Thanks for the info. I think it is a workable concept as "Force Multiplier". Need to know more on the employment and deployment.Originally Posted by kaur
I always thought it's common sense that all combat (sub-)units (down to squad Ldr and his 2nd) that move independently (at minimum platoon) should be able to call for fires.
The officers of non-combat units should be able to do so as well (maybe restricted to smoke, though).
The dedicated fire support teams / forward observers should be limited to
- pricey dedicated equipment like powerful radars, mast-mounted thermals, counter-artillery radars (Aufklärende Artillerie, reconnoitering artillery, units in German)
- especially important tasks to be done from dominating terrain features
- doing the fire support coordination in open terrain (enough line of sight that a these experts can make a difference) at especially important places (CoG, river crossing / major obstacle breaching, for example)
The differences in the ability to call for fires should be only in its scope (mortars only? smoke only? binding requirement or just a plea?)*.
An old solution to the FO problem in Germany was that artillery battery COs were acting as FO, for their battery and for others. They ensured a high level of competence and a connection (dedication) of the artillery arm to the front.
I think Gudmundsson mourned over the loss of this connection in "On Artillery" (I read it years ago, not sure).
It never felt quite natural to me; more like a legacy of 19th century (and WW2 AT ambush) arty direct fire tactics.
The Germans fixed the mortar FO problem by often attaching medium mortars to front-line units for quasi direct fire. Only heavies and some mediums were kept massed in the "rear" (actually more like in the last company defensive position, as the "rear" was even less safe).
--------------
*: Sorry for lots of non-standard terms. I'm not much into all those acronyms and terms, especially not as I use sources in three languages). I'm already incomprehensible to most laymen, so there's little motivation left to learn even more acronyms.
Thanks for the info. I think it is a workable concept as "Force Multiplier". Need to know more on the employment and deployment.
KRSNA
True! Fire Support is a different task than STA and Snipers must not be seen as former. They don't count for much impact on ops either. But the role suggests surgical action at ranges beyond matching capability, not to forget the collateral damage avoidance in Urban Warfare.
KRSNA
Kiwigrunt, sorry for stretching your topic, but I think that precisely shooting men/and women have done harm to opposite side through the history of armed conflict (I don't mention javelin throwers and longbow handlers. As Ken has mentioned several times, everything depends on METT. This picture shows in a nice way different possible armed conflict modes. Your TTP depends a lot on what side you are fighting. There are myriad variations to define sniper, but for me Spicer's definition is most universal.
Diagram source
http://www.understandterror.com/arti...az%20Ganor.pdf
I hope this doesn't come across as to bold or arrogant for my first post aside from introducing myself. As always with everything opinions are like fleas and every dog has them
Snipers are an asset that specializes in being covert. A DM in general is more of an overt role especially with the tendency towards presence patrolling. A DM can perform some of the tasks a Sniper fulfills but unless he emerged from the womb ghillied up and leopard crawled past the Doc and out the door he isn't going to have the level of field craft or self discipline required to remain covert for 24-72 hr periods. If he did chances are he has been identified and snapped up by Recon or Snipers already. The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it. When everything turns pear shaped a DM will revert to his most basic role which is a rifleman with a scoped rifle, a Sniper team is an independent entity commanded by a JNCO which can react to whats going on and has been trained to hopefully be able to deal with drastic situation changes.
Now whether or not you need this covert capability and level of independence in an asset to be deployed depends on what types of operations you are conducting.
Recon detachments are indispensible and I don't say that just because I command one. In general rifle Platoons are noisy messy things that leave a black bin liner worth of rubbish everywhere they travel, rifle sections are not much better. Some Platoons/sections are better than others but none can ever achieve the level of noise and field discipline expected of a Recon det, if they were capable of it they would be in Recon. The discipline required in Recon is the main thing that sets them apart from the rest of the Battalion. Remaining covert for a long period of time in adverse weather conditions or when the pucker factor is high is not easy. A lot of Soldiers can't cut it which is why there are courses to assess possible candidates.
Any rifle section is and should be capable of conducting reconnaissance type tasks but they are not ideal for that role. The size of a section hinders its ability to perform the tasks through the amount of sign it makes and amount of ground it requires when in an LUP. Cutting a section down to a det size to negate this removes a lot of the fire power the commander has until now taken for granted, unless he has spent a lot of time conducting BCDs he is going to be at a disadvantage trying to achieve a clean break. Recon dets don't have this problem they do not have to go out and conduct Sect/Pl IAs and Coy DLOC. All they practice is the different types of BCDs until they become second nature. Due to the size of a det the commander does not have the luxury of sitting back and assessing the situation, he is right there in the fight and has to rely on his teams level of training for the first few bounds until he can get them to grips and start making command decisions.
From my own experience as a commander and DS on patrol procedures courses I would say that 10% of the Soldiers in a Battalion are capable of doing the job well. For most it is the self discipline that lets them down. Enforced discipline can be used but is hard to apply in a close prox OP. Now one could disband the RISTA elms in a Bn and hope that their experience is filtered out to the remainder but that is a pretty long shot. At the end of the day the CO is pushing his Recon assets out to find information about the En and deny the En info on FF assets. If he sends out a C/S that is compromised quickly and does not meet his CIR all that has been achieved is the exposure of his possible intent.
Nothing wrong with arrogant or bold, if you deliver!I hope this doesn't come across as to bold or arrogant for my first post aside from introducing myself. As always with everything opinions are like fleas and every dog has them
That's based on one understanding of a DM.Snipers are an asset that specializes in being covert. A DM in general is more of an overt role especially with the tendency towards presence patrolling.
So where are Sniper currently crawling off to engage targets? That's all romantic wonderful stuff but does it represent what snipers on operations actually do.A DM can perform some of the tasks a Sniper fulfills but unless he emerged from the womb ghillied up and leopard crawled past the Doc and out the door he isn't going to have the level of field craft or self discipline required to remain covert for 24-72 hr periods.
All JNCOs should be able to call for fire.The other things are a DM does not in general have the training or experience to call in accurate Mort/Arty/CAS and most importantly the ability to understand the higher commanders intent and his role in it.
So the justification for Snipers is the apparent chronically poor training of platoons?Recon detachments are indispensible and I don't say that just because I command one. In general rifle Platoons are noisy messy things that leave a black bin liner worth of rubbish everywhere they travel, rifle sections are not much better.
Every worthwhile platoon should be able to generate 4-7 teams of 4-5 men. In WW2, they did. 20-man close reconnaissance patrols of 4 x 5 man teams were routine.
Reconnaissance is a core infantry skill. No excuse not to be good at.
Poor training and leadership is likewise not an excuse to maintain the status quo.
If infantry training and employment wants to stay stuck in the stone age, then all you say is true, but then you have to understand the historic beliefs and infatuations with the "classical" roles of Snipers and Reconnaissance may not be examples of best practice, but actually products of wholly thinking and poor training.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That may be true in many Armies
but it is criminally stupid and can easily be remedied by dumping the 1914 training mentality prevalent in most Armies.Not true in my experience. You take what the system provides, you train it well and it will do what it is trained to do. There are certainly people who cannot adapt and therefor should not be in the Army at all -- you get rid of them -- but the bulk can be properly and acceptably trained by a good trainer. That entails the units sustaining that training to retain the cognitive and muscle skills. That last is the cause of many seeming failures of line units to perform (and a reason for 'elite' formations which are usually small due to their expense); they do not get adequate sustainment training because that's expensive. Particularly so for a too large force. Politicians would rather spend money to buy votes.Some Platoons/sections are better than others but none can ever achieve the level of noise and field discipline expected of a Recon det, if they were capable of it they would be in Recon. The discipline required in Recon is the main thing that sets them apart from the rest of the Battalion. Remaining covert for a long period of time in adverse weather conditions or when the pucker factor is high is not easy. A lot of Soldiers can't cut it which is why there are courses to assess possible candidates.Probably true, though I'd go with 20%. Not the issue, though. The issue is how many can do it acceptably in combat. I believe that figure is about 80% with halfway decent training. Never been a perfect Army or unit and never will be. Having been in a large number of so-called elite units, I'm firmly convinced that Bill Slim had it right -- a good infantry battalion properly trained can do any mission with the possible exception of strategic reconnaissance. I also believe that carries through down to rifle Platoon and even Squad or Section level....I would say that 10% of the Soldiers in a Battalion are capable of doing the job well.
The key to 'good' units is better and more careful selection of ALL entrants for a professional peacetime force and acknowledgment that a war time force, bulked up, will have less exacting standards and must adjust slightly. Only slightly...
Bingo! This is also why I am not a fan of centralized schools that units send individuals to. Training the whole unit is going to have much better long term effects on a units ability to perform the mission then having any number of tabbed or badged individuals in it it.
Reed
It's all about the mix. You need some centralized courses to dissipate innovations quickly.
The German Army detected many shortcomings in its 1939 Poland campaign.
The lessons learned (that were mostly about "mistakes of our officers") were compiled and thousands of officers were moved through courses to correct the deficiencies in about half a year.
On the other hand it seems natural to me that soldiers join their unit after periods of courses and train with it for a rather long time before it's again about time to attend schooling for new assignments.
Where have all the good guys gone?
Ideally yes...but remember what Alexis de Tocqueville remarked "When the best part of a nation forsakes the military profession .....sovereignty is the first casualty". Hence training is the only answer to make the 'good' the 'best'. However, it is easier said than done. We must create 'Islands of excellence' first and then join them as 'Centers of excellence'.
KRSNA
My understanding is a DM is a member of a rifle section or platoon who has received extra training in marksmanship and is equipped with a scoped rifle capable of a good degree of accuracy. He is able to accurately engage EN forces at distances outside the range of IW with accurate single shots but is also able to provide rapid fire. At its most basic he is a sharpshooter. The level of skill in other areas will depend on who has trained him and the individual himself. He is not trained to the same level as a sniper. If he was he would cease to be a DM and would then be a sniper. If I am wrong please direct me to the doctrine that states otherwise but I am not aware that DM were being taught to operate independently of their Sect/PL/Coy.
I don't remember there being anything romantic about leopard crawling in a ghillieSo where are Sniper currently crawling off to engage targets? That's all romantic wonderful stuff but does it represent what snipers on operations actually do.
I can think of quite a few times I have seen snipers use ghillies in East Timor. I personally know two snipers who have had call to wear their ghillies in Bamyan, I'm sure others have used them if the task required as well. A ghillie is only an aid, just like parachuting or fast roping is only a way of getting there.
Yes they should, I would further say any Pte should be able to call in a cold grid or ECAS mission when the SHTF and his commander cant. However a DM is not usually a JNCO. Being able to call in indirect and being able to use that indirect effectively is a different thing. I would like all soldiers to be able to call in a linear or converge mission if the opportunity presents and also have called it live beforehand. The reality is mortar bombs cost money and there is only so much to go around. WTS are cheap to use and a good tool but they are no substitute for live rounds.All JNCOs should be able to call for fire.
I never said it was the justification for Snipers at all and I wouldn't say the level of training is chronic either. Considering the soldiers average at 1-2 years service and a tour patrolling the streets of Dili I don't expect their close country drills to be anywhere near as good as someone who spent 6 months patrolling the bush on INTERFET/UNTAET let alone the forces we sent to Vietnam who had a long period of training in Malaysia beforehand. The bin liner was picked up after tracking up a Pl for an 8 day period and the majority was found as someone thought he was a smart bugger and tried to bury his rubbish. Another Pl was followed up by a patrol other than mine for the same period and all they picked up was an ear plug. The individual that did that would have hopefully been identified by the selection process most Recon Pl use. A Pl has strength in numbers, a small group is only as strong as its weakest member.So the justification for Snipers is the apparent chronically poor training of platoons?
Every worthwhile platoon should be able to generate 4-7 teams of 4-5 men. In WW2, they did. 20-man close reconnaissance patrols of 4 x 5 man teams were routine.
Reconnaissance is a core infantry skill. No excuse not to be good at.
Poor training and leadership is likewise not an excuse to maintain the status quo.
If infantry training and employment wants to stay stuck in the stone age, then all you say is true, but then you have to understand the historic beliefs and infatuations with the "classical" roles of Snipers and Reconnaissance may not be examples of best practice, but actually products of wholly thinking and poor training.
As it stands METLs have to be met and currently there is no identified requirement for a Pl to be able to break down into well trained recon patrols. If the need is identified then it will be implemented but I believe it will be to the detriment of other skills. The jack of all trades analogy is a great idea but I personally believe it is better in the current environment for troops to specialize in certain fields, I base that off my own experience. Rotating people back to the companies to impart their skills onto others should be done however and it stops the Recon Pl or Sniper cell from becoming a boys club.
What do you see as the historical roles of Recon and Snipers and the difference with how the are being used now? As I know it the role of a BN Recon PL is to provide the CO with information on EN and terrain in the BN AO, the role of the Sniper cell is the similar with the addition of being able to destroy selected targets at X range and to provide harrasing fire out to X range. X being the effective and maximum ranges of the weapon system employed. I don't see that being any different in the past or present. Recon is the COs asset that he can push out to provide him with the information he needs to employ his other assets. Yes he could detach a fire team from a Coy to do it but that would require them to reorg for this role. It requires specialized eqpt like optics, comms and data transfer ability and training in its use. It requires a well trained CLS who is able to provide care above the normal level. A Recon Pl provides him this capability immediately.
You can try to train people to do everything but eventually you will reach information overload. The people who are able to do everything are special individuals and are in a unit a lot flasher than mine.
I fully believe that a WWII unit would have been capable of what you speak. Having talked to veterans of that conflict on ANZAC day one of the things that struck me was the continuity of personnel they had, replacements rounded out casualties but the in most cases the core of the unit remained. Having operated together for a number of years they would have achieved a very high level of training I wish my Bn could aspire to. Sadly people move around to frequently, a Sect Comd will finally get to a good level of training with his troops and then he will lose a number to release, promotion and transfer and is forced to start all over again. If that was not a factor I agree that my job would be obsolete and that unit would be a force to be reckoned with. In the modern world I don't see it happening any time soon though.
Thanks for taking the time to reply to my comments.
Ken, I agree with you. Given the time and money much could be accomplished, however their is only so much money and training time to go around. Continuation training is vital and it is normally something that is paid lip service to. Directed outputs have to be met.
Thank you also for taking the time to reply to my comments.
Last edited by sixthree; 08-26-2009 at 09:34 AM.
Sixthree
I appreciate where you are coming from, but 95% of your arguments/statements are the same as I have heard for keeping the infantry rifle platoons back in the dark ages and not forcing a higher standard of competence on to them.
As it is, in most Commonwealth Army's infantry has a far greater range of skills than any other arm. We undervalue the infantry and always have, and we fail to serve them well with equipment, training and doctrine.
I think we need "snipers"/Long Range Rifleman.
I think every platoon needs two. Selecting and training them, need to be re-thought in that regard.
I also think Platoons should train towards a predominantly dismounted reconnaissance and surveillance role. Do that well, all else follows.
I think all Infantrymen, should have "Ghilles" - in the right terrain.
The arguments about optics/sensors and comms were true, 20 years ago. Today, every fire team can have a data capable PRC-148, spotting scopes, and Thermal Imagers. Having said that, I served in a Close Reconnaissance Platoon in the early 1980's with little in the way of specialised equipment.
The ultimate consequence of wholly Recon and Sniper thought, is you end up pulling good man power from the Rifle Platoons. Rifle Platoons are the critical element. Rifle Platoons literally win wars. That is where the main effort of training and resources needs to go.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That's something I have said for years, but I've scaled it down to a more practical approach.
Infantry should in fact place a much greater emphasis on camouflage to enhance its survivability.
The ongoing wars taught terrible lessons. Soldiers were standing around for weeks with heavy armour plating and survived. That wouldn't even work for minutes against competent opponents. Our soldiers learn that it's OK to be seen if you have enough armour - a terrible lesson that will likely hurt us later.
Helmet, Shoulder and arms are most important and should be covered with great camo. Soldiers carry very little equipment in those places anyway (few pouches on arms).
An even more practical approach is to use 3D camouflage (similar to this) on arms and helmet.
The current discussion about mere universal digital camo patterns is already technically obsolete in my opinion.
Must be chilly in...
Holy Cow! I agree with Fuchs on something.
Reed
Wilf, I would add one cavet to your patrol/reconn based infantry. The "close" fight, ie, restricted terrain and urban settings, is a core skill for infantry as well.
the link didn't work:
link
Sure. We could call it.. let me think.... errr... fighting patrols?
Fighting dismounted is fighting dismounted and yes context is critical. If anyone can point out to me how an infantry Platoon is hindered by equipping, training and organising for fighting and reconnaissance patrol activity, I'll gladly listen.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Fighting patrols
The reason I stated "close" fighting was due to the tendency of infantry theorists to focus on firepower over mobility and tend to organize to assualt static positions to the best that I can figure out. Dismounted 120mm and even 81mm mortars make little sense, as does heavy long range AT weapons, yet they keep appearing in organizational schemes low on the echelon scale. The other reason was that reconn "purists" state that reconn should not have ANY heavy wepons or HE projection capability since reconn is looking and not fighting. This is also flawed. As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle.
Reed
Eyhh... yes and no. Yes, you are right in the purist approach, and yes, no dismounted 81 or 120mm.
However, if we take rifle Platoons to be the basis for the capability we are talking about, then they do need support. You need mortars from somewhere. How and who needs to be examined. I am working on this at the moment, looking at Infantry Battalion of less than 500 men.
AT weapons, such as Javelin or Spike are required, but they are an optional capability. Any platoon should be able to employ them. - so could you have a Mortar Platoon, worked the same way?
Could they be manned by the artillery?
Point is, if we all agree on where we are going, we can then discuss how we get there!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Fuchs, I'll add to your post 1 good comment
Modern basic individual camouflage
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....amouflage.html
Off-topic request.
Wilf said:
I'm trying to find information about IDF unit Maglan's structure, where in small unit are connected long range AT weapons and scouts.However, if we take rifle Platoons to be the basis for the capability we are talking about, then they do need support. You need mortars from somewhere. How and who needs to be examined. I am working on this at the moment, looking at Infantry Battalion of less than 500 men.
AT weapons, such as Javelin or Spike are required, but they are an optional capability. Any platoon should be able to employ them. - so could you have a Mortar Platoon, worked the same way?
Could they be manned by the artillery?
Point is, if we all agree on where we are going, we can then discuss how we get there!
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...d.php?t=120866The unit is made of two elements - the missile launching teams, which will deploy and launch the ATGM, and the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) teams that will detect the target as well as guide the ATGM to it by laser designating it.
Any additional information (with additional sources) is very welcome and I'm waiting your PM's
Almost everything about Maglan is classified. As far as I can work out though, they are basically the Parachute Brigades, Recon and Anti-tank unit. How those two roles come to be together, I guess comes from the M151 Jeeps with TOW launchers they were equipped with back in the 1970s.
.... and doctrinally it's not a stretch or even silly to have AT and Recon as the same people, for a who range of reasons I will not bore everyone with right now.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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