Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[MikeF]

I would say that, at present, it's an insoluble problem.

Insoluble or possibly unsolvable. That's what makes these types of problems so interesting. Hence, the technical study of wicked problems.

""Wicked problem" is a phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems."

I meant to add some on-line resources earlier that better define these problems and potential solutions, but I forgot...Here's a good start point.

CogNexus Institute

Dillema in General Theory of Planning

Knowledge Mapping for Complex Social Messes.


I don't necessarily subscribe that these problems are unsolvable. Rather, many of these issues simply take time and alternative approaches. Regardless, these are the types of dillemas that young company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders face on a daily basis.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)

[MikeF]

Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)

As I've attempted to sort through the feedback and my own experiences, I consolidated the given scenario into this specific guidance for a young company commander dealing with these types of problems. Focus on the following:

1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

With a broad sweep, that is the best that I can provide. I'll step aside (really this time), and allow others to confirm, deny, or add to the template.

Have I missed something?

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

I'd actually make it even simpler.

1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.

[MikeF]

I'd actually make it even simpler.

1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.

Wilf, for the American Army, my suggestions are a bit unconventional...Your views are simply subversive or rebelious.

The typical view would state that one must maneuver along these lines of operation:

- Security
- Essential Services
- Tribal/Political Leadership engagement
- Security Force Development/Training

These views are simply too constrained and ambigious for me.

v/r

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Contrary to my statement above, I believe we have to focus on the populace, because a mobilized populace is a powerful weapon. Thus the softer side of irregular warfare where we focus on providing basic needs, hope for a better tomorrow, education, and an alternative narrative to the enemy among other activities is critically important, and perhaps even decisive over time. I think most of us agree on this point to varying degrees.

This is why I think Secretary Gate's push for a whole of government approach (team effort) is the basis of enabling the strategy. A promising sign that we're perhaps moving in this direction (ever so slowly) is that the State Department was recently given several million dollars to take lead on the counter propaganda war in Afghanistan. The military role in irregular warfare is not "the strategy", but simply one leg in the total effort, and its role in this soft zone should largely be focused on providing security and logistics to enable the other legs (do gooders) to their work.

The problem since 9/11 is that the military was implementing the entire strategy by itself. Sort of like putting a football team in the field that only has an offense team. They know the principles of defense, but they're not very good at it. This has forced the military to play positions on the team that they were not prepared for, and now it has become the norm. Of course the danger is we're weakening our offense team by making them play defense. Not until recently have we seen a concerted interagency effort to get into the fight and better enable a holistic strategy, but I suspect we're still a long ways off from getting it right.

Our senior military and many junior leaders in the field are focused on building schools, improving the economy, and taking a stab at good goverance (good luck on that one), because they know it needs to be done and no one else has been picking up the ball and running with it. Now that the team is "begining" to get flushed out with the appropriate interagency players we may need to reassess what the military should be focused.

I think Mike F. took a good first stab at it with:

1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

At a minimum I would add:

4. Provide security and logistics support to the do gooders.
5. Conduct offensive operations against the enemy.
6. Help build host nation security force capacity.

I know there are multiple schools of thought on what comes first in the counterinsurgency chicken or the egg argument, but I'm in the school who believes you have to establish security for the populace before you can develop their economy and establish good governance (if a government can't protect its people, then it is a stretch to claim they're providing good governance).

I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.

During 2003-2005 in Iraq, as many have stated, we conducted drive by COIN, by executing nightly raids to go after suspected insurgent leaders, and then we turn the populace back over to insurgent control. Since we were only focused on offensive operations, rather than providing security to the populace, this strategy proved ineffective and of course led to resentment of our forces in many cases. It wasn't until the surge (in some locations prior to the surge) that the military adjusted its military strategy and pushed out into the streets to protect the populace which had telling results (however, the results are only temporary without the right team coming in once security is established to start fixing the other problems). Since we had even less forces in Afghanistan (a much larger country), we obviously left a lot of terrain under the control of the enemy. In short, we didn't execute the military portion of the strategy very effectively. The military can't blame the interagency for failure to follow the basics of military strategy of taking and holding physical and human terrain. Instead we pursued some network targeting "theory" that continues to fail us. The network targeting theory would be a great supporting effort to a real clear and hold strategy (which would result in more dead insurgents), but it is no way to win this this fight.

[Bob's World]

I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.

First I must make clear that I am not an advocate for CNAS-brand "Population-centric" engagement that is all about controlling the population and attempting to buy them off by producing "effective" governmental services free from corruption, etc.

I am an advocate for Jones-brand "Populace-centric" engagement that is all about understanding the needs of the populace and enabling self-determined governance on their terms while focusing on brokering/enabling positive movement between the populace and their existing government to address conditions of "poor governance" (defined as any issue, real or perceived, that is so important to any substantial segment of a populace so as to drive them to subversion or full insurgency; that they also perceive they have no means to address through legitimate channels).

Poor governance does not require a dictatorship; it merely requires a little bit of governmental arrogance or ignorance mixed with a lack of effective process for a populace to express their discontent. Personally, I think we should focus our effort on enabling good process and communication; but because we have cast these problems as "warfare" we apply military solutions, as WILF wisely points out, the military role is far more about defeating threats and providing security.

At the end of the day, we have overstated this entire problem to the degree that it appears impossible to address. On the Government/Civil side we have created a "population-centric" problem set that we in no way have the capacity to address; and on the population end have conflated the threats into a massive "they are evil and out to get us" monster that we are lashing out at inappropriately in all directions.

Less is more definitely applies.

Remember, the key to good governance is not how well it performs, the key is both how the populace feels about the governance and the degree of certainty they have that they can do something about it short of breaking the law.


As to the US and how we got mixed up in these little soap operas; is due to our degree of interference in these relationships. What I call "establishing an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government of others." When a populace perceives that a 3rd party is an obstacle to their achieving good governance at home, they will target that third party to attempt to break that obstacle. So, to reduce the threat at attack to the US and our interests is not to target these nationalist movements, but instead to target this perception that we are an obstacle to good governance.

We chose to make our focus "Defeat AQ"; and may well achieve a tactical success that produces a strategic defeat in the process. Make the focus these perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy instead, and keep our efforts against AQ low-key and IAW the main effort; and we can render AQ irrelevant. If we simply "defeat" them they will be replaced by a smarter and more effective organization that is free from their baggage but primed to run through the hole AQ made for them. That would be a tragedy, simply becasue it is so avoidable.

[MikeF]

The feedback in this thread has allowed me to consolidate and shape some of my thoughts on general guidance for a company commander should approach interdicting into a denied area. Over the next several weeks, I'm going to try and consolidate it into an essay explaining how my troop did it. Below is the outline. It combines some existing COIN principles, a bit of Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond Model, and other advice received from SWJ and other mentors. If you have a moment, take a look at it, and let me know if I've missed anything.

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

2. CLEAR and SEIGE
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence
c. Confront the Sheiks
d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance
b. Restore Essential Services
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force
d. Conduct reconciliation
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

Thanks,

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

Several quick and semi-incoherent thoughts:

• Why "confront" the sheikhs? It some cases might it not be sway, coopt, or some other (less combative) verb? Also, if you're writing this for broader significance than Iraq, you might want to be wary about implying that tribal leaderships are equally relevant in all places.
  
• Can "humanitarian assistance" always be held to 4e? Might it not have to come much sooner in some cases?
  
• Are the subpoints meant to be sequential (in which case I would move up 4c, or collapse it into 4a), or simultaneous?
  
• Should Step 1 also point to the need to seek information from sources beyond boots on the ground and local leadership engagement? This could include NGOs, SME, neighbouring areas, or even the unit that you just RIPed.
  
• "Transition to FID" can mean many things, some of which overlap considerably with 4c (Establish a Police or constabulary force).
  
• 4a (a. Restore Governance) assumes that there was (central government) governance before the insurgency (dubious in parts of Afghanistan, it seems to me), and becomes problematic in those cases where NOT being governed by the central government in a desire of much of the local population (parts of Afghanistan, Somalia, etc).