Good observation.
FM 3-24 says (I-155) that 'if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week, if it works in this province, it might not work in the next'. I think US COIN warfighting doctrine does, to a degree, recognise this.
On the other hand, I agree that a lot of effort is heaped in creating concepts fit for the worse areas, which threatens overreacting and overdoing it where conflict is in a different stage (btw, I don't necessarily agree that reduced resistance and stronger local government actually means less effort is required or that the area is any less 'high intensity' - I think it's more about the how and much less about the how much).
I see the way to this in developing COIN, including the whole spectrum of COIN - i.e. not just 'grunt stuff' but the later stages -, as an organic doctrine that goes down to the individual boot on the ground. Subsidiarity would allow regional and subregional commanders to determine what the appropriate level and form of action is. It would require the big leap of faith to assume that regional and subregional commanders could, and would, get it right. In exchange, it would be a more sensitive approach to COIN.
Again, good point & good observation.
Bookmarks