipment issue, history and traditions, rules regulations and law, standards and admin. Regulatorily or other required social etc. classes, Care and cleaning of equipment (to include training, not expecting them to picj it up and do it right on their own), Daily PT including walking or marching everywhere (minimal close order drill [COD]; Fall in, Sling Arms, Port Arm, Inspection Arms, Left and Right face, column movements and no more; no shoulder arms, no flanking movements). No night training.

Module 2 - Road march (~3-5km)to Hut Encampment, initial field training, individual movement, basic navigation (without map or compass) as a confidence builder, Familiarization firing issue weapon(first and last day), Weapon and equipment care and cleaning under fikled conditions (again training, not DS goof of time), First Aid/CLS (all), field sanitation, field fortifications. Daily PT, alternating a run (not for speed or time) and a no pack but with weapon and harness march every day at random times, increasing from an initial one Km by adding 500m per day ending 4.5 to 5 km (3 mi). No COD. 20% night or low vis training (without NVG).

Module 3 - Road march (!4-6km) to new location, erection of tentage. 1/2 day on field living.Range period -- Known distance training followed by Field Firing/Trainfire etc. to include urban, semi urban, rural woodland and rural plains/desert settings. Entire time period; qualification on day nine followed by striking and turn in of tentage. No PT, No night training, concentration on weapon mastery. ~2 km road march to range and back with weapon and harness, no pack, no speed marches.

Module 4 - Road march (~4-6km) to new location. Field shelter living, field cooking to include, field sanitation, land navigation to include a test, target detection, observation and reconnaissance techniques, scouting, familiarization firing (other weapons). More field care and manitencane training. Basic tracking and tracking avoidance, rural and urban. Survival preparatory training. Buildings away from bivouac area used for classes, some meals but not for sleeping. PT consisting of random time exercises daily plus alternating run and road march with pack starting at 1.5km and adding 500m per day, ending at 5km (3 mi). 30% night or low vis training, no NVG.

Module 5 - Survival training, classes and preparation (2-3 days; PT only in this phase, exercise and easy timed run); Survival exercise (with pack and harness but no weapons or ammo; not an Escape and Evasion/SERE drill; two man teams directed; scattered drop off). Training phase 10-15% night, no NVG; Exercise 24 hours/Total of four or five days; pickup, return to garrison/barracks, clean up and maintenance. Yes, that's minimal and lets them learn enough to be dangerous -- better that than none and the combat arms guys get a second, harder dose later. Two day Training holiday, freedom of the post.

Module 6 - Cross country march (~3-5km) to Field, draw and erect tentage. Team training, arbitrary teams forced to work together and to implement previous training. Field firing, fire control and fire discipline. Land navigation, calls for fire. PT daily, random times exercise with weapons plus random times [not necessarily concurrent with exercise]alternating run, road, and cross country march starting at 2.5km and adding 750m per day, ending at 7km (4.25 mi). 40-50% night or low vis, no NVG.

To be continued...