In illo tempore...

[SWJED]

In illo tempore...

Marc Tyrrell

There is a curious quality that overcomes the mind during a visit to sacred space. Today, I rode along on the staff ride at Gettysburg and saw that quality of mind slowly come into being as we moved from site to site on the battlefield. The manifestation that arose was not one of what lessons can we learn from the battle and campaign but, rather, one of what questions should we ask.

As you might have gathered, Robert and I rode in different buses even while we both took part in the same staff ride. Or did we? After the ride was over, we got the chance to talk to each other about how each of our rides operated and, as it turns out, there were some differences.

The biggest difference between our two rides lay in the tactics of how people were encouraged to interact, both with each other and with the past. In place of people having been tasked with short presentations, we were encouraged to ask questions, make comments and, in general, bring out free associations between the past, the present and the future.

I cannot say whether this difference came about as a result of differing pedagogical styles or just emerged from the group interaction. What I can say, however, is that I had an opportunity to both witness and take part in an event that I can only describe as a “ritual”. Over the course of the day, I could see people bringing the past into the present until, by the end of the ride, past and present seemed to co-mingle. It was fitting that the end of the ride was signalled by thunder, lightning and a line squall.

I describe the event as a “ritual” in a very technical sense. Fifty years ago, Mircea Eliade talked about the power of origin myths – how by re-enacting the origin myth, the participants in these rituals would touch both a “sacred time” and a source of power that could re-invigorate them. I saw some of that process operating today.

At the start of his post, Robert asked

Why would the Army waste the time of the senior leaders of its training and doctrine command with a guided tour of a 19th century battlefield? What does Gettysburg have to do with Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other conflicts the Army is likely to face?

Certainly for the ride I was on, the answer is still “Quite a lot”, but it went beyond historical analogies and lessons into something much more subtle and intangible. It set the stage for these senior leaders to reconnect with one of the key events that defines the modern United States. It was truly a case of “In that time...”.

And before someone comments that I am being overly poetic, let me note that we were primed for this by a quote that served to introduce the ride and, for our bus at least, served to close it.

In great deeds something abides. On great fields something stays. Forms change and pass; bodies disappear; but spirits linger, to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls. And reverent men and women from afar, and generations that know us not and that we know not of, heart-drawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them, shall come to this deathless field, to ponder and dream; and lo! the shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them in its bosom, and the power of the vision pass into their souls.

Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, October 3rd, 1889

[Bill Jakola]

Then as now, the simplistic views and categorizations we (humans) tend to apply to most all things, to more rapidly wade through the vast amount of information associated with everything around us, significantly limits our ability to see the world the way it actually exists.

The truly superb Army War College(AWC) historians, who conducted this staff ride, allowed me to see far more of the richness and complexity of this battle.

Today, we want to develop our leaders with the skills, similar to those of the AWC historians, for seeing the world in its totality; for only in this way will we be able to rapidly transition along the full spectrum of operations to apply the requisite tactical solutions that support our operational and strategic goals. The danger of simplifying reality to ease our ability to manage war risks executing a tactically prudent course of action at the expense of strategic success.

For example, on 01 July, 1863, “Confederate General James Longstreet argues that Lee should move east between the Union Army and Washington and build a defensive position. Lee overrules him. "No," he said. "The enemy is there, and I'm going to attack him there.... They are there in position, and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip me. " Longstreet had a tactically prudent course of action; but, Lee understood that this otherwise useful tactic would lead to almost certain strategic failure. Because the North had a larger population and economy, the South needed to obtain a negotiated settlement to survive. Thus, Lee knew his strategic goal was to reduce the Northern popular will for support of the war to gain a negotiated peace. Additionally, the only way to achieve this was to utterly destroy the Army of the Potomac; and, Longstreet’s tactic would not accomplish this strategic imperative.

[John T. Fishel]

historian, but one who has studied Gettysburg for nigh on to 60 years (am I really that old?), I have to disagree with your assessment of Lee's strategy - and Lee as a strategist. Indeed, I am inclined to think that while there was no way the1863 invasion of the North could have succeeded in forcing a negotiated peace, IMHO Longstreet's proposal came closest. The Longstreet campaign plan had the possibility of tactical success; I don't think giving battle at Gettysburg as Lee did really had such a possibility. I am also inclined to think that even with Stonewall Jackson, Lee would have failed. The Union had tactical commanders who were as good - or even better than the Confederates. In Meade, they had an operational commander who was certainly up to the job. Meade had the advantage of terrain, of intelligence, of numbers, and of fighting on home ground. He also had tactical interior lines.
Over time. I have come to the conclusion that Lee was a good and inspiring tactial commander, perhaps even a good operational commander, but IMO no strategist. In many of his successes, Lee was an opportunistic gambler who got lucky. In the Gettysburg campaign Lee's luck ran out, in part because his "strategy" was flawed.
Well, I guess that will provoke a reaction from any "old unreconstructeds" and partisans of Marse Robert. Still, the point of the staff ride in this context was not so much to debate the historical example but to get folk to think about the kinds of problems that might be useful in present circumstances. You raise those questions. Is there an analogy between Lee's Gettysburg campaign and the Marine incursion into Helmand today? If so, is Lee's solution more apropos than Longstreet's or vice versa? (All with the caveat that - as Neustadt & May argue - analogies of all kinds are suspect and must be used with great care).

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Hi John,

Still, the point of the staff ride in this context was not so much to debate the historical example but to get folk to think about the kinds of problems that might be useful in present circumstances.

In all honesty, I'm still processing the staff ride experience in my hindbrain at the moment. Still and all, I suspect that while what you said was the stated reason for the ride, and it's justification, that it is not the underlying reason behind it.

The more I process the experience, the more convinced I am that the underlying reason was to pull people out of their current time and "selves" (social roles). Yeah, I know, I've spent too much time studying mysticism, but let's look at it in terms of effects (snort... I think I just created a new acronym for the military lexicon Effects Based Mysticism or EBM ).

Okay, 'nuff silliness. There is a serious organizational issue that GEN Dempsey faces that has two main, internal faces. The first is the hierarchical nature of the organization with it's concomitant restrictions on expressions of thought (see here for a good commentary by Bob King). The second is the bureaucratic imperative to map out and "understand" reality (see here for some of my comments on this in the IO context). When we add in the minor point that CYA appears to be a human universal that is accelerated and rewarded in such a system, we have some real problems.

One way to deal with this is to use another piece of human nature, our ability to "act as if" something were true. Actually, we do this all the time in organizational contexts as well as in daily life, but it can also be a mental "tactic" that allows us invert certain assumptions of our current belief / perception structures. Now the crucial part is not that we can act as if something else is true, but that we can become consciously aware that our beliefs are a form of acting as it they were true. This lets us stand back from them and opens our thought processes up to let us look at our current problems in a new light.

Enough philosophy.... Let me just also note that we can get the same effect on perceptions (i.e. that type of a shift) by using humour - a point well know to GEN Dempsey.

If I had to put its purpose into a sound byte, I would say that it is to use the past to free use from the present.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

Still, the point of the staff ride in this context was not so much to debate the historical example but to get folk to think about the kinds of problems that might be useful in present circumstances.

I agree. That is exactly what staff rides should aim at.

Problem is that the "new war brigade," keep telling us that "modern conflict" is so far more complex than in the past, thus the past holds limited lessons.

If your whole agenda is to denigrate traditional military force, and promote "something new" then Military history is a very uncomfortable body of evidence, and probably best avoided.

[marct]

Problem is that the "new war brigade," keep telling us that "modern conflict" is so far more complex than in the past, thus the past holds limited lessons.

If your whole agenda is to denigrate traditional military force, and promote "something new" then Military history is a very uncomfortable body of evidence, and probably best avoided.

Beautifully said, Wilf!!!! Have you been watching this ?

[Ron Humphrey]

Have however stayed in a few Holiday Inn's and whenever I do in a place where there are historic sites I always make the trip.

Like much of what you mention I also felt doing so helped me to "step" outside of the current wars thinking long enough to gain some perspective.

Went to FT Fisher NC a while back and it was really an eye opener when you considered that 4000 + died in the effort to close and or hold that place. In Strategic context for the north it was a must in order to close off a major port of the south . And it took a whole lot to do so. Naval bombardments, Troop ground movements under heavy fire, siege tactics and ambushes, pasage of lines, you name it. It really helped me to accept how very complex war is(in any given time).

Wilf, do they really say that war is more complex now or is the message and point rather that those complexities must be understood and dealt by lower ranks then ever and under much faster shifting of circumstances?

[Bill Jakola]

“I have to disagree with your assessment of Lee's strategy - and Lee as a strategist.”

John T. Fishel,

I agree we can view history in different ways, but our individual conclusions are not important for the lessons of this staff ride; because as you point out, “the point of the staff ride…[was] to get folk to think about the kinds of problems that might be useful in present circumstances.”

My deeper point is the need to acquire and instill the skills of these AWC historians into ourselves and more importantly into our junior leaders. The AWC historians possess an ability to view life (history) in great richness and detail. I understand that war today is no more complex than during other times; but our ability to perceive this complexity changes depending on many factors including who we are—education, training, and experience—but also how much we are willing to work at achieving a view that more closely approximates reality.

Therefore to develop more capable leaders it seems necessary to replicate in our training the complexity of actual operations. For me, this Gettysburg experience did exactly that. I have spent time here before, but never have I encountered this history in such vivid detail.

Major Bill Jakola