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Thread: Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion

  1. #21
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Mike,

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    In grad school, I was fascinated by the subject of anthropology, but I always thought it a bit presumptious that one could believe that they could penetrate a society without making waves.
    Any Anthropologist who says that is lying through his/her teeth ! Of course we're going to make wave - the question is are they big ones or small ones? Personally, I'm in favour of really, really small ones. Basically, the best tactic once you are in the field that I've found is find an analog and learn to act in a very roughly similar manner. The people we're studying may or may not know what we do (they should, but that's another story...), but as long as they have a pretty good idea of why we are there, how we are going to operate and what we are going to do in return for the information we get, I'm pretty cool with it.

    We do, if we are doing a lot of fieldwork with the same group over a long time, end up more as members (often absent) of that community - in effect, we go more native than most others, but that keeps all of us sane.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    It reminds me of all the times that we had embedded reporters within our unit. Guys would put on all their tricked out "kits" around the photographers and pose hoping to get the "GI Joe" photo-shot. I imagine that it is the same for villagers when an anthropologist comes to town. Some will posture, others will exaggerate....In the end, the visitor becomes a bit of amusement outside their normal day to day life.
    I've seen that when some of the sociologists I've run across try to do ethnographic fieldwork. Probably the best analog would be a DoS dweeb who flies in for a couple of two day staged tours and then "knows all about the situation". Pathetic! I actually ahd one guy tell me he could get a complete social structural model of organizations by spending no more than 15 hours actually in them !

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Good analogy. I only wish that dealing with wives was as simple as dealing with tribal sheiks. At least the locals are from earth. Women are from Venus
    Having said that, I won't repeat what my wife said when she found out !

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  2. #22
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Oh how we digress...

    Hi Marc,

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Having said that, I won't repeat what my wife said when she found out !
    Marc
    Time to buy flowers, jewelry, chocolate, and find a baby-sitter so you can take her out this weekend.

    Back to small wars stuff...

    One form of infiltration that may even surpass the ability to speak the language is mannerisms..

    If you can learn to sit the way locals sit, hold your cigarette the way the locals do it, etc...In essence, learn to mimick your counterparts, then everyone feels comfortable. Form is often as important as function. Fortunately, this revelation works just as well in visiting local bars in new cities.

    Back to your dillema...

    Just blame all your issues on the SWJ Council-we're a bad influence. Tell your wife that you have to deal with us for your job, we're a bunch of unrefined thugs, and you just wish that you could spend every moment with her Good luck with that one.


    v/r

    Mike
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 08-13-2009 at 07:30 AM. Reason: manuerisms to mannerisms

  3. #23
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Mike,

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    One form of infiltration that may even surpass the ability to speak the language is manuerisms..

    If you can learn to sit the way locals sit, hold your cigarette the way the locals do it, etc...In essence, learn to mimick your counterparts, then everyone feels comfortable. Form is often as important as function. Fortunately, this revelation works just as well in visiting local bars in new cities.
    Yupper, works every time. It's one of the reasons why I recommend to my students that they take some acting classes ! As to bars, we used to send our students out to bars and clubs all the time to do observational work (less now, they're younger than they used to be ).

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Back to your dillema...

    Just blame all your issues on the SWJ Council-we're a bad influence. Tell your wife that you have to deal with us for your job, we're a bunch of unrefined thugs, and you just wish that you could spend every moment with her Good luck with that one.
    Hmmm, well, I'm cooking dinner tonight, so that will have to do.....

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  4. #24
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Any Anthropologist who says that is lying through his/her teeth ! Of course we're going to make wave - the question is are they big ones or small ones? Personally, I'm in favour of really, really small ones. Basically, the best tactic once you are in the field that I've found is find an analog and learn to act in a very roughly similar manner. The people we're studying may or may not know what we do (they should, but that's another story...), but as long as they have a pretty good idea of why we are there, how we are going to operate and what we are going to do in return for the information we get, I'm pretty cool with it.

    We do, if we are doing a lot of fieldwork with the same group over a long time, end up more as members (often absent) of that community - in effect, we go more native than most others, but that keeps all of us sane.
    We could probably trade some amusing stories on this score. I live in an indigenous community that is very heavily studied; we always seem to have anthropologists and other social scientists in residence or passing through. In many cases one wonders why they come, as they seem to know what they will conclude before they even arrive! The community, of course, has its own ways of coping with being studied, and in many cases there are some truly hilarious comparative discussions of the methods, personalities, and assumptions of various researchers... is there a field of study in which those studied study those who study them?

  5. #25
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Dayuhan,

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    We could probably trade some amusing stories on this score. I live in an indigenous community that is very heavily studied; we always seem to have anthropologists and other social scientists in residence or passing through. In many cases one wonders why they come, as they seem to know what they will conclude before they even arrive!
    I suspect we could trade some truly humourous stories !

    As to why they come, there are some interesting structures operating in academic Anthropology. For example, certain universities "own" certain regions (that's the term I've heard!), and send their students there. Those are mainly the larger/richer universities, so the smaller ones have to make do with studying "sub-cultures" .

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    The community, of course, has its own ways of coping with being studied, and in many cases there are some truly hilarious comparative discussions of the methods, personalities, and assumptions of various researchers... is there a field of study in which those studied study those who study them?
    Yup, although there really isn't a name for it. You might want to talk with the local community and see if they would be interested in publishing a book about it !

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  6. #26
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default Back on topic....

    One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

    I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

    1. Corrupt governance.
    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
    3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
    4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

    1. Corrupt governance

    Governance, at least the forms and functions of it, are not universal. The example Mike quoted from me was set up in a very particular way, specifically that the form and functions of local governance did not meet local idealized expectations or satisficing levels (they're different, but that example was set to not meet either).

    Now a lot of COIN / SFA / FID doctrine is based around an axiomatic assumption that actions taken in the field need to reinforce the "legitimacy" of the HN government. This "legitimacy" was under attack in the example not because of foreign or insurgent actions, but because of the actions of a legally appointed governor.

    Now, I put legitimacy in quotes, because what makes actions legitimate is culture bound (even in the simplistic FM 3-24 definition of culture). Elections, "snout counting" to quote one of my favorite alternate history authors, is one particular form of legitimacy, but only one. It relies on the pre-existence of a number of factors including, but not limited to, literacy (at least amongst those holding the franchise), a "belief in the system", and an economic structure that allows people to have the leisure time to actually think about the issues.

    A lot of these pre-conditions are not generally available in some of the areas where COIN / SFA / FID is taking place. So, in order to solve the "problem", at least the example problem I gave, you have to do two things. First, you have to discover what constitutes "legitimacy" at the lived, cultural level - that's why I gave the answer I gave to question #4 (here). Now, in order to discover what constitutes "legitimacy", you have to get rid of "snout counting" as an axiomatic assumption. It is not always an indicator of legitimacy. In some cases, it may well be an indicator of social theatre operating to "validate" what the actual systems of legitimacy have already decided will happen; think of it as Oberammergau on steroids .

    So, that's point 1. Point 2 is that you have to figure out what is the "legitimate" way of getting rid of or modifying the behaviour of the local governor. And, as a note, you have to do this without assuming "snout counting" and its precursors as the basis for legitimacy - in effect, forget the democratic social thatre known as "mass protests" or "impeachment hearings". The Mosul Case Study had some interesting observations on culturally appropriate and legitimate ways of removing officials (basically, using personal contact networks to show how the offical was a danger to other power brokers). Basically, you have to figure out how the local political power system operates - the real system, not the formality which may have been imposed - and use it.

    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

    The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

    Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

    For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

    If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.

    3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.

    In general, tactics for dealing with this problem are similar to those for dealing with the first problem. The primary area of difference lies in motivation. The first thing to find out is how the individuals view their "office" - how is it connected in a semantic web of meaning, and how is this web reinforced. As a simple example, police forces in many areas of the world assume that bribery is a basic part (perq) of their office. This assumption is built in at the highest level via HR policies on remuneration and other perqs. If this is the case, then the best tactic is to attack the root cause (low/infrequent pay, poor perqs, etc.) while, at the same time, increasing the sense of professional pride. The basic idea is that you make holding the office valuable in a way that is legitimate and acceptable, and then create an organizational / professional culture that is aimed at protecting access to that office.

    If we are dealing with the army officer who is using his office as an inquisitor (aka death squads), then you are back to a political solution along the lines of question #1.

    4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

    I already gave my answer to this, but the general rule is always ask to find out what they perceive is happening and how they would solve it. Find a local solution that meets your requirements, and then "sell it".

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  7. #27
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Another wicked problem...

    Hi Marc,

    For the most part, I agreed with your last comments, specifically on our pre-conditioned values, beliefs, and norms that we all must learn to relax when dealing with a foreign indigenous population. I find myself constantly struggling to remember that normal for me is not normal for others. I will take issue with one and use a current example to try and articulate.

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.

    I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:

    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.

    The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.

    Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.

    For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.

    If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.
    My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.

    Taliban threaten to chop off voters' fingers in Afghan election

    Ben Farmer
    The Guardian

    Insurgents in southern Afghanistan told locals that fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.

    "We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off," a commander warned villagers in the south of the country, the New York Times reported.

    The Taliban ruling council led by Mullah Omar has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.

    The new threat of mutilation appeared to rule out hopes that lower level Taliban leaders would call a temporary ceasefire to allow the vote to proceed without violence.
    To the rational western actor, we would assume that the Taliban would simply allow the people to vote. If the Taliban won, then we would be in a difficult conundrum. Instead, the Taliban is using another measure of coersion to control the populace through fear.

    Just another example of what the boys are dealing with.

    v/r

    Mike

  8. #28
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Mike,

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.
    I agree that it is a nasty situation. Going back to how I was parsing things out for a moment, I would argue that AQI was using the first model - destroying the "traditional structures" via selective assassination and forced grafting by marriage into their remnants. There's a definite tipping point in that type of tactic, as the Anbar Awakening showed, where those groups will revolt against the "insurgent" activities (the principle is called hysteresis). In biological terms (sorry, my head is wrapped up in them right now... ), they are doing a forced mutation by applying stringent selection pressure.

    What I find fascinating about the Taliban threat to cut off fingers is that they are only talking about fingers. I know that probably sounds callous, but in their view, voting is an act of treason and I am surprised that they aren't harsher in their threats.
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  9. #29
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I agree that it is a nasty situation. Going back to how I was parsing things out for a moment, I would argue that AQI was using the first model - destroying the "traditional structures" via selective assassination and forced grafting by marriage into their remnants. There's a definite tipping point in that type of tactic, as the Anbar Awakening showed, where those groups will revolt against the "insurgent" activities (the principle is called hysteresis). In biological terms (sorry, my head is wrapped up in them right now... ), they are doing a forced mutation by applying stringent selection pressure.

    What I find fascinating about the Taliban threat to cut off fingers is that they are only talking about fingers. I know that probably sounds callous, but in their view, voting is an act of treason and I am surprised that they aren't harsher in their threats.
    To add on to this point, I would suggest that those actions "sometimes" lead to a Tipping Point. Other times, the events can lead to what sociologist term anomie, and there is a breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values. One example include when agrarian societies moved into the big cities. Rapid changes in economics, family support structures, and daily life cause a relaxation or a sense of loss to how one used to view the world.

    Getting back to the initial example, what the ground force commander is trying to determine is how and when to intervene. On one hand, he must try to respect the local's governmental structures, societal values, "ways of doing business," etc...On the other hand, sometimes, he has to make a judgement call...i.e. It's not okay to cut off your neighbor's head, hand, or finger.

    It's a fine line, and there are no easy answers. Additionally, it is important to realize in my personal experiences that I shared (and some of the current situations in Afghanistan), US forces are not doing SFA or FID. They are unilaterally occupying using COIN principles as a matter of triage to stop an unacceptable level of violence. Later, we transitioned to FID once we had established security. This point is sometimes overlooked in the scope of the bigger picture.

    v/r

    Mike

  10. #30
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Tactical problems are always hard, regardless of the type of warfare one is engaged in. This is the hard fact of the life of the combat soldier.

    Doubly frustrating is that nagging question that is also always there, regardless of the form of combat, of if your hard efforts and sacrifice have in any way contributed to the ultimate "good" that brought you to this harsh place to begin with. Sadly, far too often, history shows that often effort and lives are squandered on efforts that contribute little to that ultimate success.

    So, as to Mike's questions:

    1. Corrupt governance.
    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
    3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
    4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

    The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.

    I have opinions that I will share on all of these, but figured I'd see what others had to offer first.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  11. #31
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Thumbs up Thank you for saying that

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Tactical problems are always hard, regardless of the type of warfare one is engaged in. This is the hard fact of the life of the combat soldier.

    Doubly frustrating is that nagging question that is also always there, regardless of the form of combat, of if your hard efforts and sacrifice have in any way contributed to the ultimate "good" that brought you to this harsh place to begin with. Sadly, far too often, history shows that often effort and lives are squandered on efforts that contribute little to that ultimate success.

    So, as to Mike's questions:

    1. Corrupt governance.
    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
    3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
    4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.

    The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.

    I have opinions that I will share on all of these, but figured I'd see what others had to offer first.
    It has been a constant frustration to me how often we fail to follow the adage know yourself before trying to know the enemy.

    Put more bluntly can anyone point to any given society ours included within which all of 4 of those don't exist in some form.

    And more importantly how they are addressed differently not only in different nations but even in different cities/towns/etc.

    If we can accept at the reality of their existence and as they exist in a much more familiar form thus the reasons for various approaches will be easier to actually understand; then maybe we can ask the more important questions like why, where, and how to address them somewhere else.

    -Ron
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  12. #32
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Mike,

    I've been thinking about this since you posted it yesterday, but decided to hold off on my response until this morning.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    To add on to this point, I would suggest that those actions "sometimes" lead to a Tipping Point.
    Sorry, i should have explicitly stated that - you're right of course that it is only sometimes.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Other times, the events can lead to what sociologist term anomie, and there is a breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values.
    I've always had problems with anomie as a concept, mainly because it has six major definitions . Still, if we go back to Durkheim's original use of it, that's a valid point. I should point out, however, that, in the case of Afghanistan, that "breakdown in traditional norms, beliefs, and values" is exactly what NATO is pushing for by establishing a centralized system of governance.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    One example include when agrarian societies moved into the big cities. Rapid changes in economics, family support structures, and daily life cause a relaxation or a sense of loss to how one used to view the world.
    Yupper, there's some really good studies of this. As a note, I remember reading a working paper (not online unfortunately) years ago about how this was operating in Nigeria. It seems that the clan system was being exapted in the urban environment into mutual help groups. A structurally similar event took place in the US and, to a lesser degree, in Canada during the 19th century using secret societies (see here for some of it).

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Getting back to the initial example, what the ground force commander is trying to determine is how and when to intervene. On one hand, he must try to respect the local's governmental structures, societal values, "ways of doing business," etc...On the other hand, sometimes, he has to make a judgement call...i.e. It's not okay to cut off your neighbor's head, hand, or finger.
    I would say that, at present, it's an insoluble problem. If it's not okay to cut off heads and hands, then why does the US support the Saudi government that does so? Is it any better, ethically, to put people in cages where they will be gang raped and/or killed?

    Yeah, I'm using emotionally charged language here (), but it's to make a point - cultures have emotional reactions to actions at a very deep, almost sub-conscious level. You have to be aware of your own cultural programming in order to be effective. And that requirement to "know yourself" is even stronger if you want to change the cultural programming of another group of people. When you attack a cultures rituals, you are attacking a cultures values. If you want to get them to change their rituals, i.e. the actions that are culturally programmed to arise of of certain situations/events, then you have to do it fairly slowly and in a manner that doesn't dis the core value.

    Let me give you an interesting example from the Norther Sudan from back in the 1980's. One of the "insurgent" groups operating then decided that FGM was not acceptable. Rather than banning it, they replaced it by arguing that the act of a girl killing a man was the ritual analog of shedding blood for her purity. Know what, it worked.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    It's a fine line, and there are no easy answers. Additionally, it is important to realize in my personal experiences that I shared (and some of the current situations in Afghanistan), US forces are not doing SFA or FID. They are unilaterally occupying using COIN principles as a matter of triage to stop an unacceptable level of violence. Later, we transitioned to FID once we had established security. This point is sometimes overlooked in the scope of the bigger picture.
    I do agree with you that it is an occupation using COIN principles. However, i would also note that it is using constantly changing principles depending on whose AO it is, so it is even worse - COIN by committee!

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  13. #33
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    COL Jones, Ron, and Marc provided some excellent comments that I will try to address from my vantage point.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.
    Population centric COIN is a theory not a law. A serious gap still remains in the transition from clearing and holding to stabilization and reconstruction. Furthermore, in very hostile and complex environments, the required method for military action is typically more Wilf and CvC than Ghandi or Greg Mortensen.

    I used this thread to highlight some of the problems company commanders face on the ground. In most situations, company grade officers do not have the luxury of choosing when, where, and how to fight. They must accomplish the mission given to them; however, these types of inductive case studies may ultimately prove superior to others grand theorizing using extrapolated data sets of metrics on levels of violence, schools built, wells dug, etc...That's why it is important for others to write on the both capabilites and limitations of their operations.

    I think that Bing West's Tactics or Strategy? (an initial spot report to be followed up with a more detailed account I hope) is poignant:

    I came back from my latest month in the field in Afghanistan disquieted about our basic military mission. Is the military mission to engage, push back and dismantle the Talbian networks, with population protection being a tactic to gain tips and local militia, or is the military mission to build a nation by US soldiers protecting the widespread population, with engagements against the Taliban as a byproduct?

    It appears our strategy is nation-building, with fighting and dismantling of the Taliban a secondary consideration. Thus, the number of enemy killed will not be counted, let alone used as a metric. This non-kinetic theory of counterinsurgency has persuaded the liberal community in America to support or at least not to vociferously oppose the war. But we have to maintain a balance between messages that gain domestic support and messages that direct battlefield.
    On really bad days, it seemed like all we were doing was trying to force social re-engineering on a society that was not quite ready for it. On better days, one can see a glimmer of hope as children of different sects, tribes, and religions attend school together.

    Originally by Ron Humphrey: Put more bluntly can anyone point to any given society ours included within which all of 4 of those don't exist in some form.
    I'm from North Carolina. I've spent some significant time studying some of the south's negative history in terms of race equality and relations. Reading back through some of the propaganda used by the KKK in the early twentieth century is hauntingly familiar to what I've observed by extreme Islamist groups in Iraq.

    Originally by MarcT: Yupper, there's some really good studies of this. As a note, I remember reading a working paper (not online unfortunately) years ago about how this was operating in Nigeria. It seems that the clan system was being exapted in the urban environment into mutual help groups. A structurally similar event took place in the US and, to a lesser degree, in Canada during the 19th century using secret societies (see here for some of it).
    I vividly remember the feast of Ramadon 2006. I was having dinner at Sheik Adnon al-Timimi's house, one of the leading ####tes in my area. He had established a refugee camp for about twenty displaced families, and he wanted me to meet them so that I could have a firm grasp on the deteriorating situation in Diyala. Throughout the night, we talked about family, religion, business, and life in general. At one point, he started going on about the "New Generation." It reminded me of the lectures from my Papaw as a child. He was complaining how the new generation was going off to college in the "big" cities of Baqubah and Baghdad, earning degrees in engineering, law, and medicine, and being changed by the western influence.

    "Mike, it's just different now. They no longer respect the way life has always been. Now, everyone wants to be just like you Americans. After all this fighting is done, I'm afraid it will never be the same."

    "Sadi (Sir)," I replied, "Maybe that's not a bad thing.

    He smiled. The society was changing, but it started long before the American invasion. Those changes were not forced by the sword. There may be a learning point in that antecdote.


    v/r

    Mike
    Last edited by MikeF; 08-16-2009 at 04:31 PM. Reason: spelling

  14. #34
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Wicked Problems

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I would say that, at present, it's an insoluble problem.
    Insoluble or possibly unsolvable. That's what makes these types of problems so interesting. Hence, the technical study of wicked problems.

    ""Wicked problem" is a phrase used in social planning to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems."
    I meant to add some on-line resources earlier that better define these problems and potential solutions, but I forgot...Here's a good start point.

    CogNexus Institute

    Dillema in General Theory of Planning

    Knowledge Mapping for Complex Social Messes.


    I don't necessarily subscribe that these problems are unsolvable. Rather, many of these issues simply take time and alternative approaches. Regardless, these are the types of dillemas that young company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders face on a daily basis.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default

    1. Corrupt governance.
    2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
    3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
    4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
    Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

    Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

    The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

    The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

    Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Accepting I risk a howl of "Oh my G@D" has anyone applied a bit of Old Prussian here?

    Of those 4 items, I only see one, where military force can be usefully applied. Item 2.

    The other items are all Policy conditions within which, the military is forced to work. Corruption is both "policy" and "friction." Grievances (Passion) are the same - it may even be the enemies "COG." - Who knows.

    The solution I would be inclined towards, is not how do I solve this, but how do I remain effective (Solving Item 2) with working within the other problems. Work with the Chaos, not against it.

    Maybe I've missed the point, but that's my 10 Shekels worth (you can get a pretty good cup of coffee for that!)
    As I've attempted to sort through the feedback and my own experiences, I consolidated the given scenario into this specific guidance for a young company commander dealing with these types of problems. Focus on the following:

    1. Control the Physical Terrain.
    2. Control the Populace.
    3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.

    With a broad sweep, that is the best that I can provide. I'll step aside (really this time), and allow others to confirm, deny, or add to the template.

    Have I missed something?

    v/r

    Mike

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post

    1. Control the Physical Terrain.
    2. Control the Populace.
    3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.
    I'd actually make it even simpler.

    1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
    2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

    Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default Lines of Operations (LOO)...I couldn't resist

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I'd actually make it even simpler.

    1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
    2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.

    Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.
    Wilf, for the American Army, my suggestions are a bit unconventional...Your views are simply subversive or rebelious.

    The typical view would state that one must maneuver along these lines of operation:

    - Security
    - Essential Services
    - Tribal/Political Leadership engagement
    - Security Force Development/Training

    These views are simply too constrained and ambigious for me.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Default Pop Centric Strategy can be a dangerous idea

    Contrary to my statement above, I believe we have to focus on the populace, because a mobilized populace is a powerful weapon. Thus the softer side of irregular warfare where we focus on providing basic needs, hope for a better tomorrow, education, and an alternative narrative to the enemy among other activities is critically important, and perhaps even decisive over time. I think most of us agree on this point to varying degrees.

    This is why I think Secretary Gate's push for a whole of government approach (team effort) is the basis of enabling the strategy. A promising sign that we're perhaps moving in this direction (ever so slowly) is that the State Department was recently given several million dollars to take lead on the counter propaganda war in Afghanistan. The military role in irregular warfare is not "the strategy", but simply one leg in the total effort, and its role in this soft zone should largely be focused on providing security and logistics to enable the other legs (do gooders) to their work.

    The problem since 9/11 is that the military was implementing the entire strategy by itself. Sort of like putting a football team in the field that only has an offense team. They know the principles of defense, but they're not very good at it. This has forced the military to play positions on the team that they were not prepared for, and now it has become the norm. Of course the danger is we're weakening our offense team by making them play defense. Not until recently have we seen a concerted interagency effort to get into the fight and better enable a holistic strategy, but I suspect we're still a long ways off from getting it right.

    Our senior military and many junior leaders in the field are focused on building schools, improving the economy, and taking a stab at good goverance (good luck on that one), because they know it needs to be done and no one else has been picking up the ball and running with it. Now that the team is "begining" to get flushed out with the appropriate interagency players we may need to reassess what the military should be focused.

    I think Mike F. took a good first stab at it with:

    1. Control the Physical Terrain.
    2. Control the Populace.
    3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.
    At a minimum I would add:

    4. Provide security and logistics support to the do gooders.
    5. Conduct offensive operations against the enemy.
    6. Help build host nation security force capacity.

    I know there are multiple schools of thought on what comes first in the counterinsurgency chicken or the egg argument, but I'm in the school who believes you have to establish security for the populace before you can develop their economy and establish good governance (if a government can't protect its people, then it is a stretch to claim they're providing good governance).

    I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.

    During 2003-2005 in Iraq, as many have stated, we conducted drive by COIN, by executing nightly raids to go after suspected insurgent leaders, and then we turn the populace back over to insurgent control. Since we were only focused on offensive operations, rather than providing security to the populace, this strategy proved ineffective and of course led to resentment of our forces in many cases. It wasn't until the surge (in some locations prior to the surge) that the military adjusted its military strategy and pushed out into the streets to protect the populace which had telling results (however, the results are only temporary without the right team coming in once security is established to start fixing the other problems). Since we had even less forces in Afghanistan (a much larger country), we obviously left a lot of terrain under the control of the enemy. In short, we didn't execute the military portion of the strategy very effectively. The military can't blame the interagency for failure to follow the basics of military strategy of taking and holding physical and human terrain. Instead we pursued some network targeting "theory" that continues to fail us. The network targeting theory would be a great supporting effort to a real clear and hold strategy (which would result in more dead insurgents), but it is no way to win this this fight.

  20. #40
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default I guess I would need at least one example to be convinced of this

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.
    First I must make clear that I am not an advocate for CNAS-brand "Population-centric" engagement that is all about controlling the population and attempting to buy them off by producing "effective" governmental services free from corruption, etc.

    I am an advocate for Jones-brand "Populace-centric" engagement that is all about understanding the needs of the populace and enabling self-determined governance on their terms while focusing on brokering/enabling positive movement between the populace and their existing government to address conditions of "poor governance" (defined as any issue, real or perceived, that is so important to any substantial segment of a populace so as to drive them to subversion or full insurgency; that they also perceive they have no means to address through legitimate channels).

    Poor governance does not require a dictatorship; it merely requires a little bit of governmental arrogance or ignorance mixed with a lack of effective process for a populace to express their discontent. Personally, I think we should focus our effort on enabling good process and communication; but because we have cast these problems as "warfare" we apply military solutions, as WILF wisely points out, the military role is far more about defeating threats and providing security.

    At the end of the day, we have overstated this entire problem to the degree that it appears impossible to address. On the Government/Civil side we have created a "population-centric" problem set that we in no way have the capacity to address; and on the population end have conflated the threats into a massive "they are evil and out to get us" monster that we are lashing out at inappropriately in all directions.

    Less is more definitely applies.

    Remember, the key to good governance is not how well it performs, the key is both how the populace feels about the governance and the degree of certainty they have that they can do something about it short of breaking the law.


    As to the US and how we got mixed up in these little soap operas; is due to our degree of interference in these relationships. What I call "establishing an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government of others." When a populace perceives that a 3rd party is an obstacle to their achieving good governance at home, they will target that third party to attempt to break that obstacle. So, to reduce the threat at attack to the US and our interests is not to target these nationalist movements, but instead to target this perception that we are an obstacle to good governance.

    We chose to make our focus "Defeat AQ"; and may well achieve a tactical success that produces a strategic defeat in the process. Make the focus these perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy instead, and keep our efforts against AQ low-key and IAW the main effort; and we can render AQ irrelevant. If we simply "defeat" them they will be replaced by a smarter and more effective organization that is free from their baggage but primed to run through the hole AQ made for them. That would be a tragedy, simply becasue it is so avoidable.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 08-17-2009 at 01:13 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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