with his stoopid advocacy...

Obviously all those apply to how your Troop did it and I'm sure the lessons are generally relevant. If the essay is to be Historical, that outline will be great. OTOH if the Essay is intended for those who follow, you might consider as you probably already have, in addition to Rex Brynen's good comment, the remarks below:

1. a. Covert infiltration and reconnaissance will often not be possible due to ethnic, language, time or other constraints. It may also not be necessary dependent upon the unit mission.

2. c. Control the population. Very much METT-TC dependent. In a typical scenario of today given enlightened and civilized behavior on the part of the US armed forces and with media presence almost assured, I doubt the population can be controlled in almost any sense. You might be able to manipulate them, bribe them, even exercise a mild degree of coercion but it is unlikely they can be controlled for any extended period.

2. d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. Again METT-TC will rule. What if the opponents are not counter state. As is the case today in Afghanistan and as was the case in Iraq in many areas with a plethora of counter state, smugglers, criminal gangs, people with other agendas and who knows what. Regardless, they may have an infrastructure and a -- more likely several -- support network(s) that should be destroyed but the different character and goals of varied types of opposition will almost certainly impact how that destruction -- or disruption, which may be adequate -- will occur.

2. e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population. Comment above applies.

3. a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense. FID may not be the goal.

3. c. Confront the Sheiks. What if there are no Sheiks. Point is that leaders or elders in various societies vary widely in the degree of control or even influence they possess. Sunni Sheiks possess some clout, a Village Chief in coastal Viet Nam possessed almost none while a Montagnard Chief possessed only a little more. An Afghan warlord may not be tribal leader but can still effectively rule a fief (of people or terrain or both). A Lur or or Bakhtiar Vali in Iran will have power very much dependent on his current wealth and which branch of the tribe he or she (yes, she -- it can happen with them though not with Arabs) represents. Lot of variables in this one.

Generic comment. Interdiction in denied areas for the purpose of FID will or should generally follow your outline. I'll note for many who contend that the 'armed social work' model is viable that your experience, like mine, is apparently that not a lot of service restoration and humanitarian assistance will or can take place until there is a degree of security...

Know that you know all that I mentioned, but I cued on the outline presented -- my Wife is always amazed that my mind reading skills have not improved in the last 44 years -- so my apology if all that's redundant. Look forward to the essay.