Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[MikeF]

Mike:

In Afghanistan and Pakistan,where in years past I lived and served, the practice of "backshees" [my phonetic spelling???] is that all, everyone, gets pay offs and kick backs for and from whatever they do vocationally.

This said, and it is true, how do you or we differentiate between everyday grassroots corruption and high level corruption, which corruption is true on all sides, the non-Taliban governance officials as well as the Taliban?

More critique, disagreement, whatever on this topic could be helpful to one and all as the advertised effort to clean up corruption to me seems highly unlikely to be achievable due to these folks hundreds of years of precedent of instutitionalized corruption, corruption as defined by a Westerner, job security and old age pension set asides as defined by locals over there from bottom to top.

George,

It took four tours to the Middle East to absorb what you are saying and comprehend the true limits of my own abilities as a ground force commander. My initial questions were intentionally weighted to encourage response and debate amoung other members of the council. I'm pretty sure that I'm not the only one that has been in such a dilemma.

With that said, on the ground level, when one is supposed to "control" their environment while working within the constraints of indigenous culture, to include bribery, pay-offs, kick-backs, and simple corruption, I would suspect that a commander must determine an appropriate acceptable level.

When the local government surpasses the norm, actions must be taken. For example, in Diyala, Iraq (circa 2006-2007) Iraqi Army and local police units were being used by the elected government to cleanse the Sunni populace. Simultaneously, the Sunnis sided with al Qaeda as to check the government. Both sides were wrong- they were embattled in a civil war.

We were simply trying to maintain the peace.

I suppose that is what makes these examples interesting- Americans intervening in internal affairs trying to provide a least-bad solution.

I'm not sure if this applies to Afghanistan, but my intuition tells me that many of the issues in Afghan are Mullah Omar v/s Harmad Karzai.

With that, I'll wait for y'alls response.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

I've struggled during the past two years to accurately describe our small portion during the "Surge." I'm finally starting to tell the story....This is the beginning of my entrance into the realm of wicked, irregular, or undefined problems..... Telling this tale has been extremely difficult for me.

I hope others will continue to share their experiences and answer the first set of questions so that we can all learn a bit...

v/r

Mike

Boss, what do you want me to do now?

Late May 2007, Zaganiyah, Diyala River Valley, Iraq

We watched the video over and over again. Today should have been a day of relief. After sixty days of siege, fighting through twelve attacks a day, sorting through hundreds of deep-buried improved explosive devices (DBIEDs), houses rigged to blow (HBIEDs), and suicide bombers, our persistance paid off. Last night, we killed the primary bomb-maker in the Diyala River Valley.

Intuitively, we knew violence would go down. The enemy's ability to disrupt or block the roads would be severly hampered by this kill. Soon, I could reopen the only ground line of commucation (LOC) leading back to the outside world. We would no longer have to rely solely on air assets for mobility and resupply. I would continue to put the squeeze on Ali Latif al Zuharie, the regional al Qaeda leader of this end of the Diyala River Valley. Killing his sole bomb-maker is the equivilent of taking out his star quarterback.

The siege was working. Continued pressure on the remaining insurgents would result in their destruction, surrender, or eggressing into safer areas. My area of operations was quickly becoming a non-safe area for those that continued to rebel or revolt violently from the elected government. The Islamic State of Iraq would soon dissolve from this area. Reading off the COIN playbook, I would begin restoring local indigenious security, essential services, governance, resettling displaced families, and arbitrating tribal, clan, and family reconciliation.

Today should have been a good day, but my boss and I sat transfixed at the images playing out on the computer screen. Frame by frame, I pointed out terrain features verifying the location. LTC Poppas, my squadron commander, would take a copy back to show the Brigade and Division Commanders. They would offer assets, support, and guidance, but at the end of the day, I would be responsible for determine the appropriate course of action and execution.

I thought that I had seen it all, but for some reason, during this deployment, every time you solved one problem, two more popped up. The situation became messier, more confusing, and more wicked every time I pulled back a layer of the onion. During the Thunder Runs, I sped through the Republican Guards last stand brilliantly firing tank rounds and machine gun fire to dissolve any resistance. This time, we fought through the trenches in Turki Village throwing grenades back and forth to neutralize an al Qaeda training camp. We fought through villages abadoned from al Qaeda's ethnic cleansing. We dealt with regular war, irregular war, and everything in between. I thought that I had seen it all, but it all hit home when we watched this video.

Maybe I observed too many deaths. Maybe I lost too many of my own men. Maybe not.

During this time in Iraq, everyone became numb to death. I remember back in 2003 when we first saw the beheadings of Daniel Pearl. I felt sick, but now, the beheading videos seemed normal. This time was different.

After we killed the bomb-maker, during the sensitive site exploitation, we uncovered numerous videos of his accomplishments. First, we found the pornography. Pornography may seem a paradox to your purist beliefs of al Qaeda, but he was no Islamist. Honestly, in my four tours, I've only met three true Muslims. This man was a former Ba'athest explosive expert under Saddam currently working for the highest bidder. We watched hours of him and his wife on tape trying to emulate the sexual exploits of Pamela Anderson's epic ventures. So much for the purity of the Jihad. Next, we found the attacks overrunning the Zaganiyah security forces from 10 November 2006- ten days to the day when Alpha troop left Zag. Finally, we watch the video. This video was different.

It started with the capture of one of our local Iraqi Army brothers. He was a Shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town trapped in a zero-sum perpetual feud with the Sunnis from Zaganiyah. The soldier was beaten and drug into the town's square: the cemetary 100 meters from my current patrol base. The entire town of Zaganiyah crowded the area to watch the spectacle. Protected by a black mask covering his face, Ali Latif al Zuharie served as the prosecutor, judge, and jury.

"For crimes against humanity, for disobeying Allah and supporting the infidel backed government, this man is sentenced to death." demanded Ali Latif.

"Allah Achbar, Allah Achbar (God is Great, God is Great)," the crowd cheered.

Ali Latif presented his sword and beheaded the soldier, and the crowd succombed in ecstacy declaring how great god was as the soldier's head flopped to the ground.

I stopped the video. I could no longer take watching my neighbors engage in such tragedy. I knew these people. I spent time with them. I drank tea and smoked cigarettes with them. I cried and laughed with them. I thought I knew them. I no longer knew anything.

"Boss, what do you want me to do now" I asked my squadron commander.

"Mike, I don't know." he replied.

It was the first time that I ever found LTC Andrew Poppas indecisive.

[Ron Humphrey]

A,B,C,Z

Honestly the truth is you may find few aside from the august (said old guys) who feel even marginally up to the task of giving you the type of directions which you would go in the given areas. It's rather difficult to truly face the tasks we (the American people) have asked you guys to undertake although perhaps that's the point. If we're not ready to accept and give greater consideration to the facts as they may well be on the ground before you are sent in then there will likely be quite a few important questions which have to be answered on the ground at a much higher price than might have been otherwise.

So for now I like others will wait to absorb the wisdom of others in helping to direct you down the path and hopefully learn quite a bit in the process.

ps: in reference to your last post

Did you confront any of those you recognized from the video and when(if) they answered was there a notable shame or was it more like someone talking about a dream they had?

[MikeF]

Thanks for taking the time to read the thread Ron.

ps: in reference to your last post

Did you confront any of those you recognized from the video and when(if) they answered was there a notable shame or was it more like someone talking about a dream they had?

Eventually, I'll tell the whole story. My initial reaction was that everyone in that town was simply evil and needed to die. After I let the anger pass, I tried a tactic that would typically be frowned upon in a cultural awareness class on Iraq- I used shame.

I brought every leader from that town into our patrol base, and I forced them to watch the video. I hovered over them as they cried and swore "Wallah, Wallah (I swear, I swear)." After the video ended, I told them that I was disgusted to be around them, they were not true Muslims, and they would probably burn in hell.

Then, I told them that they had no right to be around me or my men, and I kicked them out...

I suppose that is probably a politically incorrect answer, but it worked. I was able to gain more wasta (power) over them in subsequent talks.

A,B,C,Z

Honestly the truth is you may find few aside from the august (said old guys) who feel even marginally up to the task of giving you the type of directions which you would go in the given areas. It's rather difficult to truly face the tasks we (the American people) have asked you guys to undertake although perhaps that's the point. If we're not ready to accept and give greater consideration to the facts as they may well be on the ground before you are sent in then there will likely be quite a few important questions which have to be answered on the ground at a much higher price than might have been otherwise.

So for now I like others will wait to absorb the wisdom of others in helping to direct you down the path and hopefully learn quite a bit in the process.

That is the point. It is important to remember that my company was only a small player during the "Surge" working as a supporting effort in denied areas. This thread is not supposed to be about our deeds; I was simply able to start telling the story. Some commanders have told their story (Neil Smith pops to the top of my head), and I'm hoping that others will share their experiences so that we can all learn.

I'm sure that my brothers in Afghanistan are currently facing similar situations or worse, and the least I can do from my armchair is discuss how I worked through my issues.

SWJ is one forum where we can discuss relevant issues in a non-partisan manner. The only issue surfaces when some try to replace theory with practice. Every think tank wannabe has an opinion until you talk facts. I hope to avoid that.

v/r

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Mike F,

Thanks for those posts on the dilemmas and one way to move ahead.

Similar, less violent dilemma in Afghanistan the other day: http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/08...ce-afghan-mob/

Faced by rioters, curiously with the ANP giving support, 82nd Airborne exit a village instead of conducting searches. One wonders what the patrol commander did when he got back to the FOB - with the eight ANP.

davidbfpo

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Thanks for sharing that story. As to your solution being politically incorrect, it probably is but, you know what? I would have done the same thing. Not to have done something on that order would have been taken as a sign of both weakness and lack of, hmmm, "constancy in service" (or to a goal) is probably the best phrase. There is a concept of what almost might be called "Fate" that runs through much of the region - as in one if fated to do X, Y and Z. This tends to move those so touched to act outside of the everyday cultural expectations and touch the "sacred". BTW, it's also what a lot of the AQ crowd have been drawing on. You tagged into that cultural narrative.

Back to your earlier question of what advice I'd give, really my previous post contained it. I can't really give more specific advice without actually being there and seeing the situation .

Cheers,

Marc

[MikeF]

As to your solution being politically incorrect, it probably is but, you know what? I would have done the same thing. Not to have done something on that order would have been taken as a sign of both weakness and lack of, hmmm, "constancy in service" (or to a goal) is probably the best phrase. There is a concept of what almost might be called "Fate" that runs through much of the region - as in one if fated to do X, Y and Z. This tends to move those so touched to act outside of the everyday cultural expectations and touch the "sacred". BTW, it's also what a lot of the AQ crowd have been drawing on. You tagged into that cultural narrative.

1. From the feedback that I've received from various junior leaders across the board, it seems that many are confusing being nice for being respectful. The damn phrase of "winning the hearts and minds" is being translated into never upset anyone. That is simply wrong, and I've seen too many soldiers get killed from those mistakes.

2. Never say never. We soldiers, not anthropologist. We use our understanding of cultural awareness to accomplish our mission not write an extensive ethonography on that nation's culture. Many times I learned through blunt trauma, but I did learn that you should never rule out any tools in your kitbag.

3. Relationship building. We operated in and around Zaganiyah for nearly nine months before this incident. I developed extensive relationships with both the Sunni and Shia tribes. I never took sides. Right before we entered Zaganiyah, I had the local IA commander arrested b/c he was commiting his own autrocities and feuling the local civil war (he was a shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town). I tried my best to stay neutral and only take action when necessary. Plus, I rarely raised my voice. So, when the appropriate time came to do so and show anger and disgust, it was respected.

4. In reality, at least in Diyala Province, yelling is the first part of any negotiation. It usually works like this...

1/3- Offended parties yell at each other in heated, exaggerated shows of emotion.
1/3- Arbitrator (Typically sheik or imam) calms everyone down and the discuss a reasonable solution
1/3 - Hugs, Man kisses, chai, and cigarettes. Everyone celebrates.

It is an odd way to do business, but it works for them.

v/r

Mike

[Greyhawk]

Mike F,

Thanks for those posts on the dilemmas and one way to move ahead.

Similar, less violent dilemma in Afghanistan the other day: http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/08...ce-afghan-mob/

Faced by rioters, curiously with the ANP giving support, 82nd Airborne exit a village instead of conducting searches. One wonders what the patrol commander did when he got back to the FOB - with the eight ANP.

davidbfpo

I submit the 'on the bright side' explanation that "As ugly as it was, we were able to confirm there is anti-coalition sentiment in Tokchi'' as one of the great military quotes of all time.

Less off-topic, MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

[Kiwigrunt]

...MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

I'd buy it.

[MikeF]

Less off-topic, MikeF, you are going to ultimately write a book, right?

Eventually, I'd like to write a book, but it'll probably take several years. I'm going to allow some more time and space to allow me to get it right. For now, I'll publish an occasional paper on SWJ and comment on threads to try and provide some assistance to the younger guys out actually doing the fighting.

Additionally, I send most of my writings to my former O's and NCO's. We were very close (Band of Brothers like), and they fact check my work to make sure I get the details and sequence of events correct. Plus, they keep reminded me of how awesome they were and want their story told. In fact, that will probably be the best part of the story- the people involved to include our final IA Company.

I'd buy it.

Thanks KiwiGrunt.

Back to this thread, I'm still hoping some of the other military guys will comment on how they have tackled these problems in the past.

v/r

Mike