Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[Infanteer]

In our Army, Infantry battalions have a Recce Platoon which is made up of specially trained infantryman. We also have a Sniper Cell, under the administrative command of the Recce Platoon Commander, which is in reality overseen by the Unit Master Sniper (a Warrant Officer). Recent experience has seen us aim to grow the Sniper Cell into something bordering on Platoon strength, with the potential for an Officer to command it simply to keep the UMS out of the CP to do his job.

Our Armoured Regiments have mechanized Recce Squadrons and Troops. They are currently armed with the Coyote (LAV 25) although the government is looking at some sort of JLTV to replace them, which may cause a bit of a debate as we've become used to a decent fighting vehicle in the Armoured Recce Role.

Infantry Recce Platoons focus on Close Recce while Armoured Recce works on the medium recce. They can both do either, but really excel at one or the other. They both are pretty good at Combat Recce and work in conjunction with the Snipers to develop and prosecute targets.

Designated Marksman are something we are wrestling with at the moment - the idea hasn't been fully grounded yet. These are essentially "Sniper-lite" soldiers who recieve extra training on marksmanship.

At various times, different operations have seen these organizations under various command relationships with eachother (all grouped together, all seperate, etc, etc); I've heard various reports about both - I'd venture that personalities, more than anything else, make or break an effective combination of these various assets.

Our military has just released a new PAM entitled Ground Manoeuvre Recconaisance which rolls all of these into one and is actually quite good.

[Kiwigrunt]

From Ken:

To do what? ' Snipe' is not a good answer:

Bummer, back to the drawing board.


Ken:

If I understand what you wrote, then a 'sniper' is just an average DM with exceptional capabilities...

Correct, and that would be the point. Just like with your battalion level scouts regarding recon.


Ken:

I have a three fold question. What are these exceptional capabilities really; why are they necessary or desirable;

They would be referring to (apart from ‘sharp shooting’) field craft, as taught to all infantry, but to much higher standards (again, similar to your scouts).

Snipers are capable of operating unseen, behind enemy lines, in small teams (typically of two) to engage the enemy. This in contrast to scouts who avoid any contact.

I see a DM (what’s with the ‘D’ anyway, why not just M?) as integral to the unit, be that squad, platoon or company. As such his rifle can essentially be seen as a support weapon. I don’t see a DM as someone who is likely to move far from said unit.

A sniper works directly for battalion (or whatever) and can operate independently, behind enemy lines at great distances from anyone else. His rifle, which may be the exact same, would be an IW (for him).


Ken:

and what are they to be used to accomplish?

To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens
Ambush – or cut off to ambush
Area denial /covering terrain
Blocking positions
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.

(I pulled some of these points straight out of Mark Spicer’s book)
And again, potentially all behind enemy lines and in very small teams (stealth and economy of force). And there, I think, lies the difference between a sniper and a DM.

Also from the book:
Page 17

The British army definitions: The sniper is a selected soldier who is a trained marksman and observer, who can locate and report on an enemy, however well concealed, who can stalk or lie in wait unseen and kill with one shot. The marksman/sharpshooter is a soldier who consistently achieves a high standard of shooting and who is trained to inflict casualties on opportunity targets using the standard individual weapon.

I think we have pretty much moved beyond the standard IW, although....nah, different discussion.

And more:
Page 18

Firepower usually means an increased number of misses per minute. Fifty misses are not firepower. One hit is firepower.

This is also nicely applicable to our conversations on firepower and suppressive fire….


And:
Page 47

Close target reconnaissance is usually carried out by the dedicated recce troops of a unit and wherever possible, it should be left to them. But the sniper should still be able to carry out this task both to assist where needed, and to recce likely sniper and hide locations as a part of his own operational deployment. The similarities between the sniper’s role and that of the recce soldier are often confused. The sniper does not necessarily make a good recce soldier. Likewise the recce soldier does not necessarily make a good sniper. However, they complement each other when deployed correctly.

One more:
Page 115

A role that usually gets overlooked whenever people think of snipers is that of observation and reporting. This role is usually coupled to the sniper’s main role of killing selected enemy personnel. It requires him to have the ability to read the overall battle plan of his commanders, and to know when to shoot and when to report in order to assist his commander’s plan and to not compromise it. Much of the sniper’s time is spent observing the battlefield, looking for anything unusual that will lead him to his quarry. He is therefore the ideal man to assist and complement the recce troops.

And I do agree with Ken for the need for a battalion recon (okay, I keep calling it that, call it scout or whatever) unit, be that a squad or a platoon. Note that usually the platoons are actually not all that large anyway.
I support that with Ken’s words:

Ken:

It's not that the Rifle Cos can't / aren't patrolling and plunking in beaucoup Intel, the reasons for a Bn Scout section are to avoid having to task a Co to provide a patrol that would take people away from their Sector or Zone for those EEI that the S2 identifies that do not fall clearly in the areas assigned to a Co; to provide some Intel trained eyes that can notice things that the Co patrols might miss due to personnel turbulence, casualties/replacements, etc.; Provide people that can give a good full bore report -- a trained observer and reporter is better than a good one. It allows for special training in forensic examination, document review, Rifle Co Recon Patrol debriefs and other good stuff without having to cull from the Cos some who might have had such training -- I can go on for another hour.

from Infanteer:

We also have a Sniper Cell, under the administrative command of the Recce Platoon Commander

I can see the logic in that, from an admin perspective. I just hope that that won’t draw the snipers unnecessarily close to the recon camp.

[Infanteer]

I can see the logic in that, from an admin perspective. I just hope that that won’t draw the snipers unnecessarily close to the recon camp.

Nope - they work in different areas and both the Recce Pl Comd and the UMS report to the CO and receive their tasks from him.

[Ken White]

Correct, and that would be the point. Just like with your battalion level scouts regarding recon.

Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?

They would be referring to (apart from ‘sharp shooting’) field craft, as taught to all infantry, but to much higher standards (again, similar to your scouts).

Snipers are capable of operating unseen, behind enemy lines, in small teams (typically of two) to engage the enemy. This in contrast to scouts who avoid any contact.

I see a DM (what’s with the ‘D’ anyway, why not just M?) as integral to the unit, be that squad, platoon or company. As such his rifle can essentially be seen as a support weapon. I don’t see a DM as someone who is likely to move far from said unit.

A sniper works directly for battalion (or whatever) and can operate independently, behind enemy lines at great distances from anyone else. His rifle, which may be the exact same, would be an IW (for him).

In stability operations and in mobile warfare, there are no enemy lines to speak of -- that's always subject to modification based on the METT-TC of the war or a particular period in a war. If there is a degree of stasis, is this sniper team restricted to the Battalion zone and if so, how far out in front of the BN FLOT / FEBA / MLR or whatever we call it today can they be expected to go?

To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens *
Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
Area denial /covering terrain *
Blocking positions *
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)

No sniper team or collection of sniper teams is going to do those things I placed an asterisk by. They can try but they will not be able to do any significant damage in such missions. You may not agree and if it's important, perhaps you could give me some examples of such actions. Taking just one example, in the area denial mission or the screening mission against marginal opponent, I believe that if one were to try that against a mediocre or even a poor Rifle Co they'd eat your lunch in about 30 minutes. You might get a few but your survival expectation would be quite low...

While I see some counter recon value, a DM ( LDM, Lowly DM ??? ) can do that job and I do not agree on using shooters for recon or scouting -- wrong mentality.

So what you're left with is HVTs (perhaps if the fates smile), targets of opportunity, harassment, counter sniping and some counter recon. Is the cost and effort to train compensated by that?

(I pulled some of these points straight out of Mark Spicer’s book) And again, potentially all behind enemy lines and in very small teams (stealth and economy of force). And there, I think, lies the difference between a sniper and a DM.

Presuming there is an enemy line, what precisely is the sniper to do behind them? He can get off a good shot or two but then he's going to have to move thus decreasing his 'unseen' quotient. He may kill an opposing Brigade Commander -- but that is unlikely to even slow the Brigade, much less stop it. I think I see far more myth than reality here -- but I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

Do prepare yourself for a bit of sniper-myth chest-beating

[Pete]

Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?

The DoD R & D guys have a prior claim on that acronym, meaning Engineering Design Model.

We used to have thousands of guys called RTOs, for radio-telephone operators, but the acronym had to be given up because Railway Transport Officers (all 12 or so) had an earlier claim to the abbreviation dating back to the First World War.

[Pete]

The Tom Ricks blog has the following quote from Gunner Keith, USMC:

Technology. Used appropriately, can be a force multiplier. Unfortunately, Marines look at our technology as short cut tools. If I got my trusty G-Boss aimed down that road, I don't need to patrol it or if there is a boom in the area, no reason to go and investigate as I will just track it on my handy G-Boss. No doubt these things are impressive tools and can help considerably but nothing compares to a Marine being there or seeing it with his own eyes.

To read the rest click on the link below. This is the 12th in a series of tutorials by Gunner Keith on small unit tactics in the Ricks blog--they can be found by scrolling backwards through the blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ce_being_there

[RJ]

Wilf posted

Based on your figures Patton was doing 80 miles a day on the march. Correct?
Harold Godwinson marched his Army 185 miles in about four days, in 1066, so 46 miles a day on foot!

Food for thought?

1066 - Hmmm. That date is floating around the back part of my brain.

I'm a bit foggy about England's history back beyond the War of the Roses

How did old Harold make out when he met the enemy with a tired, footsore and strung out bunch of Axe, Swordsmen and Carls or Jarls?

We have shifted from Recon and Infantry Battalions to Mech Road March statistics and the occasional historical reference.

I suspect Recon in Afgahanistan is going to be much different than Recon has been in Iraq.

I just finished Zinni's book with T. Clancy and am looking at 5 different wars fought in Vietnam, controled by the terrain.

I had a brother in I Corps, and an other in the Central Highlands and a cousin married a Seal who did duty in the Mekong Delta. Sitting around a fire having a taste with these men and you realize they all fought in a different war tactically. I never put it togther until I read Zinni's book.

[reed11b]

Update. Just returned from RSLC at Benning and have some infantry recon observations. One, the infantry recon community is tiny. Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission. Three, there is a huge disconnect between the larger Cav scout community and the infantry scout community. There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts. I say that the latter idea is a really bad one. This would transfer many of the missions that we do over to SF, not Cav, and our SF community is already A) over tasked (often a self created problem) and B) using less experienced and trained soldiers to a meet this over tasking. Much of the Urban and long range recce missions can be performed by infantry given time and training, freeing up SF to do other missions.
Reed

[Ken White]

As one who has been all three -- SF, Inf Recon and Cav -- I wholeheartedly agree with what you say. The SF intrusion into the reconnaissance and surveillance business was all about funding and mission turf expansion (and it hit at a low point in the fortunes of the US Army when McNamara's project 100,000 was in full bloom and training was being dumbed down). Spaces and budget slices.

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element and due to bad equipping decisions (and the aforementioned poor training system), Armor heavy and 'Hi diddle diddle right down' the middle oriented.

Much of our problem with recon is impatience -- some staff squirrel is afraid his Boss will ask a question he cannot answer so they drive their Recon elements into dumb situations and thus the perception that Recon is (a) too slow and (b) too dangerous to employ properly is thoroughly embedded in the heads of too many.

There are some exceptions to all the above but they are far too few.

[Rifleman]

One, the infantry recon community is tiny.

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.

Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?

There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.