This story comes from the Washington Post today and was also listed in the SWJ news roundup today: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...081602304.html

Summary: Concerns by Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen about General McKiernan's ability to deliver the results they needed in Afghanistan led to his replacement. This article tells the story of the events preceding his removal, as told by those who had direct knowledge of the events described in the article.

I first learned of McKiernan from the Pentagon briefings he gave from Iraq in Fall 2006. Most of the content, as I recall, was about the tenuous stability in Diyala Province and the numbers from EOD operations and raids.

This article highlights something that is probably obvious to many in the defense community but is only vaguely understood (if at all) by those outside it.

"Blame General Petraeus," a senior Defense Department official said. "He redefined during his tour in Iraq what it means to be a commanding general. He broke the mold. The traditional responsibilities were not enough anymore. You had to be adroit at international politics. You had to be a skilled diplomat. You had to be savvy with the press, and you had to be a really sophisticated leader of a large organization. When you judge McKiernan by Petraeus's standards, he looked old-school by comparison."
(Page 2)

And he [McKiernan] acknowledged that he should have "done a better job of feeding the beast in Washington," even though he believed that "an operational commander needs to spend the vast majority of his energy and time and efforts focused inside the theater of operations and not on trips to Washington."
(Page 5)

The above excerpts from the article struck me as the real weakness of McKiernan that led to his removal. I was immediately reminded of the issues Patton had during his campaigns in North Africa and Europe. Anymore, a general must be a technically and tactically proficient warfighter, statesman, AND advocate for his operational choices in Washington. The amount of work involved there seems overwhelming, even with a headquarters staff...

My question is this: do the command and staff colleges instruct officers on how to deal with "feeding the beast in Washington," or do they have to learn it on the job? Are the frequency of meetings between top commanders and Washington (e.g. Congress and the President) a phenomenon of the Afghan and Iraq wars or something that has existed for several decades? Has a new precedent been set by the current wars for a closer relationship between top commanders and Washington? Will Congress and the President expect a closer relationship in the future?