Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[MikeF]

The feedback in this thread has allowed me to consolidate and shape some of my thoughts on general guidance for a company commander should approach interdicting into a denied area. Over the next several weeks, I'm going to try and consolidate it into an essay explaining how my troop did it. Below is the outline. It combines some existing COIN principles, a bit of Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond Model, and other advice received from SWJ and other mentors. If you have a moment, take a look at it, and let me know if I've missed anything.

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

2. CLEAR and SEIGE
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence
c. Confront the Sheiks
d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance
b. Restore Essential Services
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force
d. Conduct reconciliation
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

Thanks,

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

Several quick and semi-incoherent thoughts:

• Why "confront" the sheikhs? It some cases might it not be sway, coopt, or some other (less combative) verb? Also, if you're writing this for broader significance than Iraq, you might want to be wary about implying that tribal leaderships are equally relevant in all places.
  
• Can "humanitarian assistance" always be held to 4e? Might it not have to come much sooner in some cases?
  
• Are the subpoints meant to be sequential (in which case I would move up 4c, or collapse it into 4a), or simultaneous?
  
• Should Step 1 also point to the need to seek information from sources beyond boots on the ground and local leadership engagement? This could include NGOs, SME, neighbouring areas, or even the unit that you just RIPed.
  
• "Transition to FID" can mean many things, some of which overlap considerably with 4c (Establish a Police or constabulary force).
  
• 4a (a. Restore Governance) assumes that there was (central government) governance before the insurgency (dubious in parts of Afghanistan, it seems to me), and becomes problematic in those cases where NOT being governed by the central government in a desire of much of the local population (parts of Afghanistan, Somalia, etc).

[Ken White]

with his stoopid advocacy...

Obviously all those apply to how your Troop did it and I'm sure the lessons are generally relevant. If the essay is to be Historical, that outline will be great. OTOH if the Essay is intended for those who follow, you might consider as you probably already have, in addition to Rex Brynen's good comment, the remarks below:

1. a. Covert infiltration and reconnaissance will often not be possible due to ethnic, language, time or other constraints. It may also not be necessary dependent upon the unit mission.

2. c. Control the population. Very much METT-TC dependent. In a typical scenario of today given enlightened and civilized behavior on the part of the US armed forces and with media presence almost assured, I doubt the population can be controlled in almost any sense. You might be able to manipulate them, bribe them, even exercise a mild degree of coercion but it is unlikely they can be controlled for any extended period.

2. d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. Again METT-TC will rule. What if the opponents are not counter state. As is the case today in Afghanistan and as was the case in Iraq in many areas with a plethora of counter state, smugglers, criminal gangs, people with other agendas and who knows what. Regardless, they may have an infrastructure and a -- more likely several -- support network(s) that should be destroyed but the different character and goals of varied types of opposition will almost certainly impact how that destruction -- or disruption, which may be adequate -- will occur.

2. e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population. Comment above applies.

3. a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense. FID may not be the goal.

3. c. Confront the Sheiks. What if there are no Sheiks. Point is that leaders or elders in various societies vary widely in the degree of control or even influence they possess. Sunni Sheiks possess some clout, a Village Chief in coastal Viet Nam possessed almost none while a Montagnard Chief possessed only a little more. An Afghan warlord may not be tribal leader but can still effectively rule a fief (of people or terrain or both). A Lur or or Bakhtiar Vali in Iran will have power very much dependent on his current wealth and which branch of the tribe he or she (yes, she -- it can happen with them though not with Arabs) represents. Lot of variables in this one.

Generic comment. Interdiction in denied areas for the purpose of FID will or should generally follow your outline. I'll note for many who contend that the 'armed social work' model is viable that your experience, like mine, is apparently that not a lot of service restoration and humanitarian assistance will or can take place until there is a degree of security...

Know that you know all that I mentioned, but I cued on the outline presented -- my Wife is always amazed that my mind reading skills have not improved in the last 44 years -- so my apology if all that's redundant. Look forward to the essay.

[jmm99]

Hi Mike,

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT

[1/2a. Prepare General Area Study before insertion]

a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements

Talk with local leaders ?

c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

[d. Prepare Area Assessment Study (updated throughout employment)]

2. CLEAR and SEIGE

[1/2a. Bring in indigenous security forces - need something to FID in phase 3a; and also a permanent presence in area for this and succeeding stages]

a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks

What mean "destroy" ? Same as CORDS-Phoinix "neutralize", which translated to roughly 1/3 kill, 1/3 capture & detain, 1/3 convert ? Some legal issues here.

e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

IO and the "Political Struggle" ? If so, need indigenous political cadres.

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence

Same questions as 2d.

c. Confront the Sheiks

[co-opt ?]

d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance

[see 2e comment]

b. Restore Essential Services

[continuing 3d. ?]

c. Establish a Police or constabulary force

"Ruff-Puffs" should be in play, in and after phase 2. Here, as part of 4a., we are talking two things: 4c1. Establish a criminal justice system; and 4c2. Establish a civil justice system (there is more civil justice in a community than criminal justice), which must contain a process to enforce good governance and allow the masses' complaints to be heard

d. Conduct reconciliation

[optional - cf. Peace Enforcement & Peacekeeping, etc.]

e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

We've done all this - or at least tried to - as laid out by BG Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL).

Regards,

Mike

[Bob's World]

Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

[Steve Blair]

Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

[Bob's World]

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

However, "CHB" remains a threat-centric approach; coupled with the belief that once once clears out the threat, if they build effective government infrastructure and process they will "win."

All situations being unique, of course, for the situation the US currently finds itself in (mired in the insurgencies of two countries that we imposed ourselves into; and also targeted by the insurgencies of several other countries that we consider as allies, but who's populaces see us a protector of governments that they are dissatisfied with).

I suggest that instead of targeting the insurgent (there will always be insurgencies all over the world, and no amount of engagement will change that fact), that instead we target the perception that we stand as an obstacle between populaces and their respective governments.

A shift of focus.

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

And we'll be able to look in the mirror when we shave in the morning to boot.

[Ken White]

"Effective genocide program!" I love it...

Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Which is why I pointed out above that 'population control' is not likely at all and in any even if implemented, will not last long -- lacking the Phrase of the Week.

Bob adds this:

"This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check."

Truly good statement. More to the point, influence is better than force -- and once you've escalated to the point where you've committed the GPF it is not ever going to be nice or tidy or easy or cheap. Ever...

[Dayuhan]

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

This highlights one of the key problems in our current interventions: our exit strategy depends on an evolutionary process that we do not control. That process may be far more complex and difficult than we initially assume it to be: in Iraq in particular, our intervention was supported by some quite naive underestimations of the challenges of developing a government that would be functional and acceptable to all of the major groups. Something to consider before intervening, certainly: realistic assessment of challenges is a useful thing..

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

I largely agree, but there's a factor here we often overlook. Americans often assume that people who have lived long under bad government will crave and strive for good government, and that they will define "good government" much as we do. In reality our concept of "good government" may never enter the picture: people who have only experienced bad government are likely to define "good government" as whatever type of bad government brings the most benefit directly to them. In these cases the quest for "good government" is likely to be violent and destabilizing, as each group's idea of "good government" is likely to be focused on immediate benefit and is likely to come into conflict with competing definitions from other groups.

All of this of course is on a wider scale and is of little use to those facing local problems such as those discussed in the OP. In these cases I'd only add that one obstacle to seeing a solution to an ill-defined problem set is our tendency to define problem sets in our own terms and according to our own framework, which may mean we're trying to solve the wrong problem. Typically outsiders would be biased toward a national "government vs insurgency" paradigm, which may be of limited relevance on a local scale. An example would be a situation where one subgroup allies with the government to gain advantage in a pre-existing conflict with another subgroup, which then turns to the insurgents to gain leverage of its own. In this case support for the group allied to the government (which may or may not have a more legitimate position in the root conflict) would be less advisable than an attempt to address the underlying conflict between the groups.

There was discussion of the impact of a corrupt governor, and the idea of a culturally acceptable level of corruption. The culturally acceptable level of corruption is likely to vary radically depending on who is speaking: a level that would be perfectly acceptable in an official who is one of "us" might be totally unacceptable if the governor is one of "them". In this case the objection openly stated as "he's corrupt" might actually be "he's not one of us and we feel threatened by his ability to leverage government resources for the benefit of our rivals".

All a roundabout way of advising people facing intractable problems to take a bit of extra time to be sure they're addressing the right problem... with full knowledge that everybody you speak to on the local scene is likely to be trying to distort your picture according to their own perception.