Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

[MikeF]

The feedback in this thread has allowed me to consolidate and shape some of my thoughts on general guidance for a company commander should approach interdicting into a denied area. Over the next several weeks, I'm going to try and consolidate it into an essay explaining how my troop did it. Below is the outline. It combines some existing COIN principles, a bit of Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond Model, and other advice received from SWJ and other mentors. If you have a moment, take a look at it, and let me know if I've missed anything.

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

2. CLEAR and SEIGE
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence
c. Confront the Sheiks
d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance
b. Restore Essential Services
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force
d. Conduct reconciliation
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

Thanks,

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

Several quick and semi-incoherent thoughts:

• Why "confront" the sheikhs? It some cases might it not be sway, coopt, or some other (less combative) verb? Also, if you're writing this for broader significance than Iraq, you might want to be wary about implying that tribal leaderships are equally relevant in all places.
  
• Can "humanitarian assistance" always be held to 4e? Might it not have to come much sooner in some cases?
  
• Are the subpoints meant to be sequential (in which case I would move up 4c, or collapse it into 4a), or simultaneous?
  
• Should Step 1 also point to the need to seek information from sources beyond boots on the ground and local leadership engagement? This could include NGOs, SME, neighbouring areas, or even the unit that you just RIPed.
  
• "Transition to FID" can mean many things, some of which overlap considerably with 4c (Establish a Police or constabulary force).
  
• 4a (a. Restore Governance) assumes that there was (central government) governance before the insurgency (dubious in parts of Afghanistan, it seems to me), and becomes problematic in those cases where NOT being governed by the central government in a desire of much of the local population (parts of Afghanistan, Somalia, etc).

[Ken White]

with his stoopid advocacy...

Obviously all those apply to how your Troop did it and I'm sure the lessons are generally relevant. If the essay is to be Historical, that outline will be great. OTOH if the Essay is intended for those who follow, you might consider as you probably already have, in addition to Rex Brynen's good comment, the remarks below:

1. a. Covert infiltration and reconnaissance will often not be possible due to ethnic, language, time or other constraints. It may also not be necessary dependent upon the unit mission.

2. c. Control the population. Very much METT-TC dependent. In a typical scenario of today given enlightened and civilized behavior on the part of the US armed forces and with media presence almost assured, I doubt the population can be controlled in almost any sense. You might be able to manipulate them, bribe them, even exercise a mild degree of coercion but it is unlikely they can be controlled for any extended period.

2. d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. Again METT-TC will rule. What if the opponents are not counter state. As is the case today in Afghanistan and as was the case in Iraq in many areas with a plethora of counter state, smugglers, criminal gangs, people with other agendas and who knows what. Regardless, they may have an infrastructure and a -- more likely several -- support network(s) that should be destroyed but the different character and goals of varied types of opposition will almost certainly impact how that destruction -- or disruption, which may be adequate -- will occur.

2. e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population. Comment above applies.

3. a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense. FID may not be the goal.

3. c. Confront the Sheiks. What if there are no Sheiks. Point is that leaders or elders in various societies vary widely in the degree of control or even influence they possess. Sunni Sheiks possess some clout, a Village Chief in coastal Viet Nam possessed almost none while a Montagnard Chief possessed only a little more. An Afghan warlord may not be tribal leader but can still effectively rule a fief (of people or terrain or both). A Lur or or Bakhtiar Vali in Iran will have power very much dependent on his current wealth and which branch of the tribe he or she (yes, she -- it can happen with them though not with Arabs) represents. Lot of variables in this one.

Generic comment. Interdiction in denied areas for the purpose of FID will or should generally follow your outline. I'll note for many who contend that the 'armed social work' model is viable that your experience, like mine, is apparently that not a lot of service restoration and humanitarian assistance will or can take place until there is a degree of security...

Know that you know all that I mentioned, but I cued on the outline presented -- my Wife is always amazed that my mind reading skills have not improved in the last 44 years -- so my apology if all that's redundant. Look forward to the essay.

[jmm99]

Hi Mike,

1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT

[1/2a. Prepare General Area Study before insertion]

a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements

Talk with local leaders ?

c. Develop hypothesis of current situation

[d. Prepare Area Assessment Study (updated throughout employment)]

2. CLEAR and SEIGE

[1/2a. Bring in indigenous security forces - need something to FID in phase 3a; and also a permanent presence in area for this and succeeding stages]

a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks

What mean "destroy" ? Same as CORDS-Phoinix "neutralize", which translated to roughly 1/3 kill, 1/3 capture & detain, 1/3 convert ? Some legal issues here.

e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population

IO and the "Political Struggle" ? If so, need indigenous political cadres.

3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence

Same questions as 2d.

c. Confront the Sheiks

[co-opt ?]

d. Restore Essential Services

4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance

[see 2e comment]

b. Restore Essential Services

[continuing 3d. ?]

c. Establish a Police or constabulary force

"Ruff-Puffs" should be in play, in and after phase 2. Here, as part of 4a., we are talking two things: 4c1. Establish a criminal justice system; and 4c2. Establish a civil justice system (there is more civil justice in a community than criminal justice), which must contain a process to enforce good governance and allow the masses' complaints to be heard

d. Conduct reconciliation

[optional - cf. Peace Enforcement & Peacekeeping, etc.]

e. Conduct humanitarian assistance

We've done all this - or at least tried to - as laid out by BG Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL).

Regards,

Mike

[Bob's World]

Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

[Steve Blair]

Remember, "Clear-Hold-Build" is the same strategy we applied to deal with the Indian "problem" and estabish good governance over the Western US. Not too many people look back at that as a shining example of how to treat a populace (effective, yes, but at what cost; and is it effective if you don't combine it with an effective genocide program?).

Personal opinion; this is a cliche' sound-byte that we need to set back on the shelf of history and look for models that work without taking out the local populace and replacing them with your own in order to be effective.

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

[Bob's World]

Actually the Spanish combined it with a very effective genocide program and it didn't do them much good....

If we're going to go picking into history for examples, we also need to be careful to retain the context and framework of each situation and solution. The Frontier is perhaps best understood as a poorly-planned occupation and conquest with elements of what we'd now consider counter-insurgency thrown in for good measure. It was an operation that for the most part only got half-hearted support and minimal funding from the central government, and was often agitated by what might now be considered "non-state actors" on all sides of the issue. It also contains any number of examples about how operational templating and "one size fits all" planning can lead to less than optimal outcomes.

I think it's more important to have a good understanding of the issues (including restrictions) that face your particular situation and have the knowledge and tools to be able to create a plan based on the specifics of your situation. Properly informed adaptive leadership and planning will be more successful than all the perfect models in the world poorly applied.

However, "CHB" remains a threat-centric approach; coupled with the belief that once once clears out the threat, if they build effective government infrastructure and process they will "win."

All situations being unique, of course, for the situation the US currently finds itself in (mired in the insurgencies of two countries that we imposed ourselves into; and also targeted by the insurgencies of several other countries that we consider as allies, but who's populaces see us a protector of governments that they are dissatisfied with).

I suggest that instead of targeting the insurgent (there will always be insurgencies all over the world, and no amount of engagement will change that fact), that instead we target the perception that we stand as an obstacle between populaces and their respective governments.

A shift of focus.

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

And we'll be able to look in the mirror when we shave in the morning to boot.

[Ken White]

"Effective genocide program!" I love it...

Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Which is why I pointed out above that 'population control' is not likely at all and in any even if implemented, will not last long -- lacking the Phrase of the Week.

Bob adds this:

"This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check."

Truly good statement. More to the point, influence is better than force -- and once you've escalated to the point where you've committed the GPF it is not ever going to be nice or tidy or easy or cheap. Ever...

[slapout9]

From our own SWJ/Library An Introduction to the Technique of Small Wars by Major Utley. I think ????? he wrote more later but have not been able to confirm this. Once the fighting is over or calmed down you move in and esatblish a partial or complete miliatry government to keep the country running with the ultimate aim of setting up a stable government/elections and then go home. Sounds like a plan to me don't worry if it is COIN,LIC,or CT, or More Tea just handle it.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/utley.pdf

[MikeF]

Thanks for the initial feedback and criticism. The hardest part of writing this essay is trying to get the outline correct. During the actual operation, events were very fluid and unstructured. A lot of our learning came on the fly.

To clarify a couple of things, I'm writing my account of my company's operations in Zaganiyah, Iraq from March-June 2007. It is the follow up to my first article on SWJ titled "The Break Point: How AQIZ established the ISI in Zaganiyah." That essay focused on how AQI created a shadow government and denied or "No-Go" area in the Diyala River Valley. This essay will explain how we took it back with primary focus on company level planning, operations, strategy, decision making, and problem solving.

It is by no means a definitive account- just one more narrative to add to the growing collection of works that others have published. I'll be happy if it helps some young captain trying to comprehend the difficulties of command.

As for the outline:

1. Prepare General Area Study. I'm going to add that one to the list.

2. Controlling the Populace. This is impossible to do 100%, but for a short-term you can enforce curfews, driving restrictions, block roads, etc...

3. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks. This entails shutting down enemy training camps, shadow government offices,
neutralizing IED networks, etc...To accomplish this, heavy reconnaissance is required and you must gain influence and trust networks of your own.

4. Confronting the Sheiks. I need to rephrase this own, but I haven't found the right words yet. On a personal level, I got along with most of my sheiks, but everytime we had to talk business, it became confrontational. At times, I felt like a used car salesman trying to pitch a clunker.

5. I'm not advocating a "burn the village down in order to save it" strategy, but a certain level of violence is required to secure an area.

That leads to some questions.

Should we be employing GPF forces in this manner? My current answer is no, but President Obama hasn't asked me to weigh in on his foreign policy (that would be a sad, sad day!). The reality is that we are conducting these types of operations. I'm skeptical of the current population centric crowd. In my experience, there is a tremendous gap between the theory and the practice. I introduced several examples in the beginning of this thread, and I guess my take is that some of these "wicked" problems cannot be solved by US military. Even when we have success, it is almost impossible to accurately predict the secondary and tertiary effects. Additionally, deploying into these types of areas can bring high risk and come at a high cost.

What should we be doing? I wish I knew. I tend to side with Bob's World's thoughts and overall SF mentality- small footprint, indirect actions, lower expectations, and longer presence.

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check.

This highlights one of the key problems in our current interventions: our exit strategy depends on an evolutionary process that we do not control. That process may be far more complex and difficult than we initially assume it to be: in Iraq in particular, our intervention was supported by some quite naive underestimations of the challenges of developing a government that would be functional and acceptable to all of the major groups. Something to consider before intervening, certainly: realistic assessment of challenges is a useful thing..

Many tend to focus on the ideology applied to rally the people; or the role of organizations like AQ to leverage these nationalist movements and miss the real underlying issues. These are distractors and we focus on them to our peril. We need to set our fears aside, and adjust our approach to foreign policy to enable relatively peaceful pursuit of self-determined governance. It won't all be what we would like to see, but it won't be half as scary as the fear mongers out there make it out to be either.

I largely agree, but there's a factor here we often overlook. Americans often assume that people who have lived long under bad government will crave and strive for good government, and that they will define "good government" much as we do. In reality our concept of "good government" may never enter the picture: people who have only experienced bad government are likely to define "good government" as whatever type of bad government brings the most benefit directly to them. In these cases the quest for "good government" is likely to be violent and destabilizing, as each group's idea of "good government" is likely to be focused on immediate benefit and is likely to come into conflict with competing definitions from other groups.

All of this of course is on a wider scale and is of little use to those facing local problems such as those discussed in the OP. In these cases I'd only add that one obstacle to seeing a solution to an ill-defined problem set is our tendency to define problem sets in our own terms and according to our own framework, which may mean we're trying to solve the wrong problem. Typically outsiders would be biased toward a national "government vs insurgency" paradigm, which may be of limited relevance on a local scale. An example would be a situation where one subgroup allies with the government to gain advantage in a pre-existing conflict with another subgroup, which then turns to the insurgents to gain leverage of its own. In this case support for the group allied to the government (which may or may not have a more legitimate position in the root conflict) would be less advisable than an attempt to address the underlying conflict between the groups.

There was discussion of the impact of a corrupt governor, and the idea of a culturally acceptable level of corruption. The culturally acceptable level of corruption is likely to vary radically depending on who is speaking: a level that would be perfectly acceptable in an official who is one of "us" might be totally unacceptable if the governor is one of "them". In this case the objection openly stated as "he's corrupt" might actually be "he's not one of us and we feel threatened by his ability to leverage government resources for the benefit of our rivals".

All a roundabout way of advising people facing intractable problems to take a bit of extra time to be sure they're addressing the right problem... with full knowledge that everybody you speak to on the local scene is likely to be trying to distort your picture according to their own perception.

[Bob's World]

The more we focus on what we think is "good governance" the less likely we are to be helpful to the process

We need to use our considerable influence not to force our will, but instead to enable (relatively) peaceful evolution of governance.

We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

This is the message that we need to carry to the White House. Control-based policies brought us to where we are. They will not take us to where we need to be.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's W, We can not embrace change, in other words, until we reliquish control.

That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.

Posted by Ken: Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good."

Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

[jmm99]

it would be easier accomplished by a military with political commissars and heavily filled with political cadres (also doubling as military cadres). We don't have that - and I'm not recommending it.

The attached snips I ran into from some early evening reading tonite. They seem applicable and general enough - even though we lack political commissars. And, they do come from the "winner's playbook" (01 and 02)

Please note that Giap considered the RVN to be the insurgents ("rebels", "puppets", "lackeys"), with the US supplying the external muscle power. So, Giap was practicing "counter-insurgency" by combining guerrilla and conventional forces - or, unconventional warfare in occupied territory.

[Bob's World]

That may be true, but it isn't germane to those in the fight. My point is you rejected population control as an effective COIN tactic, and my opinion you couldn't be more wrong. At the tactical/operational level it is essential. A counterinsurgency strategy must address populace control (it is the only means to isolate the populace from the enemy), which is always tailored to each individual situation. It rarely means employing the methods utilized in Malaysia or Algeria, which are the most frequently cited case studies because they were so extreme (but also effective). It seems you believe there is acceptable political middle ground that will be acceptable to the Islamists and those more moderate, and somehow this middle ground will emerge through some sort of natural political evolution under our gentle guiding hand. Sharia law and the extremists who want to impose a strict version of it are not going to accept anything less, so where is this compromise or evolution you speak of? If we're going to fight it (assuming that remains our policy in select locations such as Afghanistan), then we're (coalition/HN/US) going to have to exert some degree of control over the populace. You can't state that the population is key terrain then simply surrender that terrain to the enemy. For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.



Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems. We strive for utopia, we don't live it.

When was the last time you preferred to be "controlled" in some context, rather than been "supported.?"


The U.S. has interests. These must be supported, that is our job. But, if we do so in such a way that we offend the populaces of the countries where those interests lie, we harm our cause, rather than support it.

Interests will rarely match up, so this requires that we make reasonable compromise. Others before us have used their historic positions of power to ignore popular concerns and to enforce their will over others. Those power are all now minor players on the global scene. We can avoid their fate by refuting their tactics. We must, must, live up to our American heritage by being the one nation that marches to a different drummer.

The age of European dominance over others is over. We held their place to win the Cold War, but now that is over too. Now we enter a new age, and we can lead the way and prevail, or seek to obstruct the way and be over ran.

To me, the choice is obvious. We must lead.

[Ken White]

...For those who support the arguments against populace control, just what the heck do we think the Taliban are doing? Are they not attempting to establish control over the populace? In most cases it coerced control.

I don't support arguments against populace control -- I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.

I agree we need policy changes, but once you're given a military mission, then we have to focus on what works in that situation. It is easy to state simply do away with population control, and then find another way, but I haven't seen any viable ideas presented as alternative strategies for those with muddy boots.

I agree with that -- I did not and do not say do away with it -- I do say it is beyond difficult to do, so try we must but the probability of success in that aspect is not great. Been there, done that...

What can be and is being done is local, short time control and long time shaping. Makes the job harder but as you say, ain't no Utopias out there...

Really? Last time I looked we conquered the West (and East), and the so called lingering problems are very minor. The lingering problems are not due to population control, but do to the conflict. I'm not aware of any conflict where there aren't lingering problems.

Really? Well, the added (east) was simply to remind Bob's World that there were Indians in the east as well as in the west of the US but to get to your comment, let me repeat the salient point of that post of mine for you: ""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Ken, I merely say we cannot as a third party intervenor do it very well and therefor those who insist on it being done are asking for something that cannot be produced other than briefly and in a finite area -- in other words, lacking being the government and opting for Algerian or Malayan solutions, you are not going to control the populace of a nation today. Yes, the Talibs are attempting to do that but they can and are doing things we cannot do -- and they are slowly but surely turning more people against the Taliban solution.

Agreed, and we sometimes fail to mention that during the troubles both Malaysia and Algeria were colonies, so that somewhat mitigated the third party effect. Population control measures can include a wide range of activities, and I agree that some of them have a short shelf life due to the impact on those affected, but others like protecting the population must endure for the length of the crisis. Population control is not a "strategy", but rather a means to set conditions that will allow the political strategy to be implemented. In my view, population control creates a window of opportunity to do the real work that needs to be done. It isn't the end game.

""with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." " (emphasis added / kw). I believe Steve whom I referenced was pointing to the fact that the Spanish beat the US of A hands down in the genocide business and they got run completely off the continent so it didn't do them much good. So, yeah, Really...

I don't think we should confuse genocide with population control, and I'm sure you agree with that. We're not talking Hitler's Final Solution, but rather a means for separating the populace from the insurgents. Furthermore, the Spanish during that time frame were highly ineffective at most things. They were the equivalent of the Christian Taliban during that era, and thus were incapable of learning, assimilating knowledge from other cultures, or modernizing a foreign culture until they got their church under control. Spain may be a great nation now, but during its dark period they were far behind the rest of Europe. Therefore, I don't think it is accurate to equate their genocidicial approach as the reason they failed, that was simply a reflection of their overall backwardness during that time frame. In the U.S. we were heavy handed also, but we were effective, why? I think like most things in life the answer is never simple or black & white.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World: The age of European dominance over others is over. We held their place to win the Cold War, but now that is over too. Now we enter a new age, and we can lead the way and prevail, or seek to obstruct the way and be over ran.

To me, the choice is obvious. We must lead.

Agree with your last post, and in the end we may be talking past one another. Population Control has a terrible connotation, and we need a new term for a new era that reflects what we're actually trying to do. I don't like being controlled, but the fact is I'm controlled to a large extent by a number of laws (and regulations since I'm in the military). I sure as hell wouldn't like it if some foreigner was imposing those controls over me in my country, so we're in agreement.

Two counterpoints:

Population and Resource Control is focused on separating the populace from the insurgents, and the majority of this effort should be focused on providing security to the populace so they cannot be coerced by the insurgents. (If they support the insurgent's ideology, then we're on the losing side and shouldn't be there to begin with unless we're practicing UW). This includes check points, intelligence operations, combat outposts, patrols, information operations, etc. However, when you mention Population Control everyone has visions of the moving people away from their villages and confining them in a camp like the Brits did in Malaysia or we did to the American Japanese in the U.S. during WWII. From my optic that is not the intent, we do this as gently as possible, but we do implement the necessary measures based on the situation. I'll meet you half way, and agree we need another term for this, but you still have to achieve this effect to be effective.

Second counterpoint: You suggested supporting over controlling, and that would be ideal in a real FID scenario, but in Iraq and Afghanistan we are/were an occupying power and that changes the dynamic from where we support to where we must do, until we can evolve the situation to a point where we can really transition to a supporting role. This why I think severe punative raids may be a better option in some cases instead of occupying a country and trying to transform their society at great cost to "all" concerned. In my opinion we over emphasize what we can accomplish with soft power.

[Ken White]

...others like protecting the population must endure for the length of the crisis.

Agree, problem is getting enough people to do that. Million and a half troops in Viet Nam could not even begin to protect more than about a fifth of the population of 16M or so in a nation half the size of the Philippines land area and a quarter the size of Afghanistan -- where there are less than a quarter million troops of all coalition types in terrain far more rugged and compartmented than was VN.

I'm pretty sure that the likelihood of having enough troops to do the population control thing thoroughly in any nation larger than Belize or Singapore is unlikely unless we get a whole lot of Allies willing to work.

Population control is not a "strategy", but rather a means to set conditions that will allow the political strategy to be implemented. In my view, population control creates a window of opportunity to do the real work that needs to be done. It isn't the end game.

Not to be nit picky but if you cannot control them totally, aren't you talking more about providing security to the extent you can and shaping their thoughts and goals also to the extent you can?

I think we're pretty much in agreement on what has to be done if you're there and we both know if the Pols say go, we're going -- but I do agree with Bob's World that we should try our best not to be in that position. In this era, it is a no-win proposition, not least because of the lack of ability to control the population to a great extent. Population centric COIN is a good book theory, it just doesn't work at all well in practice -- and that lack of population control is the reason; only works if conditions are ideal or in a relatively small area.

I don't think we should confuse genocide with population control, and I'm sure you agree with that.

I do agree, of course. However, my subject line comment about your irony pill was at taking that whole genocide train of thought -- which started with a purely and surely ironic statement by Bob's World, followed by one by Steve Blair and one by me -- as being something meriting serious comment. It wasn't meant as anything other than 'Well, we aren't going to do that...' and it doesn't work that well in any event (as you said also) so no one was seriously or even in jest proposing it...

[Ken White]

(If they support the insurgent's ideology, then we're on the losing side and shouldn't be there to begin with unless we're practicing UW).

I agree with that. Totally. However, what if, as in Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq, the population doesn't really support the 'insurgents' but OTOH, they don't support you or the government either; they just want everyone to go away and leave them alone. That really compounds your population control problem.

This includes check points, intelligence operations, combat outposts, patrols, information operations, etc

Agree with that definition and you're correct that the 'control' word produces bad vibes for some -- but the real problem is not that you are going to put em in Camps -- the real problem is that you cannot put them in camps, thus you are NOT going to control them and you are unlikely to have enough people to effect any can kind of temporary control over other than a small area. Population control's problem is that it takes more people than the US Army can provide in most cases.

This why I think severe punative raids may be a better option in some cases instead of occupying a country and trying to transform their society at great cost to "all" concerned. In my opinion we over emphasize what we can accomplish with soft power.

Agreed!