Army Doctrine Reengineering and the Loss of Any Historical Perspective

[Klugzilla]

Amen. The doctrine efforts are ongoing, but we hope the ATTP will be the useful tool that many in this thread advocate. As someone who was tangentially involved in the writing of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, acts as the current custodian of FM 3-24, and who had a hand in FM 3-24.2, I agree. FM 3-24 is essentially an operational/higher tactical manual, although some of its material is of course widely applicable. FM 3-24.2 did not build from the bottom up and link to FM 3-24 as it was supposed to; it linked to FM 3-24 and built down, but it did not go far enough in my opinion.

[William F. Owen]

Doctrine is what is taught. In that respect the FMs are WHY something needs to be done and the some explicit guidance as to how.
IMO, the "manual" should form the reference work from which the teaching is done and not aim to teach something in and of itself. You cannot throw "Infantry Platoon Tactics" at a 2nd LT and then assume he is good to go.

The biggest problem I have with the current US FM's is the poor history, and some of the worst writing the English Language has ever been subject to, in terms of wordy, complex, high-falutting gobbledegook.
Clarity of writing IS clarity of thought. - anyone with any doubts, look at the drivel that gets written about Operational Design.

[Klugzilla]

Doctrine is a body of thought, so it certainly can be what is taught. Doctrine consists of fundamentals, TTP, terms, and symbols. TTP provide explicit guidance as to the "how," so it depends on the manual's scope and purpose on how explicit you get. You absolutely right in that you don't throw Infantry Platoon Tactics at 2LT and assume he is good to go. While there is a reason D comes first in DOTMLPF, the other pieces are obviously vital.

What manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors.

The writers of FM 5-0 are wrestling with a difficult problem in crafting design doctrine for the whole Army. It is challenging as there are several views on design, it's a new concept for doctrine, and it's complex.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

Klugzilla asked "what manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors."

Answer: Notably absent from recent draft field manuals written by authors at CADD are quotes from key leaders past and present and historical vignettes or other historical reference to illustrate the application of a doctrinal principle. Examples include the initial draft of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 24 July 2009 (shortened to 209 pages); the revised final draft of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, 5 June 2009(shortened to 268 pages) and the DRAG draft of FM 3-92, Corps Operations, 7 August 2009 (shortened to 145 pages). They are short, but lack historical perspective. This worries me.

[Klugzilla]

While I think your point is a valid one, I believe the stripping of vignettes and other historical material is part of the effort to reduce the size of manuals. I will ask the authors. What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

I've made my point, so I suggest some of the other participants that may be more widely read than I weigh in to try help answer your question about poorly written history.

[William F. Owen]

What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

2-46. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare among and within the people. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power.
Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. The effective application of military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert
their influence. Secondly, irregular warfare also differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach.

FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.

[Klugzilla]

I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another. Any history is interpretation based on fact. Yours differs from DOD policy, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine, as FM 3-0 is built to be consistent with DOD policy and joint doctrine. If you want to attack the way irregular warfare is treated, you'll have to start at the top. Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.