Leading scouting/counter-scouting theorists

[Ken White]

Rifleman:

That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war...

Prior to that foolishness, the rule of thumb was that close was indeed inside organic and DS fire support range but that was the province of the Companies. The Battalion Reconnaissance Platoons (recall they were mounted where Scouts are not) had no close or distance restrictions, it was simply a METT based decision and I've operated 60-70 km out for three to five days at a time on many occasions. We pulled two mounted missions in Viet Nam when I was the acting PL and there were no distance or support limits. The rest of the time, we used Helicopter insertions and those were frequently 50-100 km away from everything.

The Separate Brigades in VN had LRP Platoons and Cav Troops. What they did depended on th Bde Cdr. That was all general practice in training prior to VN. After VN, we got stupid.

Van:

...how many U.S. COs would use scouts outside of logisitical support range for any length of time;
Probably 'not many'. But having the capability for those special occasions, and maintaining the standards would be worth the training and logistical investments.

True on both counts. The Commanders are constrained by yet another Viet Nam myth and our newly acquired risk aversion. That needs to go. The current TOEs are a 1990s production designed to save spaces and money; it is not a wartime TOE -- and that tradition of peacetime design has hurt the US Army on many occasions.

I'd note that the Scouts being dismounted are far more a result of the cost of a HMMWV being ten times the cost of the M151 it replaced than any logical doctrinal or tactical reason...

...the principle is whether you choose to 'dumb down' your soldiers or provide them the training and tools to exceed your expectations.

EXACTLY! We continually do this. Criminal.

Fuchs

...thinks he meant this to be about armoured recce

He may think that but that's not exactly what he said: LINK. No intent to hijack but recce is a broad topic. In US usage, Scouts generally do dismounted stuff, Cavalry does mounted stuff and Reconnaissance or recce is the act that both perform. All that said not to pick on you, but after three 'mad' icons above, I wanted to leave smiling.

[Steve Blair]

Rifleman:

That Close and LRRP definition was one of many BAD results of Viet Nam where one of the more ridiculous SOPs became that no US troops could operate outside US Artillery support fans. Both Brigades I was in ignored the rule totally at the times I was there; most obeyed it. We picked up a lot of really bad habits in that war...

Part of that grew out of combat experience with the 4th ID in the Central Highlands (although it later spread to other CTZs and sectors), and was really a result of the 4th being asked to cover FAR too much territory. The 4th also gave birth to the short range recon concept (as distinct from LRRP and considered a death sentence by those asked to do the short-range missions) and a number of other ideas that seem to have lingered on well past their shelf-life.

[Ken White]

but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.

[Steve Blair]

but that it had in the words of of a 1/101 Bn Cdr "Some of the nicest incompetents you'd ever meet..." On two occasions when they first came in country, I had to break up fire fights between 1-22 Inf units. That was one of the better things I saw of the Bde that was on the coast. The Div was dispersed, a Bde and Div Hq in the Highlands, one Bde on the coast and another IIRC down south in Tay Ninh; thus not so much an area but initially trying to operate as a Div when the Bdes should have been seen as the independent units they actually were...

No matter, I think you're correct on them being the originators of the idea. It did not exist in '66 but was firmly in place when I got back in '68 though 3/82 just ignored it as unworkable while I was there, may have changed later.

I should have been more accurate. They weren't spread as far as the Americal, but they did operate in terrain that (especially in the early days) they didn't seem to understand, and also had to deal with the presence of large NVA concentrations just across the border (which, again, they seemed to have issues dealing with). My read on their ops in the early days has always been that after a few rough encounters they went over to larger-unit patrols and operations within artillery fans no matter what. That comment of course applies to the units working the Highlands and no so much those down near the coast.

You're quite correct, I think, in their desire to continue controlling ops as a division as opposed to recognizing the decentralized elements of their environment. There was also the issue of the "brigade swap" between them and the 25th ID down by Saigon. I've never seen much concerning how that might have impacted their operations, although I'd certainly suspect that it wasn't for the better...

I'm not sure, but it might have been General Peers who came up with the SRP (short range patrol) concept. Don't remember off the top of my head, but it came into use around 1967. Some units did ignore it, while others tried to put it into place.

[slapout9]

One of the SWJ research Links is called... A Horse Soldier Speaks..., here is a paper he wrote in 1981. Just found it so I haven't read it myself but seems have some merit for this thread.



http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...lename=984.pdf