Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[krsna]

In his 2002 book “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” (a title drawn from T.E. Lawrence's “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”, describing the messiness of waging “war upon rebellion”), John Nagl, an American lieutenant-colonel, concluded that Americans in Vietnam remained wedded to “unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower”,

According to Mao's well-worn dictum, guerrillas must be like fish swimming in the “water” of the general population. T.E. Lawrence, helping to stir up the Arab revolt against Turkish rule during the First World War, described regular armies as plants, “immobile, firm-rooted, and nourished through long stems to the head”. Guerrillas, on the other hand, were like “a vapour”. A soldier, he said, was “helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.

Even if America cannot imagine fighting another Iraq or Afghanistan, extremists round the world have seen mighty America's vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, the AK-47 and the suicide-bomber.

The U.S. Army has just ordered another 1,095 Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems, and 2,195 vehicle installation kits. For decades, sniper detectors were theoretical darlings of military R&D geeks. But now, with lots of need, better technology and money to quickly buy several generations of a system, the devices are actually making themselves useful. Not all units have officers or troops who can make the most of sniper detection systems. But those that do, are hell on the local sniper population.

The Chechens made extensive and effective use of snipers. Snipers fired from well inside rooms versus near window openings, as well as, from rooftops and basements. The Russians lacked an effective sniper and counter-sniper capability of their own. (Lessons Learned from Russian Military Operations in Chechnya 1994-1996)

Well!! The long prelude is to highlight the following:

1. “unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower” is no guarantee of mil success.
2. Unconventional wars leave the conventional soldier “helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at”.
3. Chechens made extensive and effective use of snipers while Russians lacked an effective sniper and counter-sniper capability of their own.
4. Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems are in demand with US Forces.

Hence the Snipers shall continue their "usefulness" for opposing forces as "Force Multipliers".
Recon missions would be relevant at the lowest end of technological spectrum due to need of Human Psyche for "Feeling the Ground" or "Seeing it first hand". The "eye for the ground" is the cause of all Recon activity. If UAV tends to replace the "Recon Soldier" then Armed Drones should replace the "Fighting Soldier".

Bottomline: When all fails the Human spirit prevails.

[kaur]

1 "old" proposal by LtCol Jeffery E. Dearolph

Conclusion

The proposed solution involves creating a division-level sniper company to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set. Research shows that potential adversaries will seek to offset U. S. strengths by operating in urbanized terrain. Primarily designed to achieve maximum effectiveness in open terrain, U. S. weapons suffer from degraded effectiveness in urban areas. The presence of civilians further complicates fighting in cities due to constraints designed to limit collateral damage and non-combatant casualties. The enemy operates in a dispersed pattern versus concentrated pattern in order to avoid U. S. firepower. This dispersed pattern manifests
itself in an urban target set consisting of enemy combatants mixing with non-combatants, enemy snipers, and enemy SPTs. Given the limitations of U. S. weapon systems in attempting to minimize collateral damage, this urban target set presents a dilemma for commanders fighting in cities. However, research indicates that U. S. Army and Marine Corps snipers can effectively
engage the elements of the enemy’s urban target set without incurring civilian casualties.
Although U. S. snipers possess the weapons, equipment and training required to engage the urban target set, they do not possess the number of snipers to cover effectively the large urban areas where the enemy operates. Located only at the infantry battalion-level, U.S. snipers, provide
support only to those organizations. In order to provide the coverage necessary in urbanized terrain, the creation of a division-level sniper company must occur. Consisting of thirty-two more sniper teams for the division, the sniper company provides the division with the capability to engage the enemy’s urban target set in large cities. The requirement exists and research shows that the proposed division sniper company satisfies the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability criteria. Therefore, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps can create sniper companies in order to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[William F. Owen]

Consisting of thirty-two more sniper teams for the division, the sniper company provides the division with the capability to engage the enemy’s urban target set in large cities. The requirement exists and research shows that the proposed division sniper company satisfies the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability criteria. Therefore, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps can create sniper companies in order to engage effectively the enemy’s urban target set.

Empire building? That makes no sense that I can see, unless these "sniper teams" have the support, communications, sensors and weapons to make the investment worthwhile.
How many Helicopter hours would that little "empire" drag away from rifle companies?
I'd be really interested to know if the"research" is in reality just a set of opinions. Not much "urban" in A'Stan for example, and there is no evidence that snipers are actually decisive, as a function of their numbers.

[krsna]

1 "old" proposal by LtCol Jeffery E. Dearolph



http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Thanks for the info. I think it is a workable concept as "Force Multiplier". Need to know more on the employment and deployment.

[Fuchs]

The U.S. Army has just ordered another 1,095 Boomerang Sniper Detection Systems, and 2,195 vehicle installation kits. For decades, sniper detectors were theoretical darlings of military R&D geeks. But now, with lots of need, better technology and money to quickly buy several generations of a system, the devices are actually making themselves useful. Not all units have officers or troops who can make the most of sniper detection systems. But those that do, are hell on the local sniper population.

Most systems rely on the supersonic crack created by the bullet.
That supersonic crack is not being caused by subsonic bullets, which can be powerful nevertheless by being heavy.

Look at this, for example:
http://world.guns.ru/sniper/sn72-e.htm

[kaur]

Fuch mentioned silenced Russian rifle - i remembered killing of Dagestan interior minister with silenced rifle - i remembered killing of US soldiers in Iraqi urban check points - John West has written book about those kind of action and this is called "Art of urban sniping". This book and everyday life in some violent urban centers has spoiled one more time the definition of sniper. In western sniper community the sniper is man who can achieve 1st shot hits in very long distance. In Iraq the distance is sometimes 50 meters. This difference is very well covered by Greg Roberts in the article "Insurgency sniping" in "Combat and Survival" magasine. This fact makes me come back to Spicers definition:

Sniping is the employment of individual shooters from concealed positions with no warning, from any distance, depending on the range of the weapon. This is not to say, of course , that to maximize the chances of sniper surviving to fight again, the longer the distance between him and the victim the better. Conversely, if the sniper is able to conceal himself and endage successfully at close range, then that is also sniping.

If we talk about such short distances, then every scout can be sniper. Here couple German snipers talk about distances during II WW.

6. What was the range of the furthest target you ever fired at, and what kind of target, size?

A. About 1,000 meters. Standing soldier. Positive hitting not possible, but necessary under the circumstances in order to show enemy that he is not safe even at that distance! Or superior wanted to satisfy himself about capability.

B. 400 to 700 meters.

C. About 600 meters, rarely more. I usually waited until target approached further for better chance of hitting. Also confirmation of successful hit was easier. Used G43 only to about 500 meters because of poor ballistics.

http://www.snipersparadise.com/history/german.htm

I speculate that for average scout those distances are not hard to achive. Today the sniper community is pushing the distance limits via what they define their professional skills. When Canadians achieved record shot in Afgansitan, then everyone is trying to copy this (German spotting scopes, Swiss range finders, expencive rifles etc). For average scout this is too much. In Afganistan with huge terrain with open fields of fire, this need is understood, but in a lot of other places?

This is nice article by Michael Haugen that talks about calibres and distances.

http://www.remingtonmilitary.com/art...02005.05MH.pdf

[Fuchs]

The need for expensive rifles is gone. There's a sub-MOA rifle in 7.62mm available on the civilian U.S. market for less than 500 US-$. The scope would be separate, but doesn't need to be more expensive either.

[krsna]

Returning to the original argument: Snipers are valid in the Infantry Battalions for following reasons:
1. Surveillance at ranges beyond that of Rifleman.
2. Target Acquisition for crew served weapons at the "Area of Interest" boundary.
3. Target engagement with a view to put caution in the minds of the enemy and delay his move for own forces to be ready to engage from a position of tactical advantage.
4. Cause harassment and make enemy deploy a part of reserves to deal with the unseen threat much earlier than "contact ranges".
5. Cause disarray by knocking the heads off i.e. "Kill the Commanders".
6. Must operate in buddy pairs for inherent "continued surveillance" and "local protection" at the lowest level.
7. The highest level could go upto a squad or platoon where they can be grouped with dedicated Recon Platoons/Companies.
8. They have proved their worth in Urban Warfare as also in Counter Terrorist operations where collateral damage is to be avoided.

Recon capability is mission essential requirement. At the Infantry Battalion level it can be foot based or vehicle based but must not be seen as "armed recon". It must remain "silent recon" with integral SATA/ISTAR Equipment including Micro UAVs when available. Human angle is important for "feel of the ground" and "natural awareness" besides "experiential analysis" of situation.