Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[Ken White]

Thanks Fuchs, you made the points a bit clearer and more concise than I managed.

Yes, he did. In fact, he went where I was trying to get -- which is away from the sniper myth and into reality. Good job, Fuchs.

Sure, but there could still be something that we might call ‘bandit country’.

Yep -- and that's a very different thing than 'behind enemy lines.' Neutral ground may have good guys or bad guys in varying amounts and decently trained troops can operate there in small numbers with a little stealth or in large numbers without it. Behind enemy lines implies that the Enemy occupies the territory in numbers enough that you are not there -- it's a question of opponent density.

Does that mean that riflemen have the wrong mentality for the find function? If that’s so than we may want quite a few recon platoons to a battalion.

Yes and no. Depends on a lot of things like age, maturity (those two are not the same thing), experience, physical condition and other things. The basic problem is that if you have offensively oriented folks (snipers, DM, average rifleman) they do not comfortably ignore small batches of opponents and they do not have the training (nor should they) to classify a bridge, collect soil samples, determine load bearing surface capability, determine locations for river crossings or drop zones, and they are not specifically trained to observe and report. They can do a Recon patrol to find enemy formations or positions, provide local security or to select movement routes but the detailed stuff requires more than most infantrymen will be able to provide. It does take a different guy to lay still in a hide and let bad guys step on his hand.

And that would be the crucial question. Part of that equation would be, what might it potentially ‘cost’ the battalion if snipers were not fulfilling those tasks, even if they are only marginally effective. And I certainly cannot answer that.

Old METT-TC again but having operated as one -- plus later in units in combat with and without snipers -- I'd say most Bns most of the time can get by without them but if present they provide a capability that can enhance that Bns combat power slightly in some types of warfare and significantly in stability ops.

I carried a Scoped '03 during part of the moving war in Korea, I got some good shots and know others that did also -- but we admitted we did little real damage and had no significant effect. OTOH, a couple of years later when it was a static war of trenches and outposts, snipers had a ball and countersniping was in and some did some good stuff.

Snipers in Viet Nam did some legendary stuff, Carlos Hathcock for example -- but they didn't really have much effect on the war. The biggest complaint I've heard from Desert Storm snipers is that they didn't get to fire a shot.

Yet, today in both Afghanistan and Iraq, snipers have been extremely effective. Far more so than most realize or makes the news. So; lot of variables and the key, I think, is that in stability ops or a static warfare situation, they're generally more valuable than in mobile warfare.

All that said, the skill is important and needs to be maintained because in some situations, it is extremely valuable.

. I’m really just trying to get to the bottom of this ‘myth’ and to understand it better.

Aren't we all...

Where to put them? Rifleman has a point with a Bn cell -- that occurs because it simply makes the training easier to manage in garrison -- and because if you put them in the Co (where in both our current theaters, they really should be) you have the human factor problem of disinterested or lazy NCOs or Officers that will interfere with the training and / or the employment. Bde's probably too high; Bn and Co are about right but the factors mentioned mitigate for a Bn cell. Right now in the US Army they're in the Bn Scout Platoon, I don't think they should be but the US army is reluctant to do what the Commonwealth Armies do and trust things like that to a WO or NCO.

So, who we gonna call…….myth busters!

True dat. Myths abound about all things but the snipers, parachutists and SF have some real whoppers. Been all those and learned believing the myths can get you killed and / or embarrassed...

[William F. Owen]

True dat. Myths abound about all things but the snipers, parachutists and SF have some real whoppers. Been all those and learned believing the myths can get you killed and / or embarrassed...

...and worrying, when it appears that most "sniper history" and thus "sniper doctrine" is built on myths and very little evidence to support how and why.

My point: Very good shots, with very good rifles are an essential infantry capability (75% still air hits on a 1 x 0.5m tgt at 800m?). That does not necessarily describe, or justify the "snipers" of popular imagination.

[kaur]

Ken's argument:

Not a frontage issue in all cases but it can be -- it is a depth issue in the sense that the Rifle Co Recon (Combat patrols are a separate animal and they belong to the Cos and not to the Scout sect) Patrols should normally go out no more than 10-15 km, max, generally less -- and METT-TC dependent -- so they run about 4 hours out and 4 back, max (with 4-6 total being better and with no overnight stays) the Scout Sec, OTOH should be prepared for three to five day patrols in bad guy territory or up to about 30 km out. Not everyone grooves on that-- or can do it. Div Recon should be used for the stuff from 30-100km out while Force Recon can do the strategic stuff beyond 100km.

plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin

kiwigrunt cited Spence's book missions:

To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens *
Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
Area denial /covering terrain *
Blocking positions *
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)

Fuchs added his definition:

Meant to work in teams of two or three, usually separated from infantry (except movement to and from missions). Relies more on concealment and camouflage, less on cover or body armour for survivability than DM.
Extreme single shot long-range capability (training+hardware) and long-range observation capability (spotting scope). Low mobility, but extraordinary patience and endurance.

I agree with Ken White that snipers (DM's) can't accomplish those missions alone. They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business

If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.
If squad DM is trained in a week to hit human targets in 500m distance with 5,56x45 ammo (without spotter, without LRF), I think this is really possible that the same soldier can hit targets with .338 in 800m (or even further) distance. If USA Army will find themselves new assault rifle via competition, maybe they should add that contenders (Colt, FN, HK etc) should add semi-auto .338 to their family of weapons. Armalite already has http://www.armalite.com/ItemForm.asp...0-49488ec48776
If .338 is chosen, who get's those M110 rifles? Another question is on what level this DM should be located. Platoon level, like Wilf has proposed?

Just one comment to Ken White's post:

That crew is the squad so that's where he or she should be. The training issue in garrison is easily solved by scheduling the DM sustainment training so that they all get together under the senior Co (or Bn) DM / Sniper. In my view, you'd have two Sniper * tms at Co, a DM in every squad and the senior Sniper becomes the Co DM trainer. if there's also a Bn Sniper Tm or section, the leader becomes the Bn Master Shooter and oversees training.

Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word

http://www.scribd.com/doc/18522946/S...nated-Marksmen

[William F. Owen]

If you give to soldier who is trained according to Wilf's doctrine semi-auto .338 rifle, then most of the missions should be accomplised.

I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do!

My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.

[jcustis]

All that said, the skill is important and needs to be maintained because in some situations, it is extremely valuable.

Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems.

[reed11b]

I suppose I had better put some meat on these bones, before others do!

My "Long Range Rifleman" works in the Platoon as part of the fire support effort. His mission is to deliver precision fires out to X-range (800m).
I envisage him using an 8.59mm Lapua, bolt action rifle with an scope for daylight and TI or II for night-time (300m?).

The 2 week unit-level training course is aimed at getting him to hit a target, by correctly judging distance and environmental conditions, so that he can gain a first round hit on a man-sized target, under operational conditions.

Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
Reed

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I agree that a "sniper" (or whatever the heck else you want to call him) does provide neccessary fire support (espicially against enemy csw), but the scout and information aspect is certainly there. You are the one that helped me verbilize my thoughts that rifle optics are valuable more as a "sensor" then as a firepower multiplier, why would the same not be true for your LRM or a sniper?
Reed

Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.

[Fuchs]

I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task.

I always thought it's common sense that all combat (sub-)units (down to squad Ldr and his 2nd) that move independently (at minimum platoon) should be able to call for fires.

The officers of non-combat units should be able to do so as well (maybe restricted to smoke, though).

The dedicated fire support teams / forward observers should be limited to

- pricey dedicated equipment like powerful radars, mast-mounted thermals, counter-artillery radars (Aufklärende Artillerie, reconnoitering artillery, units in German)

- especially important tasks to be done from dominating terrain features

- doing the fire support coordination in open terrain (enough line of sight that a these experts can make a difference) at especially important places (CoG, river crossing / major obstacle breaching, for example)

The differences in the ability to call for fires should be only in its scope (mortars only? smoke only? binding requirement or just a plea?)*.


An old solution to the FO problem in Germany was that artillery battery COs were acting as FO, for their battery and for others. They ensured a high level of competence and a connection (dedication) of the artillery arm to the front.
I think Gudmundsson mourned over the loss of this connection in "On Artillery" (I read it years ago, not sure).
It never felt quite natural to me; more like a legacy of 19th century (and WW2 AT ambush) arty direct fire tactics.
The Germans fixed the mortar FO problem by often attaching medium mortars to front-line units for quasi direct fire. Only heavies and some mediums were kept massed in the "rear" (actually more like in the last company defensive position, as the "rear" was even less safe).




--------------
*: Sorry for lots of non-standard terms. I'm not much into all those acronyms and terms, especially not as I use sources in three languages). I'm already incomprehensible to most laymen, so there's little motivation left to learn even more acronyms.

[krsna]

Yes, a sniper, with a radio, can go and find things and conduct surveillance. That he can does not mean he should. The primary issue here is one of a division of labour, or rather tasking. I want to differentiate the "fire support task" from the STA task. They are not one and the same, even though one skill set might combine them.

True! Fire Support is a different task than STA and Snipers must not be seen as former. They don't count for much impact on ops either. But the role suggests surgical action at ranges beyond matching capability, not to forget the collateral damage avoidance in Urban Warfare.

[Ken White]

I'm still working on that acronym...

...plus Wilf's patrol based infantry doctrine and I'm close to throwin word "Sniper" to dustpin

I'm inclined to agree on the word -- but the concept is still viable. There's a need in many circumstances, it's just important that the capabilities and limitations be understood.

...They do need security componet close. They can act like in movie "Sniper", but in real life this is really risky (if this is even the right word) business

True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.

Isn't this structure close to your thought, except the "Sniper" word

Yes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon. Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.

[Rifleman]

True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.

In the '80s the only information we really had to work with, employment wise, was the 9th Infantry Division's Vietnam experience. I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.

9th ID SOP called for the sniper team to be secured by a fire team to squad size element. The SOP acually reads four to eight men. I have no idea where those exact numbers come from since they don't match any official unit size from that era. Probably the 9th's understrength rifle squads were within that number range?

And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.

Yes -- and in fairness, the US Army essentially considers the Sniper and his Spotter as a crew and the Sniper rifle as a crew served weapon.

That's where I was coming from with my idea to have all company snipers/DMs in one squad in a rifle company's weapons platoon. I believe in battalion level snipers too.

Having done the job with no spotter, being a bit of a loner and vaguely anti-social plus believing it is easier to hide one man than two, I don't -- but then I'm not in charge.

Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.

[tankersteve]

"Absolutely. I fear, however, that with the likes of pre-deployment training going on, and the sense of urgency that precludes professional development training for leaders, we are doing the process an injustice. Specifically, snipers continue to be screened, selected, and trained, but we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control. Thus the need for good training in appropriate employment.

I'll be the first to argue that you cannot get such training from the snipers themselves from within the unit. That just leads to all sorts of problems. "

I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.

Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?

Tankersteve

[Kiwigrunt]

Hmmm, good points indeed Jcustis and Tankersteve.
That lack of direction and understanding from outside the ‘sniper community’ may be largely responsible for the myth as well….or at least for creating or allowing an environment for it….


And on that myth and acronyms, I’m starting to get the feeling that the myth is associated more with the word ‘sniper’, rather that the job. Now what if sniper wasn’t a word but an acronym:
SNIPER -- Special Needs Individual Precious Expert Rifleman.

We’ve had these so far:
BADASS -- Better than Average Destroyer And Sharp Shooter
EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen
DIM -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksman
DIMWITS -- Dedicated Intelligent Marksmen With Incredible Tactical Skills.
KAUR -- Kinetic Assault Ultra Range
Keep’m comin’


Ken:

True, many times today, in US practice, a Rifle squad or more is sent with the Snipers for that reason.

Would that not negate the individual/stealth/blahblah aspect of a sniper? This seems a scenario where a DM is sufficient.


Ken

I'd say most Bns most of the time can get by without them but if present they provide a capability that can enhance that Bns combat power slightly in some types of warfare and significantly in stability ops.

I carried a Scoped '03 during part of the moving war in Korea, I got some good shots and know others that did also -- but we admitted we did little real damage and had no significant effect. OTOH, a couple of years later when it was a static war of trenches and outposts, snipers had a ball and countersniping was in and some did some good stuff.

Snipers in Viet Nam did some legendary stuff, Carlos Hathcock for example -- but they didn't really have much effect on the war.

Thanks for all the points you made in that post Ken.
Now this goes back to the bean counter aspect. How much effect ‘should’ a small (but relatively expensive to train) team as part of an 800 or so strong unit have to justify its existence? For instance, how much effect does a 51 mm platoon mortar man have on the overall effect of a war? (I’m not suggesting to scrap platoon mortars, and realise this is not apples/apples.)

[Ken White]

jcustis:

we (and this includes the USMC) are probably not continuing along with good sniper EMPLOYMENT training that allows us to maximize their potential. That is the key, since (unless their commander is totally incompetent) snipers should not be writing their own mission task and moving about will-nilly with no control.

I'd be willing to bet that the training of prospective commander on the Machine Gun barely scratches the surface. They teach the use of the Clinometer? I'm not at all sure that training or the employment of snipers is a glaring shortfall -- or even a minor oversight. It would seem to me that an Officer or Senior NCO would dig into the capabilities and the employment of elements he might have access to on his or her own. Many will say they should not have to do that and while there's some truth there, I doubt it's possible to adequately cover all the possibilities in any training -- and I'm probably the loudest guy on this board about more and better training...

That said, I don't dispute the fact that some sort of capability outlay is needed but I believe it should be in the book of war (the FM / FMFM for one's particular unit type) because any School education or training is going to have a shelf life and is going to be placed in the users own priority for recall and use.

One of the problems with snipers, discussed above, is that they have little to no value in some kinds of warfare, only moderate value in others and are a highly situational dependent asset. That leads to neglect until they appear and in a situation where the skills are pretty important.

Rifleman:

I never heard an instructor at the XVIII Airborne Corps AMTU school say word one about WWII, Korea, or anything the USMC was doing.

Parochialsim is the American way. In the mid 90s, my son was doing the obligatory earthling tour in the 25th, in a Scout Platoon and was sent to the Marine Sniper School at Kaneohe (LINK). They trained Scouts as well so he came back with all sorts of good ideas (like not wearing the Kevlar on the range... ) and virtually everything he suggested that he thought the Marines were doing better was roundly rejected as not being the Army way and the rejection was usually pretty derogatory. In Germany he went to the NATO LRRS School for several courses, brought back good ideas and all were rejected because the US Army didn't do it that way. True -- and an amazing number of Armies do a lot of things better than we do...

Earlier, I had been an Instructional Branch Chief at the Armor School. I spent a lot of Kitchen Table time developing some really good lesson plans. Not sure why I bothered because I knew at the time that all the NCO instructors would watch someone else teach a class, pattern their own class after it and would ignore the lesson plan. I even put trick sentences in a couple to see if they'd catch them. They did not. (so I had to resort to deceit and treachery to force them to think -- they mostly did pretty well but did I assist few in finding other employment. ).

The point of all that is that your comment doesn't surprise me a bit -- and I think that all three items are a major smack at the 'selection' of instructors (there isn't any, most are pipeline feeds or self selected folks that want to hide from TOE units; curiosity about what they're going is not an issue), the training of instructors (abysmal, too much on tasks etc. and counseling) and the parochial "It wasn't invented here" syndrome (which is everywhere. Unfortunately. It is dangerous.).

And it wasn't like the security element was in the same hide site as the sniper team. Just close enough to support by fire.

True, many miss that aspect -- and that goes back to my comment to jcustis -- people have to think and the old METT-TC thing makes every situation different. Many want nice pat book solution -- no one on this board, of course but others -- however there aren't any that will work reliably in all situations. Life is easy if you can do what those NCO Instructors at Knox did and just follow the example of others. Those Instructors you mention should've dug a little deeper, there are some great good and bad sniper actions out of WW II and Korea. Like this: LINK. That's been here before...

Understood. And there's certainly advantages and disadvantages to each approach. All things considered, I believe in a spotter and I look at the team as a "crew" of sorts the same as an MG or anti-armor team.

I can take that or leave it, some people work better alone and I think if you know your people and you have one of those, he should be allowed to go out singly. Varies from unit to unit. That's with respect to the sniper -- on the DM, he's a part of a Squad, has no spotter -- and should not IMO -- so I'm inclined to make the system work rather than adjust to cope because it doesn't want to do the right thing 'cause it's too hard...

Tankersteve:

I had an honest-to-God US Army school-trained sniper in one of my attached infantry platoons. He had no real advice on how to employ his capabilities. Certainly Iraq was not the best environment for their use, but a commander will have a hard time coming up with sound uses without a proper grounding in their capabilities and limitations.

Thus you'll probably disagree with my comment to jcustis above. That's fine but my observation has been that new capabilities get introduced in every war (or, like snipers, old ones are reinvented) and I'm not sure the training system can cope with every need. Some stuff you just have to pick up on the fly...

I know no one here is guilty of it (or they wouldn't be here) but there are many out there -- and we've all known a couple -- who take the line that "Every Officer and NCO is responsible for his or her own professional development." to mean solely selecting future assignments and doing all the important things that get noticed Many forget or would like to forget that it also means they have a responsibility to spend some of their own time learning the trade and that may mean that other, more personally intiguing things have to be foregone occasionally.

On Iraq, perhaps it depended on where one was and what was being done. I've talked to several who are convinced that the snipers in the last couple of years had a great deal to do with taking out a lot of the IED pizzazz by making planting a very risky occupation. Not to even go into the counter sniper effort.

Perhaps this is then partly leading to the issue of where to locate the sniper - at battalion, where a more experienced leader can decide where/how to employ them, or at the company, where they will probably do more good? Or is this a chicken/egg problem?

My perception is that they are best employed at and by the Company in most cases where they are of value but due to the points you, jon and rifleman have all mentioned, they are located Bn. That's part administrative and training ease in peacetime or garrison but mostly human factors related; the S2 or S3 should be better able to employ them; they're a body of people all in one place for training; and they don't have to cope with personalities of 1SGs who don't like 'special' people or a Co Cdr who's too busy with 180 other things to use them properly (very difficult when there may be at the time, no real employment -- which is another sniper problem). The down side of that is more reluctance to employ them occasionally as that mean placing them in some company's AO. Sometimes, that Co doesn't want the hassle of "Bn's snipers." Lot of interesting sidelights and perambulations to the issue.....

A recurring mention or implication by many is snipers out running loose with no command supervision. Well, yes -- that sort of goes with the territory. Reluctance of some to accept that responsibility (with concurrent inability to personally affect it...) is part of the sniper problem. And the sniper myth doe not lead to dispelling that. Also mildly problematical when they're at Co level is the unit that insists on sending a support and cover party with them -- that can have an adverse affect on the sniper himself as well as the mission.

Due to all that they're tightening the criteria for selection for the Sniper School. With the right people selected, that ''no command supervision' isn't a problem (except for the few commanders or 3s who will make it so due to a lack of self confidence -- or CSMs / 1SGs who are overprotective of their Boss...) and the problem you had in Iraq should disappear. Well, be ameliorated a bit, anyway...

[Fuchs]

Maybe a bit war experience from wars with 'peer' powers:
The infantry hated snipers unless they were sent to counter-snipe.
Sniper action provoked enemy sniping and indirect counterfires, and the infantry got hit in return for the sniper's actions. Infantrymen with scope scratch marks on their rifles got killed upon capture for being alleged snipers.

Snipers were dead if captured and really hated (even by their own infantry) in both World War's stationary phases. Exceptions prove the rule.


There are really a lot of factors that play into the sniping issue simply because snipers usually work detached from infantry formations/positions without needing a force concentration to be effective (that's a difference to AT units, for example).

My preference is a platoon at Bn level that trains snipers and forms sniper teams. The snipers can then be tasked with missions (support defence, support offence, surveillance, counter-sniping, free hunt). A loss of a sniper team (or something simple like sickness) wouldn't take away snipers from a Plt or Coy simply because the Bn level sniper Plt sergeant could send a ready replacement team.
An additional need for snipers in offensive actions or to counter enemy sniping could be met as well.