Army Doctrine Reengineering and the Loss of Any Historical Perspective

[William F. Owen]

Doctrine is what is taught. In that respect the FMs are WHY something needs to be done and the some explicit guidance as to how.
IMO, the "manual" should form the reference work from which the teaching is done and not aim to teach something in and of itself. You cannot throw "Infantry Platoon Tactics" at a 2nd LT and then assume he is good to go.

The biggest problem I have with the current US FM's is the poor history, and some of the worst writing the English Language has ever been subject to, in terms of wordy, complex, high-falutting gobbledegook.
Clarity of writing IS clarity of thought. - anyone with any doubts, look at the drivel that gets written about Operational Design.

[Klugzilla]

Doctrine is a body of thought, so it certainly can be what is taught. Doctrine consists of fundamentals, TTP, terms, and symbols. TTP provide explicit guidance as to the "how," so it depends on the manual's scope and purpose on how explicit you get. You absolutely right in that you don't throw Infantry Platoon Tactics at 2LT and assume he is good to go. While there is a reason D comes first in DOTMLPF, the other pieces are obviously vital.

What manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors.

The writers of FM 5-0 are wrestling with a difficult problem in crafting design doctrine for the whole Army. It is challenging as there are several views on design, it's a new concept for doctrine, and it's complex.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

Klugzilla asked "what manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors."

Answer: Notably absent from recent draft field manuals written by authors at CADD are quotes from key leaders past and present and historical vignettes or other historical reference to illustrate the application of a doctrinal principle. Examples include the initial draft of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 24 July 2009 (shortened to 209 pages); the revised final draft of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, 5 June 2009(shortened to 268 pages) and the DRAG draft of FM 3-92, Corps Operations, 7 August 2009 (shortened to 145 pages). They are short, but lack historical perspective. This worries me.

[Klugzilla]

While I think your point is a valid one, I believe the stripping of vignettes and other historical material is part of the effort to reduce the size of manuals. I will ask the authors. What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

I've made my point, so I suggest some of the other participants that may be more widely read than I weigh in to try help answer your question about poorly written history.

[William F. Owen]

What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

2-46. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare among and within the people. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power.
Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. The effective application of military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert
their influence. Secondly, irregular warfare also differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach.

FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

[Ursus horribilis toklat]

In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.

[Bob's World]

While I realize that "write doctrine" is arguably the principle task of the Regular force in peace; we need to ask who has the principle task of "read and employ doctrine," and tailor the doctrinal products to that audiance.

Mostly doctrine is for students and higher level staffs. While, as Ken points out, the bulk of the force is at BN and below; I doubt highly that that is the bulk of the doctrine audance.

What the guys and gals at that level need are usable products that convert doctrine to the environment that they will be expected to operate in. Pocket guides that help Platoon leaders and Squad leaders gain effectiveness through the experiences of others.

Could we use less doctrine? Undoubtedly.

Should we attempt to achieve this by stripping the life out of what is already dry reading to begin with, in some effort to make one size fit all? I think that would be a disaster.

Remember, the historic strength of the American warfighting force has always been that the warfighter himself was a draftee or volunteer brought on specifically to fight the war, and who had probably never been within 10 paces of a doctrinal manual. The regulars up at Division had those books and had taught them at places like Benning and Leavenworth. Doctrine shapes the operational construct, but it does not guide the fight.

[slapout9]

Here is an example of what I was talking about. The Combat Leaders Field Guide....comes in big size and pocket size. As a PDF file you can print what you need or all of it, you add or delete as needed.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/clg.pdf

[Klugzilla]

In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.

As I mentioned before, I too hate to see this happening; however, the actual appearance of quotes, vignettes, etc. does not necessarily mean that history does not underpin doctrine. That train has left the station.

Also, we have yet to settle on a format for the ATTP, which is where vignettes may have the most impact. I think this ties into the Bob's World post.

[Klugzilla]

I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another. Any history is interpretation based on fact. Yours differs from DOD policy, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine, as FM 3-0 is built to be consistent with DOD policy and joint doctrine. If you want to attack the way irregular warfare is treated, you'll have to start at the top. Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.

[William F. Owen]

While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another.

I'm not sure I am. I don't view Military history as a buffet bar to be raided selectively in support of doctrine. If it is, then that forgives all the stupidity you see in armies today! Military history does layout clear lessons, and the context of those lessons is critical. The US IW definition is not founded in any historical fact. It is a definition used to support doctrine, when it should be the opposite.

Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.

An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.
That the JOC rejected it, is not evidence that we should. The JOC came up with "hybrid," which is a clumsy forcing mechanisms to try and short cut real military education.