Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[davidbfpo]

A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective).

I'm no expert on Malaysia or Algeria, but the populace control was not of the general population. In Malaysia it was the Chinese minority, mainly in the countryside and a large minority, the Malays were "on side" throughout.

Malaysia became independent in 1957 (excluding Borneo & Singapore) and the 'Malayan Emergency' lasted from 1948-1960. The UK had indicated way before 1957 that independence was coming and that helped undermine the insurgency. Note an amnesty played a big part in the COIN campaign. Some help from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency

In Algeria there was a large European minority, the Pied Noir, 10% of the population (1m) and for many complicated reasons lage numbers of Algerians served in the regular (170K) and irregular units (236K, often called Harkis). The film 'Battle of Algiers' portrays only a small part of the war and 2m were forced into camps. The real war was in the countryside, although one can argue the 'Battle' lost the war for the French.

With help for the war: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War and the Pied Noir: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pied-noir

From my armchair in such conflicts an important metric is how many locals loyally serve in state service alongside the intervenors? Or serve the state, e.g. black Africans in Rhodesia.

So, if we cannot have minority populace control, what are the options? SWC have often written on these options, good governance, good works, undermining the narrative etc.

davidbfpo