Dominos of Democracy

[Dayuhan]

Everyone seems to have an idea about Iran...

Does anyone have a good idea on what to do in Iran? I hope so, because I don't.

The talk about Saudi Arabia came mainly from neocons outside the administration. Here's Michael Ledeen, in the National Review, Aug 2002:

One can only hope that we turn the region into a cauldron, and faster, please. If ever there were a region that richly deserved being cauldronized, it is the Middle East today. If we wage the war effectively, we will bring down the terror regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and either bring down the Saudi monarchy or force it to abandon its global assembly line to indoctrinate young terrorists.

Of course Ledeen was also one of the guys who thought the INC was a reliable source of information and that we should turn Iraq over to Chalabi...

[MikeF]

Does anyone have a good idea on what to do in Iran? I hope so, because I don't.

Do nothing...They'll sort it out for themselves. That is a lesson that has been hard for us to learn.

In some ways, dealing with Iran is like dealing with a teenage high school prom queen, in her own mind she is above the fray, and she has to figure things out on her own. The Persians are a great society, and they have a proud history. The worst thing we could do would be to tell them how to dress....

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

That's about the conclusion I've reached. I'm not sure that doing nothing while MA and the mullahs go for a nuke is a good idea, but it's probably the best of an unappealing range of alternatives.

[Valin]

That's about the conclusion I've reached. I'm not sure that doing nothing while MA and the mullahs go for a nuke is a good idea, but it's probably the best of an unappealing range of alternatives.

1 IMO (freely given and worth almost that much) there are no good solutions.
2 Doing nothing? Begs the question, will the Israelis go for that, given the statements coming out of Tehran, I doubt the Israelis will sit by and do nothing.
3 From what I understand their nuclear program in very popular with all segments of the country, even those that oppose the mullahs.

[Ken White]

I thought I recalled scanning the left leaning blogs over the past few years and seeing a great deal of froth about Saudi Arabia and Pakistan being ignored as friends of the Bush family while poor Afghanistan was attacked and we went to Iraq for the oil...

Not of any great interest to me then or now so my recall could be off. Blog chatter and pundits don't know or say much of note. Yes, including me

Does anyone have a good idea on what to do in Iran? I hope so, because I don't.

My vote would be to resume diplomatic relations -- or try; that would put them in a put up or shut up position. They want the Persian Empire back but know that's not likely; they want International respect but on their terms because they are the Persian Empire who rule from the Bosporus to Samarkand -- except they don't...

They're conflicted and have delusions of grandeur and the leaders are really rather happy with their own little world, demanding things from the west, tweaking the nose of the great Satan. So my solution is, as it is for North Korea, play the game as we have been doing since 1979 and 1953 respectively. Certainly cheaper than most alternatives.

But then, I'm not a nuke worrier, whether has the the capability or not I believe makes little real difference.

[Valin]

‘The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East’
MESH invites selected authors to offer original first-person statements on their new books—why and how they wrote them, and what impact they hope and expect to achieve. Joshua Muravchik is a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, and a member of MESH. His new is book is The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East.

From Joshua Muravchik

When I would tell people that I was writing a book about Middle Eastern democrats, the reaction was invariably the same: “That will be a short book.” This jibe expressed the common knowledge that the region remains stubbornly autocratic.

The fact that there is precious little democracy in the Middle East does not mean, however, that there are no democrats.
(Snip)

Depressing book in what these people are going up against. Uplifting in that they have the courage to do it.

[MikeF]

They're conflicted and have delusions of grandeur and the leaders are really rather happy with their own little world, demanding things from the west, tweaking the nose of the great Satan. So my solution is, as it is for North Korea, play the game as we have been doing since 1979 and 1953 respectively. Certainly cheaper than most alternatives.

But then, I'm not a nuke worrier, whether has the the capability or not I believe makes little real difference.

Ken, that's what I meant with the prom queen analogy. I think most of our foreign policy matters can be handled with State not DoD...Walk softly and carry a bit stick and all that.

If non-proliferation remains a major national policy consideration, then re-organize a 21st century version of the OSS (not to be stricken by the beauracracies of our current CIA)...

Again, just my two cents...

v/r

Mike

[Dayuhan]

I thought I recalled scanning the left leaning blogs over the past few years and seeing a great deal of froth about Saudi Arabia and Pakistan being ignored as friends of the Bush family while poor Afghanistan was attacked and we went to Iraq for the oil...

I'm sure you did. Froth from the left and froth from the right are in no way mutually exclusive, even on the same issue. Still just froth, of course.

[TT]

jcustis - any answer to your question(s) relating to why the US (or the Bush admin) invaded Iraq is complicated, not least as most if not all of the main Bush admin decision makers almost certainly had several justifications of equal relevance for taking down Iraq. Indeed, no state, no group of policy makers ever (well, maybe on rare occasions somewhere in history) commits to war for one reason. In other words, there no short answer. My view, for what it is worth and which broadly accords with Ken White’s, is as follows as shortly as I can make it given it is well past midnight and my bedtime (and I am out of single malt):

A) The rationale of Iraq becoming nuclear state was more about providing legitimacy for the invasion of Iraq in the eyes of the American public and garnering international legitimacy as well (ie, Husseins violation of UN Sec Council resolutions, so UN support, which provides more internal legitimacy). But some of the principles, probably Rumsfeld and Cheney, believed this the main, or at least a principle, casus belli.

B) The neocons, as well as agreeing with the publicly articulated need to remove a putative threat (which they had wanted to do since 1991!), perceived the source of terrorism was, well, the Middle East itself. 9/11 posed a conundrum: 50 or so years of US policy towards the Middle East resulted in three airliners smashing into buildings on American soil (with a fourth thwarted by the heroic measure of that plane’s passengers) plus 15 of 19 of the hijackers were Saudi’s. So, do you continue with the same policies as before (which is what the Europeans were arguing at the time) or do you do something different? Possibly radically different? We know what the Bush admin decided…..

C) Take this and think about 15 Saudi nationalists as the hijackers. Saudi is a problem. Well, not really ‘the’ problem, The problem as the Bu####es saw it, it seems to me, was the why behind what these 15 did what they did. The Euros at the time argued it was about poverty, lack of education, etc and so on, except the 15 were all at least middle class, looking at a future as professionals with a comfortable life style (you know, 2.3 wives, 3.4 kids, 4.1 cars, etc and so on). So, the answer for the neocons was that these 15 (and the other four) did what they did because they were politically disenfranchised – that is, they were not free, did not live in democracies. The Neo Cons were as, I term them, messianic democrats – a foundation of their view of how to ensure US security was to transform the world into democracies (and yes, seriously long term goal – and imperialistic goals at that). So, to generalize, the source of terrorism in the Mid East for them was (is?) the systems of governance – they are not democratic.

D) So, the solution to terrorism, long term at least, is to transform the governance in the Mid East. For the Neo Cons believed, as Wolfowitz publically argued, that Islam and Arabic culture were not incompatible with democratic governance, contrary to what many argued (including many on the left who made this politically incorrectly argument).

E) There is clearly a central problem in Saudi A, yet US cannot attack and overthrow the House of Saud. Heck, the US cannot really even pressurize it too much, because a) the US receives about 10% of its oil from Saudi [I likely have the percentage wrong, but not far off], and b) you need the House of Saud on side to sustain the King Fahd [sic?] Airbase, a forward US military base. Which the US needs why? To deter Hussein’s propensity for adventurism. Interestingly enough, within 3-4 months of the toppling of Hussein the US had reportedly mothballed the airbase and removed all US personnel (well, I think all). [Hmm, what did Osama demand in his 1996 declaration of war against the US? – right, the removal of all American personnel from the Islamic Holy Land.] Oddly enough, thereafter the House of Saud started to take the threat of AQ more seriously. And yes, in part as AQ elements started to attack the Saudi state, but there is a bit of a chicken and egg question here – which came first, increasing pressure by the House of Saud on supporters of AQ - and likely quietly pressured by the US to do this - with the AQ elements responding with violence (no more safe haven!) or the other way around?

F) It was argued that Iraq had, under Hussein, was the most educated and middle class society, and so was most amenable to democracy (there are hints of Marxism in this assessment!). Plus of course that Chalabi and other external dissidents saying the US would be greeted as liberators (telling the neo cons what they thought was true). And if Iraq becomes democratic it serves an exemplar for the rest of the population that their countries, Islamic and Arabic though they may be, could be democratic too. So, yes, there was as a rational the view (hope) if the US destabilized the Mid East and established a democracy in Iraq, a democratic domino theory would come to pass. Topple, topple, topple…..

To be cont....

[TT]

Onwards....

G) Then add to this that having the US military parked in Baghdad posed a serious threat to Iran and Syria – the US military only had to turn left or right, after the rather compelling demonstration of it capacity to fight and win. Syria and Iran were (and still are) critical supporters of two groups who are constant spoilers of any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. Thusly the US parked in Baghdad could very credibly pressure Iran and Syria to at least temper, if not out and out stop, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas to increase, significantly mayhap, the prospects of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine – which many people, probably erroneously, see as being the cornerstone of any transformation of the Middle East (and to some, the reason for the radicalization of dissidents [aka terrorists] in the ME).

H) And finally, of course, a final point was that such a demonstration of American power (hey, that the US took down a state with essentially three divisions – joint divisions mind – is a powerful demonstration of American power) would serve as a warning to other potentially problematic states that they should behave themselves lest they suffer the same fate (and worth mentioning is that the US military demonstrated that having chem weapons was not a deterrent when they invaded Iraq, undermining many states belief that chems were a poor man’s nuc).

Convoluted? Oh, yes. Could it have worked had the recognized the crux was the post conflict phase? Possibly, but unlikely, as the linkages while having some coherence were (are) way too contingent. Still, to be fair, Iran and Syria both moderated their behaviour in the months after Hussein was toppled (indeed, reportedly Iran stopped its direct drive for nuc wpns in the 6-8 months aftermath – cause and effect here is hard to make, though, as far as I know). And of course Khaddafi gave up his WMD programmes (had chems, had wanted a nuc) in the same period. So, maybe…?

So a short answer, distilled from the above, is that the Bush admin decided that the only way to transform the middle east was to destabilize it, knowing the consequences were uncertain and very certainly bloody, rather than carrying on the US had in the past. Iraq becomes democratic and the dominoe theory kicks in (over many years, mind). Bush frequently said that 50 years from now historians would judge him to have been right…… Or for an alternative short answer, what Ken said.

Which brings us back to A – few Americans, or heck, Brits, Canucks, French, whatever – would buy into B through H as a casus belli, it is way too convoluted even if logically coherent (sort of), but there is no question these publics (particularly the American public) would buy into using force to remove a threat, putative or otherwise, of a hostile state with nucs.

So to your main question, jcustis– what to read? Hard to recommend any one book, as they all have their pet theories. The above is derived from my reading the NYT (and others) at the time, as this was all in those papers if one read beyond the front page (which was all about WMDs). No conspiracy, just not openly articulated US policy. But it was there in the open. In any given book you read, though, you find most of the points I made above. Starting with the Woodward books (first two) is not a bad way to go, but read these with very, very large grain of salt…..

And probably, as the above is one persons view, read the above with a very large grain of salt too......(grin).

[jcustis]

And probably, as the above is one persons view, read the above with a very large grain of salt too......(grin).

Good points nonetheless TT. And remember, the Gaddis interview took place before the invasion.

[MikeF]

Onwards....

G) Then add to this that having the US military parked in Baghdad posed a serious threat to Iran and Syria – the US military only had to turn left or right, after the rather compelling demonstration of it capacity to fight and win. Syria and Iran were (and still are) critical supporters of two groups who are constant spoilers of any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. Thusly the US parked in Baghdad could very credibly pressure Iran and Syria to at least temper, if not out and out stop, their support for Hezbollah and Hamas to increase, significantly mayhap, the prospects of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine – which many people, probably erroneously, see as being the cornerstone of any transformation of the Middle East (and to some, the reason for the radicalization of dissidents [aka terrorists] in the ME).

Exellent points TT. Particularly G. Rereading it, it seems so obvious, but I had never considered it.

Thanks for taking the time to post.

v/r

Mike

[TT]

Jcustis - Gaddis did indeed understand before the invasion the 'democracy domino' theory at play. Not surprising as he is very astute (and always worth reading vice US strategy), plus this goal was, as I mentioned, out there in the public domain. But it was obscured as the Bush administration officially focused on three reasons: WMD, Hussein's links to terrorism, and the [humanitarian] liberation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime. Wolfowitz in an interesting interview with a Vanity Fair reporter (in late May or early June 2003) noted these three reasons, and said that for 'bureaucratic reasons' the admin focused on WMDs (he did not say what these bur reasons were but my guess is that it was the one which would convince the American public to support the invasion). Intriguingly, in the full transcript of the interview, he then starts to discuss a '4th' reason, in which he appears to start to say that the transformation of the Middle East was a goal; however, the interview is ended there and he never finished.

As everyone knows, once it was evident there were no WMDs (or links to terrorists, Mr.Cheney's favourite reason), the Bush administration shifted to arguing that the US goal was to 'Democratize' the Mid East - which made this reason appear to be a post hoc rationalization rather than it being one of many reasons that had always been present in the administration's thinking.

Also, in my typical absent minded way, one book I would highly recommend on that period but I forgot to note, is: Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution, 2003). Not about Iraq per se, but the authors capture well the shift in US foreign/security policy that serves as a framework for some of the thinking vis a vis invading Iraq.

MikeF - Gaddis also understood point G. As Jcustis mentions, Gaddis also recognized the role that preemption played. I focused in G on the impact of the invasion on Iran and Syria but for the US to engage in a preventative attack against Iraq sent a clear signal to any state that the US had the will and conventional military means to deal with anyone it perceived as a potential threat (as long as they did not have nukes), and members of the Bush Admin understood this. As an aside, of sorts, in the aftermath of the invasion Kim Jong-il vanished from public view for a number of months, resulting in speculation that he had gone into hiding fearing that the US would be after him next (that the US would attack N Korea is extremely dubious, as it seems to me the US, no matter which Admin, would be deterred by N Korea's capability to inflict massive human and physical destruction on Seoul by conventional means - there are, IIRC, over 10,000 N Korean artillery tubes able to strike Seoul).