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Thread: Leading scouting/counter-scouting theorists

  1. #41
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Come on, whenever I talk or write about anything that's specialized, you come up with the statement that your standard infantry should be able of doing it anyway. You never gave me the impression that you understood the importance of specialization advantages or the importance and rigidity of mindsets.
    In which case I am failing in my attempt to outline what and more importantly WHY, the infantry should be core arm of land warfare.

    More over it entirely depends what level and type of specialisation we are talking about.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.
    "Close" is a UK term, essentially meaning, "dismounted." Personally, I feel General Infantry should be able to sustain themselves for about 72 hours, but the devil is in the detail. (6 x PRC-148 batteries per set for a start).

    However, the only reason I am not suggesting every infantry platoon should be de-facto SOG-type RT is because the comparison is simplistic. Having said that, the UK's 1937 Infantry training regulations did state that night reconnaissance patrolling was the "gold standard" of infantry work. Words to the effect, that any Platoon/section that can do that well, has little difficulty with anything else.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    In the '80s, I understood close to be inside the arty fan (105s and 4.2s for me). Long range patrolling was outside the arty fan.

    That was an informal light/airborne outlook.

    Battalion scout platoons operated "close." Division LRRP units operated "long." There was no brigade level recon that I can recall.
    Last edited by Rifleman; 08-22-2009 at 07:10 AM.
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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    In the '80s, I understood close to be inside the arty fan (105s and 4.2s for me). Long range patrolling was outside the arty fan.

    That was an informal light/airborne outlook.

    Battalion scout platoons operated "close." Division LRRP units operated "long." There was no brigade level recon that I can recall.
    When did Brigade Reconnaissance Troops come to being?
    Example is better than precept.

  5. #45
    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    When did Brigade Reconnaissance Troops come to being?
    At least in the 2nd BDE 1st Armored Div, 1998-9. (I was the 1-35 AR S2 at the tail end of standing up the BRT.)

    I like Rifleman's definition of 'close'; within organic fire and DS support (check or hold?).

    As to Ken's question about how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
    Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments. Consider one of the key arguments against 7.62mm NATO caliber rifles - "Soldiers rarely engage targets past 400m"... So we'll remove the capability so they cannot engage targets past 400m, and not bother to train them to? Now, this is Cold War surplus doctrine, when badguys wore distinctive clothes and hats, but the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.

    I firmly believe in the most flexible and highest quality tools, and training to get the best advantage out of those tools.

    Sadly, there are too many ORSA bean-counters and political hack accountants that advocate lowering the standards to save money and make the troops fit their models better.

  6. #46
    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Re: "Wider Recce"
    Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.
    Probably so -- and perhaps doesn't bear too much open discussion anyway...
    Yeah, I'm inclined to limit my comments to discussions of Baden-Powell's Aids to Scouting for NCOs and Men and My Adventures as a Spy, although Allen Dulles' The Craft of Intelligence has some good discussion of the general concept.

    P.S. I've got soft copy of Baden-Powell's books, drop me a PM and they'll be on the way.

    V

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    Re: "Wider Recce"
    Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.
    Uhmm, Mr. thread opener thinks he meant this to be about armoured recce.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Several points on the topic...

    Rifleman:

    That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war...

    Prior to that foolishness, the rule of thumb was that close was indeed inside organic and DS fire support range but that was the province of the Companies. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoons (recall they were mounted where Scouts are not) had no close or distance restrictions, it was simply a METT based decision and I've operated 60-70 km out for three to five days at a time on many occasions. We pulled two mounted missions in Viet Nam when I was the acting PL and there were no distance or support limits. The rest of the time, we used Helicopter insertions and those were frequently 50-100 km away from everything.

    The Separate Brigades in VN had LRP Platoons and Cav Troops. What they did depended on th Bde Cdr. That was all general practice in training prior to VN. After VN, we got stupid.

    Van:
    ...how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
    Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments.
    True on both counts. The Commanders are constrained by yet another Viet Nam myth and our newly acquired risk aversion. That needs to go. The current TOEs are a 1990s production designed to save spaces and money; it is not a wartime TOE -- and that tradition of peacetime design has hurt the US Army on many occasions.

    I'd note that the Scouts being dismounted are far more a result of the cost of a HMMWV being ten times the cost of the M151 it replaced than any logical doctrinal or tactical reason...
    ...the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.
    EXACTLY! We continually do this. Criminal.

    Fuchs
    ...thinks he meant this to be about armoured recce
    He may think that but that's not exactly what he said: LINK. No intent to hijack but recce is a broad topic. In US usage, Scouts generally do dismounted stuff, Cavalry does mounted stuff and Reconnaissance or recce is the act that both perform. All that said not to pick on you, but after three 'mad' icons above, I wanted to leave smiling.

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    Default Scout's Out

    (Warning: shameless plug)

    I just started reading Scout's Out, and therefore have not formed an opinion on the content, but the cover photo is SGT Burns, one of the tankers in my company in Tal Afar. For that alone, I presently approve.

    Tankersteve

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Rifleman:

    That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war...
    Part of that grew out of combat experience with the 4th ID in the Central Highlands (although it later spread to other CTZs and sectors), and was really a result of the 4th being asked to cover FAR too much territory. The 4th also gave birth to the short range recon concept (as distinct from LRRP and considered a death sentence by those asked to do the short-range missions) and a number of other ideas that seem to have lingered on well past their shelf-life.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  11. #51
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I'd argue that the 4th ID did not have far too much territory

    but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

    No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.

  12. #52
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

    No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.
    I should have been more accurate. They weren't spread as far as the Americal, but they did operate in terrain that (especially in the early days) they didn't seem to understand, and also had to deal with the presence of large NVA concentrations just across the border (which, again, they seemed to have issues dealing with). My read on their ops in the early days has always been that after a few rough encounters they went over to larger-unit patrols and operations within artillery fans no matter what. That comment of course applies to the units working the Highlands and no so much those down near the coast.

    You're quite correct, I think, in their desire to continue controlling ops as a division as opposed to recognizing the decentralized elements of their environment. There was also the issue of the "brigade swap" between them and the 25th ID down by Saigon. I've never seen much concerning how that might have impacted their operations, although I'd certainly suspect that it wasn't for the better...

    I'm not sure, but it might have been General Peers who came up with the SRP (short range patrol) concept. Don't remember off the top of my head, but it came into use around 1967. Some units did ignore it, while others tried to put it into place.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    One of the SWJ research Links is called... A Horse Soldier Speaks..., here is a paper he wrote in 1981. Just found it so I haven't read it myself but seems have some merit for this thread.



    http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...lename=984.pdf

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    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    However, going and "Finding" the enemy is a very costly business, especially as the enemy is often only detected when they open fire.
    Seriously? In recon terms, this is what we call "Not doing it right."

    Otherwise, I am warming to your ideas vis-a-vis recon.

    Personally, I still pray to the "Find the enemy" God at night for dissolution of MI branch and return of surveillance assets to those who know what they're good for.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    Seriously? In recon terms, this is what we call "Not doing it right."
    Concur, but in the Lebanon in 2006, a great many enemy positions where not detected until soldiers were within some meters of them, despite extensive surveillance and observation. Look at OP Anaconda? A lot of the AQ positions went undetected until they opened fire.

    My point being, many (not all) reconnaissance missions, will entail "advancing to contact." Over watch and surveillance will help, but you might as well not lead with your chin!

    Not one size of Reconnaissance fits all, which is why I get little concerned when it becomes an equipment and formation specific role.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  16. #56
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default That's why....

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Concur, but in the Lebanon in 2006, a great many enemy positions where not detected until soldiers were within some meters of them, despite extensive surveillance and observation. Look at OP Anaconda? A lot of the AQ positions went undetected until they opened fire.

    My point being, many (not all) reconnaissance missions, will entail "advancing to contact." Over watch and surveillance will help, but you might as well not lead with your chin!

    Not one size of Reconnaissance fits all, which is why I get little concerned when it becomes an equipment and formation specific role.

    God created tanks.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    God created tanks.
    Amen Brother Mike. Might as well take a big gun to a gun fight.
    In a tank or on foot, I the see the "Advance to Contact," as the bread and butter or ground based reconnaissance. That does not mean charging ahead regardless. It means good use of ground, and moving at a rate that does not prejudice your safety or the mission.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Does anybody know/have files about the French armoured recce?
    I understand that they have a rather unique idea of armoured recce, as they're the strongest proponents of 90-105mm armed 6wd recce vehicles in NATO (and possibly world-wide).

  19. #59
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    This is the kind of stuff and quality I am (still) looking for:
    Trading the saber for stealth

    Mod's Note: link is broken.

    The main disadvantage of this study is that it's very U.S.-specific, mostly about (predictable) disillusionment.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-28-2010 at 01:06 PM. Reason: Mod's Note

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    Default Fuchs, try a PM to ....

    this char-jockey - RICM avec 10RCs.

    Bonne chance.

    Mike

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