Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[Steve Blair]

Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

[Bob's World]

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

However, "CHB" remains a threat-centric approach; coupled with the belief that once once clears out the threat, if they build effective government infrastructure and process they will "win."

All situations being unique, of course, for the situation the US currently finds itself in (mired in the insurgencies of two countries that we imposed ourselves into; and also targeted by the insurgencies of several other countries that we consider as allies, but who's populaces see us a protector of governments that they are dissatisfied with).

I suggest that instead of targeting the insurgent (there will always be insurgencies all over the world, and no amount of engagement will change that fact), that instead we target the perception that we stand as an obstacle between populaces and their respective governments.

A shift of focus.

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

And we'll be able to look in the mirror when we shave in the morning to boot.

[Ken White]

"Effective genocide program!" I love it...

Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Which is why I pointed out above that 'population control' is not likely at all and in any even if implemented, will not last long -- lacking the Phrase of the Week.

Bob adds this:

"This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check."

Truly good statement. More to the point, influence is better than force -- and once you've escalated to the point where you've committed the GPF it is not ever going to be nice or tidy or easy or cheap. Ever...

[slapout9]

From our own SWJ/Library An Introduction to the Technique of Small Wars by Major Utley. I think ????? he wrote more later but have not been able to confirm this. Once the fighting is over or calmed down you move in and esatblish a partial or complete miliatry government to keep the country running with the ultimate aim of setting up a stable government/elections and then go home. Sounds like a plan to me don't worry if it is COIN,LIC,or CT, or More Tea just handle it.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/utley.pdf

[MikeF]

Thanks for the initial feedback and criticism. The hardest part of writing this essay is trying to get the outline correct. During the actual operation, events were very fluid and unstructured. A lot of our learning came on the fly.

To clarify a couple of things, I'm writing my account of my company's operations in Zaganiyah, Iraq from March-June 2007. It is the follow up to my first article on SWJ titled "The Break Point: How AQIZ established the ISI in Zaganiyah." That essay focused on how AQI created a shadow government and denied or "No-Go" area in the Diyala River Valley. This essay will explain how we took it back with primary focus on company level planning, operations, strategy, decision making, and problem solving.

It is by no means a definitive account- just one more narrative to add to the growing collection of works that others have published. I'll be happy if it helps some young captain trying to comprehend the difficulties of command.

As for the outline:

1. Prepare General Area Study. I'm going to add that one to the list.

2. Controlling the Populace. This is impossible to do 100%, but for a short-term you can enforce curfews, driving restrictions, block roads, etc...

3. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. This entails shutting down enemy training camps, shadow government offices,
neutralizing IED networks, etc...To accomplish this, heavy reconnaissance is required and you must gain influence and trust networks of your own.

4. Confronting the Sheiks. I need to rephrase this own, but I haven't found the right words yet. On a personal level, I got along with most of my sheiks, but everytime we had to talk business, it became confrontational. At times, I felt like a used car salesman trying to pitch a clunker.

5. I'm not advocating a "burn the village down in order to save it" strategy, but a certain level of violence is required to secure an area.

That leads to some questions.

Should we be employing GPF forces in this manner? My current answer is no, but President Obama hasn't asked me to weigh in on his foreign policy (that would be a sad, sad day!). The reality is that we are conducting these types of operations. I'm skeptical of the current population centric crowd. In my experience, there is a tremendous gap between the theory and the practice. I introduced several examples in the beginning of this thread, and I guess my take is that some of these "wicked" problems cannot be solved by US military. Even when we have success, it is almost impossible to accurately predict the secondary and tertiary effects. Additionally, deploying into these types of areas can bring high risk and come at a high cost.

What should we be doing? I wish I knew. I tend to side with Bob's World's thoughts and overall SF mentality- small footprint, indirect actions, lower expectations, and longer presence.

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

This highlights one of the key problems in our current interventions: our exit strategy depends on an evolutionary process that we do not control. That process may be far more complex and difficult than we initially assume it to be: in Iraq in particular, our intervention was supported by some quite naive underestimations of the challenges of developing a government that would be functional and acceptable to all of the major groups. Something to consider before intervening, certainly: realistic assessment of challenges is a useful thing..

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

I largely agree, but there's a factor here we often overlook. Americans often assume that people who have lived long under bad government will crave and strive for good government, and that they will define "good government" much as we do. In reality our concept of "good government" may never enter the picture: people who have only experienced bad government are likely to define "good government" as whatever type of bad government brings the most benefit directly to them. In these cases the quest for "good government" is likely to be violent and destabilizing, as each group's idea of "good government" is likely to be focused on immediate benefit and is likely to come into conflict with competing definitions from other groups.

All of this of course is on a wider scale and is of little use to those facing local problems such as those discussed in the OP. In these cases I'd only add that one obstacle to seeing a solution to an ill-defined problem set is our tendency to define problem sets in our own terms and according to our own framework, which may mean we're trying to solve the wrong problem. Typically outsiders would be biased toward a national "government vs insurgency" paradigm, which may be of limited relevance on a local scale. An example would be a situation where one subgroup allies with the government to gain advantage in a pre-existing conflict with another subgroup, which then turns to the insurgents to gain leverage of its own. In this case support for the group allied to the government (which may or may not have a more legitimate position in the root conflict) would be less advisable than an attempt to address the underlying conflict between the groups.

There was discussion of the impact of a corrupt governor, and the idea of a culturally acceptable level of corruption. The culturally acceptable level of corruption is likely to vary radically depending on who is speaking: a level that would be perfectly acceptable in an official who is one of "us" might be totally unacceptable if the governor is one of "them". In this case the objection openly stated as "he's corrupt" might actually be "he's not one of us and we feel threatened by his ability to leverage government resources for the benefit of our rivals".

All a roundabout way of advising people facing intractable problems to take a bit of extra time to be sure they're addressing the right problem... with full knowledge that everybody you speak to on the local scene is likely to be trying to distort your picture according to their own perception.

[Bob's World]

The more we focus on what we think is "good governance" the less likely we are to be helpful to the process

We need to use our considerable influence not to force our will, but instead to enable (relatively) peaceful evolution of governance.

We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

This is the message that we need to carry to the White House. Control-based policies brought us to where we are. They will not take us to where we need to be.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's W, We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.

Posted by Ken: Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

[Bob's World]

That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.



Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

When was the last time you preferred to be "controlled" in some context, rather than been "supported.?"


The U.S. has interests. These must be supported, that is our job. But, if we do so in such a way that we offend the populaces of the countries where those interests lie, we harm our cause, rather than support it.

Interests will rarely match up, so this requires that we make reasonable compromise. Others before us have used their historic positions of power to ignore popular concerns and to enforce their will over others. Those power are all now minor players on the global scene. We can avoid their fate by refuting their tactics. We must, must, live up to our American heritage by being the one nation that marches to a different drummer.

The age of European dominance over others is over. We held their place to win the Cold War, but now that is over too. Now we enter a new age, and we can lead the way and prevail, or seek to obstruct the way and be over ran.

To me, the choice is obvious. We must lead.

[Ken White]

...For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I don't support arguments against populace control -- I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.

I agree with that -- I did not and do not say do away with it -- I do say it is beyond difficult to do, so try we must but the probability of success in that aspect is not great. Been there, done that...

What can be and is being done is local, short time control and long time shaping. Makes the job harder but as you say, ain't no Utopias out there...

Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems.

Really? Well, the added (east) was simply to remind Bob's World that there were Indians in the east as well as in the west of the US but to get to your comment, let me repeat the salient point of that post of mine for you: ""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken, I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.

Agreed, and we sometimes fail to mention that during the troubles both Malaysia and Algeria were colonies, so that somewhat mitigated the third party effect. Population control measures can include a wide range of activities, and I agree that some of them have a short shelf life due to the impact on those affected, but others like protecting the population must endure for the length of the crisis. Population control is not a "strategy", but rather a means to set conditions that will allow the political strategy to be implemented. In my view, population control creates a window of opportunity to do the real work that needs to be done. It isn't the end game.

""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really...

I don't think we should confuse genocide with population control, and I'm sure you agree with that. We're not talking Hitler's Final Solution, but rather a means for separating the populace from the insurgents. Furthermore, the Spanish during that time frame were highly ineffective at most things. They were the equivalent of the Christian Taliban during that era, and thus were incapable of learning, assimilating knowledge from other cultures, or modernizing a foreign culture until they got their church under control. Spain may be a great nation now, but during its dark period they were far behind the rest of Europe. Therefore, I don't think it is accurate to equate their genocidicial approach as the reason they failed, that was simply a reflection of their overall backwardness during that time frame. In the U.S. we were heavy handed also, but we were effective, why? I think like most things in life the answer is never simple or black & white.

[jmm99]

it would be easier accomplished by a military with political commissars and heavily filled with political cadres (also doubling as military cadres). We don't have that - and I'm not recommending it.

The attached snips I ran into from some early evening reading tonite. They seem applicable and general enough - even though we lack political commissars. And, they do come from the "winner's playbook" (01 and 02)

Please note that Giap considered the RVN to be the insurgents ("rebels", "puppets", "lackeys"), with the US supplying the external muscle power. So, Giap was practicing "counter-insurgency" by combining guerrilla and conventional forces - or, unconventional warfare in occupied territory.